People v. Elisarraraz CA4/3

CourtListener 10314367Calctapp15.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/15/25 P. v. Elisarraraz CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062613

v. (Super. Ct. No. 20CF1018)

SERGIO ELISARRARAZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange
County, Andre Manssourian, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D.
Butera, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
In 2021, defendant Sergio Elisarraraz pleaded guilty to one count
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of attempted murder (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; count 1) , one count of
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), and one count of
street terrorism (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 3). He also admitted he committed
count 1 with “willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation . . . and with the
specific intent to kill” and that counts 1 and 2 were committed for the benefit of
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1).) He further admitted two prior
strikes (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(2)(A); 1170.12, subd. (b)) and a serious felony
prior (§ 667, subd. (a).)
The court sentenced defendant to state prison for an aggregate
term of 17 years. In 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under
former section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6).2 After briefing from the parties, the
court issued an order to show cause in January 2023. The prosecution
responded by filing a motion requesting the court reconsider the order to show
cause. The court subsequently vacated the order to show cause and summarily
denied defendant’s petition for resentencing. Defendant appealed.
On appeal, defendant contends the court erred by denying his
petition at the prima facie stage. Relying on People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, defendant argues an intent to kill finding, without more, is insufficient to
establish his ineligibility for relief. For the reasons below, we agree the court
erred and reverse the order.

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)

2
FACTS
As the factual basis for his guilty plea in 2021, defendant stated:
“In Orange County, California, on May 3, 2020, I unlawfully, with willfulness,
premeditation and deliberation within the meaning of Penal Code section
664(a), and with the specific intent to kill, attempt[ed] to murder John Doe, a
human being. I also willfully and unlawfully committed an assault, or aided
and abetted in the assault, upon the person of John Doe with a deadly weapon,
namely a knife.” In three other paragraphs, defendant stated he: (1) committed
the attempted murder and assault with a deadly weapon “while knowingly and
actively participating as a member in the criminal street gang known as
Delhi”; (2) “willfully assisted, furthered, or promoted felonious criminal
conduct by members of Delhi by either directly committing the felony offenses
or aiding and abetting the felony offenses”; and (3) committed the offenses “for
the benefit of, at the direction of, and in association with . . . Delhi with the
specific intent to assist, further and promote criminal conduct by Delhi gang
members.”
In his petition for resentencing filed in 2022, defendant averred:
“1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that allowed
the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime, or attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 2. I was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at
which I could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder. [Citation.]
[¶] 3. I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder
because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective January 1, 2019.”

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The court appointed counsel for defendant and received briefing
from the prosecution and defendant. After a hearing, the court issued an order
to show cause. The prosecution filed a motion requesting the court reconsider
the order to show cause. The prosecution argued, among other things,
defendant was not entitled to resentencing because he admitted he acted with
the intent to kill. Defendant filed a reply.
The court subsequently vacated the order to show cause and held
another prima facia hearing, acknowledging its “oversight” in failing to
consider issues flagged by the prosecution. In a statement of decision, the
court denied defendant’s petition and explained defendant’s guilty plea
“contained a detailed, typed-out, factual basis wherein [he] admitted that on
May 3, 2020, he had the specific intent to murder the victim.” The court
concluded defendant “did act with the intent to kill on May 3, 2020” so he “was
convicted under a still-viable theory of [a]ttempted [m]urder.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the court erred by denying his petition because
his guilty plea was generic and did not exclude liability for attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. Relying on People v.
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433, he claims the court only made findings as to his
specific intent to kill but not whether he made a direct, ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing. For the reasons below, we agree the court
should conduct an evidentiary hearing.
Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of murder
“under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (Id., subd. (a)(1).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)

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(Stats. 2021, ch. 551 § 2) amended section 1172.6 to expand resentencing
eligibility to persons convicted of attempted murder. A defendant convicted of
attempted murder is eligible for relief under section 1172.6 only if that
conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
(People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.) Thus, a defendant convicted
of attempted murder either as an actual perpetrator or a direct aider and
abettor is not eligible for relief. (People v. Cortes (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 198,
204.)
In determining whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case
for relief under section 1172.6, the trial court may rely on the record of
conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 970–971.) “When the
petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea rather than a trial, the record
of conviction includes the facts ‘the defendant admitted as the factual basis for a
guilty plea.’” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1206, 1211–1212.) As our
Supreme Court explained, “The record of conviction will necessarily inform the
trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the court to distinguish petitions
with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971.)
“We independently review the trial court’s determination that the petitioner
failed to make a prima facie showing for relief.” (People v. Ramos (2024) 103
Cal.App.5th 460, 465.)
Here, the information charged both defendant and a co-defendant
with attempted murder in generic terms, according to the statutory definition of
the offense. It further alleged the attempted murder was committed “willfully,
deliberately and with premeditation.” The factual basis for defendant’s guilty
plea also was insufficient. “‘Attempted murder requires the specific intent to kill
[the mens rea] and the commission of a direct but ineffectual act toward
accomplishing the intended killing [the actus reus].’” (People v. Perez (2010) 50

5
Cal.4th 222, 224.) In his plea, defendant admitted he “unlawfully, with
willfulness, premeditation and deliberation” and “with the specific intent to kill,
attempt[ed] to murder” the victim. This admission regarding defendant’s mens
rea does not conclusively establish that he committed the requisite acts (the
actus reus) as either the actual perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor. (See
People v. Curiel supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [“A finding of intent to kill does not,
standing alone, cover all of the required elements”].)
The People disagree, arguing defendant’s guilty plea establishes he
was either the direct perpetrator or direct aider and abettor of the attempted
murder. According to the People, the record shows defendant took a direct but
ineffectual step toward accomplishing the intended killing because: (1) he
admitted he attempted “to murder” the victim; and (2) he admitted he
furthered criminal conduct of a criminal street gang by “directly committing”
or “aiding and abetting” the attempted murder and the assault with a deadly
weapon. We disagree. The admission that defendant attempted “to murder” is
generic, and the language that defendant “directly committ[ed]” or “aid[ed] and
abett[ed]” the offenses does not appear in the portion of the plea form
regarding the attempted murder count. Instead, it appears in the portion of the
plea form regarding the street terrorism count. The record also does not
establish the theory of aiding and abetting under which defendant admitted
guilt. Nothing in the record conclusively establishes he admitted guilt on a
direct aiding and abetting theory rather than a natural and probable
consequences theory. (People v. Gaillard, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 1212.)
For the foregoing reasons, the record of conviction did not refute
the allegations of defendant’s petition as a matter of law. The current state of
the law leads us to conclude defendant should be afforded an evidentiary
hearing.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is reversed and remanded for further
proceedings.

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DELANEY, J.

GOODING, J.

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