People v. Higgenbotham CA4/3

CourtListener 10308510Calctapp07.01.2025

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 1/7/25 P. v. Higgenbotham CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063883

v. (Super. Ct. No. INF2201521)

ORIN OVEAL HIGGENBOTHAM, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside
County, Kristi E. Hester, Judge. Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and
remanded with instructions.
Susan S. Bauguess, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Kristen A. Ramirez and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Orin Oveal Higgenbotham is a sex registrant who failed to
register from February 23, 2022, through July 5, 2022. The Riverside County
District Attorney’s Office charged Higgenbotham with two felony counts of
willfully and knowingly failing to register. At trial, Higgenbotham conceded
he failed to register but argued he misunderstood the registration
requirements for traveling transients, thus his failure to register was not
willful or knowing. The jury convicted him on both counts, and the trial court
sentenced him to two years in state prison on both counts, with count 2
stayed pursuant to Penal Code § 654.1
Higgenbotham raises four issues on appeal: (1) there was
insufficient evidence to support the conviction on count 1; (2) the trial court
erred in denying Higgenbotham’s pinpoint jury instruction; (3) the trial court
erred in denying Higgenbotham’s request for a mistake of law jury
instruction; and (4) there was an error in the minute order and abstract of
judgment.
We agree there was insufficient evidence on count 1 and there
was an error in the minute order and abstract of judgment. The jury
instruction contentions lack merit. We reverse the judgment on count 1,
affirm the judgment on count 2, and remand with instructions to correct the
minute order and abstract of judgment.

1
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTS
I.
THE CHARGED OFFENSES
Higgenbotham is a transient sex offender subject to mandatory
registration under the Sex Offender Registration Act. (§ 290 et seq.)
Transient registrants like Higgenbotham must register in whichever
jurisdiction they are physically present: (1) within five working days of their
birthday; (2) every 30 days; and (3) within five working days of coming into or
residing in any city or county. (§§ 290, subd. (b), 290.011, subd. (c).) If the
transient registrant leaves the new city or county by the fourth working day,
this specific registration requirement would not apply to them. The other
requirements nevertheless apply.
For 15 years, Higgenbotham successfully complied with the
registration requirements, registering over 70 times. Higgenbotham stopped
registering after February 23, 2022, and began traveling around California
and Arizona. On July 5, 2022, a police officer arrested Higgenbotham in
Desert Hot Springs, California, after concluding he was out of compliance
with his sex offender registration requirements.
The Riverside County District Attorney charged Higgenbotham
with two felony counts for failing to register: (1) within five working days of
residing in Desert Hot Springs, California (§ 290, subd. (b)); and (2) within
five working days of his birthday (§ 290.011, subd. (c)). Relevant to this
appeal, the prosecution did not charge Higgenbotham with failing to register
every 30 days as a transient. (§ 290.011, subd. (a).) The prosecution also
charged Higgenbotham with sustaining a prior serious and violent felony.
(§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(1), 1170.12, subd. (c)(1).)

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II.
THE PROSECUTION’S CASE-IN-CHIEF AT TRIAL
In the prosecutor’s case-in-chief at trial, two office specialists
from the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department testified. Their job
duties included assisting sex offender registrants with registering at the
Victorville station by completing one or both required forms, form 8047 and
form 8102. Their combined testimony showed every sex registrant must
complete the annual form 8047 within five working days of the registrant’s
birthday, and transient registrants must also fill out form 8102 monthly.
Both forms begin with the registrant’s biographical information, and the
remaining pages contain numerous advisements explaining the sex offender
registration requirements, terms, and conditions, including the requirement
to register within five working days of their birthday and within five working
days of coming to a new city or county within California. The registrant must
acknowledge the advisements by placing their initials next to each one.
The office specialists testified that Higgenbotham did not have
any registration violations since he began registering in 2007 until he fell out
of compliance during the period at issue. They personally assisted
Higgenbotham in registering on many occasions, including his most recent
registration on February 23. One office specialist recalled going over all the
terms and registration duties enumerated on the form with Higgenbotham.
Higgenbotham initialed every advisement on the form. He signed the bottom
of each page with an advisement indicating he understood its contents. He
told the office specialist that he did not have any questions about the
enumerated terms.

