People v. Merrill CA3

CourtListener 10311364Calctapp09.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/9/25 P. v. Merrill CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Placer)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099569

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 62178605)

v.

CHRISTOPHER MATTHEW MERRILL,

Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted defendant Christopher Matthew Merrill of two counts of child
molestation with a prior conviction (Pen. Code, § 647.6, subd. (c)(2))1 and one count of
exhibiting harmful material to a minor (§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2)). In a bench trial, the court
found true Merrill’s prior convictions for child molestation in 2009 and 2017, as well as

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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multiple aggravating circumstances under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421.2 The
trial court sentenced Merrill to an aggregate term of seven years four months in state
prison.
On appeal, Merrill contends the trial court abused its discretion by denying a 60-
day continuance for retained counsel to prepare for trial. Merrill also contends the court
erred in failing to sentence him to the lower term under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),
enacted by Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 567) (Stats. 2021, ch.
731, § 1.3, eff. Jan. 1, 2022). We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In July 2020, 12-year-old J.K. met Merrill, who was in his 30’s, at a local park.
J.K. and Merrill exchanged text messages about relationships and girls. In a message
sent in mid-November 2020, Merrill referred to J.K. as his “sugar baby” and wrote,
“Love you more than you will ever know.” J.K. and Merrill arranged to meet at J.K.’s
grandmother’s house, where J.K. planned to sneak outside and give Merrill a hug. J.K.
met Merrill about “three or four” times. Merrill once made a sexual advance towards
J.K.
On the night of November 18, 2020, J.K.’s mother caught him sneaking out of the
house on his bicycle. J.K. claimed he was meeting a friend. Upon checking his cell
phone, J.K.’s mother discovered a text message J.K. had sent to Merrill stating, “got
caught sneaking outside.” Unfamiliar with Merrill’s name as one of J.K.’s friends, she
searched the Megan’s Law website for individuals in the area near the park, found
Merrill’s name and photograph, and reported the messages to the police.
J.K. was interviewed by a police detective, and a search of Merrill’s residence
ensued. During the search, Merrill admitted to meeting J.K. in the park and

2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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acknowledged being aware of J.K.’s age. Police recovered a cell phone belonging to
Merrill’s roommate, who stated that Merrill often used the phone to access social media.
The phone contained conversations between Merrill and another minor, E.V., from
September 2020. E.V. was 17 years old. Merrill discussed his preferred penis size and
disclosed that he had been in trouble for speaking to a 12-year-old boy in a sexual
manner. Merrill and E.V. arranged a video call using Merrill’s roommate’s phone.
During the call, E.V. and Merrill engaged in “mutual masturbation.” Merrill denied to
police that he had used his roommate’s phone to communicate with E.V. on social media.
In January 2023, a first amended information charged Merrill with three crimes:
two counts of child molestation with prior convictions from 2009 and 2017 (§ 647.6,
subd. (c)(2); counts one & two) and one count of exhibiting harmful material to a minor
(§ 288.2, subd. (a)(2); count three). The information also alleged seven aggravating
circumstances under rule 4.421: the victims were particularly vulnerable
(rule 4.421(a)(3)); the manner in which the crimes were carried out indicated planning,
sophistication, or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)); Merrill took advantage of a position
of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)); Merrill’s prior convictions as an adult were numerous or
increasingly serious (rule 4.421(b)(2)); Merrill had served a prior prison term
(rule 4.421(b)(3)); Merrill was on parole at the time of the crimes (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and
Merrill’s performance on parole was unsatisfactory (rule 4.421(b)(5)).
In March 2023, the jury found Merrill guilty on all counts. Merrill waived a jury
trial on the prior convictions and aggravating circumstances. The trial court found both
prior convictions true.3 Additionally, the trial court found the aggravating circumstances

3 The trial court also permitted the prosecution to present evidence under Evidence Code
section 1108 of Merrill’s prior convictions for possession of child pornography (§ 311.11,
subd. (a)) in 2008 and child molestation (§ 647.6, subd. (c)(1)) in 2009.

