CourtListener 10318830•People v. Diaz CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/22/25 P. v. Diaz CA4/3
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G059723
v. (Super. Ct. No. 18NF2130)
MARIO ALBERTO DIAZ, SR., OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Sentence vacated and matter remanded for
resentencing.
Victoria H. Stafford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Following a bench trial, the court found Mario Alberto Diaz, Sr.,
guilty of one count (count 1) of oral copulation of a child who is 10 years of
1
age or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)) , one count (count 2) of sexual
penetration of a child who is 10 years of age or younger (ibid.), and five
counts (counts 3 through 7) of lewdly committing a lewd or lascivious act
upon a child who is under 14 years of age (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). The
trial court sentenced Diaz to a term of 15 years to life on count 1, a
consecutive term of 15 years to life on count 2, a consecutive upper term of
eight years on count 3, and concurrent middle terms of six years on each of
counts 4 through 7. Diaz’s sentence amounted to a determinate term of eight
years followed by a consecutive indeterminate term of 30 years to life with
the possibility of parole.
In a prior opinion, People v. Diaz (Nov. 14, 2022, G059723)
[nonpub. opn.], we affirmed the judgment. In February 2023, the California
Supreme Court granted Diaz’s petition for review and deferred further action
in this matter pending disposition of a related case. In August 2024, the
Supreme Court issued an opinion in that related case, People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch), and subsequently transferred this matter to us with
directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the cause in light of
Lynch. Following transfer, Diaz filed a supplemental brief; the Attorney
General did not.
We confirm our conclusion reached in our prior decision that the
trial court exercised informed discretion by making the indeterminate terms
on counts 1 and 2 run consecutive to the determinate term on count 3. The
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
issue on transfer from the Supreme Court is whether under Lynch we must
remand the matter for resentencing on count 3 under the version of Penal
Code section 1170, subdivision (b), in effect as of January 1, 2022 (amended
section 1170(b)). We conclude, as we did in our prior opinion, that the
evidence at trial established beyond a reasonable doubt all three
circumstances in aggravation relied upon by the trial court in imposing the
upper term on count three. We conclude, however, that remand is necessary
because the record does not clearly indicate the trial court would have
reached the same sentencing conclusion had it known that a sentence could
not exceed the middle term absent findings beyond a reasonable doubt on
circumstances in aggravation.
FACTS
X.A. was six years old when Diaz moved into the home she shared
with her father, mother, and two brothers. X.A. slept in a bedroom with her
parents and one brother, the other brother slept in the living room, and Diaz
had his own bedroom. Diaz took X.A. and her brothers to the movies, bought
her games, presents and snacks.
Diaz’s sexual abuse of X.A. began when she was seven years old.
At the time, Diaz would take X.A. and her brothers to the movies and
sometimes would watch movies on television with them in his bedroom. The
bedroom was small — it had only one twin bed and a television — and Diaz
would keep the room dark while the television was on. Diaz would position
himself on the bed behind X.A. and would touch her waist and buttocks, lick
her ear, and breath heavily. He would slip his hand down between her pants
and underwear and touched her vagina. X.A. was shocked and did not know
3
what to do. Diaz would kiss X.A. on the neck and tried to kiss her on the lips.
Diaz often engaged in this conduct.
On a separate occasion, Diaz got on top of X.A. when they were
both clothed and rubbed his penis in her vaginal area. X.A. could feel Diaz’s
hard penis rubbing against her.
When X.A. was eight years old, Diaz digitally penetrated her
vagina. Diaz encountered X.A. in the kitchen and from there led her into his
bedroom. He said in Spanish, “Hey, let’s watch a movie,” but instead pushed
X.A. onto the bed, shut the door, pulled down her pants, and stuck two
fingers into her vagina. After a few minutes, Diaz let X.A. go. sympathy
On a separate occasion, Diaz again encountered X.A. in the
kitchen, led her into his bedroom, pushed her onto the bed, and pulled her
pants down. On this occasion, Diaz got down on his knees and licked X.A.’s
vagina. X.A. tried to kick him off but he was heavier than she was and would
not stop. After about three minutes he stopped and let her go.
