People v. Klene CA2/4

CourtListener 10318205Calctapp21.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/21/25 P. v. Klene CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE, B330963

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. YA033562
v.

JOHN GAVIN KLENE AND
EDWARD R. DUMBRIQUE,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Amy N. Carter, Judge. Reversed and remanded
with instructions.
Deirdre O’ Connor, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendants and Appellants.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Stephanie C. Brenan and Jonathan
M. Krauss, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
MEMORANDUM OPINION1

This case involves two individuals, John Gavin Klene and
Edward R. Dumbrique (appellants), who were convicted of
murder in 1998, and have since been exonerated through habeas
corpus proceedings. With over 25 years having passed since their
wrongful murder convictions, appellants now seek to be found
“factually innocent” by a preponderance of the evidence within
the meaning of Penal Code section 1485.55, subdivision (b).2 As
counsel states in appellants’ opening brief: “Put simply, this
appeal isn’t about money; it’s about the system’s
acknowledgement of [appellants’] actual innocence and the
permanent removal of these false accusations from the public
record so that these two men can rebuild their lives free from the
stigma of ‘suspected murderer.’”3

1 Because the issue presented in this appeal is narrow and
straightforward, and because we are not publishing this opinion,
we resolve this case by memorandum opinion. (See Cal. Stds.
Jud. Admin., § 8.1.)
2 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code. Section 1485.55, subdivision (b) provides: “In a contested or
uncontested proceeding, if the court has granted a writ of habeas
corpus or vacated a judgment pursuant to Section 1473.6 or
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 1473.7, the person may
move for a finding of factual innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence that the crime with which they were charged was either
not committed at all or, if committed, was not committed by the
petitioner.”
3 Appellants’ counsel has augmented the record to include
documentation showing appellants have already obtained
compensation from the California Victim Compensation Board
(“the Board”) for each day they were wrongfully imprisoned. In

2
In the trial court, the Los Angeles County District Attorney
(District Attorney) conceded appellants had met their burden of
demonstrating factual innocence by a preponderance of the
evidence.4 Instead of declaring appellants factually innocent
under section 1485.55, however, the trial court concluded that
section did not apply to appellants. The court instead concluded
section 851.8 applied, and denied appellants relief under that
statute. Appellants and the Attorney General all agree the trial
court erred by concluding appellants did not fall under section
1485.55. The parties also agree the court erred by concluding
section 851.8 applied to appellants. We agree with the parties.
The only issue in dispute on appeal is the proper remedy.
The Attorney General argues the case should be remanded for
the trial court to reevaluate appellants’ petition under the correct
statute. Appellants contend the proper remedy is for this court to

other words, appellants are not seeking to be declared factually
innocent for purposes of obtaining compensation from the Board,
as that relief has already been granted. (See § 1485.55,
subdivision (a).)
4 The District Attorney noted, among other things, that
“[t]he convictions in this case were based on [(1)] the testimony of
an unreliable jailhouse informant who has since shown himself to
be a liar and, by his own admission, an accessory to murder in a
separate case, and [(2)] a recanting witness who was the sole
eyewitness to the murder, and whose initial identifications no
longer appear reliable.” The District Attorney also noted that the
only reason the sole eyewitness initially identified appellants
(before later recanting that testimony) was because the
investigating officers pointed them out as the culprits. The
District Attorney additionally noted that eyewitness has no
apparent stake in the outcome of this case, nor any apparent
motivation to lie to help appellants.

3
either: (1) grant appellants’ petition for a finding of factual
innocence; or (2) remand the matter to the trial court with
instructions to enter a finding of factual innocence. We agree
with appellants. On this record, having thoroughly reviewed the
overwhelming evidence exonerating appellants, we reach the
following conclusion as a matter of law – that appellants are,
within the meaning of section 1485.55, subdivision (b), factually
innocent, by a preponderance of the evidence, of the murder of
Antonio Alarcon.5
The matter is remanded to the trial court with instructions
to declare appellants factually innocent under section 1485.55,
subdivision (b). We conclude declaring appellants factually
innocent in this regard would best serve the interest of justice.
(See § 1260 [granting appellate courts broad discretion to fashion
remedy that best serves principles of fairness and justice].)

5 We agree with appellants’ counsel’s summation that the
record contains “no evidence of guilt.”

4
DISPOSITION

We reverse the trial court’s order denying appellants relief
under section 1485.55. The matter is remanded to the trial court
with directions to grant appellants’ unopposed petition to be
declared factually innocent.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

CURREY, P. J.
We concur:

MORI, J.

ZUKIN, J.

5

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