CourtListener 10312689•People v. Rodriguez CA2/4
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/13/25 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328706
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA070627)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
ORDER MODIFYING
OPINION
v.
[NO CHANGE IN
SAMANTHA RODRIGUEZ, JUDGMENT]
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT:
It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on December 19,
2024 be modified as follows:
On page 18, under the heading DISPOSITION, the
signature block was previously listed as: COLLINS, J.,
CURREY, P.J. and MORI, J.
The opinion is to be modified so that the signature block
now reads as follows: COLLINS, ACTING P.J., MORI, J., and
ZUKIN, J.
___________________________________________________________
COLLINS, ACTING P.J. MORI, J. ZUKIN, J.
Filed 12/19/24 P. v. Rodriguez CA2/4 (unmodified opinion)
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B328706
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. PA070627
v.
SAMANTHA RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Affirmed.
Stanley D. Radtke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellant Samantha Rodriguez appeals the denial of her
petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.61 at the
prima facie stage. She contends the trial court erred in its
application of the law of the case doctrine, and that her conviction
for conspiracy to commit murder does not render her ineligible for
relief on her convictions for attempted murder. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Charges and Convictions
An amended information filed March 20, 2012 charged
appellant and codefendants Horacio Gonzalez, Cristian Adame,
and Myra Rangel with conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182,
subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a), count 1); the attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murders of Sergio Abrego and
Miguel Castro (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, count 2); and shooting at an
occupied motor vehicle (§ 246, count 3).2 The amended
information alleged that the offenses were committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that a
principal—Gonzalez and Adame—personally used and
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), (d), (e)(1)).
1 Appellant filed her petition under former Penal Code
section 1170.95, which was renumbered to section 1172.6
effective June 30, 2022 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 10.) All further undesignated statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2 The amended information also charged codefendants
Gonzalez and Adame with numerous additional crimes, including
murder and attempted murder, stemming from other shooting
incidents. Appellant and Rangel were charged only with the four
crimes and related enhancements stated here.
2
Appellant and her codefendants were tried jointly. It is
undisputed3 that, at the trial, evidence was adduced that
Gonzalez and Adame were gang members with whom appellant
and Rangel associated. On or about March 15, 2010, appellant
and Rangel telephoned a rival gang member, Abrego. Posing as
an acquaintance of Abrego’s, appellant and Rangel invited Abrego
to meet them to “party.” An uncharged gang member drove
appellant and Rangel to the meeting location—an intersection—
and Gonzalez and Adame traveled there in a separate vehicle.
Appellant and Rangel called Abrego multiple times as they
traveled to and waited at the meeting location. When Abrego and
his friend Castro approached the meeting location in Abrego’s
van, Gonzalez and Adame repeatedly shot into the van. Abrego
was injured and the van was disabled; Castro was unhurt. Police
later recovered 18 shell casings from two different guns and one
slug at the scene. It is undisputed that appellant was not one of
the shooters.
As discussed more fully below, the trial court instructed the
jury4 on conspiracy, direct aiding and abetting, and the natural
3 Both parties draw their factual summaries from the
unpublished opinion in appellant’s and her codefendants’ direct
appeal, People v. Gonzalez (Oct. 26, 2015, No. B249598) [nonpub.
opn.] (Gonzalez). We refer to Gonzalez only “for background
purposes and to provide context for the parties’ arguments.”
(People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 978, fn. 2.) We do not
rely on the facts in Gonzalez to review the trial court’s
determination of appellant’s eligibility for resentencing at the
prima facie stage. (Id. at p. 988.)
4 The People requested that the trial court take judicial
notice of the record from appellant’s direct appeal, including the
3
and probable consequences doctrine. The prosecutor argued all
three theories during closing argument. The prosecutor also
emphasized that a key distinction among the theories was
whether each defendant “actually had an agreement to go kill.”
She argued, “if you do not believe that one or some of them were
involved in the conspiracy, then for those people that you don’t
believe actually had an agreement to go kill, you don’t find count
1.” As to appellant specifically, the prosecutor argued she was
guilty either due to her own intent to kill or her intent to aid and
abet Gonzalez and Adame.
