Velazquez v. Plug Connection CA4/1

CourtListener 10319929Calctapp23.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/23/25 Velazquez v. Plug Connection CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

VICTORINA “DIANA” SANTIAGO D082892
VELAZQUEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 37-2023-
v. 00014059-CU-WT-NC)

PLUG CONNECTION, LLC,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Robert P. Dahlquist, Judge. Affirmed.
Pettit Kohn Ingrassia Lutz & Dolin, Jennifer N. Lutz, Michelle Perez-
Yanez, and Annie F. Fraser for Defendant and Appellant.
Jimenez Loayza, Francisco A. Loayza, Marisol Jimenez Loayza;
Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

After Victorina “Diana” Santiago Velazquez sued her employer, Plug
Connection, LLC (Plug), Plug attempted to compel arbitration of the dispute.
The trial court determined that Plug failed to establish a valid arbitration
agreement. Plug appeals that order contending first, the trial court erred
because Velazquez did not dispute her handwritten name appeared on the
arbitration agreement; and second, the trial court improperly excluded
evidence. We affirm, finding sufficient evidence that Velazquez did not
knowingly sign the alleged agreement and any errors in the evidentiary
rulings were harmless.

II. BACKGROUND

Plug is a greenhouse grower that specializes in cultivating and selling
young plants. Velazquez began working for Plug as a seasonal employee in
December 2021. When she returned for her second season in December 2022,
Plug assigned Velazquez a position working with “a chemical named Dip ‘N
Grow.” A week later, Plug terminated Velazquez’s employment after she
reported an allergic reaction to Dip ‘N Grow.
On April 4, 2023, Velazquez filed a complaint against Plug asserting

11 causes of action.1 On August 8, 2023, Plug moved to compel arbitration,
alleging that Velazquez entered into a Mutual and Voluntary Agreement to
Arbitrate (“Agreement”) that covered the claims asserted in her complaint.

1 The causes of action are: “1. Disability Discrimination [Cal. Gov. Code
§ 12940(a)]; 2. Disability Discrimination—Failure to Accommodate [Cal. Gov.
Code § 12940(m)]; 3. Disability Discrimination—Failure to Engage in the
Interactive Process [Cal. Gov. Code § 12940(n)]; 4. Retaliation [Cal. Gov. Code
§ 12940(h)]; 5. Harassment Based on Physical Disability [Cal. Gov. Code
§ 12940 (a)]; 6. Failure to Prevent Harassment and Discrimination [Cal. Gov.
Code § 12940(k)]; 7. Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision;
8. Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy [Gov. Code § 12940, and
Lab. Code §§ 98.6, 132a, 6310 and 6400]; 9. Retaliation [Cal. Lab. Code
§ 1102.5]; 10. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; [and] 11. Violation
of California Labor Code §§ 201, 203, 208—Failure to Pay all Wages Due
Upon Termination.”
2
In support of its motion, Plug submitted a declaration from Yvette
Campos, who served as the company’s “Human Resources Manager and the
Accounting Manager at the same time on an as needed basis.” In this role,
Campos maintained Plug’s personnel files and was familiar with Plug’s new
employee orientation. The orientation included an explanation of all
onboarding documents, such as the Agreement, and allowed the employees to
independently review the documents and ask questions prior to signing.
Based on her review of Velazquez’s personnel file and Plug’s routine
practices, Campos declared on information and belief that “Velazquez was
given an explanation of the contents and effect of each paragraph of the
Agreement and was given sufficient time to independently read and
understand the terms of the Agreement,” Velazquez did not ask any
questions or try to negotiate, and Velazquez signed the Agreement. Campos
also declared that Velazquez’s orientation was conducted in Spanish, which
was chosen by Velazquez as her preferred language.
Campos’s declaration included a 2022 W-4 for Velazquez, the
Agreement, and a hiring checklist as exhibits. All three documents contain
the name “Diana Santiago” in similar handwriting at highlighted portions of

the documents.2 In the Agreement, which is written in Spanish, “Diana” is
written in the box designated for a signature, “Santiago” is written above
that box, and the box for the employee’s name is blank. In the checklist,
“Diana” is written in the space designated for the employee’s name, and
“Santiago” is written in the space for the employee’s signature. The checklist
states hiring representatives are required to explain all forms to new hires,
and it is signed by Elsa Limon as the hiring representative. The checklist