On another occasion, Diaz had X.A. touch his penis. Diaz again
led X.A. from the kitchen into his bedroom and closed the door behind them.
X.A. turned around and saw Diaz standing in front of the door with his penis
exposed. Diaz told X.A. to touch his penis. Sensing that X.A. was in shock,
Diaz grabbed her arm and used her hand to rub his penis. X.A. was confused
because she trusted Diaz and viewed him as a friend.
Once when X.A. and her brother were watching a movie with
Diaz in his bedroom, Diaz rubbed his penis against X.A. buttocks. Diaz and
X.A. were lying on the bed underneath a blanket, which allowed him to hide
his conduct; Diaz pulled down X.A.’s pants, placed his penis between her
buttock cheeks, and “slid[ed]” his penis “through as in up and down.” While
Diaz rubbed his penis between X.A.’s buttocks cheeks, he whispered in
4
Spanish in her ear, “Do you like it?” and rubbed his hardened penis against
X.A.’s buttocks cheeks.
When X.A. was somewhere between the ages of seven and 11,
Diaz told her to lick his penis. This occurred in Diaz’s bedroom. X.A. was
sitting on the bed. Diaz had closed the door and stood against it to block X.A.
from leaving. Diaz faced X.A. and said, “Lick it.” X.A. refused. Diaz told her,
“I’ll let you go if you lick it.” She complied.
Although Diaz never threatened to harm X.A. if she told anyone,
he would put his index finger to his lips and say, “shush, don’t tell no one.”
Once, when X.A. was about 10 years old, she agreed to go with
Diaz to run an errand because he promised to buy her chips if she did. Diaz
drove and X.A. sat in the back seat. Diaz pulled over and told X.A. to “come
to the front [seat].” When she declined, he said he was not going to drive
until she sat in the front. X.A. moved to the front passenger seat. She was
wearing shorts, and on the drive, Diaz grabbed and squeezed her bare thigh.
Diaz last molested X.A. when she was 10 and a half years old. At
that time, it was harder for Diaz to molest X.A. because another family with
children had moved into the home. When the other children were in their
room, Diaz called X.A. into his bedroom, pushed her onto the bed, pulled
down her pants, and touched her vagina. He then pulled down his own
pants, grabbed X.A.’s arm, and made her rub his penis.
The molestation stopped when Diaz moved out of the house. But
X.A.’s trauma continued. From the time Diaz started molesting her, X.A. wet
the bed, and was still wetting the bed at the time of trial, when she was 16
years old. She would have nightmares about Diaz touching her and would
wake up with her left leg shaking. She started seeing a therapist in October
2017 but did not tell the therapist about what Diaz had done to her.
5
While in the seventh grade, X.A. started cutting her arms with
razor blades; she felt sad and suicidal. A close friend noticed that X.A. was
upset and her arms were cut. X.A. told her about what Diaz had done.
In March 2018, X.A. told her mother. X.A. was sobbing and could
not be calmed down. The next day X.A. told her high school mental health
counselor that six years’ earlier a male roommate would lure her to his room
and touch her inappropriately. X.A.’s parents took her to the police
department to make a report. When the police had not contacted X.A. by
May 2018, her parents went to the police department and complained. In
May 2018, X.A. spoke with a police detective.
DISCUSSION
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY MAKING THE
INDETERMINATE AND DETERMINATE TERMS
CONCURRENT
Diaz contends the case must be remanded for resentencing
because the trial court was unaware of its discretion to run the determinate
term imposed on count 3 concurrently with the indeterminate terms imposed
on counts 1 and 2. We disagree. The trial court was aware of its discretion to
run the determinate and indeterminate terms concurrently but made the
rational decision to make them consecutive instead.
