People v. Phillips CA6

CourtListener 10307847Calctapp06.01.2025

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Filed 1/6/25 P. v. Phillips CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H051373
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. BB516948)

v.

JONATHAN PHILLIPS,

Defendant and Appellant.

In 2006, Jonathan Phillips entered a plea of no contest to one charge of felony
false imprisonment (Pen. Code, § 236/237.)1 The trial court sentenced Phillips to a total
term of 90 days in jail.
Between 2008 and 2023, Phillips filed four separate motions pursuant to section
17, subdivision (b)2, asking that his conviction be reduced from a felony to a
misdemeanor. Phillips’ fourth petition filed in 2023, which is the underlying subject of
this appeal, was denied by the court on the basis that it was barred by collateral estoppel,
and that Phillips’ charge of felony false imprisonment was not eligible for reduction to a
misdemeanor under section 17, subdivision (b).

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
This section provides, in relevant part, that “[w]hen a crime is punishable, in the
2

discretion of the court, either by imprisonment in the state prison or imprisonment in a
county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h) of Section 1170, or by fine or
imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor for all purposes under the following
circumstances: [¶] (1) After a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment
in the state prison or imprisonment in a county jail under the provisions of subdivision (h)
of Section 1170.” (§ 17, subd. (b).)
On appeal, Phillips argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
petition because all of the elements of collateral estoppel were not satisfied, and the facts
of his offense demonstrate he was eligible for a reduction. The Attorney General
concedes that collateral estoppel was not a valid basis for denial, but argues that the court
did not abuse its discretion in finding that Phillips’ charge was not eligible for reduction.
For the reasons explained below, we find no reversible error and affirm the court’s
order.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background3
On September 30, 2005, victim C.P.4 was driving with a friend when Phillips,
whom C.P. had met through college, called her and asked to hang out at a night club in
Mountain View. After C.P. and her friend drove by the night club, Phillips saw and
followed them in his car to another friend’s house. C.P.’s friend attempted to evade
Phillips but was unable to do so. After they reached the house, Phillips followed C.P. and
her friend inside and did not leave when asked to do so. Phillips stated that he wanted to
“hang out” with C.P. and asked her if he could get some “alone time” with her. When
C.P. responded “[n]o” and told him she needed to get home, Phillips offered to give her a
ride, which she accepted.
After C.P. got into Phillips’ car, he asked her if she wanted to get into the back
seat, which she refused. C.P. began feeling uncomfortable and wanted to exit the car, but
Phillips began driving before she could do so. When C.P. attempted to give Phillips
directions to her house, he ignored her and began driving erratically. C.P. asked him to

3
The facts of this offense are taken from the police report, which is also quoted in
Phillips’ opening brief.
4
We refer to the victim in the proceedings by his or her initials only to protect
personal privacy interests pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(10) and
(11).

2
stop the vehicle so she could leave, but he refused, began running red lights, and drove
around for approximately 20 minutes without allowing her to exit.
After Phillips began driving on the highway, C.P. told him that she would call the
police. Phillips slowed down, opened the passenger door, and pushed C.P., causing her
to fall out of the car. Although C.P. initially stated she was not injured, she later
indicated that she had sprained her ankle.
B. Charges, Plea, and Original Sentence
On October 13, 2005, the Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office filed a
felony complaint charging Phillips with false imprisonment (§ 236/237; count 1).5 The
complaint specifically noted that the charge was for felony false imprisonment because it
had been effected by “violence, menace, fraud, or deceit.”
On February 24, 2006, Phillips entered a plea of no contest to felony false
imprisonment. On April 13, 2006, the trial court sentenced Phillips to 90 days in county
jail, but suspended the imposition of his sentence and placed him on three years of formal
probation.
C. Post-Plea Proceedings
1. 2008 and 2013 Motions
On February 8, 2008, Phillips filed his first section 17, subdivision (b) motion,
asking that his conviction be reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor. Shortly thereafter,
the motion was taken off calendar, which his counsel later explained was due to it being
“effectively, a waste of [Phillips’] resources.”

5
Section 237, subdivision (a), as it existed at the time of Phillips’ charging and
conviction, read as follows: “False imprisonment is punishable by a fine not exceeding
one thousand dollars ($1,000), or by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the false imprisonment be effected by
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, it shall be punishable by imprisonment in the state
prison.” The statute was subsequently amended in 2011, where the concluding sentence
was modified from “in the state prison” to “pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170.”
(Stats. 2011, ch. 15, § 288.)