The jury found appellant guilty of all the charges against
her, including conspiracy to commit murder. It also found the
enhancement allegations true and found that both attempted
murders were committed willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation. The trial court sentenced appellant to 25 years to
life on the conspiracy count, plus a consecutive term of 25 years
to life for the related firearm enhancement and another
consecutive term of 25 years to life for the attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Castro. The court
imposed and stayed sentence on all other counts and
enhancements. Rangel was convicted of the same crimes and
received an identical sentence.
clerk’s and reporter’s transcripts. Appellant also provided the
court with selected jury instructions and excerpts from the
reporter’s transcript. As the People point out in their unopposed
request for judicial notice of the record from appellant’s direct
appeal, the trial court did not address their request for judicial
notice below. We grant the current request for judicial notice.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.)
4
II. Direct Appeal
Appellant and her codefendants appealed. A different
panel of this court affirmed their convictions in an omnibus
unpublished opinion. (See Gonzalez, supra.) As relevant here,
appellant argued that the trial court improperly instructed the
jury on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. She
contended that the instructions “permitted the jurors to . . .
convict appellant for the natural and probable consequences of an
offense she didn’t aid and abet,” a beating.
In rejecting this argument, the appellate court noted that
the natural and probable consequences instruction erroneously
stated that conspiracy to commit murder could be a natural and
probable consequence of assault likely to produce great bodily
injury. The court found the error harmless, however. It stated:
“The error here was cured by the court’s proper instruction that
the conspiracy count required the People to prove defendants
agreed and intended to ‘intentionally and unlawfully kill’ and
‘had an agreement and intent to commit murder.’ Additionally,
the People repeatedly invited the jury to acquit Rodriguez and
Rangel on the conspiracy count if it applied the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The jury’s guilty verdict on the
conspiracy count—and its findings that the attempted murders
were willful and premeditated and not simply an escalated
consequence of a target offense—indicates that it rejected the
natural and probable consequences theory in favor of the People’s
lead theory of direct aiding and abetting.”
III. Section 1172.6 Proceedings
Appellant filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing on
June 23, 2022. The trial court appointed counsel for her and
ordered the People to file a response. In that response, filed
5
October 13, 2022, the People argued that appellant was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. They argued that the conviction for
conspiracy to commit murder was outside the ambit of section
1172.6, and relief was not available on the attempted murder
convictions because they rested on either a conspiracy or direct
aiding and abetting theory.
To support the latter argument, the People provided the
trial court with a copy of People v. Rangel (May 18, 2022, No.
B302169) [nonpub. opn.] (Rangel), in which a different panel of
this court found codefendant Rangel ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. In Rangel, the court found that the
portion of the Gonzalez opinion quoted above foreclosed relief
under section 1172.6. Applying the law of the case doctrine, it
reasoned that the Gonzalez court’s legal conclusion that the jury
rejected the natural and probable consequences theory in favor of
the direct aiding and abetting theory was essential to the
holding. (See Rangel, supra.) The court continued, “Because the
record of conviction establishes that appellant was convicted of
attempted murder and conspiracy to commit murder under a
direct aiding and abetting theory, she is ineligible for relief under
section 1170.95.” (Ibid.)
In her reply in support of her petition, appellant asserted
that the trial court could not consider Rangel because it was
unpublished, was not part of appellant’s record of conviction, and
was not law of the case due to a lack of privity between appellant
and Rangel. She further argued that she met the prima facie
standard because her jury was instructed with the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, and “there is no way to
determine from the record of conviction which theory or theories
of murder [sic] and attempted murder culpability the jury based
6
its conviction.” Appellant also argued that she made a prima
facie case because her jury was instructed on the kill zone theory,
“which imputed malice to petitioner as an aider and abettor.”
She attached transcripts of some oral instructions her jury
received, as well as excerpts from the prosecutor’s closing
argument regarding the natural and probable consequences
doctrine.
