CourtListener 10313537•People v. Jenks CA4/3
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Filed 1/14/25 P. v. Jenks CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G063476
v. (Super. Ct. No. FVI18001808)
HOWARD JENKS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino
County, Shannon Faherty, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with instructions.
Theresa Osterman Stevenson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
A jury found defendant Howard Jenks guilty of breaking into the
victim V.E.’s home and sexually assaulting her over the course of about three
hours. This resulted in guilty verdicts on, among other things, six counts of
sexual assault—three each of rape and forced oral copulation. At sentencing,
the court sentenced him consecutively on each of those counts, resulting in a
total sentence exceeding 150 years to life.
On appeal, Jenks first contends the court abused its discretion in
running the counts consecutively. The court based its ruling on the fact that
Jenks had many opportunities to stop and consider what he was doing but
decided to press on with the assault. We find no abuse of discretion in that
ruling and thus affirm the vast bulk of the sentence.
However, we agree that a two year determinate sentence for
criminal threats should have been stayed because the threats were part of a
single course of conduct to accomplish the sexual assaults.
Next, Jenks contends there was insufficient evidence to find
beyond a reasonable doubt that Jenks used a knife, which the prosecution
relied on to support an enhancement for use of a deadly weapon. However,
the victim specifically testified to feeling a blade against her neck and
hearing a clunk that sounded like a knife being put down, and the police
ultimately found a knife in Jenks’s possession when he was arrested.
Moreover, corroborating her trial testimony, V.E. told a nurse the evening of
the assault that her assailant had used a knife. Crediting the victim’s
testimony, as we must, the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Jenks used a knife.
Jenks also contends there was insufficient evidence of great
bodily injury. However, the lacerations and bruising found on various parts of
the victim’s body supported the jury’s finding.
2
Finally, Jenks contends the prosecutor committed error when he
commented on defendant’s testimony, stating, “Apparently, a complete set of
flat-out lies is no problem for the defense attorney.” The trial court recognized
that this comment was inappropriate, as do we. However, we agree with the
trial court that, in the grand scheme of the trial, this single comment was not
prejudicial. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTS
On June 28, 2018, V.E., aged 69, was living in a triple wide
mobile home in the city of Hesperia, San Bernardino County, with her adult
son Chris. Around 10 p.m., V.E. said goodnight to Chris, locked the doors,
and turned off the air conditioning before going to sleep in her bedroom.
Chris was in the family room. He was getting ready to go pick up his friend
James, who was at a party about a block away and needed a ride home. Chris
drove to the location of the party and was sitting in his car waiting for James
to come out when he saw Jenks and someone named “Bear” drive up in
Jenks’s car and go inside. They appeared drunk.
Chris had met Jenks about two years before, though they were
not friends. In fact, Chris had confronted Jenks about making sexual
advances on Chris’s girlfriend. Jenks denied it, though Chris did not believe
Jenks. Oddly, that confrontation ended with Chris providing Jenks with
drugs. Chris would later be convicted of manufacturing drugs, and at the
time of the incident in this case, he was on felony probation.
On the night of the rape, after Jenks went into the house where
the party was being held, James emerged and Chris drove him home, which
was about 10 minutes away. When Chris returned to his own home, V.E. was
already in bed. Chris remained in the den and living room until going to sleep
in the den around midnight.
3
At 1:30 a.m., V.E. awoke to Jenks holding a knife against her
neck, telling her to be quiet and not to say anything or he would slit her
throat. Jenks said Chris was selling drugs to little kids and owed him
$30,000. The debt had to be paid, and he was going to either rape her or kill
Chris and asked which one she wanted.
Jenks got on top of V.E. and started to pull her down off the bed.
When her feet touched the ground, she ran for the door and started to
scream, but Jenks hit her with a closed fist, splitting open the side of her
head. Stunned, she turned, and he hit her across the ear, splitting open her
ear. V.E. heard her nightgown rip. She did not see a knife but heard Jenks
place something metal which she believed to be a knife on her nightstand.
Jenks threw V.E. back on the bed, spread her legs and started having sex
with her. Jenks inserted his penis in her vagina and thrusted eight or ten
times before losing his erection. He then put his penis in her mouth and told
her to suck on it. V.E. complied because she was scared for herself and her
son.
Jenks began to lose his erection and pushed V.E. back on the bed,
climbed on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina a second time.
