People v. Dawson CA6

CourtListener 10313585Calctapp14.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Dawson CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051092
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1348958)

v.

KENNETH DEAN DAWSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2014, defendant Kenneth Dean Dawson was convicted by plea of three counts
of second degree robbery (Pen. Code,1 §§ 211, 212.5, subd. (c)) and admitted 12 prior
strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12), three serious prior felony convictions
(§ 667, subd. (a)), and five prior convictions that resulted in a prison term (§ 667.5, subd.
(b)). At sentencing, the trial court struck 11 of the 12 prior strike convictions and
sentenced Dawson to 20 years in state prison.
In 2023, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to the trial court recommending recall of Dawson’s
sentence and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). In connection
with his resentencing, Dawson requested that at least two of the section 667, subdivision

1
All further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
(a) (section 667(a)) enhancements be stricken pursuant to recent amendments to section
1385. The trial court recalled Dawson’s sentence, struck the section 667.5, subdivision
(b) (section 667.5(b)) enhancement, reduced Dawson’s sentence by one year, and denied
his request to strike the section 667(a) enhancements under section 1385.
On appeal, Dawson contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his request to strike the section 667(a) enhancements because the evidence demonstrates
he does not pose a danger to the public, and the court relied on an impermissible factor in
declining to strike the enhancements.
For the reasons stated below, we decide the trial court did not abuse its discretion
and affirm the judgment.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Facts and Charges
On January 25, 2013, Dawson, who was then 53 years old and on parole, entered a
bank in San Jose wearing a hat and sunglasses and holding a rag over his face. He ran
into some of the standing signs in the bank while approaching the bank tellers and
smelled of alcohol. He yelled multiple times that he had a friend outside who had a gun
and would start shooting and demanded the tellers give him “ ‘all the money.’ ” Dawson
“grabbed at his pants” and witnesses thought he might have been armed. He handed a
plastic bag to three bank tellers in succession and walked out with $2,494. Dawson
attempted to flee in a taxi, but police stopped the vehicle and apprehended him.
A person working at an auto care shop near the bank reported to the police that,
immediately before the robbery, Dawson had asked him for gloves and a plastic bag. The
employee provided Dawson a pair of latex gloves but did not give him a plastic bag. He
observed Dawson walk over to a taxi and begin speaking with its driver. The taxi driver
reported that he had been dispatched to pick up a customer at the auto care shop. Dawson

2
These facts are drawn from the summary of the offense provided in the probation
officer’s report prepared for Dawson’s sentencing.
2
asked the driver to wait for him at the auto care shop because Dawson’s “wife was across
the street.” The driver reported that Dawson walked away and returned approximately
three to four minutes later.
On May 7, 2014, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a first amended
complaint charging Dawson with three counts of robbery in the second degree (§§ 211,
212.5, subd. (c)). The complaint also alleged that Dawson had been previously convicted
of personal discharge of a firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3), robbery (§§ 211,
212.5, subd. (b)), attempted robbery (§§ 211, subd. (b), 212.5, subd. (b), 664), and bank
robbery (former 18 U.S.C. § 4010B), each of which constituted a prior serious or violent
felony pursuant to sections 667, subdivisions (b) through (i) and 1170.12. The complaint
further alleged that Dawson’s prior convictions for personal discharge of a firearm with
gross negligence (§ 246.3), robbery (§ 211), and bank robbery (former 18 U.S.C.
§ 4010B) constituted serious felonies under section 667(a). In addition, the complaint
alleged that Dawson had served prison terms for convictions for possession of stolen
property (§ 496, subd. (a)), second degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (b)), willful
discharge of a firearm in negligent manner (§ 246.3), robbery (§ 211), and bank robbery
(former 18 U.S.C. § 4010B), pursuant to section 667.5(b).
B. Prior Criminal History
In 1978, Dawson was sentenced to four to six years in prison for bank robbery
(former 18 U.S.C. § 4010B), but due to his age—he was 19 years old at the time—he
“was found eligible for handling under the Federal Youth Corrections Act” and released
on March 19, 1982.
In 1983, Dawson was sentenced to 18 years and four months in state prison for
robberies and attempted robberies committed on the following days in 1982: July 25,
August 11, August 15, August 17, August 21, August 23, August 26, and August 27. He
was released on parole on May 1, 1993.