3
On March 21, 2008, Phillips filed a motion requesting that his probation be
terminated and the entire action be dismissed pursuant to sections 1203.36 and 1203.4.7
On April 7, 2008, the trial court granted Phillips’ motion, terminated his probation, and
dismissed the criminal action.
On January 8, 2013, Phillips filed a new section 17, subdivision (b) motion
requesting that his conviction be reduced to a misdemeanor. Although his case had
already been dismissed, Phillips indicated that he was still requesting a reduction in order
to allow him to apply for certain jobs that required a record clear of felony convictions.
On April 25, 2013, the matter was taken off calendar without prejudice; the minute order
does not indicate the reason for the matter being taken off calendar.
2. 2016 motion and appeal8
On May 31, 2016, Phillips filed his third section 17, subdivision (b) motion (2016
motion). Phillips again claimed that a reduction to a misdemeanor would allow him to
achieve better job prospects and pay. He further argued that false imprisonment is a
“wobbler” offense that could be charged as either a misdemeanor or felony, thus making

6
Section 1203.3 provides, in relevant part, that “[t]he court may at any time when
the ends of justice will be subserved thereby, and when the good conduct and reform of
the person so held on probation shall warrant it, terminate the period of probation, and
discharge the person held.” (§ 1203.3, subd. (a).)
7
Section 1203.4 provides, in relevant part, that when a defendant “has been
discharged prior to the termination of the period of probation, or in any other case in
which a court, in its discretion and the interest of justice, determines that a defendant
should be granted the relief available under this section, the defendant shall, at any time
after the termination of the period of probation, if they are not then serving a sentence for
an offense, on probation for an offense, or charged with the commission of an offense, be
permitted by the court to withdraw their plea of guilty or plea of nolo contendere and
enter a plea of not guilty…and…the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or
information against the defendant and except as noted below, the defendant shall
thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of
which they have been convicted.” (§ 1203.4, subd. (a).)
8
The record does not reflect the People filed a response to Phillips’ motion.

4
him eligible for relief under section 17, subdivision (b). Phillips also noted that he had no
other criminal conduct since this conviction, was only 20 years old when the offense
occurred, and had been an employed, productive member of society since completion of
his sentence.
In response, the probation department recommended against reduction on the basis
that Phillips’ conviction was for a non-alternative felony. The department noted that
under section 237, false imprisonment was required to be punished as a felony if it was
“affected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit.” Therefore, based on the facts of the
case, the department contended that Phillips’ conviction could not be reduced to a
misdemeanor.
In his supplemental briefing, Phillips’ counsel asserted that the facts of the
offense, as stated by C.P. in the police report, did not reflect any use of violence, menace,
fraud, or deceit. Counsel claimed that the only possible “violence” was when Phillips
pushed C.P. out of the vehicle, which effectively ended the encounter. As the sentencing
transcript did not address the issue of what portion of section 237 Phillips was being
sentenced under, and no plea form or transcript from the change of plea hearing could be
located, counsel argued that the facts from the police report were sufficient to
demonstrate that Phillips’ conviction was eligible for a reduction to a misdemeanor
offense.
On December 1, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Phillips’ motion. The court
indicated that subdivision (a) of section 237 was divided into two portions as follows:
(1) a first section for misdemeanor false imprisonment, which was punishable by a fine or
a county jail sentence; and (2) a second section for felony false imprisonment, which
involved the use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, and was punishable as provided in
section 1170, subdivision (h). Accordingly, the court concluded that the People could
only charge the offense as felony false imprisonment if there was sufficient evidence to
demonstrate one of the aforementioned four elements was present. Based on this

5
conclusion, the court found that Phillips was not eligible for a reduction and denied his
motion.
Phillips timely appealed the court’s order but failed to submit a supplemental brief
on his own behalf after his attorney filed an opening brief pursuant to People v. Serrano
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 496. Therefore, on February 21, 2018, this court dismissed his
appeal as abandoned and did not reach the merits.9
3. 2023 motion proceedings
a. Phillips’ motion and response
On May 3, 2023, Phillips filed a fourth section 17, subdivision (b) motion (2023
motion), which is the subject of the instant appeal. Like the 2016 motion, Phillips’
counsel again argued that the facts in the police report did not reflect that Phillips used
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit during the commission of the offense. Counsel noted
that in other cases involving similar section 17, subdivision (b) motions for false
imprisonment convictions, courts defined “menace” as “ ‘a threat of harm express or
implied by word or act[,]’ ” while defining violence as “ ‘the exercise of physical force
used to restrain over and above the force reasonably necessary to effect such
restraint[.]’ ” (People v. Babich (1993) 14 Cal. App. 4th 801, 806, italics omitted.)
Counsel contended that Phillips’ behavior of simply pushing the victim out of the vehicle
fell “far below the standard” required to demonstrate any violence or menace. Lastly,
counsel argued that it would be in the interests of justice to reduce Phillips’ conviction to
a misdemeanor based on his young age (20) at the time of the offense, his lack of any
further criminal activity, and his consistent employment as a security guard since 2013.
In response, the People argued that Phillips’ motion should be barred under the
principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata, which prevented relitigation of issues
argued and decided in prior proceedings. The People noted that because Phillips raised

On our motion, we take judicial notice of the record in Phillips’ first appeal (No.
9

H044377.)

