CourtListener 10318206•People v. Dalton CA2/6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Dalton CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B327308
(Super. Ct. No. 2017042577)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
TREVER RICHARD
DALTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
Trever Richard Dalton shot and injured his neighbor
following an altercation. After waiving jury, the trial court found
appellant guilty of assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd.
(a)(2))1 and found true the special allegations that he personally
inflicted great bodily injury and used a firearm during the
commission of the offense (§§ 12022.7, 12022.5, subd. (d)).
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
He contends (1) his conviction should be reversed because
his jury trial waiver was invalid, and (2) the matter should be
remanded for the trial court to consider his eligibility for mental
health diversion pursuant to the amended version of section
1001.36. The People contend a limited remand is appropriate in
light of Senate Bill No. 1223’s (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.)
amendments to the eligibility requirements of the statute. (Stats.
2022, ch. 735.)
We agree remand is appropriate so the trial court may
consider appellant’s application for mental health diversion
pursuant to amended section 1001.36. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.
Facts and Procedural History
On December 5, 2017, appellant, a California Highway
Patrol officer for 11 years, was off duty and spent the day
drinking alcohol. He purchased a 30 pack of beer and drank
seven or eight beers. He also stopped at two restaurants and had
a few more drinks. At one of the restaurants, he struck up a
conversation with a man whose father was purportedly a member
of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club. Appellant, who was
struggling with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), major
depressive disorder, paranoia, and a hypervigilant mindset,
thought the man might be “watching” him. Later that night,
appellant decided to ride his bicycle to a neighbor’s house, a
former member of the Hells Angels. He brought with him a few
beers and his firearm.
Around midnight, Sorin Popescu was preparing to evacuate
his family due to the Thomas Fire, which had caused a blackout
in the neighborhood. When Popescu saw appellant, dressed all in
black, standing near his neighbor’s front door, he became
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suspicious. Popescu did not know appellant and thought he
might be a burglar. After a brief altercation with Popescu,
appellant rode away on his bicycle. Minutes later, Popescu heard
a “loud boom” that sounded like a gunshot. He ducked, heard a
“second shot,” and felt the impact of a bullet hit his back. He
turned and saw appellant behind his car. Popescu and his wife
rushed inside the house and called 911.
Appellant was arrested and charged. Prior to trial, he
moved for a grant of pretrial mental health diversion (§ 1001.36).
The prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied it.
In October 2022, appellant waived his right to a jury trial.
The trial court found him guilty as charged, suspended
imposition of sentence, and placed him on three years formal
probation.
Waiver of Right to Jury Trial
Appellant contends his jury trial waiver was not valid
because the trial court did not advise him that (1) a jury would be
selected from members of the community, and (2) he could
participate in the selection of the jury with defense counsel. He
also contends his jury waiver is invalid because the trial court
should have informed him of recent statutory changes to Code of
Civil Procedure, section 231.7, including the prohibition against
racial and other forms of discrimination in the jury selection
process. We are not persuaded.
On October 10, 2022, appellant waived his right to jury.
The following colloquy occurred:
“[Court]: On the Trever Dalton Matter. . . . Both sides are
announcing ready for trial, three to four days, but I believe it’s
going to be a court trial; correct?
3
“[Defense Counsel]: Yes. The parties have agreed on court trial.
Mr. Dalton is prepared to waive jury, your Honor.
“[Court]: Mr. Dalton, you do have the right to a jury trial. Do you
waive your right to a jury trial, sir?
“[Appellant]: Yes, your Honor.
“[Court]: And what that means is the People would have to call
witnesses and a jury would sit and judge their credibility, and the
twelve jurors would be the trier of fact. They would have to be
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, all twelve of them
unanimously, that the People have proven the charges and
special allegations beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand
that?
“[Appellant]: Yes, your Honor.
“[Court]: And you waive that right and instead of having a jury
make that decision, it’s going to be a judge. Do you understand
that, and do you agree to that?
“[Appellant]: Yes, sir.
