CourtListener 10311363•People v. Mitchell CA2/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 1/9/25 P. v. Mitchell CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B335904
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA422497)
v.
BERNARD MITCHELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Ronald S. Coen, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt Bloomfield and Stefanie Yee,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
This is the fourth time we consider the sentencing of
Bernard Mitchell for his 2013 robbery conviction.
In this appeal, the People concede that remand is
appropriate in one respect, because the trial court did not
recognize the full scope of his discretion in resentencing, and thus
did not rule on several of Mitchell’s requests. We agree, and
reverse and remand for a full resentencing.
However, we disagree with Mitchell’s contention that the
trial court abused its discretion when it denied his request to
strike any of the firearm enhancements or impose a lesser
enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 12022.53,
1
subdivision (h). Accordingly, we affirm that portion of the
ruling.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In August 2013 and December 2013, defendant and one
other person entered two different One West Bank locations in
Los Angeles. Each time, they ordered bank employees, at
gunpoint, to lie on the ground. They took the amount of $73,740
in cash from the August robbery and $63,800 in cash from the
December robbery.
II. Procedural History
As explained in our prior opinions, a jury convicted Mitchell
of six counts of second degree robbery, one for each of the victims.
The jury also found true six enhancements for the personal use of
a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), as well as an enhancement for
1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
the amount taken. The jury also convicted Mitchell of being a
felon in possession of a firearm. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).)
The trial court originally sentenced defendant to 40 years
in state prison. After a successful appeal on an unrelated
sentencing issue, the trial court sentenced Mitchell on remand to
39 years. In coming to this calculation, the court used one of the
second degree robbery counts from the first robbery as the
principal count and imposed a sentence of 16 years, which was
comprised of a high-term base sentence of five years plus 10
years for the personal use of a firearm with no injury, and one
year for the amount of money taken. For the remaining five
robbery counts, the court imposed consecutive sentences of four
years and eight months, comprised of a base sentence of one year
(calculated as one-third the mid-term, three-year base sentence
for robbery) plus three years and four months for the personal
use of a firearm (calculated as one-third of the 10-year
enhancement) plus four months for the amount taken (calculated
as one-third of the one-year enhancement). The court then added
a further consecutive sentence of eight months for the felon-in-
possession count.
During that resentencing, the trial court was requested to
dismiss the firearm enhancements or impose a lesser sentence
under the enhancement for personal use of a firearm. The court
declined to do so, indicating its understanding that it had to
either strike the enhancement completely or not at all.
Mitchell appealed and we initially affirmed. (People v.
Mitchell (May 28, 2020, B298910) [nonpub. opn.].) Our Supreme
Court granted review and then ruled in People v. Tirado (2022)
12 Cal.5th 688 (Tirado) that courts have discretion to dismiss a
greater enhancement for an uncharged lesser statutory
3
enhancement, remanding this case back to us for consideration in
light of Tirado.
We thereafter remanded the matter to the trial court for a
new sentencing hearing to “reconsider its decision whether to
strike the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancements in this
case in light of the broader discretion, recognized in Tirado, to
impose unproven lesser enhancements, including under section
12022.5.” (People v. Mitchell (June 2, 2022, B298910) [nonpub.
opn.] at p.*2.)
Upon remand to the trial court after that decision,
Mitchell’s counsel asked the trial court to reconsider his sentence
in three ways:
1) Order concurrent terms on counts 2, 3, 5 and 6 for an
aggregate sentence of 11 years and four months;
2) Impose a sentence no greater than the mid-term due to
recent amendments to section 1170, subdivisions (b)(1) and (2),
since no “aggravating factors have been admitted by the
defendant or pled and proven beyond a reasonable doubt”; and
3) Dismiss or reduce the enhancements under section 1385.
The trial court concluded that it lacked discretion to
consider the first two requests. Citing People v. Cervantes (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 326 (Cervantes), the court concluded that “the
issues that the court may address on remand proceedings are
limited to those specified in the reviewing court’s directions. . . .
That is, the court cannot exceed the scope of the remand.” The
court then read from the disposition section of this court’s 2022
opinion, as follows: “The judgment is reversed to the extent it
imposed firearm enhancements pursuant to section 12022.53
subsection (b). The matter is remanded for sentencing with
directions that the court exercise its discretion pursuant to
4
12022.53 subdivisions (h) and (j). In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.”
The court thus ruled only on the third request, and
explicitly noted that it was considering both whether to strike one
or more of the section 12022.53, subdivision (b) enhancements
under section 12022.53, subdivision (h) and also whether, in lieu
of striking, to impose a lesser included enhancement pursuant to
section 12022.5, subdivision (a).
The court then noted that “the case involved takeover
robberies that caused great fear to the victims. The defendant
had two, prior felony convictions at the time of the commission of
the offense or offenses, I should say. I find that in the interest of
justice it would not be served – well served to strike any
enhancement pursuant to . . . section 12022.5 subdivision (h). [¶]
It would not be in the interest of justice to impose any lesser
included enhancement pursuant to . . . section 12022.5
subdivision (a) in lieu of the 12022.53 subsection (b). [¶] As such
the sentence remains unchanged.”
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
There are two issues in this appeal, both of which are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The first is
whether the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion
in resentencing by only considering the third issue posed rather
than reconsidering sentencing on the other two bases. A court
that is unaware of the scope of its discretion necessarily abuses
its discretion. (People v. Mitchell, supra, (June 2, 2022) at p. *7,
citing People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378 (Carmony).)
5
The second issue is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the 12022.53,
subdivision (b) enhancements or impose a lesser enhancement.
The abuse of discretion standard is highly deferential.
