CourtListener 10306377•People v. Williams CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/31/24 P. v. Williams CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A169664
v.
MATTHEW STEPHEN (Mendocino County
WILLIAMS, Super. Ct. No. SCUKCRCR2017898231)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Matthew Stephen Williams appeals after the trial court
revoked his mandatory supervision and ordered him to serve the remainder
of the sentence that had previously been imposed based upon his plea
bargain. He contends the trial court erred in failing to strike an
enhancement based on a statutory amendment that went into effect between
the time he was originally sentenced and the time the trial court revoked his
mandatory supervision. We conclude defendant forfeited this challenge by
failing to raise it in the trial court, and accordingly we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Defendant was charged on April 27, 2017 with four counts of possessing
an assault weapon for purposes of sale (Pen. Code, § 30600, subd. (a); counts
1
1, 4, 6, and 10),1 five counts of possession of a large capacity magazine
(§ 32310, subd. (a); counts 2, 5, 7, 11, and 12), one count of carrying in a
vehicle a loaded firearm not registered to him (§ 25850, subd. (c)(6); count 3),
one count of carrying in a vehicle a loaded concealed weapon not registered to
him (§ 25400, subd. (c)(6); count 13), and two counts of offering to sell and
furnish cocaine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a); counts 8 and 9). As
to counts 1 and 2, it was alleged that defendant, a principal in the offense,
was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)), and as to counts 9 through
13, it was alleged that he committed the offenses while released on his own
recognizance for another offense (§ 12022.1).
Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, defendant pled no contest to
counts 1, 4, 9, and 10, and he admitted two special allegations under section
12022, subdivision (a)(1). The remaining counts were dismissed. Under the
plea agreement, defendant would receive a “split sentence” of 11 years and
four months, with four years, four months to be spent in county jail and seven
years under mandatory supervision.
The trial court sentenced defendant on August 4, 2017 to a term of 10
years and eight months, with the first four years and four months in
confinement and the remaining six years and four months on mandatory
supervision.2 It also imposed fines and fees. Defendant did not appeal from
the judgment.
1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 This was a lower term than the parties had originally agreed to. The
discrepancy seems to have been due to an error in the initial calculation of
the terms for the enhancements, which contemplated one-year terms for both
the firearm enhancements (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) rather than one one-year
term and one term of one-third the middle term, or four months. When the
probation officer pointed out this issue, the People did not object to imposition
of the reduced sentence.
2
Defendant was released from custody and ordered to report to
probation in June 2019. Two months later, on September 25, 2019, the
probation department filed a petition alleging defendant had violated the
terms of his supervision by failing to attend probation appointments and
failing to register with law enforcement. (Former Health & Saf., Code,
§ 11590.) Defendant failed to appear at an October 7, 2019 hearing on the
petition, and the trial court revoked mandatory supervision and issued a no-
bail arrest warrant.
The probation department filed an amended petition on January 24,
2020, alleging defendant had violated the terms of his mandatory supervision
by possessing cocaine. (Health & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a).) He was in
custody and had been transported to Mendocino County. The probation
department filed a second amended petition on February 7, 2020, alleging
further violations, including failure to attend a probation appointment and a
positive test for cocaine and marijuana at county jail.
Defendant was released on bail on April 10, 2020. On June 9, 2020, he
failed to appear for a hearing on his violation of mandatory supervision, and
the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest.3
Defendant apparently remained at large until March 2023, when he
was arrested in Texas on warrants for tampering with governmental records
(Tex. Pen. Code, § 37.10) as well as on the Mendocino County bench warrant.
He was returned to Mendocino County in September 2023, and the probation
department filed a third amended petition.
3 We subsequently considered an appeal by the surety company that
provided defendant’s bail bond. (People v. International Fidelity Insurance
Company (Oct. 14, 2022, A163296) [nonpub. opn.].)
3
The mandatory supervision revocation hearing resumed, and the trial
court found defendant had violated the terms of his supervision. On
December 15, 2023, the trial court permanently revoked defendant’s
mandatory supervision and ordered him to serve the remainder of his
sentence, with custody credits awarded. This timely appeal ensued.4
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s sole contention on appeal is that he was entitled to the
benefit of amendments to the sentencing laws that went into effect after he
was originally sentenced but before the trial court ordered him to serve the
remainder of his sentence in custody.
Section 1385 authorizes a judge to dismiss an action or enhancement in
the furtherance of justice. (§ 1385, subds. (a), (b).) Effective January 1, 2022,
in Senate Bill No. 81, the Legislature added subdivision (c) to this statute,
providing that, “[n]otwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,” unless prohibited
by an initiative statute. (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1); Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1, Sen.
Bill No. 81.) In exercising its discretion, the court must “consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant” to show that one of a
number of mitigating circumstances exist, among them that “[m]ultiple
enhancements are alleged in a single case.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B).) In such
a case, “all enhancements beyond a single enhancement shall be dismissed.”
(Ibid.) And, “[w]hile the court may exercise its discretion at sentencing, this
subdivision does not prevent a court from exercising its discretion before,
4 Defendant’s appellate counsel wrote a letter to the trial court, asking
it to award four additional days of custody credit for time defendant spent
incarcerated in Texas and to correct a clerical error in the abstract of
judgment. Defendant informs us the trial court granted his request on April
27, 2024.