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After registering on February 23, the office specialist provided
Higgenbotham with a “receipt,” which summarized that date’s registration
and, in highlight, indicated his next registration date was March 23 at
10:00 a.m. The court admitted into evidence copies of Higgenbotham’s past
initialed and signed registration forms and a surveillance video showing
Higgenbotham registering on February 23. The video showed Higgenbotham
placed the receipt in his backpack.
The prosecutor’s final witness was the Desert Hot Springs Police
Officer who arrested Higgenbotham. The officer testified that on July 5, he
conducted a property check at an abandoned and condemned hotel in Desert
Hot Springs. He encountered Higgenbotham sleeping in one of the rooms.
Higgenbotham provided his name and birth date of April 18, 1986, and told
the officer he had been in Desert Hot Springs for a day or so. The officer ran
Higgenbotham’s information in his system and, upon learning he was out of
compliance with his sex offender registration, arrested him.
III.
HIGGENBOTHAM’S TESTIMONY AT TRIAL
Higgenbotham stipulated that he is required to register as a sex
offender because he was convicted of a qualifying offense. He admitted to
initialing and signing both form 8102 and form 8047 “faithfully” for years,
totaling over 70 registrations. His testimony demonstrated a working
knowledge of the registry requirements. He mentioned never staying five
working days in one place because he “didn’t want to go against what [his]
requirements were and that [was] to register within five working days.” He
referenced his registration forms multiple times.

5
At one point, Higgenbotham articulated, “According to forms that
I sign and police officers, once I find a residence where I can call home, I
would only have to register once a year, sir.” The prosecutor asked him when
he has to register once a year, to which Higgenbotham replied, “On or before
your birthday.” The prosecutor asked Higgenbotham whether he knew he had
to register within five days before or after his birthday. Higgenbotham
replied, “That’s on the form. Yes, sir.” Higgenbotham testified the office
specialists gave him a “receipt” each time he registered, which he kept in his
wallet.
Higgenbotham admitted he did not register after February 23,
2022, but testified this was because he was traveling, never staying five
working days in one jurisdiction. Higgenbotham provided a rough timeline
accounting for his whereabouts from his last registration on February 23
through his arrest on July 5. He traveled by car from Victorville to Rialto. At
first, he did not remember when he left Victorville, but then testified it was
within five days of his February 23 registration. He estimated that he stayed
in Rialto “one or two days,” then went to his parents’ house in Los Angeles for
two days. From there, he went to Van Nuys for “about three days.” In one
day, he went to San Francisco, back to Los Angeles, then to Hesperia for the
night.
He did not recall where he went after that, but later testified he
drove straight from Hesperia to Mesa, Arizona to visit his fiancée’s grave
“who died in a crash about 10 years ago on her birthday.” The prosecutor
asked, “You said it was for her birthday?” Higgenbotham replied, “Yes, sir,”
and said her birthday was June 2. At first, Higgenbotham said he did not
remember when he returned to California but later testified that he stayed at

6
the cemetery in Mesa “less than five hours,” then drove to Yuma, Arizona to
rest “a few hours.” His vehicle was towed in Yuma, so he went by bus to
Blythe early the following morning. He got a Lyft car ride from Blythe to
Desert Hot Springs “maybe two hours or three hours later,” again qualifying
his testimony stating he did not remember. He testified that he arrived in
Desert Hot Springs on July 4, 2022, and was arrested the next day. He
testified no one advised him he still needed to register annually for his
birthday even if traveling and not staying in one location for five working
days.
A jury convicted Higgenbotham on both counts, and the trial
court sentenced him to two years state prison on each count, with count 2
stayed pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
I.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Higgenbotham contends there was insufficient evidence for a
reasonable trier of fact to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of count
1: failing to register within five working days of residing in Desert Hot
Springs. We agree.
For sufficiency of the evidence claims, we review the entire record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
“evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value . . . from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 (Lindberg).) “Our sole
function is to determine if any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Balkin

7
(2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 487, 491–492 (Balkin).) “The standard of review is the
same in cases where the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial
evidence.” (Ibid.)
We find Balkin analogous and instructive. In that case, the
defendant was a sex offender registrant released from prison and required to
register within five working days of his release. (Balkin, supra, 145
Cal.App.4th at p. 490.) He was arrested on April 21, 2005, in Los Angeles.
(Ibid.) He told the arresting officer his mailing address was in Los Angeles.
(Ibid.) The prosecutor charged the defendant with failure to register within
five days of entering Los Angeles, rather than failure to register within five
days of his release from custody. (Id. at p. 492.) At trial, staff at two different
men’s correctional institutes where the defendant previously resided testified
that their practice was to go over the sex offender registry details with each
inmate subject to registration upon their release. (Id. at pp. 489-490.) The
evidence showed the defendant previously registered at least three times. (Id.
at p. 490.) There was evidence defendant was informed of his duty to register
at least nine times. (Ibid.)
A jury convicted the defendant of failure to register within five
days of entering Los Angeles. (Balkin, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.) The
appellate court reversed, concluding there was insufficient evidence to
support the judgment. (Id. at pp. 493-494.) His presence on the date of arrest
and a mailing address was wholly insufficient to establish his presence in Los
Angeles for five working days. The court noted the outcome may have differed
if the prosecutor moved to amend or sought a jury determination on the
more-appropriate theory that the defendant failed to register within five days
of his release from incarceration. (Id. at p. 493.)

