CourtListener 10306376•Slutske v. Gratton CA2/5
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Filed 12/31/24 Slutske v. Gratton CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
JEFFREY SLUTSKE, B325068
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BC723488)
v.
THERESA GRATTON,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael B. Harwin, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
Workman Law & Litigation and Seth E. Workman, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horvitz & Levy, H. Thomas Watson, Andrew G. Spore;
Tseng & Associates, Jennifer T. Tseng and Carmen R. Selame,
for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Jeffrey Slutske sued defendant Theresa Gratton
for injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile collision. The
jury found that defendant was negligent but that her negligence
was not a substantial factor in causing plaintiff harm. On
appeal, plaintiff contends that the jury’s verdict is not supported
by the evidence and that the trial court erred when it granted a
motion to quash a subpoena and denied his motion to tax costs.
We modify the judgment to reduce the costs award by $4,520.80.
As so modified, we affirm the judgment.
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Relevant Facts1
1. The Collision
On the evening of December 16, 2017, plaintiff and
defendant were driving their respective cars near an outlet mall
in Camarillo, in Ventura County. Defendant, who was driving
between 10 to 15 miles an hour, struck plaintiff’s car, causing
impact between the front of defendant’s car and the driver’s side
of plaintiff’s car. Plaintiff, a deputy with the Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Department, was 45-years old and had worked as a
police officer since 1997.
The collision caused the airbags on plaintiff’s car to deploy
and plaintiff felt a jarring impact to his left side. Immediately
after the collision, defendant, who was a licensed vocational
nurse, got out of her car, approached plaintiff’s car, and asked
1 “We recite the facts in the manner most favorable to the
judgment and resolve all conflicts and draw all inferences in
favor of respondent[]. [Citation.] Conflicts in the evidence are
noted only where pertinent to the issues on appeal. [Citation.]”
(Meister v. Mensinger (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 381, 387.)
Plaintiff moves to augment the record to include five
additional photographs depicting the damage to his vehicle.
Although these photographs were published to the jury at the
time of trial, collectively, as plaintiff’s exhibit no. 48, the record
does not demonstrate that the exhibits were filed or lodged with
the court. Augmentation of the record is permitted for “[a]ny
document filed or lodged in the case in superior court[.]” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A), italics added.) Accordingly,
plaintiff’s motion to augment the record is denied.
3
plaintiff if he was alright. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was
okay. Defendant then moved her car off the roadway, called 911,
and returned to plaintiff to check on him. Plaintiff again
acknowledged that he was okay.
Plaintiff then exited his car on the passenger side because
the driver’s side door would not open. He sat on the curb and
took some deep breaths. Neither defendant nor a third-party
witness noticed any visible injuries on plaintiff.
Paramedics responded to the collision and attended to
plaintiff. Although plaintiff told the paramedics that he did not
need medical care, he also reported feeling pain in his left side,
his face, and his right wrist. The paramedics observed that
plaintiff’s blood pressure was elevated and therefore
recommended that he go to the hospital.
At the hospital, plaintiff experienced pain in his neck,
shoulder, and right wrist. An x-ray, sensation test, and
neurological exam all showed that the wrist was normal. A
musculoskeletal exam indicated no swelling, deformity, or
bruising. Plaintiff was able to move his neck in all directions.
2. Plaintiff’s Subsequent Medical Treatment
Two days after the collision, plaintiff was examined by his
primary care physician. At that time, he had no muscle
weakness or swelling to the wrist and experienced no sensory
changes. Plaintiff reported to his physician that he was feeling
better. But plaintiff began to experience headaches a couple of
days later.
Plaintiff’s attorneys referred him to a chiropractor, Dr.
Ronald Maugeri, whom plaintiff visited two weeks after the
4
collision. Plaintiff received treatment from Dr. Maugeri, which
helped to alleviate the pain in his neck and back. His headaches
also improved. Plaintiff, however, continued to feel pain in his
wrist.
In August 2018, plaintiff, who continued to feel pain in his
wrist, was examined by Dr. Bobby Dezfuli, a board-certified hand
surgeon. Dr. Dezfuli observed that plaintiff did not have swelling
or loss of sensation in his wrist. Dr. Dezfuli diagnosed plaintiff
with De Quervain’s tenosynovitis.2 An MRI exam revealed the
existence of a small cyst on plaintiff’s wrist. Dr. Dezfuli
discussed the option of surgery with plaintiff.
Dr. Dezfuli examined plaintiff again in November 2018. At
that time, he advised plaintiff that if his pain was caused by the
cyst, surgery would not alleviate it. Plaintiff decided to proceed
with the surgery. At no time during his treatment of plaintiff did
Dr. Dezfuli form an opinion as to the cause of plaintiff’s De
Quervain’s tenosynovitis, which can be brought on by trauma,
age, or repetitive motions.
On January 11, 2019, Dr. Dezfuli performed a tendon
release surgery on plaintiff’s wrist. Two months after the
2 Dr. Dezfuli explained that the condition is referred to as
both De Quervain’s tendonitis and De Quervain’s tenosynovitis.
The terms are “interchangeable.” The term refers to “a painful
condition affecting the tendons on the thumb side of the wrist.”
(Mayo Clinic <https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/de-
quervain-tenosynovitis/symptoms-causes/syc-20371332> [as of
Dec. 30, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/2UBH-RD2Y>.)