A. Background
In sentencing Diaz, the trial court imposed a determinate
sentence of eight years on count 3. This determinate sentence would be
served first and would be followed by two consecutive indeterminate
sentences of 15 years to life imposed, respectively, on count 1 and count 2. As
for the other counts, the trial court imposed concurrent sentences.
6
In a sentencing brief, which the trial court acknowledged having
read, the prosecution noted the court had discretion to run the terms
concurrently but recommended that defendant be sentenced to a maximum
possible term of consecutive life sentences on counts 1 and 2 with consecutive
sentences on the remaining counts. In addition, Diaz’s counsel acknowledged
at the sentencing hearing that the court had discretion to run the
determinate and indeterminate sentences concurrently or consecutively.
The trial court agreed with the prosecution’s sentencing brief and
cited several reasons for the sentence. For one, the court noted that Diaz
targeted an “extremely vulnerable” victim from a “position of trust.” Another
reason the court gave was Diaz planned his crimes and inflicted severe
“psychological and emotional harm,” as shown by the fact the victim wet her
bed well into her teenage years. Those facts warranted a denial of probation
and consecutive sentences.
B. The Trial Court Was Aware of Its Discretion to Impose Consecutive or
Concurrent Sentences
When the trial court imposes a determinate sentence and an
indeterminate life sentence, the court has the discretion to decide whether
the terms will be served concurrently or consecutively. (People v. Galvez
(2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1256, 1264.) “‘[A]bsent a showing to the contrary, the
trial court is presumed to have known and followed the applicable law and to
have properly exercised its discretion.’” (Ibid., quoting People v. Bradford
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1355.) The party challenging the sentence
bears the burden of showing the sentencing decision was “‘“irrational or
arbitrary”’” and, to meet that burden, must “‘affirmatively demonstrate that
7
the trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.’” (People v. Lee (2017)
16 Cal.App.5th 861, 866.)
Diaz has cited nothing from the record that meets his burden of
affirmatively demonstrating the trial judge, who, we note, is quite
experienced, was unaware of his sentencing discretion. To the contrary, at
the sentencing hearing, the court stated it had read the prosecution’s
sentencing brief, which explained that the determinate and indeterminate
sentences could be run concurrently. When imposing sentence on count 2,
the court stated it had “selected” to make that sentence consecutive rather
than concurrent. By using the word “selected” the court expressed its
understanding that it alternatively could have selected the sentence on count
2 to be concurrent.
The trial court gave reasons for its decision to impose a
determinate sentence on count 3 to be followed by consecutive sentences on
counts 1 and 2: The court stated the crimes and their objectives were
“predominantly independent” of each other, count 2 involved a separate crime
against the same victim, and count 2 was committed at a different time and
place from the crimes charged under count 1. In denying probation and
imposing an aggravated term on count 3, the trial court found “the victim
was very vulnerable and the defendant inflicted great emotional and
psychological harm to the victim” and that Diaz’s crimes “demonstrate some
planning.” The court stated the victim had been “to hell and back” and Diaz’s
acts “demonstrate[d] a high degree of callousness.” (See Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 4.425(b).) The very fact that the trial court made findings and comments
shows it understood it had discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences and exercised that discretion to impose consecutive sentences.
8
Count 3 was based on a violation of Penal Code section 288,
subdivision (a), as were counts 4, 5, 6, and 7. The trial court made the
sentences imposed under counts 4, 5, 6, and 7 run concurrently. By doing so,
the court demonstrated it was aware of its discretion to make the sentence on
count 3 also run concurrently but chose not to do so.
Diaz contends the trial court’s statement “that term must be
served first” in reference to the determinate sentence on count 3, as well as
an apparent lack of rationale for imposing a consecutive sentence on count 3,
is evidence the court was unaware of its discretion. The most plausible
reading of the record, however, is the court was simply advising both parties
on the correct application of the law; that is, “‘“the determinate term of
imprisonment shall be served first . . . .”’” (People v. Galvez, supra, 195
Cal.App.4th at p. 1264.)