3
On October 14, 1993, Dawson was sentenced to eight years in state prison for
personal discharge of firearm with gross negligence (§ 246.3), robbery (§ 212.5, subd.
(b)), and attempted robbery (§§ 212.5, subd. (b), 664) for crimes committed in July 1993.
He was released on parole on June 4, 1997.
Dawson “incurred approximately 19 [p]arole violations between 1998 and 2013,”
and his parole agent stated that Dawson’s adjustment while on parole “was poor” and that
Dawson “had several positive drug tests and had difficulty remaining in compliance.”
C. Procedural Background
1. Mental Health Evaluations, Plea, and Original Sentence
Between July and December 2013, Dawson underwent five mental health
evaluations to determine whether he suffered from any mental illness and whether,
because of any such mental illness, he was unable to understand the nature of the case
and/or unable to assist his attorney in his defense. In December 2013, the South Bay
Conditional Release Program recommended that Dawson be committed to the
Department of State Hospitals for placement in a state hospital as incompetent to stand
trial. The Department of State Hospitals subsequently certified Dawson as being
competent to stand trial.
On September 11, 2014, Dawson waived his rights to a preliminary hearing, a jury
trial, and a court trial, and pleaded no contest to the three counts of robbery in the second
degree and admitted the 12 strike priors, the three serious felony priors, and the five
prison priors. The trial court indicated that, pending review of the probation report and a
Romero3 hearing, it would dismiss all but one of the alleged strike priors and would
sentence Dawson to a term of 20 years.
The probation report characterized Dawson’s strike prior offenses as “extremely
violent and callous in nature,” noting that he “robbed numerous businesses at gun point

3
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
4
and shot rounds at the police while evading arrest” and “continues to exhibit the same
criminal conduct over 35 years later.” It identified multiple aggravating factors in its
sentencing evaluation for the 2013 robbery, including that the manner in which Dawson
carried out the robbery indicated planning (“the defendant was in disguise and had a
getaway vehicle arranged”), and that Dawson engaged in violent conduct, had numerous
prior convictions as an adult, served a prior prison term, was on parole when he
committed the robbery, and had violated parole 19 times.
On January 13, 2015, the trial court held a Romero hearing, noting it had reviewed
and considered the probation report, Dawson’s motion, and the People’s opposition.
After hearing arguments by defense counsel and the district attorney, the trial court
granted the motion in part, striking 11 of the 12 strike priors over the district attorney’s
objection and retaining the most recent strike, personal discharge of a firearm with gross
negligence (§ 246.3). The court also struck four of the five prison priors. The court
sentenced Dawson to 20 years in prison, consisting of four years (the mitigated term of
two years, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law) for each of the charged counts of
robbery in the second degree, to be served concurrently, consecutive to 15 years for the
three prior serious felony enhancements (five years for each prior), and one year for the
remaining prior prison term enhancement.
2. Incarceration
Between 2019 and 2021 and while incarcerated, Dawson incurred five rules
violation reports including two reports of “overfamiliarity” and one of disobeying an
order. Four of these rules violations were classified as “[s]erious” and three of them
related to unsolicited and unwanted communications with female instructors at the
correctional facility and with an ex-girlfriend.
Dawson received counseling for additional rules violations occurring between
2017 and 2020, several of which involved disobeying orders. One of the incidents for
which Dawson received counseling involved his “attempt to again become overfamiliar
5
with” a prison employee after having been counseled against such behavior six days
before and despite having stated that he would cease contact with the employee. The
investigation into this incident “indicated Dawson [was] a threat to staff or inmates, or
the safety and security of the institution,” which led to the transfer of Dawson to another
institution. He received counseling for additional instances of unwanted and unsolicited
communications with others, including a university employee working at a Prison Arts
Collective and a retired police detective.
Dawson was commended for his administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) to an unconscious inmate in March 2020.
3. Resentencing
In or around 2021 and/or early 2022, Dawson submitted multiple filings seeking
resentencing pursuant to various provisions of and amendments to the Penal Code,
including amendments effectuated by the passage of Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1) (Senate Bill 81) and Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022
Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). On February 22, 2022, the trial court issued an order
stating that Dawson qualified for relief under former section 1171.14 and appointed
counsel to represent him.