A trial court’s exercise of that discretion “ ‘ “ ‘must not be
disturbed on appeal except on a showing that the court exercised
its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd
manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
II. Remand for Full Resentencing
The People agree that remand is appropriate as to the
sentencing requests made by Mitchell that were not considered
by the lower court. Both sides quote the language in the June 2,
2022 opinion that “defendant is entitled to an opportunity to ask
the court to exercise its discretion within the full range of
possible sentences in mind.” (People v. Mitchell, supra, (June 2,
2022) at p. *7.)
Our Supreme Court has held that “once a court has
determined that a defendant is entitled to resentencing, the
result is vacatur of the original sentence, whereupon the trial
court may impose any appropriate sentence.” (People v. Padilla
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 152, 163.) The so-called “full resentencing rule”
mandates that “when part of a sentence is stricken on review, on
remand for resentencing ‘a full resentencing as to all counts is
appropriate, so the trial court can exercise its discretion in light
of the changed circumstances.’ ” (People v. Buycks (2018) 5
Cal.5th 857, 893.) The rule recognizes that “the resentencing
court may consider ‘any pertinent circumstances which have
arisen since the prior sentence was imposed.’ ” (Ibid.; see also
People v. Walker (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [“when a trial
6
court corrects one part of a sentence on remand, it is obligated to
address the effects of subsequent events that render other parts
of that sentence legally incorrect”]; People v. Codinha (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 976, 995.) As recognized by both sides, the rule
requires remand in this case so that the trial court can exercise
its full discretion as to any aspect of the resentencing.
The case relied on by the trial court, Cervantes, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th 326, does not require a contrary result. That case
held that the full resentencing rule did not apply in the
circumstances present there, where the matter had only been
remanded to the trial court because of a change in the law, not
because the trial court had committed legal error in the
sentencing. (Id. at pp. 331-332.) There, the sentence had not
been vacated in any way. (Id. at p. 332.)
As the People acknowledge, Cervantes is distinguishable
and not applicable here. Here, by contrast, the judgment was
reversed because the trial court rejected Mitchell’s request to
consider a lower enhancement under section 12022.5, subdivision
(a). (People v. Mitchell, supra, (June 2, 2022) at pp. *6-7.)
Accordingly, the matter is remanded again for full
resentencing as to all counts. The trial court may exercise its
discretion to impose any appropriate sentence, and may consider
any pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior
sentence was imposed.
III. The Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in
Deciding Not to Strike or Reduce the
Enhancements
As noted above, the trial court did consider at the 2023
resentencing hearing whether to dismiss or impose a lesser
firearm enhancement and concluded that it would not. Mitchell
7
argues that in reaching this conclusion, the trial court abused its
discretion in light of appellant’s exceptional prison record over
the past 10 years.
When reviewing a decision not to strike an enhancement,
the court is “guided by two fundamental precepts. First, ‘ “the
burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that
the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In
the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have
acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its
discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will
not be set aside on review.” ’ . . . . Second, a ‘ “decision will not be
reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. ‘An
appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in
substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.’ ” ’ ”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 376-377.)
If the party attacking the sentence cannot clearly show that
the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary, the trial court
is “ ‘presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” (People v.
Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977-978.)
Mitchell argues that the trial court abused its discretion
because there was “undisputed evidence that appellant has
completely turned his life around while in prison,” and because
the Legislature has authorized trial courts to dismiss sentencing
enhancements for a “deserving defendant.” However, even after
the amendments to sections 12022.5 and 12022.53, a trial judge
retains the discretion to impose the enhancement on a
“ ‘defendant who merited additional punishment for the use of a
8
firearm in the commission of a felony.’ ” (Nazir v. Superior Court
(2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 478, 496-497.)
In fact, according to our Supreme Court, the Legislature’s
intent with the amendments to section 12022.53 was to “retain
the core characteristics of the sentencing scheme. More severe
terms of imprisonment with the harshest applicable sentence
remained the default punishment. However, courts were granted
the flexibility to impose lighter sentences in appropriate
circumstances.” (Tirado, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 701-702.)
Consistent with this analysis, the court has more recently held
that there is no rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing
enhancements. (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033.)
Here, the trial judge indicated that he had read and
considered our opinion and the remittitur “and the points and
authorities [raised] by counsel.” Mitchell’s counsel “reiterat[ed]
the fact that my client’s performance over the last ten years in
prison has been exceptional, and I would ask the court to consider
that in terms of its discretion.” The prosecutor then reminded
the court about the facts of the case: “This was a violent bank
robbery, and I believe it involved several banks. It was well
planned and organized. Defendant, co-defendants used guns.
They terrorized patrons and employees.”
The court denied the requests to either strike or reduce the
gun enhancements, noting the violence involved and the prior
history of the defendant, and concluding it would not be in the
interest of justice.
Mitchell may not prevail by arguing what a more
reasonable sentence would have been. (People v. Brugman (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [“It is not enough to show that
9
reasonable people might disagree”].) He has not met the
standard to show an abuse of discretion.
IV. The Court Will Remand for Further Resentencing
by the Trial Judge
We decline Mitchell’s invitation to resentence directly on
appeal in lieu of remand. As discussed above, remand is required
to permit the trial court to conduct a full resentencing hearing,
exercising its discretion to impose an appropriate sentence
including consideration of any pertinent circumstances which
may have arisen following imposition of the prior sentence.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed in part, as to the court’s decision
not to strike or reduce one or more of the firearm possession
enhancements under section 12022.53. It is otherwise reversed
and remanded with instructions to conduct a full resentencing
hearing.
RICHARDSON, J.
We concur:
ASHMANN-GERST, Acting P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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