8
Like in Balkin, the prosecutor here did not present sufficient
evidence to support the crime charged. The prosecutor likely had sufficient
evidence to support a charge for failing to register as a transient every 30
days, rather than failing to register within five working days of entering
Desert Hot Springs. The only evidence proving Higgenbotham’s location that
was “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” was his arrest in Desert Hot
Springs on July 5, 2022. (Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Even
considered in light most favorable to the judgment, no rational trier of fact
could have relied on Higgenbotham’s self-professed timeline to place him in
Desert Hot Springs on any specific date. While testifying, Higgenbotham
repeatedly stated he could not remember either the duration of his stay or
the next stop along his route but, when pressed, would add his best
estimation. His timeline had at least two months unaccounted for.
The jury rejected Higgenbotham’s assertion that he arrived in
Desert Hot Springs on July 4 but relied on his testimony that he was in
Mesa, Arizona on June 2 and came to Desert Hot Springs within a few days.
The jury deemed the timeline unreliable yet relied on it. It speculated
substantially and assumed Higgenbotham was residing in Desert Hot
Springs for five working days, absent credible supporting evidence. Had there
been any evidence of his presence in Desert Hot Springs before July 5, such
as a surveillance video, a receipt, a bus ticket, or a witness statement from
one of the other hotel occupants, this court’s analysis may have differed. We
reverse the judgment on count 1 with directions to dismiss count 1 in the
information.

9
II.
INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS
Higgenbotham argues the trial court committed instructional
error when it denied his proposed pinpoint instruction and declined to
instruct the jury on mistake of law. We find no error.
A. Standard of Review
We review claims of instructional error de novo. (People v.
Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581.) “The pertinent inquiry is whether the
instructions as a whole fully and fairly set forth the applicable law . . . we
assume that jurors are intelligent persons capable of understanding and
correlating all jury instructions which are given and, where reasonably
possible, we interpret the instructions to support the judgment. [Citation.].”
(People v. Jo (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1152 (Jo).)
B. The Pinpoint Instruction
The trial court and both parties crafted the language for both
substantive jury instructions on counts 1 and 2. Both instructions required
the prosecutor to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that “[t]he defendant
actually knew he had a duty under . . . section 290 to register as a sex
offender” and “[t]he defendant willfully failed to register as a sex
offender . . . . ”
Higgenbotham proposed to supplement the “actual knowledge”
and “willfulness” requirements with a pinpoint instruction reading: “A
violation of [s]ection 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty to register. A
jury may infer knowledge from notice but notice alone does not necessarily
satisfy the willfulness requirement.” Because the first sentence repeated the
“actual knowledge” element already in both jury instructions, Higgenbotham

10
proposed omitting the first sentence, so the pinpoint would only read: “A jury
may infer knowledge from notice but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy
the willfulness requirement.”
A defendant has a right to an instruction pinpointing the theory
of defense where the instruction is supported by substantial evidence, is a
correct statement of the law and does not simply highlight specific evidence
the defendant wishes the jury to consider. (Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1174.) “The trial court may properly refuse an instruction highlighting a
defense theory if it is ‘duplicative or potentially confusing.’ [Citation.]
‘[W]here standard instructions fully and adequately advise the jury upon a
particular issue, a pinpoint instruction on that point is properly refused.’
[Citations.] Put another way, ‘[t]here is no error in a trial court’s failing or
refusing to instruct on one matter, unless the remaining instructions,
considered as a whole, fail to cover the material issues raised at trial.’” (Ibid.)
Here, the trial court properly denied the proposed pinpoint
instruction because the first sentence was duplicative, and the second
sentence was not supported by substantial evidence. The pinpoint’s first
sentence, “A violation of [s]ection 290 requires actual knowledge of the duty
to register,” is nearly the exact language in element three of both counts’
substantive jury instructions, “The defendant actually knew he had a duty
under . . . section 290 to register as a sex offender . . . .” This duplicative
language is unnecessary.
The second sentence, “A jury may infer knowledge from notice
but notice alone does not necessarily satisfy the willfulness requirement,”
was similarly sufficiently covered by other jury instructions provided,
specifically CALCRIM Nos. 225 and 220. CALCRIM No. 225, states in