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under rule 4.421(a)(8), (b)(2), (3), (4), (5) true as to all three counts and the
circumstances under rule 4.421(a)(3), (11) true as to count one.
In September 2023, the trial court sentenced Merrill to the upper term of six years
on count one, one year four months (one-third the middle term) on count two, and the
middle term of two years on count three, which was stayed under section 654, resulting in
an aggregate sentence of seven years four months in state prison. Merrill timely
appealed.
DISCUSSION
I
Denial of Continuance
Merrill contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it permitted a law
firm to substitute in as his retained counsel but denied counsel a 60-day continuance to
prepare for trial. We find no abuse of discretion.
A. Procedural Background
In April 2021, the People filed the initial felony complaint. Merrill was first
represented by a retained attorney who requested to be relieved, and then briefly by the
public defender. In June 2021, a different and newly retained counsel, Julia Young,
substituted in for the public defender. In September 2022, the case was set for trial
assignment on January 6, 2023, with the jury trial scheduled to begin on January 9, 2023.
On January 3, 2023, defense counsel Young filed a motion for continuance based
on a conflict with a civil trial also set for January 9, 2023. The trial court heard the
motion the next day. Defense counsel argued that she would not be ready to try the case
until March 27, 2023, explaining that she had met with Merrill for four hours on
December 27 to discuss the case, and there were numerous issues Merrill wished for her
to investigate, which she had not been able to pursue due to her schedule. The People
opposed the motion, arguing that defense counsel selected the January 9 trial date and
that a criminal case involving minor victims takes precedence over a civil case. Defense

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counsel further argued that Merrill was facing a lengthy sentence and it was essential for
her to be fully prepared. The trial court found good cause to continue the trial and, after
conferring with defense counsel, set the case for trial on February 27, with an interim
date of February 1. The trial court admonished counsel to be prepared to proceed to trial
on the morning of February 27.
On February 1, 2023, yet another attorney, Stacey Madsen, appeared on behalf of
attorney Marion Titus, who was representing Merrill in a different matter. Attorney
Madsen stated that she was asked to appear “as a friend of the court” to request a
continuance, explaining that prior counsel, Julia Young, was no longer retained, and
Titus’s firm had been hired. She further explained that the new firm needed time to
review discovery in this matter. Attorney Madsen offered to file a written motion, which
the court indicated would be necessary in the event of an objection. The court denied
Madsen’s oral request for a continuance and advised that the next court date was
February 24 for trial assignment.
On February 15, 2023, the People filed an opposition to the motion to continue the
trial. The People argued that defense counsel had presumably received all the discovery
previously provided to prior counsel. The case had been filed in 2021 and had been set
for trial since October 2022. The case had already been continued over the People’s
objection, and the People objected to a further continuance, noting that the victims were
minors and that the People were not waiving time.
On February 16, 2023, attorney Titus filed a motion for continuance, stating that
she had been assigned the case within her firm the previous week and needed additional
time to review discovery, confirm whether all discovery had been received, and review it
with Merrill. The next day, she filed another motion for continuance to review discovery,
claiming that she received 7.38 gigabytes of discovery on February 14.

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On February 24, 2023, a different judge from the one who set the trial date heard
the motion to continue. The judge was initially under the impression that the case was
scheduled for trial that day. Attorney Titus argued that her firm was retained on
February 1 and the People disclosed approximately 15,000 pages of discovery on
February 14. She stated that it was impossible to review the discovery and be ready for
trial by the scheduled date. The People responded that only 991 pages of discovery had
been provided, 800 pages of which consisted of prior cases, and all of the discovery had
been provided to prior counsel in October 2022. The People further argued that newly
retained counsel should not have accepted the case knowing the trial date and that Merrill
had already been represented by multiple defense attorneys. The People accused Merrill
of attempting to delay the trial. The attorney acknowledged she might have been
mistaken about the volume of discovery but argued that 900 pages was still too much to
prepare for trial. The trial court denied the continuance, stating that newly retained
counsel took the case knowing the trial dates and that a change of counsel did not
automatically warrant a trial postponement. The trial court assigned the case for trial on
February 28.
On February 28, 2023, yet another attorney and principal of the firm, Mario Tafur,
filed a motion for a continuance, stating that Merrill did not wish for attorney Titus to
represent him but that another attorney from the same firm was ready and acceptable to
Merrill. The same day, the People filed an opposition, arguing that Merrill was
attempting to avoid trial by continually substituting counsel. The trial court heard the
motion that day. The attorney argued that due to a breakdown in communication and
trust with the previous attorney, Merrill sought a continuance until May 16. The attorney
stated that the previous attorney had failed to prepare the case and proposed that another
attorney take over. The trial court ordered that the previous attorney, Marion Titus, not
the firm, remained counsel of record and needed to appear to state whether she was ready
to proceed. After a brief recess, attorney Titus appeared and stated she was not ready, in