4
Effective January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.)
amended section 667.5 to eliminate prior prison term sentence enhancements for all
crimes except sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019, ch. 590, § 1.) Senate Bill 483 then
added what was then section 1171.1 to make this change retroactive. (Stats. 2021, ch.
728, § 3.) Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature amended section 1171.1 to
redesignate it as section 1172.75, with no change to the text of the statute. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 12.) We hereinafter refer to the current version of the provision as section
1172.75.
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part, that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of
[s]ection 667.5, except for any enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually
violent offense as defined in subdivision (b) of [s]ection 6600 of the Welfare and
Institutions Code is legally invalid.” The sentencing court must recall the sentence and
resentence the individual, applying current law. (Id., subds. (c), (d)(2).)
6
On March 13, 2023,5 the Secretary of the CDCR (Secretary) filed a letter with the
trial court pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) (section 1172.1(a)(1))
recommending recall of Dawson’s sentence and resentencing due to a January 1, 2019
amendment to section 1385 that authorized courts to strike enhancements imposed for
prior serious felony convictions.6 The Secretary attached to the letter a cumulative case
summary and evaluation of Dawson setting forth his criminal history, including a
summary of the present offense, as well as his prison disciplinary record, education, and
self-help activities.
On March 13, the trial court appointed counsel for Dawson and ordered that the
hearing to address the Secretary’s letter authorizing recall and resentencing pursuant to
section 1172.1(a)(1) be joined with the pending hearing on recall and resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.75.
In the People’s resentencing brief, the district attorney stated that, pursuant to
section 1172.75, the trial court should recall Dawson’s sentence and reduce it by one year
based on the now-invalid section 667.5(b) prison prior enhancement. However, the
district attorney opposed the striking of the section 667(a) enhancements. He argued that,
because Dawson’s “criminal history is long, violent, and—but for his previous stints in
custody—uninterrupted since the late 1970s,” and because Dawson “invariably
committed new serious and/or violent felonies while on parole for other serious and/or
violent felonies,” the court should not strike the enhancements. The district attorney
further argued Dawson’s rules violations while incarcerated indicated that Dawson’s
“risk for future serious and violent criminal behavior” had not declined during his
incarceration. In addition, the district attorney observed that Dawson’s sentence was