“[Court]: And you also understand if you were to have a jury trial,
you would have a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent at trial
and also at a trial on the special allegations, the right to remain
silent, and the jury would be told that they couldn’t hold that
against you. Do you understand that?
4
“[Appellant]: I do now.
“[Court]: And you still have your Fifth Amendment right to
remain silent, but instead of jury, it would be the judge who will
be trying the case, and they would also have to follow the same
rule. They couldn’t use that against you. Do you understand that?
“[Appellant]: I do.
“[Court]: All right. And I think I got it as to both the count and
the special allegation. [¶] Any additional questioning you
want . . . ?
“[Prosecution]: I’ll just do this: Mr. Dalton, basically the
difference between a jury trial and a court trial is that in a jury
trial and a court trial, both are a contested case, and both sides
would advocate for their respective positions. In a jury trial the
People have to convince all twelve jurors beyond a reasonable
doubt. In a court trial, the People have to convince one judge
beyond a reasonable doubt. Do you understand that?
“[Appellant]: I do.
“[Prosecution]: Understanding that, are you willing to give up
your right to a jury trial and agree to do a court trial?
“[Appellant]: Yes.
“[Court]: All right. I’m satisfied. [¶] You’re in agreement . . . ?
5
“[Defense Counsel]: I am, your honor. For the record, of course,
I’ve discussed this issue.
“[Court]: With your client?
“[Defense Counsel]: Right.
[Court]: Then I’m going to show Mr. Dalton has knowingly,
intelligently and understandingly waived his right to a jury trial
and has chosen instead to proceed with a court trial . . . .
“[Prosecution]: I will add for the record that the People are also
waiving jury.
“[Court]: All right. . . .”
Analysis
“Under the federal Constitution and our state Constitution,
a defendant in a criminal prosecution has a right to a jury trial.
[Citations.] However, a ‘jury may be waived in a criminal cause
by the consent of both parties expressed in open court by the
defendant and the defendant’s counsel.’” (People v. Sivongxxay
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 151, 166 (Sivongxxay), quoting Cal. Const., art. I,
§ 16.) A defendant’s waiver of the right to jury trial must be
knowing and intelligent—meaning, it must be made with an
understanding of the nature of the right being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon it—as well as voluntary.
(Ibid.)
Whether the defendant has made a knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary waiver of the right to jury trial “‘must depend upon
the unique circumstances of each case.’” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3
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Cal.5th. at p. 166.) “We uphold the validity of a jury waiver ‘“if
the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent
under the totality of the circumstances.”’” (People v. Daniels
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 961, 991 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.) (Daniels).)
In Sivongxxay, our Supreme Court “offer[ed] some general
guidance” and “recommend[ed] that trial courts advise a
defendant of the basic mechanics of a jury trial in a waiver
colloquy, including but not necessarily limited to the facts that (1)
a jury is made up of 12 members of the community; (2) a
defendant through his or her counsel may participate in jury
selection; (3) all 12 jurors must unanimously agree in order to
render a verdict; and (4) if a defendant waives the right to a jury
trial, a judge alone will decide his or her guilt or innocence.”
(Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th. at p. 169.)
Here, appellant was informed that he had the right to trial
by jury, the jury would be comprised of 12 people who had to
unanimously agree in order to render a verdict, if he waived his
right to a jury trial, a judge alone would decide his guilt or
innocence, a jury would assess the credibility of witnesses and
judge the People’s substantive charges and special allegations by
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, and appellant
maintained a Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during
both a jury or bench trial.
Appellant’s contention that his jury waiver was invalid
because the trial court did not advise him the jurors would be
selected “from the community” or that he could participate in
that selection with counsel, overlooks our high court’s admonition
that Sivongxxay’s guidelines are not mandatory. Indeed, there is
no “rigid formula or particular form of words that a trial court
must use in taking a jury waiver.” (Sivongxxay, supra, 3 Cal.5th.
7
at pp. 169-170; see also People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722,
753-754.)