6
the same issue in his 2016 section 17, subdivision (b) motion, which was heard and
decided on the merits, collateral estoppel should preclude him from bringing the same
motion again. Next, the People argued that because felony false imprisonment
constituted a “straight felony” that could only be punished pursuant to section 1170,
subdivision (h), the trial court had no power to reduce Phillips’ conviction to a
misdemeanor. Further, the People distinguished the cases cited by Phillips, noting that
those cases all involved trials where the prosecution failed to prove the elements of
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Phillips did not
go to trial and entered a guilty plea, the People contended that his plea amounted to an
admission of every element of the crime such that the court need not conduct a factual
analysis of whether the facts were sufficient to demonstrate felony false imprisonment.
b. Hearing
On August 16, 2023, a different judge from the judge who heard the 2016 motion
held a hearing on Phillips’ 2023 motion. At the hearing, Phillips’ counsel again argued
that there were insufficient facts to demonstrate that Phillips’ conduct involved violence,
menace, fraud, or deceit. Counsel also argued that the court should take Phillips’ youth
into account in determining whether he fully appreciated what he was doing or had the
appropriate intent to commit the crime in question.
The court disagreed, finding that under People v. Superior Court (Feinstein)
(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 323 (Feinstein), false imprisonment was not a wobbler offense,
but constituted a “straight felony” if committed by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit.
The court also indicated that because Phillips pled to the felony charge and admitted there
was a factual basis for his plea, the court did not have the authority to “go back” and
review the facts to see if Phillips could have been charged with a misdemeanor. The
court noted that “restraining someone in a car that’s driving down the highway, that
sounds like it satisfies the felony statute.”

7
The court ultimately denied the motion for the following two reasons: (1) the
motion was barred by collateral estoppel as it had already been taken up with another
judge and denied, then unsuccessfully appealed; and (2) the felony charge to which
Phillips pled was not a wobbler and therefore was ineligible for reduction to a
misdemeanor.
Phillips timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Phillips contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
four reasons. First, Phillips argues that collateral estoppel is inapplicable to section 17,
subdivision (b) motions, particularly when filed in a single case as opposed to multiple
separate litigations. Second, he claims the court abused its discretion in finding that
felony false imprisonment was not eligible for reduction to a misdemeanor. Third,
Phillips asserts that because of his youth and childhood trauma, the trial court was
mandated to reduce his conviction to a misdemeanor and abused its discretion in refusing
to do so. Finally, Phillips argues that the trial court improperly failed to consider whether
reduction of his conviction would be in the interests of justice.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
As discussed above, section 17, subdivision (b) specifies the circumstances under
which wobbler offenses are deemed misdemeanors rather than felonies. (§ 17, subd. (b)
[“When a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, either [1] by imprisonment in
the state prison or . . . [2] by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor
for all purposes under the following circumstances . . . .”].) “[S]ection 17[, subdivision]
(b), read in conjunction with the relevant charging statute, rests the decision whether to
reduce a wobbler solely ‘in the discretion of the court.’ ” (People v. Superior Court
(Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.)
However, the statute does not confer upon the trial court the authority to reduce a
straight felony to a misdemeanor. (See People v. Mauch (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 669,

8
674–675 (Mauch); People v. Douglas (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 810, 813; Feinstein, supra,
29 Cal.App.4th at pp. 329–330.) “ ‘Fixing the penalty for crimes is the province of the
Legislature, which is in the best position to evaluate the gravity of different crimes and to
make judgments among different penological approaches.’ [Citation.] Phrased
differently: ‘The definition of crime and the determination of punishment are foremost
among those matters that fall within the legislative domain.’ [Citations.]” (Mauch,
supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 674.) When the Legislature has classified an offense as a
felony without providing for an alternate punishment, a trial court exceeds its jurisdiction
“in purporting to reduce the offense to a misdemeanor.” (Ibid.)
As a general matter, we review a trial court’s decision to deny a section 17,
subdivision (b) motion for an abuse of discretion. However, in reviewing Phillips’
arguments and the trial court’s order, we find that the court’s basis for denying the
motion was based on a legal theory, namely, the inapplicability of section 17,
subdivision (b) to Phillips’ offense. Therefore, Phillips’ claim that he was eligible for a
reduction under section 17, subdivision (b) is a purely legal question of statutory
interpretation, which we review de novo. (See People v. Jimenez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 53,
61.)
B. Phillips’ Eligibility for Relief Under Section 17, Subdivision (b)10
Phillips contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that his
conviction for felony false imprisonment was not a wobbler offense, and therefore was
ineligible for relief under section 17, subdivision (b). Phillips argues that by entering a
plea of no contest to felony false imprisonment and stipulating to a factual basis, he was
not admitting that the facts in the police report were true or conceding that the offense

10
The Attorney General concedes that collateral estoppel did not apply to Phillips’
motion. We need not decide whether the court erred in finding collateral estoppel barred
Phillips from bringing his 2023 motion, since, as we explain in more detail below, the
other reason given by the trial court in denying the section 17, subdivision (b) motion was
legally sound.