5
Unless otherwise indicated, all further dates were in 2023.
6
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended section 1385 to remove what
had been subdivision (b), which stated that the provision “does not authorize a judge to
strike any prior conviction of a serious felony for purposes of enhancement of a sentence
under [s]ection 667.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, § 2.)
7
“already significantly lower than what it might have been” due to the original sentencing
court striking 11 of the 12 strike priors and sentencing Dawson to concurrent, rather than
consecutive, terms for the three counts of second degree robbery in the instant offense.
He argued that such initial leniency “weighs heavily against any further reduction” in
Dawson’s sentence other than the one-year mandatory reduction for the section 667.5(b)
enhancement.
Dawson filed a request for resentencing and asked the trial court to strike the now-
invalid one-year enhancement for his section 667.5(b) prison prior. In addition, he
argued that multiple mitigating factors weighed in favor of striking the enhancements for
his section 667(a) serious felony priors: the imposition of multiple enhancements; the
possibility that application of the enhancements could result in a sentence exceeding 20
years; the impact of his mental illness, including substance use disorder, on his offenses;
his conduct while incarcerated, including his administration of “life saving” CPR to a
fellow inmate; the age of his convictions; his acceptance into a treatment facility upon his
release; and his age.
On April 12, the trial court recalled Dawson’s sentence and resentenced him. The
court struck as invalid the one-year prison prior enhancement imposed pursuant to section
667.5(b). However, the court found the three section 667(a) five-year serious felony
enhancements were “justified and in the interest of justice” and denied Dawson’s request
to strike them. The court determined that, “after giving great weight and consideration to
the mitigating circumstances” raised by defense counsel, such mitigating factors were
“substantially outweighed by the substantial likelihood that the dismissal of the [section
667(a)] enhancements would endanger public safety.”
The trial court based its decision on multiple aggravating factors: Dawson’s
extensive criminal history, which “involve[d] the same behavior exhibited throughout his
entire adult criminal life”; his numerous parole violations, including offenses Dawson
committed—and for which he was convicted—while on parole, “shortly after being
8
released from prison”; his “numerous rules violations” while incarcerated; his “current
offense,” character, and future prospects; and his admission “that he has used alcohol or
drugs prior to committing a robbery to bolster his courage to commit the crime,” which
Dawson did not deny. The court also observed that the original sentencing court’s
sentence “was disparagingly lenient given his extensive record,” and opined that this, too,
“weigh[ed] against any further reduction in the sentence apart from the one-year
reduction mandated by Penal Code [s]ection 1172.75.” Relying on these factors, the
court concluded that imposition of the three section 667(a) enhancements was “justified
and in the interest of justice” and denied Dawson’s request to strike them. The court
sentenced Dawson to 19 years.
Dawson timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Dawson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request to
strike the section 667(a) enhancements because doing so would not have endangered
public safety. Dawson relies on the details of his criminal history that relate to mitigating
factors enumerated in section 1385—in particular, the imposition of multiple
enhancements and the age of the conviction on which the enhancements are based—
which he contends should be given “ ‘great weight,’ ” as well as his assertions that he has
not used a firearm in the commission of a crime since 1993, has not engaged in “any act
involving violence or force or even the threat of violence or force” and has not used or
sought to use alcohol since 2013, and has no history of “difficulty in his relationships
either with correctional staff or other inmates.” In addition, Dawson argues that the trial
court relied on an impermissible factor—its “personal animosity toward the sentence
originally imposed”—in reaching its conclusion that striking the section 667(a)
enhancements would endanger public safety.
The Attorney General contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion and
asserts that substantial evidence of aggravating factors—Dawson’s long and violent
9
criminal history and poor performance on parole, including the commission of additional
serious felonies while on parole—“neutralized” any weight that should be given to the
mitigating factors. He argues that Dawson’s abstention from violence and alcohol while
incarcerated “is immaterial to the danger he poses to the public when not imprisoned.”
The Attorney General maintains that the trial court’s “offhand comment” regarding the
purported leniency of the original sentence “does not eviscerate the substantial evidence
of [Dawson]’s danger to the public.”
A. Applicable Law
1. Section 1172.1
Section 1172.1(a)(1) authorizes the trial court “at any time upon the
recommendation of the secretary” to “recall the sentence and commitment previously
ordered and resentence” a defendant “in the same manner as if they had not previously
been sentenced.”
When considering resentencing, “[c]ourts should consider [s]ection 1385 of the
Penal Code, postconviction factors, or any other evidence that continued incarceration is
no longer in the interests of justice.” (Stats. 2023, ch. 446, § 1, subd. (b).) Section
1172.1 enumerates the following nonexhaustive list of postconviction factors courts must
consider: “the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that
reflects that circumstances have changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (Id., subd. (a)(5).)
2. Section 1385
Senate Bill 81, effective January 1, 2022, added subdivision (c) to section 1385
(section 1385(c)) through which the Legislature gave “greater definition to the concept
[of ‘furtherance of justice’] by enumerating certain mitigating circumstances” that the
trial court must “ ‘weigh[] greatly’ ” (People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087, 1090
10
(Ortiz)) when exercising its discretion in determining “ ‘ “whether to strike enhancements
from a defendant’s sentence.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1093; People v. Ponder (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052 (Ponder).)
Section 1385 provides, “(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss
an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if dismissal of that
enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “(2) In
exercising its discretion under [subdivision (c)], the court shall consider and afford great
weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that any of the mitigating
circumstances in [the subparagraphs to subdivision (c)(2)] are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the
enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger
public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of
the enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(2).)
As applicable here, the mitigating circumstances set forth in the provision include:
“Multiple enhancements are alleged in a single case. In this instance, all enhancements
beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B)); and “The
enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (Id., subd.
(c)(2)(H).) Despite the use of the term “shall” in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B),
resentencing courts retain their discretion to grant or deny a request to strike one or more
enhancements. In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker), the California
Supreme Court agreed with the decision in Ortiz that “the specification of mandatory
factors did not displace the trial court’s obligation to exercise discretion in assessing
whether dismissal is ‘in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1093; Walker, at p. 1029 [“We conclude that the plain language of section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2) contemplates that a trial court will exercise its sentencing discretion in