II. REMAND FOR RESENTENCING PURSUANT TO
AMENDED SECTION 1170(b)
A. Amended Section 1170(b) and Lynch
The trial court imposed the upper term of eight years for Diaz’s
conviction under count 3 for committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a child
who is under 14 years of age. (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a).) The court
identified the following circumstances in support of the aggravated sentence:
(1) X.A. was “very vulnerable”; (2) Diaz inflicted “great emotional and
psychological harm” on X.A.; and (3) Diaz’s conduct demonstrated planning.
Diaz was sentenced in December 2020. At that time, section
1170(b) granted the trial court discretion to impose the lower, middle, or
upper prison term in the interest of justice. (Former § 1170(b), enacted by
Stats. 2007, ch. 3, § 2, pp. 6–7; see Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 746.) In
9
2021, the Legislature amended section 1170(b), effective January 1, 2022, to
state: “When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order
imposition of a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (2).” (§ 1170(b); Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; see Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.). Under paragraph (2) of amended section
1170(b), “[t]he court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only
when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the
imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts
underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the
judge in a court trial.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.)
The 2022 amendment to section 1170(b) applies retroactively to
defendants, such as Diaz, whose judgments were not final on direct appeal at
the time the statute took effect appeal. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 749.)
In Lynch, the California Supreme Court addressed the issues of
whether, in reviewing a case in which former section 1170(b) was used, every
circumstance in aggravation must have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt, whether error in sentencing entitles a defendant to an automatic
remand or is reviewed for error, and, if it is reviewed for error, which
standard of review applies. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 742–743.) On
those issue, the court held: “We hold that under the current [amended
section 1170(b)] a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court
relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even
if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. The
violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating
10
facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the current
statutory requirements. If the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying
the Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for
resentencing.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.)
In other words, “in a case where the judgment is not yet final, a
sentence imposed under former section 1170(b) must be reversed and
remanded unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury [or court in a court trial], applying that same standard, would
have found true all of the aggravating facts upon which the court relied to
conclude the upper term was justified, or that those facts were otherwise
proved true in compliance with the current statute.” (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 743, italics added.)
C. Aggravating Circumstances Were Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Amended section 1170(b)(2) provides that when, as in this case, a
bench trial is conducted, the trial court decides whether circumstances in
aggravation have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, evidence of
circumstances in aggravation was presented during trial and at the
sentencing hearing to the trier of fact— the trial judge— and the trial judge
found, based on the evidence, three aggravating circumstances justifying
imposition of the upper term. As Diaz pointed out in the initial briefing, the
trial judge did not state he had found the aggravating circumstances to be
true beyond a reasonable doubt. But we, as the reviewing court, can and do
conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that either the trial court did find each
and every aggravating circumstance to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, or
11
would have so found if that were the burden of proof at the time of
sentencing.
The evidence of the circumstances in aggravation of the offense
charged in count 3 was overwhelming, unchallenged, and unrefuted. The
evidence at trial established that X.A. was quite vulnerable. She was only
seven years old when Diaz began to abuse her. He held a position of trust
and authority: He took X.A. and her brothers to the movies, bought her
games, presents and snacks.
The evidence at trial established beyond reasonable doubt that
Diaz inflicted severe emotional and psychological harm on X.A. She started
wetting the bed at the time Diaz began abusing her and continued to wet the
bed at age 16. As a teenager, X.A. cut herself, felt sad all the time, and
attempted suicide. She started seeing a therapist. She had nightmares
about Diaz touching her and would awake from them with her left leg
shaking. When X.A. told her mother, X.A. sobbed and could not be calmed
down. Both at trial, at which she was subject to cross-examination, and at
the sentencing hearing, X.A. testified to the emotional and psychological
harm Diaz had inflicted on her.
The evidence at trial also established beyond a reasonable doubt
that Diaz’s sexual abuse of X.A. involved planning. Four people in addition to
Diaz and X.A. lived in the two-bedroom house. Careful planning was
necessary for Diaz to avoid detection. He was careful to intercept X.A. in the
kitchen and lead her to his bedroom where he would abuse her in private.