2 The parties agree this name refers to Velazquez even though it is not
her full legal name.
3
included a space to acknowledge receipt of the Agreement, which was
initialed “DS” and “EL.”
Velazquez submitted her own declaration in opposition to the motion.
She declared that her primary language is Mixteco, but she speaks Spanish.
Having never attended school, Velazquez explained that her ability to write
is limited to copying her name, telephone number, and address from another
document, and she cannot otherwise read or write in English or Spanish.
According to Velazquez, during the onboarding process in 2022, Limon
instructed Velazquez to write her name in the highlighted portions of
numerous documents, stating they were necessary paperwork with no further
explanation. Velazquez told Limon she was illiterate, so Limon helped
Velazquez by filling in the forms and instructing Velazquez where to write
Velazquez’s name. Velazquez relied on Limon and had no ability to verify the
documents’ contents. Limon did not explain that the documents included an
arbitration agreement, and she rushed the process without giving Velazquez
an opportunity to review the documents with her family. Velazquez did not
recall seeing the Agreement or copying her name on it, and she believed she
merely filled out some paperwork with her name, address, and telephone
number. Velazquez declared she would not have signed the Agreement had it
been explained to her. Also, Campos was not present for Velazquez’s
onboarding process.
After taking the matter under submission, on September 14, 2023, the
trial court denied Plug’s motion to compel arbitration. The court determined
that Velazquez produced sufficient evidence to challenge the existence of an
arbitration agreement by declaring she did not recall the Agreement and
would not have signed it had she been aware of it.

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Regarding Plug’s burden to prove the Agreement’s validity, the trial
court sustained Velazquez’s objections to the portions of Campos’s declaration
that were based on information and belief, as well as Velazquez’s objections
to the declaration’s three exhibits.
The trial court determined “[t]he only declaration provided by [Plug] is
from Yvette Campos who was not present on the date the agreement was
purportedly signed and cannot properly authenticate it.” Citing Velazquez’s
declaration, the court explained that “Campos does not have personal
knowledge regarding the central issues,” and her declaration is not
“admissible evidence establishing that [Velazquez] was aware of the
agreement and signed the agreement.” The court therefore found Plug did
not meet its burden and denied the motion. Plug’s timely appeal followed.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Standards of Review

“Although the party seeking arbitration bears the ultimate burden of
proof as to the existence of an arbitration agreement, the burden of producing

evidence on the issue may shift pursuant to a three-step process.”3 (Ramirez
v. Golden Queen Mining Co., LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 821, 830
(Ramirez).) First, the party seeking arbitration must produce prima facie
evidence of a written arbitration agreement. (Ibid.) “A plain reading of
[Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2] indicates that as a preliminary
matter the court is only required to make a finding of the agreement’s

3 During oral argument, counsel on both sides appeared to blur
distinctions between these steps, as well as the issues of contract formation
and unconscionability. We adhere to the three-step process described in both
case law and the parties’ briefing. Further, we do not reach the
unconscionability argument because, as we explain, the record supports the
trial court’s determination that a mutually agreed on contract did not exist.
5
existence, not an evidentiary determination of its validity.” (Condee v.
Longwood Management Corp. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 215, 219, italics added;
Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016)
246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060 [“Accordingly, we conclude that defendants here
met their initial burden by attaching to their petition a copy of the purported
arbitration agreement bearing Espejo’s electronic signature.”]; see also, Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 3.1330 [“The provisions [of the arbitration agreement]
must be stated verbatim or a copy must be physically or electronically

attached to the petition and incorporated by reference.].)4
Second, the opposing party must produce evidence identifying a factual
dispute as to the agreement’s existence. (Ramirez v. Golden Queen Mining
Co., LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 830.) Finally, the party seeking
arbitration must, by a preponderance of the evidence, prove a valid
arbitration agreement. (Ibid.)
We independently review the trial court’s determination on the second
step. (Iyere v. Wise Auto Group (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 747, 755–756 (Iyere).)
On the third step, “ ‘the question for the reviewing court is whether that
finding is erroneous as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘Specifically, the
question becomes whether appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for
a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 41, 52.)
“We review any ruling by the trial court on the admissibility of
evidence for abuse of discretion,” which occurs when the “ruling exceeds the
bounds of reason.” (People ex rel. Owen v. Media One Direct, LLC (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1483–1484.) An error in excluding evidence does not

4 This first step is undisputed on appeal.
6
warrant reversal unless the appealing party demonstrates “that a different
result would have been probable if the error had not occurred.” (Zuniga v.
Alexandria Care Center, LLC (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 871, 888.)