11
relevant part, “A mental state may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
¶ . . . ¶ . . . [B]efore you may rely on circumstantial evidence to conclude that
the defendant had the required mental state, you must be convinced that the
only reasonable conclusion supported by the circumstantial evidence is that
the defendant had the required mental state.” (CALCRIM No. 225.) Applying
this principle of law to the facts, notice may be circumstantial evidence used
to prove Higgenbotham had the requisite mental state, which was actual
knowledge of his duty to register.
Construed together with the reasonable doubt jury instruction,
2
the trial court’s instructions aptly cover the pinpoint instruction. (CALCRIM
No. 220.) Notice, without more evidence, may not sufficiently prove actual
knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Because “we assume that jurors are
intelligent persons capable of understanding and correlating all jury
instructions” (Jo, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1152), we find the court’s
provided jury instructions aptly covered the proposed pinpoint instruction,
rendering it duplicative and unnecessary.

2
The court instructed, “Whenever I tell you the People must
prove something, I mean they must prove it beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .
In deciding whether the People have proved their case beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must impartially compare and consider all the evidence that was
received throughout the entire trial. Unless the evidence proves the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he’s entitled to that privilege,
and you must find him not guilty.” (See CALCRIM No. 220.)
12
C. Mistake of Law Instruction
Higgenbotham’s defense at trial was that he misunderstood the
law requiring he register as a sex offender even while traveling. He contends
the trial court erred in denying his request for the mistake of law jury
instruction. The mistake of law jury instruction reads in relevant part, “The
defendant is not guilty of [failing to register as sex offender] if [he] made an
honest or good faith mistake about the law, if that mistake shows that [he]
did not have the specific [intent or mental state] required for the crime[s] of
[failing to register as a sex offender].” (CALCRIM No. 3411.) We find no error.
A defendant is only entitled to a mistake of law instruction “if the
evidence supports a reasonable inference that any such claimed belief was
held in good faith.” (People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137.) “The
instruction is properly refused if circumstances ‘“indicate that although
defendant may have ‘believed’ he acted lawfully, he was aware of contrary
facts which rendered such a belief wholly unreasonable, and hence in bad
faith . . . .’” (People v. Koenig (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 771, 808.)
Here, the evidence did not support a reasonable inference that
Higgenbotham had a good faith belief he did not have to register while
traveling. Although he maintains he misunderstood the law, Higgenbotham
never actually testified to this direct point. The closest to this contention he
came to was when he testified that no one advised him he still needed to
register annually for his birthday even if he was not staying in one location
for five working days.
The evidence to the contrary was significant. Higgenbotham
registered consistently for 15 years, over 70 times, without a violation. He
initialed and signed hundreds of advisements instructing and reminding him

13
of his various registration requirements. He never testified he did not read or
understand the advisements. He acknowledged his initials and signatures in
the most recent registration forms he completed. The office specialists
testified they personally went over the form with Higgenbotham, and he did
not have any questions about its contents. Higgenbotham may have
contended he did not understand the registration requirements for traveling,
but the circumstances surrounding his failure to register indicate such
contention was not in good faith. A mistake of law instruction was not
warranted. The trial court did not err.
III.
THE MINUTE ORDER AND ABSTRACT OF JUDGMENT
In the reporter’s transcript from Higgenbotham’s April 27, 2023
sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered the two-year prison sentence on
count 2 stayed under section 654. The minute order and abstract of judgment
indicate the two-year prison sentence on count 2 was to run concurrent with
count 1. When there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of a
sentence and the minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement controls. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
Because we reverse the judgement and order count 1 dismissed, however, the
sentence on count 2 can no longer be properly stayed under section 654.
Accordingly, we remand for the court to impose the two-year prison sentence
on count 2.

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DISPOSITION
We reverse the judgment on count 1 with directions to dismiss
count 1 in the information. We affirm the judgment on count 2 and remand to
the trial court to impose the two-year prison sentence on count 2. The trial
court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment and forward a
certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

GOETHALS, J.

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