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part due to the large amount of discovery. The trial court granted a one-week continuance
until March 7.
On March 2, 2023, attorney Titus filed a motion to continue the trial, stating that
Merrill had a heart complication and was hospitalized. Merrill’s mother provided a
declaration stating that on February 28, Merrill came home from court, believed he was
experiencing recurrent atrial fibrillation, called for an ambulance, and was transported to
the hospital. As of March 1, Merrill’s mother did not know when he would be released.
On March 6, 2023, another attorney filed a supplemental motion to continue the
trial for 60 days, explaining that defense counsel substituted in five weeks prior, had not
had adequate time to review over 1,000 pages of discovery, investigate the case, or
interview witnesses. The attorney also noted that the People planned to introduce
evidence of Merrill’s prior charged acts and convictions.
On March 7, 2023, the trial court heard the motion to continue. The attorney
appeared and argued that she was not ready to proceed. The trial court noted that
attorney Titus remained counsel of record and had been ordered to appear that day. The
court stated attorney Titus needed to be present and was not relieved. The trial court
denied the requested continuance.
B. Legal Background
The right to a continuance to allow newly retained counsel to prepare for trial is
not absolute. (People v. Courts (1985) 37 Cal.3d 784, 790-791 (Courts).) Section 1050,
subdivision (a), requires that criminal cases be heard and determined “at the earliest
possible time.” In furtherance of this objective, a trial court can grant a continuance only
on a showing of good cause. (Id., subd. (e); see also rule 4.113 [requiring moving party
to present “affirmative proof in open court that the ends of justice require [the]
continuance”].)
“Generally, the granting of a continuance is within the discretion of the trial
court.” (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 790; People v. Jeffers (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 840,

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850.) “[T]rial courts should accommodate such requests—when they are linked to an
assertion of the right to retained counsel—‘to the fullest extent consistent with effective
judicial administration.’ ” (Courts, at p. 791.) However, “[a] continuance may be denied
if the accused is ‘unjustifiably dilatory’ in obtaining counsel, or ‘if he arbitrarily chooses
to substitute counsel at the time of trial.’ ” (Id. at pp. 790-791.)
“The party challenging a ruling on a continuance bears the burden of establishing
an abuse of discretion, and an order denying a continuance is seldom successfully
attacked.” (People v. Beames (2007) 40 Cal.4th 907, 920.) “[D]iscretion is abused only
when the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all circumstances being considered.”
(Ibid.) “Although ‘a myopic insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable
request for delay can render the right to defend with counsel an empty formality[,] . . .
[t]here are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary
as to violate due process.’ ” (Id. at p. 921.) In deciding whether the denial of a
continuance was so arbitrary as to violate due process, the reviewing court looks to the
circumstances of each case, “ ‘ “particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at
the time the request [was] denied.” ’ ” (Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 791.)
C. Analysis
Merrill presumes that the trial court permitted new counsel to become counsel of
record, but the trial court made it clear that attorney Marion Titus remained counsel of
record, having been granted a continuance and ordered to appear for trial on March 7.
We conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in requiring attorney Titus to
represent Merrill and denying a further continuance, given the rotating roster of attorneys
presenting a shifting array of reasons for a continuance.
When attorney Madsen initially appeared for attorney Titus on February 1,
requesting a continuance, the case was set for trial on February 27, a date previously
agreed upon by prior counsel. Merrill retained new counsel, fully aware of the trial date
and without any assurance that a further continuance would be granted. Counsel sought

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continuances on multiple occasions, including February 1, February 16, 17, 28, and
March 6, citing insufficient time to review discovery and prepare for trial. Despite
having five weeks from February 1 to review discovery and prepare, counsel instead
sought additional continuances, including one on the day of trial (People v. Jeffers, supra,
188 Cal.App.3d at p. 850 [“Where a continuance is requested on the day of trial, the
lateness of the request may be a significant factor justifying denial absent compelling
circumstances to the contrary’’]; Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 792, fn. 4), even after the
court had already granted multiple continuances (see People v. Blake (1980)
105 Cal.App.3d 619, 624 [additional continuance denied where the defendant already
“was granted several continuances”]; see also People v. Reaves (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d
852, 856). On February 28, the principal of the firm, attorney Tafur, filed a motion for
continuance, claiming Merrill did not approve of prior counsel and admitting that prior
counsel had failed to prepare the case, but proposing new counsel as an alternative.
Nonetheless, prior counsel then filed another motion on March 2, citing Merrill’s heart
condition and hospitalization as reasons for the delay.
Lastly, we note that on March 7, the day trial was scheduled to begin, the People
confirmed that 13 witnesses, including the victims, were ready to proceed, with
arrangements having been made for one victim to be picked up from another city to
attend the trial, and the trial court stated that a jury was scheduled to arrive at 1:00 p.m.
(Cf. Courts, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 794-795 [continuance should have been granted
where there was no showing that a continuance would have inconvenienced jurors or
witnesses].)
On this record, we do not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by
denying Merrill’s motion for a 60-day continuance on the day of trial.