The trial court heard the matter on February 6, 2023. The
court asked appellant’s counsel if the findings that the attempted
murders were willful, deliberate, and premeditated foreclosed
relief. Counsel argued that they did not, because there was still a
possibility that the jury applied the natural and probable
consequences theory. Counsel also reiterated his arguments
about the kill zone and lack of privity required to apply the law of
the case doctrine; he asserted that “[w]hatever happened in
Rangel is not binding to [sic] the court.” The prosecutor
responded that law of the case applied “not just because it was
with regard to Ms. Rangel, but because it was with regard to the
actions in this particular case.”
The trial court stated, “While I agree with you, the law of
the case with Ms. Rangel is not in and of itself binding upon Ms.
Rodriguez, if the analysis is similar, I don’t want to put form over
substance.” The trial court then summarized the pertinent
portion of Rangel and explained that “the record of conviction
establishes the appellant, granted it was Ms. Rangel, but we also
have Ms. Rodriguez also [sic] convicted of attempted murder,
conspiracy to commit murder under a direct aiding and abetting
theory, and they had earlier, on the same page, indicated that the
jury’s guilty verdict on the conspiracy count and its finding that
attempted murders were willful, premeditated doesn’t - - it’s not
7
a consequence of a target offense. It indicates the jury rejected
the natural and probable consequences theory in favor of the
People’s lead theory of direct aiding and abetting. Without the
appellate court having spoken so concisely and clearly on this
issue, I think you would have actually made the prima facie case
because I’m not supposed to do fact-finding at this juncture. I’m
not. I’m allowed to rely on the prima facie case on appellate
decisions. I agree that while Ms. Rangel is not Ms. Rodriguez,
they were convicted of the same counts with the same analysis
that I believe is applicable. So it seems to me that based on that,
the prima facie case has not been shown, and I’m making a very
thorough record here so that should someone be reviewing this,
they will know what my thought process was.” The court then
found there was no prima facie case and denied the petition.
Appellant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature amended “‘the
felony murder rule and natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human
life.’” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959, quoting Stats.
2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f) (Lewis).) These changes mean that
“a defendant cannot be convicted of murder based on the doctrine
of natural and probable consequences, even with a showing of
malice aforethought. [Citation.] It is an invalid theory. Murder
liability requires a different, valid theory, such as direct aiding
and abetting.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462
(Curiel).) The same is true of attempted murder. (See § 1172.6,
8
subd. (a); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 548.)
Someone who was convicted of murder or attempted murder
under a now-invalid theory may seek relief by filing a petition
under section 1172.6. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.)
A conviction for conspiracy to commit murder is outside the scope
of the statute. (People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 34-36
(Whitson); see also § 1172.6.)
Section 1172.6 does not open resentencing to every
defendant convicted of murder or attempted murder. (People v.
Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715 (Strong); accord, Curiel, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 460.) Relief “is unavailable if the defendant was
either the actual killer, acted with the intent to kill, or ‘was a
major participant in the underlying felony and acted with
reckless indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d)
of [Penal Code] Section 190.2.’” (Strong, supra, at p. 710.) A
defendant seeking relief must make a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) The bar for this
showing is very low. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972.) The
trial court must accept as true the petitioner’s allegation that he
or she could not currently be convicted unless that allegation is
refuted by the record of conviction. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at
p. 463.)
“‘The record of conviction will necessarily inform the trial
court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6], allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall
purpose: to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with
a person’s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless
petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step
prima facie review process.’” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp.
9
463-464, quoting Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) The record
of conviction generally includes appellate opinions (Lewis, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 972), and the court may consider the procedural
history of the case recited therein, though not the factual
summary. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Beaudreaux (2024) 100
Cal.App.5th 1227, 1237-1238.) The court also may consider
relevant jury findings, which generally have preclusive effect
under the doctrine of issue preclusion. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th
at pp. 453-454.)
The law of the case doctrine is “related” to issue preclusion,
though it “has to do with the legal principles governing a
particular case in subsequent proceedings following an appeal.”
(People v. Beaudreaux, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1240, fn. 4,
emphasis in original.) It provides that “a principle or rule that a
reviewing court states in an opinion and that is necessary to the
reviewing court’s decision must be applied throughout all later
proceedings in the same case, both in the trial court and on a
later appeal.” (People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 94.) Law of
the case is applied “even in death penalty cases, and even where
the previous decision was rendered by a Court of Appeal, but we
do not apply it when an intervening decision has altered or
clarified the controlling rules of law, or when the rule stated in
the prior decision was a ‘“manifest misapplication” of the law
resulting in “substantial injustice.”’ (Ibid.)