Moreover, appellant was represented by counsel who
indicated that he discussed jury waiver with appellant, and when
asked, appellant repeatedly indicated he understood his right to a
jury trial and wished to waive that right. Nothing in the record
supports the proposition that he did not understand the nature
and possible consequence of his action in waiving jury. To be
sure, “[c]ourts generally rely on counsel to transmit to defendants
critical information about whether to waive the jury trial right
and the consequences of waiving it . . . .” (Daniels, supra, 3
Cal.5th at p. 999 (lead opn. of Cuéllar, J.).)
In view of this well-settled precedent, we also reject
appellant’s contention that the trial court was required to inform
him of recent changes to the jury selection process pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 231.7.
Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude
appellant’s jury waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Mental Health Diversion
Appellant contends the matter should be remanded to
determine whether he is eligible for mental health diversion
under amended section 1001.36. Respondent agrees remand is
appropriate.
In January 2020, the trial court denied appellant’s pretrial
application for mental health diversion. The trial court explained
that although it was “satisfied” appellant suffered from PTSD, it
was “not satisfied” that the “nexus between the diagnosis was . . .
a sufficient cause of the actual shooting incident.” The trial court
reasoned that appellant’s PTSD “did make him become a person
who abused alcohol,” and “there are a lot of people who drink lots
of alcohol and they don’t shoot people, even if they’re suffering
8
from some sort of a traumatic situation. [¶] So on the basis of
the nexus, the application for mental health diversion is denied.”
Analysis
We review the trial court’s denial of mental health
diversion for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Moine (2021) 62
Cal.App.5th 440, 448-449.) “A court abuses its discretion when it
makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong
legal standard . . . .” (Id. at p. 449.)
In 2018, the legislature enacted section 1001.36, which
created a pretrial diversion program for certain persons with
qualifying mental health disorders. (People v. Frahs (2020) 9
Cal.5th 618, 626 (Frahs).) At the time of appellant’s application
for diversion, the trial court had discretion to grant the motion if
it found all of the following criteria: (1) the defendant suffers
from a qualifying mental disorder; (2) the disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense; (3) the
defendant’s symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (4)
the defendant consents to diversion and waives his or her right to
a speedy trial; (5) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment
as a condition of diversion; and (6) the defendant will not pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety if treated in the
community. (Former § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1)(A)-(F).)
The Legislature subsequently amended section 1001.36 to
“‘simplify the procedural process for obtaining diversion by
presuming that a defendant’s diagnosed “mental disorder” has a
connection to their offense.’” (People v. Doran (2023) 95
9
Cal.App.5th 1, 8, citing Assem. Com. On Pub. Safety, Rep. on
Sen. Bill No. 1223; Stats. 2022, ch. 735, § 1.)2
As amended, section 1001.36 now provides that when
making the initial decision on eligibility, “If the defendant has
been diagnosed with a mental disorder, the court shall find that
the defendant’s mental disorder was a significant factor in the
commission of the offense unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that it was not a motivating factor, causal factor, or
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).)
This new presumption broadens the ameliorative effects of
the statute and applies retroactively to appellant’s nonfinal
judgment. Accordingly, remand is appropriate. (Frahs, supra, 9
Cal.5th at pp. 624, 631; see also Doran, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 6-7, 10.)
However, diversion is not mandatory, even if appellant
makes a prima facie showing that he satisfies the eligibility
requirements. The decision to grant or deny diversion rests in
the sound discretion of the trial court. (§ 1001.36, subd. (a); see
People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 888.) We
express no view concerning the ultimate outcome of appellant’s
application.
Disposition
We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellant’s
motion for mental health diversion and remand the matter with
directions that the trial court conduct a new hearing to consider
appellant’s application for mental health diversion pursuant to
2 The statute has been amended since Senate Bill 1223,
but those amendments do not affect our analysis.
10
amended section 1001.36. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, J.
We concur:
GILBERT, P. J.
CODY, J.
11
Derek D. Malan, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
_____________________________
Wayne C. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Shezad H. Thakor, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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