Again, he began to lose his erection, and pulled V.E. by the legs towards the
end of the bed and inserted his penis into her vagina a third time and
thrusted about 12 times. Jenks made V.E. get down on her knees and he
shoved his penis into her mouth. His penis became erect, and he pushed V.E.
back on the bed, got on top of her, and tried to insert his penis but was
unsuccessful.
Jenks told V.E. to get lubricant. She explained that she had nothing
like that because her husband had been dead for a long time. He dragged her into
the bathroom and told her to get something. V.E. was shaking so much that
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Jenks hollered at her to stop shaking. V.E. grabbed what she believed to be hand
lotion. Jenks dragged her back to the bedroom and put the lotion on her vagina.
He inserted his penis into her vagina and began having sex with her. Jenks
stopped and asked V.E. what she had grabbed because it was making him sore.
V.E. did not know. She later determined it was a grainy foot lotion. When she
told Jenks she did not know what it was, he dragged her back into the bathroom
to get something else. V.E. searched the bathroom drawers, found lotion, and
gave it to him. Jenks told V.E. to get on the bathroom counter and he spread her
legs and inserted his penis into her vagina. He dragged her back to the bedroom
and made her get on her knees and suck his penis. Jenks had V.E. get back on
the bed, he applied lotion to her vagina and had sex with her.
Jenks told V.E. that if she could make him “cum,” this would all
be over with. Toward the end of the incident, Jenks performed oral sex on
V.E. without her permission. In the end, Jenks pulled up his pants, looked
around, grabbed a hat, and told V.E. to remain on her bed until he had
enough time to leave. The entire incident from start to finish lasted about
three hours.
In total, Jenks had sex with V.E. ten times, eight times on the
bed and twice in the bathroom. On each occasion, after Jenks inserted his
penis into her vagina, it became flaccid, rendering the sexual intercourse
brief. Twice Jenks was incapable of getting fully erect and could not insert his
penis. To the best of her recollection, V.E. recalled she was forced to orally
copulate Jenks four times. He also choked her twice.
At one point, Jenks asked V.E. if she liked Katy and the baby.
The baby was her grandson (Chris’s son), and Katy was his mother. Jenks
threatened to kill the baby if V.E. reported him to the police.
5
As soon as Jenks left, V.E. grabbed a robe and ran to the family
room at the other end of the house and woke up Chris. V.E. was bleeding. She
told Chris she had been raped for the last three hours.
Chris ran outside to look for the perpetrator, but he did not see
anyone in the dark. Chris called 9-1-1. They did not know who the
perpetrator was at the time. V.E. said that she might have seen him at the
house before.
An officer showed V.E. a six pack photographic lineup. She
narrowed it down to Jenks and one other person, and ultimately picked the
other person. James came over later that morning and based on what he said,
Chris looked Jenks up on Facebook. Chris showed V.E. a picture of Jenks,
and she replied, “a thousand times, that’s him.”
Officers found a jar of Avon Foot Works scrub with Jenks’s
fingerprint on it and bloodstains on V.E.’s bed. On the floor was a pair of
women’s underwear that appeared to be cut on the sides.
V.E. was taken to the hospital where she received stitches for a
2.5 cm laceration to her left eyebrow and adhesive for a 2.5 cm laceration to
her left ear.
A forensic nurse performed a sexual assault examination of V.E.
The nurse described V.E. as cooperative and intermittently tearful. V.E. said
she had pain to her genitals. She did not believe Jenks ejaculated because he
was frustrated that he could not “cum.” V.E. had bruises all over her body,
including her face, ear, neck, arms, back, lower legs, and thighs. The bruising
on the back of her arms was consistent with being grabbed, and bruising to
her jaw/neckline was consistent with strangulation. V.E. had multiple tears
and lacerations to her vaginal opening. Because she was postmenopausal she
was no longer producing estrogen and her genitalia was less elastic and more
6
likely to tear. V.E. had had a hysterectomy removing her cervix, meaning it
would be less likely to recover DNA.
Consistent with V.E.’s testimony that Jenks never ejaculated,
swabs from V.E.’s rape kit showed no sperm. The vaginal, vestibule and
vulva swabs had male DNA, but it was overpowered by female DNA and
insufficient to effectively determine a male profile. However, the mons pubis
and perioral (area around the mouth) swabs had both V.E.’s and, to a very
high degree of certainty, Jenks’s DNA.
Jenks lived in a trailer about eight to ten miles from V.E. When
officers arrived, there was a pair of black jeans on the floor in the doorway.