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her
petition because it “merely adopted the decision of a separate co-
defendant’s appellate opinion, which upheld the conviction on
direct appeal by resolving disputed facts and exercising discretion
on direct appeal.” She further contends “this reliance by the trial
court upon a nonpublished opinion of a separate co-defendant
10
referencing another previous nonpublished opinion was error
because it is improper to rely on the statement of facts from a
prior appellate opinion [let alone an unrelated appellate opinion]
to determine the true facts of the case.” Appellant also cites
People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 50 (Harden) for the
proposition that the law of the case doctrine can never be used to
deny a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie stage. We
review the trial court’s ruling de novo. (People v. Muhammad
(December 9, 2024, B334294) ___Cal.App.5th ___, ___.)
The trial court was permitted to consider the “procedural
history” of the case as set forth in the direct appellate opinion,
Gonzalez. Although captioned with the name of appellant’s
codefendant, the Gonzalez opinion resolved appellant’s direct
appeal and was not merely “a separate co-defendant’s appellate
opinion, which upheld the conviction on direct appeal.” It is part
of appellant’s record of conviction, just like the jury findings it
articulates. There is also no indication that the trial court
impermissibly relied on the statement of facts from that opinion
or any other. To the contrary, the trial court correctly recognized
that it was “not supposed to do fact-finding at this juncture.”
To the extent appellant is referring to Rangel, we agree
that the unpublished opinion concerning a section 1172.6 petition
filed by appellant’s codefendant is not part of the record of
conviction in appellant’s case. However, the opinion served as an
illustration of the People’s substantive argument that appellant
was ineligible for relief as a matter of law due to the procedural
history of the case as detailed in Gonzalez. Close inspection of
the court’s ruling indicates that the court did not rely on Rangel
per se, but rather the underlying holding of Gonzalez quoted
therein.
11
Appellant contends that reliance was error under Harden,
supra, 81 Cal.App.5th 45, case law she did not present to the trial
court below. In Harden, defendant Harden, who had been
convicted of first degree murder after a trial in which the jury
was instructed on the felony murder rule, filed a section 1172.6
petition asserting that she could no longer be convicted of
murder. She attached to her petition a declaration stating that
she did not kill anyone and instead entered the victims’ home
through an open door, “saw ‘what looked like a man sleeping on
the couch,’ and ‘crept in and stole various items of property.’”
(Harden, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 48-49.) The trial court
denied her petition at the prima facie stage. In doing so, it
“[q]out[ed] several paragraphs from the factual background” in
the appellate opinion resolving Harden’s direct appeal and
“concluded that Harden’s declaration was ‘completely
inconsistent’ with trial testimony showing ‘[Harden] as the killer,
not anyone else.’” (Id. at p. 49.) The Court of Appeal initially
affirmed the ruling, noting that the direct appellate opinion had
“determined there was insufficient evidence to sustain a finding
that Harden’s role was anything other than [the victim’s] actual
killer.” (Id. at p. 50.) The court “concluded this ruling was law of
the case, and thus precluded Harden from asserting otherwise at
any subsequent hearing” on her section 1172.6 petition. (Ibid.)
The court subsequently granted Harden’s petition for rehearing
and received additional briefing on the law of the case doctrine.
(Ibid.)
In that briefing, Harden argued that “law of the case
cannot be invoked where there is a ‘“substantial difference in the
evidence’” on retrial of the particular issue.” (Harden, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at p. 50.) She “acknowledge[d] that if at a hearing
12
under subdivision (d) of [former] section 1170.95, the evidence
material to her role in the murder were substantially the same,
then law-of-the-case principles would compel the same legal
conclusion to be drawn, i.e., that she was the actual killer. But if
the evidence were materially different on that issue, Harden
maintains that law of the case would not apply.” (Ibid.) The
Court of Appeal agreed that “the law-of-the-case doctrine cannot
conclusively establish disentitlement” at the prima facie stage of
a section 1172.6 petition. (Ibid.) The court reasoned that it is
“impossible to know what the evidence will ultimately be at an
evidentiary hearing that has not yet occurred.” (Ibid.) It
ultimately affirmed the order denying Harden’s petition on other
grounds. (See id. at pp. 52-58.)