When watching movies in his bedroom, he turned the lights off, positioned
himself behind X.A. on the bed, and covered himself and X.A. with a blanket
to conceal his actions.
12
In the initial briefing, Diaz relied upon People v. Lopez (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez) disapproved on another ground in Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at pp.768–769, to argue the prosecution “had no occasion to prove the
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt” and Diaz “had no opportunity
to present evidence to contest them.” In Lopez, the Court of Appeal noted
that the former sentencing law did not require the prosecution to present at
trial evidence directly relating to the aggravating circumstances, and the
defendant would have had no incentive to present contradictory evidence.
(Id. at p. 466.) For those reasons, the court concluded, “It would be entirely
speculative for us to presume, based on a record that does not directly
address the aggravating factors, what a jury would have found true in
connection with these factors.” (Ibid.)
As Lopez involved a jury trial, the trier of fact was different for the
guilt and sentencing phases, and so it might have been speculative to
presume what the jury would have found if it had been presented with
evidence of aggravating circumstances. In the present case, unlike Lopez, a
bench trial was held, at trial the prosecution did present evidence directly
relating to the aggravating circumstances, and nothing in the record suggests
Diaz would not have been permitted to present contradictory evidence. Diaz
offered no witnesses at trial and, at the sentencing hearing, did not offer or
make an offer of proof of any evidence relating to any aggravating
circumstance. It is not speculative for us to presume what the trier of fact at
the guilt phase would have found as to the aggravating circumstances
because the same trier of fact presided over sentencing and found three
aggravating circumstances, all of which were proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.
13
We therefore conclude it is beyond a reasonable doubt the facts
underlying every aggravating circumstance were or would have been found
true beyond a reasonable doubt by the trial court.
D. No “Clear Indication” the Trial Court Would Have Reached Same
Sentencing Conclusion under Amended Section 1170(b).
In Lynch, the California Supreme Court also concluded the
amendments to section 1170(b) altered a trial court’s sentencing discretion by
circumscribing the trial court’s previously—held broad authority to select
among the low, middle, and high terms. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 773.)
“The current statute narrows that authority by creating a presumption
against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts are
properly proven and the court concludes that term is justified.” (Ibid.)
If sentence under section 1170(b) was imposed before January 1,
2022, the effective date of the amendment, the question arises whether the
trial court would have imposed the same sentence under amended section
1170(b). (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 743, 773.) The Lynch court
concluded, in that situation, remand is the appropriate remedy unless the
record “‘clearly indicates’” that the trial court would have reached the same
sentencing conclusion had it known that a sentence could not exceed the
middle term absent findings beyond a reasonable doubt on circumstances in
aggravation. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 743, 771, 773–774 see People v.
Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 431 (Salazar) [“unless there is a clear
indication from the sentencing court that it would be idle to do so, remand for
resentencing is required”].)
The length of the original sentence and related sentencing
decisions, such as running consecutive sentences, imposition of middle or
14
upper term sentences, or declining to strike enhancements, is not sufficient to
clearly indicate the trial court would reach the same sentencing conclusion on
remand. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) The Lynch Court observed,
‘“when the applicable law governing the defendant’s sentence has
substantively changed after sentencing, it is almost always speculative for a
reviewing court to say what the sentencing court would have done if it had
known the scope of its discretionary powers at the time of sentencing.’” (Id.
at p. 776.)
The facts of Lynch demonstrate the “clearly indicates” standard is
a high bar indeed. The trial court in Lynch found eight circumstances in
aggravation and none in mitigation and emphasized, among other things,
that the defendant “had committed repeated acts of violence; his use of
multiple weapons in this case involved great violence, cruelty, viciousness,
and callousness; and his criminal record demonstrated a serious danger to
society.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) In addition, the defendant was
on parole when he committed the current crimes. (Ibid.) Based on those
findings, the trial court found the upper term sentence to be “‘appropriate.’”