Clipped to the inside of the left front pocket was a folding knife with a three
to four inch blade. Officers arrested Jenks at his residence.
Afterward, Jenks was physically examined. He said he had not
had intercourse in a week. A nurse took swabs of his mouth and genitals, and
a sample of his pubic hair and fingernail scrapings. The result was that V.E.’s
DNA was found on Jenks’s penile swab and hand swabs.
Jenks testified in his defense and explained that he did air
conditioning and heating for a living. Jenks met Chris through Jenks’s then-
girlfriend Christy and her friend Katy. Chris was having issues with
refrigeration lines on the side of his house and Jenks helped him out. That
was how Jenks met V.E.
Jenks did not deny having sex with V.E. On the day in question,
Jenks testified, he went to V.E.’s house to see if she needed any jobs done in
hopes of making money. He knocked on the door, and V.E. invited him in. He
asked about the air-conditioning and made a “flirty pass” towards her. That
progressed to him offering to perform sexual acts. They went to the bedroom.
First, he rubbed her feet with foot scrub, and then he gave her oral sex. V.E.
7
was worried her son would come home and catch them. He asked V.E. if she
was able to pay him, and she said no. He lost his temper, called her a
“fucking bitch,” punched her twice, and left. Jenks said he arrived around
9:00 p.m. and left 45 minutes later.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On June 6, 2023, a San Bernardino County jury found Jenks
guilty of first degree burglary with person present (count 1; Pen. Code, §
459)1, three counts of forcible rape (counts 2, 3, 4; § 261, subd. (a)(2)), three
counts of forcible oral copulation (counts 5, 6, 7; § 287, subd. (c)(2)(A)),
criminal threats (count 8; § 422, subd. (a)) and dissuading a witness from
reporting a crime (count 9; § 136.1, subd. (b)(1)). The jury further found Jenks
committed the forcible rapes and forcible oral copulation in the commission of
a burglary (§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)) and personally used a dangerous and
deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). The jury also found as to count 2
(forcible rape) that Jenks personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)). The jury was unable to make a finding on great bodily injury
allegations on the remaining forcible rape and forcible oral copulation
charges (counts 3-7), and the allegations were ultimately dismissed.
On September 14, 2023, the trial court sentenced Jenks to a total
term of 154 years to life in prison. The court imposed two years for criminal
threats (count 8), two years for dissuading a witness (count 9), and stayed the
sentence for burglary (count 1). For each count of forcible rape and forcible
oral copulation the court imposed consecutive terms of 25 years to life (counts
2-7). Jenks appealed.
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
8
DISCUSSION
I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RUNNING THE SENTENCES CONSECUTIVELY
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the court abused its
discretion in running Jenks’s sentences consecutively. The issue is
consequential: had the court run the sentences concurrently, Jenks would
have received a combined sentence of 29 years to life. Being aged 46, this
would allow the possibility that Jenks could be released during his lifetime.
As it stands, he will live out the remainder of his years in prison.
Penal Code section 667.61 specifically addresses the issue of
concurrent versus consecutive sentences in the context of certain sex crimes,
including the charges here, and it provides a framework for imposing
consecutive sentences under two circumstances. The first is mandatory: if the
“crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate
occasions,” then “a full, separate, and consecutive term shall be imposed” for
each crime. (§ 667.6, subd. (d)(1), italics added.) “A finding under section
667.6(d) that the crimes involved separate victims or occurred on separate
occasions eliminates the court’s discretion.” (People v. Catarino (2023) 14
Cal.5th 748, 753 (Catarino).) The second circumstance is permissive: if the
offenses “involve the same victim on the same occasion,” then “a full,
separate, and consecutive term may be imposed” for each crime. (§ 667.6,
subd. (c), italics added.)
Critical to this analysis is an understanding of how this statute
uses the term “occasion,” which takes on a technical meaning under the
statute. Subdivision (d)(2) provides: “In determining whether crimes against
a single victim were committed on separate occasions under this subdivision,
the court shall consider whether, between the commission of one sex crime
9
and another, the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to reflect upon the
defendant’s actions and nevertheless resumed sexually assaultive behavior.
Neither the duration of time between crimes, nor whether or not the
defendant lost or abandoned the opportunity to attack, shall be, in and of
itself, determinative on the issue of whether the crimes in question occurred
on separate occasions.” “Under the broad standard established by Penal Code
section 667.6, subdivision (d), the Courts of Appeal have not required a break
of any specific duration or any change in physical location.” (People v. Jones
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 98, 104.)