11
a manner consistent with the Ortiz court’s understanding.”]; id. at p. 1035; see also
People v. Anderson (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 233, 239–240 (Anderson).)
The Supreme Court concluded in Walker that, “[s]pecifically, absent a finding that
dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or
dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present. [Citation.] In other words, if the court
does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless
the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that
‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such
that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16
Cal.5th at p. 1029; see also id. at p. 1036; Anderson, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 239
[noting that the plain language of section 1385(c) “establishes[ that] the trial court has
discretion to dismiss sentencing enhancements; certain circumstances weigh greatly in
favor of dismissal; and a finding of danger to public safety can overcome the
circumstances in favor of dismissal”].)
B. Standard of Review
We review for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision not to strike a prior
serious and/or violent felony enhancement under section 1385. (See People v. Mendoza
(2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298 (Mendoza); People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367,
375 (Carmony).)
“The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.” (Mendoza, supra, 88
Cal.App.5th at p. 298.) Two principles guide our review. “First, ‘ “[t]he burden is on the
party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to
have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary
determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ”
12
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376–377; Mendoza, at p. 298.) “Second, a ‘ “decision
will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment
of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ” (Carmony, at p. 377.) In other words, “a trial court does not
abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable
person could agree with it.” (Ibid.)
C. Analysis
Dawson maintains that the trial court abused its discretion on two grounds. First,
he contends that, despite his “extensive criminal record,” he does not pose a danger to the
public if released earlier after the striking of one or more of the section 667(a)
enhancements. He argues that the offenses on which the section 667(a) enhancements
were based occurred “almost thirty years” before his resentencing, the 2013 robberies in
the instant matter were predicated on fear—rather than use—of a firearm, and he has not
committed any crimes or violent rules violations since he has been incarcerated. He
asserts that the record does not “establish that granting the requested relief, dismissing
one or more of his section 667[(a)] enhancements, would likely ‘result in physical injury
or other serious danger to others.’ ”
We decide the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting this conclusion.
Even though Dawson has not committed a serious or violent felony while incarcerated,
his prior and current offenses are serious and/or violent felonies—bank robbery, robbery,
and attempted robbery—and in each case, including the instant offense, involved either
the use or the threatened use of a firearm. Moreover, Dawson’s criminal and parole
history collectively demonstrate a strong tendency to violate parole and commit further
serious and/or violent offenses when he is not incarcerated. Indeed, based on his
probation report and the cumulative case summary and evaluation report attached to the
Secretary’s letter, since at least 1993, Dawson has regularly committed parole violations