9
was committed using violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. He further asserts that the facts,
as taken from the police report, did not demonstrate any use of force or violence in the
course of the offense.
We disagree. To summarize, the substance of Phillips’ argument is that because
there was insufficient evidence to support the offense as charged, he was entitled to a
reduction pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b). However, such an inquiry into the
nature and circumstances of the offense is only relevant if the offense in question is a true
“wobbler” offense that can be charged as either a misdemeanor or felony. As noted in
Feinstein, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at pages 330-331, false imprisonment is not a wobbler
offense because section 237, subdivision (a) does not provide for either punishment in the
county jail or imprisonment in state prison. Instead, section 237, subdivision (a)
specifically delineates that if the false imprisonment is effected by violence, menace,
fraud, or deceit, it can only be charged as a felony offense. (Feinstein, supra, 29
Cal.App.4th at p. 331.) Here, it is undisputed that Phillips was charged with felony false
imprisonment that included the use of violence, menace, fraud, or deceit, and entered a
plea to this charge. Accordingly, given that Phillip’s plea was to a straight felony charge,
the trial court correctly found that it did not have the authority to reduce his offense to a
misdemeanor.
Phillips additionally relies on the case of People v. Matian (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th
480 (Matian), where the appellate court reversed the defendant’s conviction for felony
false imprisonment on the basis that there was insufficient evidence demonstrating
violence or menace. In Matian, the appellate court found that the defendant’s actions of:
(1) painfully sexually assaulting the victim; (2) yelling at her “not to go[;]” and (3)
glaring at her and getting out of his chair to approach her whenever she attempted to
leave did not constitute restraining the victim through violence or reflect an express or
implied threat of harm. (Id. at pp. 486-487.) Phillips argues that because his actions in

10
the instant matter fell “far below” those in Matian, there was no demonstration of any
violence or menace that would support his conviction for felony false imprisonment.
We find the holding in Matian inapplicable to the instant matter. Unlike in
Matian, which involved the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial, Phillips
admitted to the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the crime by entering a plea of no
contest, and is therefore not entitled to a review on the merits. (See People v. Thomas
(1986) 41 Cal.3d 837, 844 [concluding that a plea of no contest admits every element of
an alleged crime and waives a challenge on appeal of insufficient evidence].)
Accordingly, regardless of whether Phillips admitted to the actual facts in the police
report itself, his plea constituted an admission to the elements of the offense as charged,
which included the allegation that the offense was effected by violence, menace, fraud, or
deceit. (See People v. Tuggle (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 147, 154 [noting that a plea of
guilty admits not only every element of the offense charged but also “all allegations, and
factors comprising the charge contained in the pleading”].) Phillips cites no authority,
nor are we aware of any, that permits him to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence by
means of a section 17, subdivision (b) motion.
In conclusion, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of Phillips’ motion on the
basis that felony false imprisonment was not eligible for relief under section 17,
subdivision (b).11
C. Consideration of Phillips’ Youth and Childhood Trauma
Phillip argues that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider
Phillips’ childhood trauma and young age at the time of the offense in evaluating his
section 17, subdivision (b) motion. Phillips cites the recently amended version of section

11
Because we find that the trial court was correct in its determination that Phillips’
conviction was not eligible for a reduction, we also do not address Phillips’ argument that
the trial court failed to evaluate whether a reduction would be in the interests of justice,
as this would only be relevant if section 17, subdivision (b) was applicable.

11
1170, subdivision (b)(6), which requires a court to impose a lower term sentence if either
trauma or youth was a contributory factor to commission of the offense, and argues that
the same principles should apply to a court’s consideration of a section 17,
subdivision (b) motion.
As Phillips himself concedes, he failed to raise any arguments regarding section
1170, subdivision (b) in the trial court. Accordingly, his argument is forfeited. (See
People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 589-590 [claims not raised in the trial court
may not be raised for the first time on appeal].) Moreover, Phillips provides no authority
in support of his claim that when evaluating a section 17, subdivision (b) motion, a trial
court must or has discretion to apply the provisions in section 1170, subdivision (b),
which specifically address felony sentencing guidelines for terms of imprisonment. An
appellate court may treat as forfeited any legal argument for which there is no citation of
authorities for the point made. (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Phillips’ section 17, subdivision (b) motion is affirmed.

12
___________________________________
Wilson, J.

WE CONCUR:

________________________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.

__________________________________________
Danner, J.

People v. Phillips
H051373

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