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II
Senate Bill 567
Merrill contends that, after his mother presented evidence that he had previously
been molested by a teacher and the molestation contributed to the current offense, the
trial court erred in failing to impose the lower term under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)(A) without making a finding that aggravating circumstances outweighed
mitigating circumstances.
Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), enacted by Senate Bill 567, provides that “unless
the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances
that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of justice, the court
shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a contributing factor
in the commission of the offense . . . .” Merrill maintains the applicable mitigating factor
enumerated in the statute is: “(A) The person has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual
violence.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A).)
At the sentencing hearing, Merrill’s mother explained, “We would not be here
today had it not been for a schoolteacher molesting [Merrill] for a period of over two
years . . . .” She stated that Merrill developed questionable behaviors after being
mentored by a teacher in sixth grade. Years later, after Merrill turned 18, moved into an
apartment arranged by the teacher, and was arrested, he admitted to being molested. He
recorded conversations with the teacher in which the teacher admitted to the misconduct,
leading to the teacher’s arrest and prosecution.
The probation report included Merrill’s account of being molested by a teacher.
As a mitigating factor, the report stated: “The defendant experienced childhood trauma,
including sexual abuse, which appears to have been a factor in the commission of the
defendant’s crime.” (Rule 4.423(b)(3).)

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At sentencing, the trial court stated that it had considered the factors in
aggravation and mitigation. Designating count one, charging molestation of J.K., as the
principal term, the court noted that it had considered all seven aggravating factors found
true. The court also acknowledged mitigating factors, finding that Merrill “was a victim
of abuse as a child and as a young teenager,” based on his statement to the probation
department and statements made during the hearing. Additionally, the court recognized
that Merrill “suffers from mental health difficulties and is currently taking medication for
these problems.”
The trial court did not address or reference section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) during
sentencing, nor was it mentioned by defense counsel or the People.4 Because defense
counsel neither objected nor advised the trial court of its omission, Merrill has forfeited
this issue on appeal. It is well established that “complaints about the manner in which the
trial court exercises its sentencing discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 356; see
People v. Wall (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1048, 1075 [“[A] defendant forfeits on appeal any
‘claims involving the trial court’s failure to properly make or articulate its discretionary
sentencing choices’ in the absence of objection below”].) This rule is particularly
applicable where, as here, section 1170, subdivision (c) requires the court to state the
reasons for sentence choice at the time of sentencing. (§ 1170, subd. (c) [“The court shall
state the reasons for its sentence choice on the record at the time of sentencing”]; People
v. Powell (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1297.)
Anticipating forfeiture, Merrill argues that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance in failing to alert the trial court to the language in section 1170, subdivision

4 The prosecution’s sentencing brief references section 1170 as the statute governing
sentencing but does not address section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), and asserts that there are
no mitigating circumstances. Defense counsel did not file a sentencing brief.

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(b)(6). To establish ineffective assistance, the defendant must show: (1) counsel’s
performance was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms; and (2) a reasonable
probability of a more favorable result but for counsel’s performance. (People v. Alvarado
(2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 178, 194.) A reasonable probability is one that undermines
confidence in the outcome. (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court identified several aggravating factors in sentencing Merrill on
count one. These included the victim’s particular vulnerability (a 12-year-old living at
home with his parents), the crime’s planned nature (Merrill arranged to meet the victim
late at night at a park to avoid detection, and the victim messaged Merrill after being
caught sneaking out), and Merrill’s use of a position of trust and confidence to commit
the offense (the victim viewed Merrill as someone older he could confide in about
personal issues, such as relationship problems). The court also noted Merrill’s numerous
and increasingly serious convictions, his prior prison term, and the fact that he was on
parole at the time of these offenses. (Rule 4.421(a)(3), (8), (11), (b)(2), (3), (4), (5).) On
this record, we see no prejudice. It appears that the trial court, if reminded to do so,
would have determined that the multiple aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating
factor under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), such that the interests of justice were served
by imposing something other than the low term sentence. In fact, the trial court
effectively performed a similar analysis when it weighed the aggravating factors listed in
rule 4.421(a) and (b) against the mitigating factor in rule 4.423(b)(3) while imposing the
upper term on count one. The court specifically noted in mitigation that Merrill was a
victim of child abuse and suffers from mental health difficulties. (Rule 4.423(b)(3).) The
trial court stated that it had evaluated all aggravating and mitigating factors in selecting
the upper term on count one. There is not a reasonable probability that, had the trial court
expressly considered section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), it would not have again determined
that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors such that imposition of the

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upper term was in the interests of justice. Accordingly, we reject Merrill’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

/s/
BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

/s/
DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/s/
FEINBERG, J.

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