4
during, or after trial or entry of plea.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(3).) The statutory
amendments apply to all sentencings that take place after January 1, 2022.
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(7).)
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
consider striking one of the firearm enhancements under the amendments to
section 1385, and he asks us to remand the matter for resentencing to allow
the court to do so.
This claim is forfeited by defendant’s failure to raise it below. In People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, 723–724 (Coleman), our colleagues in
Division Five of this court considered a similar argument and found the
defendant had forfeited his argument that enhancements should have been
stricken under Senate Bill No. 81 by failing to raise it in the trial court.
Relying on People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375–376, they explained
that “ ‘any failure on the part of a defendant to invite the court to dismiss
under section 1385 . . . waives or forfeits his [or her] right to raise the issue
on appeal.’ ” (Coleman, at p. 724; see People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th 331, 353
[applying waiver doctrine “to claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices”].)
Defendant contends the forfeiture rule is inapplicable because his
challenge is not to the manner in which the trial court exercised its discretion
but to its apparent misunderstanding of the scope of its discretion. He relies
on People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 828, 840, which declined to
apply the forfeiture rule where it appeared the trial court was unaware of its
mandatory obligation to consider the defendant’s military service-related
post-traumatic stress disorder as a mitigating factor.
Defendant argues the record here similarly shows the trial court was
unaware of the scope of its discretion. At the outset of the December 15, 2023
5
hearing, the trial court stated it would permanently revoke mandatory
supervision and sentence defendant to local prison for a total term of 10 years
and eight months, and defense counsel expressed doubt that defendant would
be able to pay restitution. The prosecutor said he was surprised at the
procedure, which suggested the court was resentencing defendant, because
the restitution fines had been imposed when defendant was originally
sentenced and defendant had not appealed from the judgment. Defendant
made a statement requesting the trial court to impose only some of the
previously stayed sentence, reinstituting a split sentence that included a
period of mandatory supervision, and further argument ensued. The trial
court acknowledged it had “put the cart before the horse” at the outset of the
hearing, but was unpersuaded on the merits. The court said it would be
“ludicrous or insane” to put defendant back on mandatory supervision, after
the opportunities defendant had squandered and the new offenses he had
committed. The court reiterated its order permanently revoking mandatory
supervision and said it was not inclined to change the previously-imposed
fines. This record, defendant argues, shows that both the district attorney
and defense counsel did not understand the procedure the court was using,
which, he urges, shows the trial court itself misunderstood the governing law.
We are unpersuaded. The court in Coleman faced a similar argument
that the absence of a mention of Senate Bill No. 81 and section 1385 meant
the trial court was unaware of the scope of its sentencing discretion.
(Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 724.) Rejecting this argument, our
colleagues explained that the sentencing hearing took place more than four
months after the effective date of Senate Bill No. 81, and the court presumed
the trial court was aware of and followed applicable law. (Id. at pp. 724–725,
citing People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1107, 1114.) And, the court
6
explained, “[d]efendant’s citation to a silent record is insufficient to meet his
burden to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.” (Coleman, at p. 725, citing
People v. Czirban (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1096–1097; accord, People v.
Ruiz (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1068, 1081 [presuming trial court was aware of
and properly applied amendments to section 1385 despite not mentioning
them], review granted March 12, 2024 (S283504), overruled on another point
in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768–769.) Here, the sentencing
decision defendant challenges took place almost two years after the effective
date of the law. The colloquy at the hearing makes no mention of section
1385 one way or the other, and there is nothing to suggest the trial court was
ignorant of or misunderstood it. As did our colleagues in Coleman, we
conclude that this record is insufficient to overcome the presumption that the
trial court was aware of and followed applicable law. (Coleman, at pp. 724–
725.) Defendant thus forfeited his challenge by failing to raise it below.5
In his reply brief, defendant argues that his trial counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to seek the benefit of Senate Bill No. 81. We
need not consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief
(Coleman, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 724; Ford v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
5 Because we reach this conclusion, we need not reach the Attorney
General’s alternative argument that defendant’s challenge to the negotiated
disposition is barred by his failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause.
Nor need we delve into how the trial court should have proceeded had it
concluded dismissal of one of the enhancements was in the furtherance of
justice. In light of the fact that defendant stipulated to the sentence in a plea
bargain, he argues his case is analogous to People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th
685 (Stamps) “in that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to strike
multiple sentence enhancements under section 1385.” The dispositive
difference between this case and Stamps is that here defendant cannot argue
the reason the trial court “failed to exercise” discretion is that governing law,
at the time it made its decision, afforded the trial court none. (Cf. Stamps, at
p. 707.)
7
(1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 696, 705), and we decline to do so here. We note,
however, that this last-minute argument does not grapple with the possibility
that trial counsel made a tactical decision to focus defendant’s request for
leniency on a split sentence rather than a lower maximum term, which was
an alternative that appellate counsel recognizes could have resulted in the
plea bargain being rescinded. (Citing Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 707.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.6
TUCHER, P.J.
WE CONCUR:
PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
People v. Williams (A169664)
6 Appellant has also filed, in propria persona, a petition for writ of
habeas corpus. (In re Williams, A171402.) We have denied the petition by
separate order filed this date.
8
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