Appellant argues that under Harden, there are no
circumstances under which the law of the case doctrine may be
applied at the prima facie review of a section 1172.6 petition.
However, People v. Medrano (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 1254, 1264
(Medrano), cited by respondent, persuasively concluded that
“[t]he holding in Harden should be limited to prohibiting
application of the law of case doctrine at a prima facie hearing
where, as in Harden, the appellate court’s prior determination
concerned the sufficiency of the evidence at the petitioner’s trial.”
(Ibid.) Medrano found it appropriate to apply the law of the case
doctrine where it was concerned not with “an appellate court’s
prior determination of the sufficiency of the evidence at
appellant’s trial” but rather “with the effect of the jury’s finding
that appellant was guilty of both first degree murder and
conspiracy to commit murder.” (Ibid.) The court found that “the
key distinction” from Harden was that “[a]t a section 1172.6,
subdivision (d) evidentiary hearing, appellant could not introduce
13
new evidence that would affect the validity of the principle of law
enunciated” in the direct appellate opinion. (Ibid.) It explained
that “the petitioner in Harden theoretically could have introduced
new evidence to controvert the appellate court’s prior
determination that, based on the evidence introduced at trial, she
must have been the actual killer” (ibid.), whereas the appellant
in Medrano “cannot relitigate” the pertinent issues concerning
jury instructions and findings. (Id. at p. 1265.)
Appellant does not address Medrano in her reply brief, and
we find it more closely analogous to the case at bar than Harden.
As in Medrano, the direct appellate opinion here contains
procedural history and legal analysis—not factual findings or
conclusions regarding the sufficiency of the evidence— that
foreclose relief. Specifically, the court in Gonzalez concluded
that the jury necessarily rejected the natural and probable
consequences doctrine in favor of a still-valid direct aiding and
abetting theory. This conclusion was one of law based on the
instructions and verdict and accordingly may be considered law
of the case in the section 1172.6 context. (See Medrano, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1264-1265; see also People v. Campbell (2023)
98 Cal.App.5th 350, 371-375 [declining to apply law of the case
doctrine in section 1172.6 context where the point at issue was
“heavily fact- and evidence-based”].)
Appellant contends the law of the case doctrine cannot
apply for another reason: the direct appellate opinion “did not
address the actus reus component at all; instead, it merely found
sufficient evidence of intent to kill,” and that is insufficient to
foreclose relief under Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th 433. We are not
persuaded.
14
In Curiel, the Supreme Court considered “the effect of the
jury’s true finding on the gang-murder special circumstance,
specifically its finding that Curiel intended to kill, on his ability
to state a prima facie case for relief” under section 1172.6.
(Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 440-441.) It concluded that “the
jury’s intent to kill finding was properly given preclusive effect in
the resentencing proceedings,” but held it was improper for the
trial court to deny the petition at the prima facie stage based
solely on that finding because a “finding of intent to kill does not,
itself, conclusively establish that Curiel is ineligible for relief.”
(Id. at p. 441.) The Court reasoned that the section 1172.6
petition “put at issue all the elements of murder under current
law,” including mens rea and actus reus, and a “finding of intent
to kill, viewed in isolation, establishes neither.” (Ibid.)
Specifically, a finding of intent to kill does not establish that an
aider and abettor knew that the perpetrator intended to commit
the fatal act, intended to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
that act, knew that the act was dangerous to human life, or acted
in conscious disregard of human life, all of which are required to
establish direct aiding and abetting liability. (Curiel, supra, at p.
463; see also id. at pp. 466-467.) As an example, the court
observed that “a defendant could act with intent to kill but at the
same time believe the actual perpetrator could never risk harm to
another human being—and be genuinely surprised when the
actual perpetrator commits a life-endangering act.” (Id. at p.
470.) The court recognized that such a scenario, in which a
defendant would be liable for murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine but not a direct aiding and
abetting theory, likely occurs in “a ‘very small set of cases.’”