“The predicate finding that enables such sentencing under
section 667.6(d) is made by ‘the sentencing judge.’” (Catarino, supra, 14
Cal.5th at p. 754.)2 The court makes that determination by a preponderance
of the evidence. (People v. Groves (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1227, 1230.) “Once a
trial judge has found under section 667.6, subdivision (d), that a defendant
committed offenses on separate occasions, we may reverse only if no
reasonable trier of fact could have decided the defendant had a reasonable
opportunity for reflection after completing an offense before resuming his
assaultive behavior.” (People v. Garza (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1092.)
In selecting consecutive terms here, the court based its ruling on
both the mandatory and permissive prongs of section 667.6. The court stated,
“The test in this situation being whether there are acts and an opportunity
for reflection. Having heard the facts this this case, I think that there were
numerous times that there were chances to stop and reflect. There were
2 In Catarino, our high court held that this factual finding, which
results in consecutive sentences, does not violate Apprendi v. New Jersey
(2000) 530 U.S. 466, notwithstanding that the factual finding is made by the
judge instead of being made by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
10
times where positions were changed, that the acts were changed, going into
the bathroom, coming out. There are a number of situations and acts that
could be considered separate in this. [¶] I’m also going to acknowledge that I
do have the discretion to impose concurrent terms, but I am going to decline
to do that based on the facts in this case.”
We conclude the court’s ruling is sound on both prongs.
With regard to the mandatory prong, a reasonable fact finder
could conclude Jenks had an opportunity for reflection between the crimes.
The entire episode lasted three hours, which provided ample time for
defendant to reflect on his actions. V.E. testified that Jenks was continually
losing his erection and that the actual acts of rape generally did not last long
as a result. These instances all provided reasonable opportunities for
defendant to reflect on his actions and stop his assaultive behavior. The
assaults occurred in different locations, such as the bathroom and different
parts of the bedroom, which afforded defendant numerous opportunities to
reflect on his actions. Bearing in mind the technical definition of “occasion,” a
reasonable fact finder could conclude each charged sexual assault occurred on
a different occasion, and thus a consecutive sentence was mandatory.
In this regard, the present case is similar to People v. Garza
(2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1081, where the defendant drove the victim to a
remote location and forced her to orally copulate him. He then forced her at
gunpoint to undress. He then digitally penetrated her. Afterwards, he fondled
her breast. Then he raped her. Even the short intervals between the oral
copulation, the digital penetration, and the rape were deemed sufficient to
support the trial court’s ruling that consecutive sentences were mandatory.
(Id. at p. 1092-1093.) Here, the various sex acts took place over a longer
11
period of time, and Jenks’s consistent failure to keep an erection provided an
even more stark opportunity to reflect on his actions and cease the assault.
But even if the consecutive sentences were not mandatory, the
court acted well within its discretion in selecting consecutive sentences. The
crimes at issue here were particularly heinous, as they involved a home
invasion, a vulnerable victim, a deadly weapon, physical violence, and threats
against the victim’s loved ones. The fact that defendant lost his erection
multiple times, and thus had a natural opportunity to end the assault, but
pressed on regardless, shows a high degree of callousness. This was a
nightmare scenario for V.E. The circumstances of the case certainly
warranted consecutive sentences, and there is nothing in this record to
suggest the court abused its discretion in so concluding.
II.
THE PUNISHMENT FOR CRIMINAL THREATS SHOULD HAVE BEEN STAYED
The count for criminal threats was based on Jenks’s threats to
V.E. when he first woke her up in her bedroom, saying he would slit her
throat and/or kill her son if she did not cooperate. Jenks contends that
because these threats were incidental to the sexual assault, the 2 year
determinate punishment should have been stayed under section 654. The
trial court never addressed whether section 654 applies. We agree with Jenks
that the 2 year sentence should have been stayed.
Section 654 provides: “An act or omission that is punishable in
different ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under
more than one provision.” The purpose of the statute “‘is to ensure that a
defendant’s punishment is commensurate with his culpability and that he is
12
not punished more than once for what is essentially one criminal act.’”
(People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1252.)
“Section 654 precludes multiple punishment for a single act or
omission, or an indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Deloza (1998) 18
Cal.4th 585, 591 (italics added).) “Whether a course of criminal conduct is
divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the meaning of
section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for
any one of such offenses but not for more than one.” (Neal v. State (1960) 55
Cal.2d 11, 19, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Correa (2012) 54
Cal.4th 331, 334.)