(Ibid.) The California Supreme Court concluded the record “certainly
support[ed] a finding that the trial court acted within its discretion in
choosing between the three available terms of punishment under the law as
it stood at the time of sentencing.” (Ibid.) However, the record did not
clearly indicate how the trial court would have exercised its discretion “under
the weight of the presumptive middle term maximum sentence that currently
exists.” (Ibid.) “Notably,” the Supreme Court stated, “the [trial] court did not
make the kind of definitive statements that we have found to clearly indicate
it would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances.” (Ibid.)
15
For examples of such definitive statements, the Lynch court cited
to People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432 (Flores) and Salazar, supra, 15
Cal.5th 416. These cases too demonstrate just how tough it is to meet the
“clearly indicates” standard.” In Flores, supra, at p. 432, the trial court
stated when sentencing the defendant, “[Q]uite frankly, based on what I
know about the defendant and based on what I know the defendant did . . . I
think [the defendant] does fall into the category of the worst of the worst
offenders thereby deserving the ultimate sentence of death” and it “believe[d]
that in this situation the punishment does fit the crimes based on the
senseless murders of four separate individuals, three being charged in the
information in this case.” (Ibid.) The trial court remarked the defendant
‘“show[ed] absolutely no remorse’. . . ‘[i]t’s as if he has no soul,’” and, in the
court’s ‘“opinion[,] justice will be served’ by a death sentence.’’ (Ibid.) In
Flores the California Supreme Court reasoned that because the trial court
had explicitly stated it thought sentencing the defendant to death—the
ultimate penalty—was just, it was clear the trial court would not have
exercised its discretion to strike a firearm enhancement in the interest of
justice if the court had such discretion at the time of sentencing. (Ibid.)
As to Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 416, the Lynch court cited to
following passage as another example of a definitive statement: “This case
also does not present the circumstances in which the sentencing court
announces that it is aware of forthcoming legislation and then explains how
it would exercise its discretion under that legislation. The sentencing court’s
statements here do not provide this type of clear indication of intent.”
(Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431, see Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
16
The trial court in the present case made the sentence on count 3
concurrent, found three circumstances in aggravation and none in mitigation,
stated the victim had been “to hell and back” and Diaz’s acts “demonstrate[d]
a high degree of callousness,” and agreed with the victim and her mother that
Diaz was “a monster.” Such forceful language indicates to us the trial court
would sentence Diaz to the upper term on count 3 even under the limited
discretion granted by amended section 1170(b). But we are constrained by
Lynch to conclude that remand is required. The trial court in Lynch found
eight aggravating circumstances and no mitigating ones, and the defendant
had committed repeated acts of violence, used multiple weapons to commit
acts of great violence, cruelty, viciousness, and callousness, and was a serious
danger to society. Yet the Supreme Court nonetheless found it “speculative”
to conclude that the trial court would have found aggravating circumstances
“sufficiently weighty to ‘justify’ an upward departure from the legislative
mandate for no more than a middle term sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 777.)
The trial court in the present case gave no clearer an indication
than did its counterpart in Lynch. So, given the facts of Lynch, we cannot say
the trial court here clearly indicated it would have imposed the same
sentence under amended section 1170(b).)2
2
It is unlikely the trial court would have been aware of
“forthcoming legislation” to amend section 1170(b) and had the foresight to
explain how it would exercise its discretion under the amended law. (See
Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th 431.) Senate Bill No. 567, the legislation by which
section 1170(b) was amended, was introduced on February 28, 2021, two
months after Diaz was sentenced. (Sen. Bill No. 567 (2020-2021 Reg. Sess.)
17
We therefore vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Under the full resentencing rule, “when part of a sentence is stricken on
review, on remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its sentencing discretion in light of
the changed circumstances.’” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)
DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for
resentencing in accordance with amended section 1170(b). The judgment is
affirmed in all other respects.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
GOETHALS, J.
18
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.