13
or further criminal offenses within anywhere from a handful of days to two years after his
release from incarceration.
In addition, while we acknowledge the positive value of Dawson’s administration
of lifesaving CPR to a fellow inmate, his numerous rules violations while incarcerated,
including violations the CDCR classified as “serious” and at least one incident that
necessitated his transfer due to the threat Dawson posed to others, indicate that Dawson
also has disobeyed orders and rules and has engaged in unsolicited and unwanted contact
with others in his community. This evidence in the record undermines his argument on
appeal that he has no history of “difficulty in his relationships [] with correctional staff.”
We perceive no legal error in the trial court’s consideration of the mitigating
circumstance enumerated in section 1385(c) and the aggravating factors in Dawson’s
record. The court stated that it found, “after giving great weight and consideration to the
mitigating circumstances and the Penal Code [section] 1385[, subdivision] (c)(2) factors
in subparagraphs ([A]) through ([I]) that were argued by Mr. Dawson, they are
substantially outweighed by the substantial likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancements would endanger public safety.” It continued: “Here, Mr. Dawson’s
continued incarceration is in the interest of justice. His criminal history is long, violent,
and, but for his previous stints in custody, almost uninterrupted since the 1970s. [¶] Mr.
Dawson’s extensive criminal history, which is summarized in the People’s papers, by
itself is evidence of a continued need for Mr. Dawson’s incarceration. [¶] He has
committed many new and/or serious violent felonies while he was on parole for other
serious and violent felonies. [¶] The postconviction factors, including his numerous
rules violations, weigh in favor of continued incarceration.” We conclude that the trial
court reasonably considered and relied upon “substantial, relevant, and credible evidence
of aggravating factors to neutralize the ‘great weight’ of the mitigating circumstances.”
(Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036; see also Ponder, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 1052–1053; Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1099.)
14
Dawson also argues that the trial court considered an impermissible factor in
declining to strike his section 667(a) enhancements by taking into account the original
sentencing court’s earlier decision to strike 11 of Dawson’s 12 strike priors. In support,
he relies on People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215 (Gonzalez).
In Gonzalez, the defendant argued that the trial court committed error by “focusing
on whether [Gonzalez] ‘presently’ and ‘currently’ endangered public safety rather than
assessing whether, looking forward, public safety would be endangered due to an earlier
release from prison (i.e., in 50 years to life rather than in 75 years to life) if the
enhancement was dismissed.” (Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 224.) The
Gonzalez court determined “the trial court erred because it considered only whether
Gonzalez currently posed a danger to the public when assessing if a dismissal of the
firearm enhancement would ‘endanger public safety.’ ” (Id. at p. 230, some italics
added.) The trial court had “specifically explained, ‘I think presently [Gonzalez] does
represent a danger to society, and for that reason . . . I do think it is appropriate for the
Court to impose an additional 25 years to life for the gun use enhancement.’ ” (Id. at
p. 231.) Because the trial court in Gonzalez relied on that single factor for its decision,
and “gave no indication of how it would rule if it did not limit its inquiry to Gonzalez’s
current dangerousness” (ibid.), the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s error
was prejudicial. (Id. at p. 232.)
In contrast to the facts of Gonzalez, here the trial court considered Dawson’s
criminal, parole, and incarceration history, as well as his current offense, his character,
and his prospects, “after giving great weight and consideration to the mitigating
circumstances” raised by defense counsel, before concluding that the mitigating factors
were “substantially outweighed by the substantial likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancements would endanger public safety.” Although the court also considered the
original sentencing court’s “lenient” sentence, the court referenced this factor only once
during the resentencing hearing and focused its attention on the other enumerated factors,
15
including Dawson’s extensive criminal history, parole violations, rules violations while
incarcerated, his character, and his potential for recidivism.
The trial court’s detailed explanation of its grounds for denying Dawson’s request,
discussed in greater detail ante, indicate that it considered numerous factors, both
mitigating and aggravating, in reaching its conclusion, and did not rely solely or
predominantly on its perception of the original sentence. We determine that any error
made by the trial court in considering the “leniency” of Dawson’s original sentence was
harmless. (See People v. Mack (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1033–1034; see also
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 231–232.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

16
______________________________________
Danner, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Greenwood, P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H051092
People v. Dawson

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