On appeal, we review any factual findings by the court for
substantial evidence, but we decide de novo whether section 654 applies.
(People v. Valli (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 786, 794.)
The People argue that the court’s implied sentencing choice
should be upheld because the threat had a different criminal intent than the
sexual assault: to instill fear as opposed to satisfy Jenks’s sexual desires.
However, there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that Jenks had any
independent desire to instill fear; rather, the fear was to facilitate the sexual
assault. As the prosecutor argued in closing, “[W]hat was [Jenks’s] motive for
making these threats? Obviously, it was to get her to submit to the rapes.”
“Where the commission of one offense is merely ‘“a means toward
the objective of the commission of the other,”’ section 654 prohibits separate
punishments for the two offenses.” (People v. Wynn (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th
1210, 1215.) That is precisely the case here. Accordingly, the 2 year sentence
for criminal threats should have been stayed.
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III.
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE OF USE OF A DEADLY WEAPON
Next, Jenks contends there was insufficient evidence that he
used a deadly weapon (a knife) in the commission of the crimes. The gist of
Jenks’s argument is that V.E. never actually saw the knife, and she was
under a lot of stress that night, so her testimony that she felt a knife against
her neck and that she heard the knife being put down on the dresser should
be discounted, and the fact that Jenks was ultimately found with a pocket
knife on him was just a coincidence.
That sounds like a viable argument to make to a jury. However,
“In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we review
the record ‘in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine
whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713.) Maybe the stress of that night clouded
V.E.’s memory, or maybe it seared the events of that night into her memory
in sharp detail. That was for a jury to contemplate, not us. There was
testimony that Jenks used a knife, and the fact that he was found with a
knife corroborates the testimony. Moreover, a fact that neither party seems to
have noted is that V.E. reported to the nurse who treated her later that night
that her assailant had held a knife to her neck. That fact undercuts Jenks’s
argument that V.E.’s memory could not be trusted. The evidence at trial
easily satisfied the substantial evidence standard.
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IV.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS GREAT BODILY INJURY
Next, Jenks contends there was insufficient evidence of great
bodily injury, which the jury found in connection with only one of the counts
of rape (count 2). We conclude substantial evidence supports the
enhancement.
“Any person who personally inflicts great bodily injury on any
person other than an accomplice in the commission of a felony or attempted
felony shall be punished by an additional and consecutive term of
imprisonment in the state prison for three years.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) “As
used in this section, ‘great bodily injury’ means a significant or substantial
physical injury.” (§ 12022.7, subd. (f).)
“[D]etermining whether a victim has suffered physical harm
amounting to great bodily injury is not a question of law for the court but a
factual inquiry to be resolved by the jury. [Citations.] ‘“A fine line can divide
an injury from being significant or substantial from an injury that does not
quite meet the description.”’ [Citations.] Where to draw that line is for the
jury to decide.” (People v. Cross (2008) 45 Cal.4th 58, 64.)
The evidence from trial showed that V.E. suffered two
lacerations, one to her left eyebrow, and another on her ear, each of which
were 2.5 centimeters long. The eyebrow laceration was closed with stitches,
and the ear laceration was closed using an adhesive. Additionally, according
to the nurse who treated her that night, “She had lots of bruises all over her
body, actually, on her face and on her neck. She had multiple bruises on her
arms, on her back, the upper part of her back, on her lower legs, and then she
had bruising in the perineal area or the upper part of the thighs, and on her
lower legs also.” She also suffered multiple lacerations to her vagina.
15
The injuries V.E. suffered are consistent with injuries held to be
sufficiently great in past cases. (See People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 357
[laceration and severe bruising were sufficient evidence of great bodily
injury]; People v. Escobar (1992) 3 Cal.4th 740, 750 [bruising, abrasions, and
soreness constituted sufficient evidence of great bodily injury]; People v.
Medellin (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 519, 529 [laceration requiring three stitches
that hurt for a few days, left a small scar, and loosened false tooth sufficient
for GBI]; People v. Sanchez (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 718, 733-734 [multiple
contusions, lacerations, and abrasions constituted great bodily injury]; People
v. Jaramillo (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 830, 836 [contusions and swelling
constituted sufficient evidence of great bodily injury].) Of course, no two
injuries are the same, but the quantity and severity of the injuries in this
case were such that the jury could find them to be sufficiently great to satisfy
the enhancement.