(Ibid.) However, it cautioned that “the question is not whether it
15
is likely a defendant could have felt and acted in such a way, but
whether the court’s jury instructions foreclose that possibility as
a matter of law.” (Ibid., emphases in original.)
Thus, to deny relief at the prima facie stage under Curiel,
“we must be confident the jury necessarily found the actus reus
[and mens rea] required for direct aiding and abetting murder.
That is, regardless of the facts, the jury must have made the
required finding based on the instructions provided by the trial
court.” (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 467, emphasis in original.)
The analysis depends on the specific jury instructions given and
findings made in a particular case: “jury instructions in other
cases might be materially different, and they might have
required different factual findings by the jury.” (Id. at p. 471.)
Appellant contends the jury’s guilty verdict on the
conspiracy to commit murder count is insufficient to foreclose
eligibility for relief at the prima facie stage under Curiel because
it “did not include findings that appellant personally committed
the attempted murders or was present when the attempted
murders were committed.” She does not clarify how the absence
of these particular findings undermines convictions based on the
still-valid theory of direct aiding and abetting, which does not
require that the petitioner be the actual killer or be present at
the scene. (See Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 463 [stating
liability requirements for aiding and abetting express and
implied malice murder]; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th
981, 992.)
Appellant further asserts that a person “may enter into a
conspiracy to commit murder, and be convicted of conspiracy,
without actually committing murder.” She contends that may
have happened in this case, albeit with regard to the attempted
16
murder counts, because the conspiracy instruction the jury
received contained the same error as the instruction given in
Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th 22. We disagree.
The crime of conspiracy generally has four elements: “(1)
the existence of an agreement between at least two persons; (2)
the specific intent to agree to commit an offense; (3) the specific
intent to commit the offense that is the object of the agreement;
and (4) an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, which may
be committed by any conspirator.” (People v. Ware (2022) 14
Cal.5th 151, 163 (Ware).) The prosecution accordingly must
prove two distinct but closely related mens rea elements: “the
specific intent both to agree to the conspiracy and to commit the
object offense.” (Id. at p. 164.) Where the object offense is
murder, it “‘requires a finding of unlawful intent to kill, i.e.,
express malice’” and “‘is necessarily conspiracy to commit
premeditated and deliberated first degree murder.’” (Id. at p.
167; see also Whitson, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at pp. 31-32.) Thus,
where a jury has been properly instructed that conspiracy to
commit murder requires an intent to commit murder, its guilty
finding on the conspiracy may preclude resentencing relief for the
underlying murder or attempted murder conviction. (Whitson,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 32.)
In Whitson, the jury was not so instructed. The court used
the CALJIC pattern instructions but, “for reasons unknown …
the trial court struck the language in the pattern instruction for
CALJIC No. 6.10 that would have instructed the jury that it was
required to find that Whitson intended to commit murder” in
addition to intending to agree to the conspiracy. (Whitson, supra,
79 Cal.App.5th at p. 33.) The court concluded that the omission
precluded it from determining that Whitson was ineligible for
17
section 1172.6 relief at the prima facie stage. (Ibid.) Appellant
contends the “same flawed instruction was given in this case,”
but that is inaccurate. Here, the trial court instructed the jury on
conspiracy with a modified version of CALCRIM No. 563. The
instruction as given required the jury to find that appellant
intended to agree and did agree to join to the conspiracy to kill
and that she “and one or more of the other alleged members of
the conspiracy intended that one or more of them would
intentionally or unlawfully kill.” The instruction also referred
the jury to the instruction on the object offense of murder,
CALCRIM No. 520, which correctly instructed the jury on the
union of actus reus and mens rea, including “a state of mind
called malice aforethought.” Thus, in convicting appellant of
conspiracy to commit murder, the jury necessarily found she
joined a conspiracy that had murder as its object, was aware of
the actual killers’ intent, and personally intended to kill. She
could not have been convicted of conspiracy to murder or the
resultant attempted murders based on imputed malice. (See
People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 871.) The trial
court did not err or violate appellant’s due process rights by
denying the petition.
DISPOSITION
The trial court order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J.
We concur:
CURREY, P. J. MORI, J.
18
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