B. Velazquez Carried Her Burden on the Second Step

One method to dispute the existence of a valid agreement is to produce
admissible evidence challenging that one knowingly signed the contract
which could create “a factual dispute as to the authenticity of the[ ]
signatures. The opponent [of the arbitration agreement] need not prove that
his or her purported signature is not authentic, but must submit sufficient
evidence to create a factual dispute and shift the burden back to the
arbitration proponent, who retains the ultimate burden of proving, by a
preponderance of the evidence, the authenticity of the signature.” (Iyere,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 755.) Here, Plug argues Velazquez did not
submit any evidence showing she did not sign the Agreement or that her
signature was forged or inauthentic. Plug contends that under these
circumstances, Velazquez’s inability to remember her handwritten signature
is insufficient to show a dispute as to the Agreement’s validity. Plug further
asserts Velazquez did not argue or establish that the Agreement was the

product of fraud in the execution.5
“There is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to what
constitutes sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute about the
authenticity of a handwritten signature on a document agreeing to

5 In the trial court and her appellate reply brief, despite not specifically
referencing fraud in the execution, Velazquez relied on the doctrine’s
principles in arguing the Agreement was invalid for lack of mutual assent.
We therefore requested and received supplemental briefing from both parties
on whether fraud in the execution applied in this case. Velazquez asserts
that it does.
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arbitration.” (Ramirez, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 825.) In Iyere, the
First District, Division Four held, “[i]f a party confronted with his or her
handwritten signature on an arbitration agreement is unable to allege that
the signature is inauthentic or forged, the fact that that person does not
recall signing the agreement neither creates a factual dispute as to the
signature’s authenticity nor affords an independent basis to find that a
contract was not formed.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758, italics
added.) The court in Iyere noted “[i]t is hornbook law that failing to read an
agreement before signing it does not prevent formation of a contract.” (Id. at
p. 759.)
On the other hand, the Second District, Division Seven, held that a
party opposing arbitration met her burden on the second step by filing a
declaration “saying she did not recall the agreement” with her purported
handwritten signature “and would not have signed it if she had been aware of
it.” (Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 167
(Gamboa).) In reaching that conclusion, the court in Gamboa relied on
several cases involving electronic signatures. (Id. at pp. 165, 167–168.) Iyere
found those cases unpersuasive when applied to handwritten signatures
because “[a]n individual cannot affirm or disavow an electronic signature
from the face of a computer printout, but an individual normally can
recognize or disavow a handwritten signature that purports to be his or her
own.” (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758.)
Plug argues the current matter is indistinguishable from Iyere, and we
should not follow Gamboa. We find the facts of this case take us outside the
Iyere/Gamboa split of authority.
In both Iyere and Gamboa, as well as Ramirez which subsequently
sided with Iyere, there was no indication that the parties opposing arbitration

8
were illiterate or relied on any representations regarding the contents of the
documents they signed. Instead, the parties opposing arbitration merely
asserted they had no recollection of the agreements and would not have
signed them had they understood them. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 753; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 167; Ramirez, supra,
102 Cal.App.5th at p. 827.) These facts invoke the general rule that failure to
read a contract does not prevent the contract’s formation. (Iyere, at p. 759.)
Although this general rule may apply even when a party is illiterate,
there is an exception when a party reasonably relies on the representations of
another regarding the contents of a document. (Ramos v. Westlake Services
LLC (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 674, 687–688.) “A contract is void for fraud in
the execution where ‘ “ ‘ . . . the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his
act, and actually does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to
enter into a contract at all.’ ” ’ [Citation.] In this instance, ‘ “ ‘mutual assent
is lacking, and [the contract] is void.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 688; see, e.g., id. at p. 690
[arbitration agreement void where Spanish speaking car purchaser relied on
dealer’s translation that did not include the English version’s arbitration
clause]; Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
394, 427–428 [sufficient showing of fraud in the execution where bank
allegedly failed to mention arbitration when explaining account initiation
documents to clients with limited English skills].)
Velazquez declared she was unable to read; her ability to write was
limited to copying her name telephone, and address from another document;
she informed Limon of her illiteracy; Limon helped her fill out the documents
and described them as necessary paperwork without mentioning a contract or
arbitration; and Velazquez believed she was merely filling out her name and
contact information. Velazquez’s declaration is consistent with the