However, that is not the end of the analysis in this instance due
to an unusual procedural quirk. At trial, the court inadvertently applied the
great-bodily injury enhancement to count 1, as opposed to count 2, which was
the jury’s finding. The court’s error was brought to its attention, and the
court subsequently struck the enhancement. However, it did not apply the
enhancement to count 2. The enhancement was not applied to count 2 in the
reporter’s transcript, the abstract of judgment, or in the minutes.
Although neither party has brought this omission to our
attention, the court’s failure to impose the enhancement was an unauthorized
sentence. Under section 1203.075, subd. (a)(6), the court had no discretion to
strike the great bodily injury enhancement. That section lists a number of
serious crimes, including rape, and states that a court “shall not” strike a
jury’s finding of great bodily injury inflicted in the commission of one of the
16
crimes. Accordingly, the court was required to impose the enhancement. “‘The
failure to impose or strike an enhancement is a legally unauthorized sentence
subject to correction’ [Citation], even if the correction results in a harsher
punishment.” (In re Renfrow (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1251, 1254.)
Accordingly, we will remand with instructions to the court to impose the
great bodily injury enhancement on count 2.
V.
ANY PROSECUTORIAL ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Jenks’s final contention is that the prosecutor committed
reversible error by disparaging defense counsel during closing argument. In
particular, in reference to Jenks’s testimony that he and V.E. had consensual
sex, the prosecutor stated, “The defense attorney wants to make it look like,
well, the defendant’s story is a simple one because it’s the truth. Apparently,
a complete set of flat-out lies is no problem for the defense attorney.” The
court sustained defense counsel’s objection that he was being attacked,
stating, “Sustained. Move on.” In response to a later motion for new trial, the
court acknowledged that the prosecutor’s comment was “disparaging” and
“unprofessional,” but the court concluded the comment did not affect the
verdict.
We review the court’s ruling for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Peoples (2016) 62 Cal.4th 718, 792-793.) We find no abuse.
“A prosecutor’s misconduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution when it ‘infects the trial with such
unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.’ [Citations.] In
other words, the misconduct must be ‘of sufficient significance to result in the
denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial.’ [Citation.] A prosecutor’s
misconduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair nevertheless
17
violates California law if it involves ‘the use of deceptive or reprehensible
methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.’” (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1202.)
“It is generally improper for the prosecutor to accuse defense
counsel of fabricating a defense [Citations], or to imply that counsel is free to
deceive the jury [Citation]. Such attacks on counsel’s credibility risk focusing
the jury’s attention on irrelevant matters and diverting the prosecution from
its proper role of commenting on the evidence and drawing reasonable
inferences therefrom. [Citations.] [¶] Nevertheless, the prosecutor has wide
latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel’s tactics and factual
account.” (People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846.)
Undoubtedly, the prosecutor’s single statement disparaging
defense counsel was inappropriate and the court properly sustained an
objection to it. However, to be reversible, Jenks must demonstrate prejudice.
“Error with respect to prosecutorial misconduct is evaluated under Chapman
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 (Chapman) to the extent federal
constitutional rights are implicated, and People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818 [(Watson)], if only state law issues were involved. Chapman is implicated
if the prosecutor’s conduct renders the trial so fundamentally unfair that due
process is violated.” (People v. Fernandez (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 540, 564.)
Here, we conclude the error was harmless under either standard.
The prosecutor’s comment was just one statement in a lengthy trial that
began on May 24, 2023, and ended on June 6, 2023. The statement was brief,
it was objected to, and the objection was sustained. Although the jury was not
admonished, the fact that the judge sustained an objection to the comment
sent the signal that the comment was not appropriate. The trial in this case
came down to a credibility contest between Jenks and V.E. In that context,
18
the jury was likely to interpret the prosecutor’s statement as a salvo against
Jenks’s account (“flat-out lies”) rather than an attempt to introduce a new
and irrelevant issue: defense counsel’s credibility. Jurors generally treat “the
prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an attempt to
persuade.” (People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 663.) There was simply no
reasonable chance that this single brief comment swayed the outcome of the
trial. Accordingly, any error by the prosecutor was harmless.
DISPOSITION
On remand, the court is instructed to stay the punishment on
count 8, criminal threats, pursuant to section 654. The court is also
instructed to impose the great bodily injury enhancement on count 2,
consistent with the jury’s finding. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed.
SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, J.
GOODING, J.
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