9
Agreement itself because she improperly filled out the boxes designated for
her name and signature.
If believed, Velazquez’s declaration indicates that she could not read
the documents, she reasonably relied on Limon’s explanation of the
documents, and that she was unaware she wrote her name on a contract.
This evidence could support a finding of lack of mutual assent, distinguishing
this case from the Iyere/Gamboa line of cases. This evidence also adequately
establishes a factual dispute as to the validity of the Agreement. (See, e.g.,
St. Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th
1187, 1200 [“If a party can show that it did not know it was signing a
contract . . . both the contract and its arbitration clause are void for lack of
mutual assent.”]; Berdan v. Berdan (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 478, 483–484 [“a
signature consists both of the act of writing the party’s name and of the
intention thereby of finally authenticating the instrument”].) Consequently,
the trial court did not err in determining that Velazquez satisfied her burden

of production on the second step.6

C. Plug Has Not Shown Reversal Is Warranted on the Third Step

Relying on Iyere, Plug contends the trial court erred in finding
insufficient evidence of an arbitration agreement. Plug further asserts the
trial court improperly excluded portions of Campos’s declaration and its
attachments. Plug believes Campos sufficiently authenticated the exhibits as
a custodian of Plug’s records, and Campos had sufficient personal knowledge
of the matters declared on information and belief.

6 Although our analysis departs from the trial court’s, “we may affirm a
decision correct on any theory regardless of the trial court’s reasoning.” (Doe
v. McLaughlin (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 640, 653, fn 8.)
10
As explained above, Plug’s reliance on Iyere is misplaced. Velazquez’s
declaration provided a firsthand account of her hiring process and alone could
support a finding that the Agreement was void due to lack of mutual assent.
On the other hand, Plug’s evidence was limited to Campos’s description of
Plug’s customs and practices, providing circumstantial evidence that Limon
may have explained the Agreement to Velazquez and given her an
opportunity to review it. Under these circumstances, Plug’s evidence
regarding the Agreement’s validity was not “ ‘ “ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and
unimpeached” [or] (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for
a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” ’ ”
(Garcia v. Stoneledge Furniture LLC, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th at p. 52.)
Consequently, the trial court’s determination that Plug failed to carry its
burden at the third step was not erroneous as a matter of law, and Plug has
failed to meet the standard for reversal.
As for the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, there was no abuse of
discretion regarding Campos’s testimony based on information and belief.
(City of Santa Cruz v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 74, 87 [“Of course, it
is true that an affidavit is normally presumed to state matters personally
known to the affiant and lacks evidentiary value, in a variety of civil
contexts, when based on information and belief.”].) We are less convinced
that Campos’s absence from the creation of the exhibits attached to her
declaration prevented her from sufficiently authenticating those documents
for evidentiary purposes. (Iyere, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 758 [“the
custodian of a document need not have been present or employed when the
document was created or signed to authenticate a document in a company’s
files”].) Nonetheless, Plug has failed to show that any error in this regard
affected the outcome.

11
Plug mistakenly asserts it is not required to show the result would
have been different had the evidence been admitted. (Zuniga v. Alexandria
Care Center, LLC, supra, 67 Cal.App.5th at p. 888.) Even if Plug addressed
this issue, it would have been unsuccessful. All three exhibits bore
Velazquez’s handwritten name in similar handwriting, indicating Velazquez
wrote her name on the Agreement. But as Plug acknowledges, Velazquez did
not dispute that fact. Instead, she disputed knowingly signing a contract.
Additionally, while the hiring checklist suggested that Limon may have
explained the Agreement to Velazquez, the trial court was concerned with
Plug’s failure to present any witnesses of the Agreement’s execution. Relying
on Velazquez’s declaration, the trial court found Campos was not present for
Velazquez’s onboarding and therefore did not have any personal knowledge of
the “central issues.” On the other hand, Velazquez’s declaration provided a
firsthand account of those matters and contradicted the implication that Plug
followed its customary practices. Accordingly, we find admission of the
exhibits would not have changed the result.
For these reasons, Plug has failed to show reversal is warranted
regarding the third step.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Velazquez is awarded costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

KELETY, Acting P. J.

CASTILLO, J.

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