Symptoms include pain or swelling near the base of the thumb,
difficulty moving the thumb and wrist when grasping or
pinching, and a “‘sticking’” or “‘stop-and-go’ sensation in the
thumb when moving it.” (Ibid.)
5
surgery, an MRI of plaintiff’s right wrist showed early signs of
arthritis of the right thumb joint. Dr. Dezfuli believed that the
surgery was a success.
Plaintiff, however, felt upset and defeated because,
following the surgery, the pain in his wrist “didn’t get any
better.” Plaintiff therefore consulted with Dr. Edwin Ashley, an
orthopedic surgeon who specialized in the hand and upper
extremity. Dr. Ashley also diagnosed plaintiff with De
Quervain’s tenosynovitis and performed a second surgery.
Plaintiff, however, continued to experience pain in his right wrist.
B. Procedural History Before Trial
1. Complaint and Settlement Offers
On September 28, 2018, plaintiff filed, in the Los Angeles
County Superior Court, a complaint alleging that he had been
damaged by plaintiff’s negligence.3
On November 14, 2018, pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure4 section 998, defendant offered plaintiff $30,001 to
settle the complaint. Plaintiff did not accept the offer.
On October 25, 2019, defendant’s counsel sent plaintiff’s
counsel an e-mail that tendered defendant’s insurance policy
limit of $100,000. Plaintiff did not accept that offer.
3 Defendant moved to change the venue to Ventura County.
The court denied the motion.
4 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
6
On November 25, 2019, pursuant to section 998, defendant
sent plaintiff an offer to settle the complaint for $100,000. Again,
plaintiff did not accept the offer.
2. Trial Subpoena
On October 11, 2021, plaintiff’s counsel issued a civil
subpoena for Dr. Charles D. Rosen to appear as a witness at
trial.5 Dr. Rosen’s counsel contacted plaintiff’s counsel to inform
him that plaintiff’s subpoena did not include the appropriate fees
to secure Dr. Rosen’s trial presence.
On March 22, 2022, plaintiff’s counsel issued another civil
subpoena for Dr. Rosen’s appearance at trial.
On March 30, 2022, Dr. Rosen filed an ex parte application
for a protective order and to quash the subpoena, or, in the
alternative, to shorten time for a hearing on a noticed motion.
On April 4, 2022, the trial court construed the ex parte
application as a motion to quash and set a hearing for that
motion.
On April 4, 2022, plaintiff filed an opposition to Dr. Rosen’s
motion. Plaintiff argued, among other things, that the motion
was moot because following a continuance of the trial date,
plaintiff had withdrawn the trial subpoena.
On April 18, 2022, the trial court conducted the hearing on
Dr. Rosen’s motion. There is no reporter’s transcript or suitable
substitute for this proceeding. The court’s minute order reflects
that plaintiff did not appear at the hearing and the court granted
the motion.
5 Defendant had designated Dr. Rosen as an expert witness.
7
C. Trial Testimony Regarding Plaintiff’s Injuries
1. Plaintiff’s testimony
During direct examination, plaintiff explained that at the
hospital, he complained of pain on the left side of his neck, his
lower back, and his right wrist. A couple of days later, plaintiff
also began to suffer from headaches.
He admitted, however, that he suffered from chronic neck
pain prior to the collision. Specifically, plaintiff had “disc issues
from a slip at work” in 2003 and had consulted with a worker’s
compensation doctor and chiropractor about the injury. He also
admitted that prior to the collision, he suffered from lower back
pain, which was caused by the 20-pound belt that he wore as a
peace officer. According to plaintiff, “[e]very officer has lower
back problems because of the belts that we wear.” And, prior to
the collision, plaintiff was treated by a chiropractor for back pain.
Plaintiff also admitted that he had suffered from migraine
headaches but claimed that he had not experienced a migraine in
the five years prior to the collision.
On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that in 2013, he
sustained a shoulder injury, which resulted in his temporary
inability to swing a bat or a golf club. He conceded it was
“possible” that in 2015 and 2017, he received treatment for
shoulder pain, including as recently as four days prior to the
collision. Further, in 2019, he continued to receive treatment on
his neck as part of an earlier worker’s compensation claim. He
conceded the possibility that he injured his neck, left shoulder,
and ribs in October 2014, when he fell down some stairs. He also
admitted that he received intravenous infusion therapy
8
treatment for migraine headaches in August 2016 and that he
likely received treatment for his migraines two months prior to
the collision. Finally, he stated that it was possible he fractured
his right hand in November 2008.
2. Dr. Ronald Maugeri
Plaintiff then introduced excerpts from Dr. Maugeri’s
deposition testimony. Dr. Maugeri examined plaintiff in
December 2017, shortly after the collision, and opined that
plaintiff’s injuries, including injuries to his right wrist, were
caused by the collision. Dr. Maugeri explained that his opinion
was based on plaintiff’s statement that he had not experienced
problems with his wrist before the collision. Plaintiff never told
Dr. Maugeri that he sustained any prior injuries to the body
parts about which he now complained.
3. Dr. Edwin Ashley
Plaintiff also introduced excerpts from Dr. Ashley’s
deposition testimony. At the time of his testimony, Dr. Ashley
was a physician but no longer certified as an orthopedic surgeon.
Dr. Ashley concluded that plaintiff’s wrist injury resulted from
blunt trauma that plaintiff sustained in the automobile collision.
Dr. Ashley affirmed, however, that his opinion was based on an
assumption about the accuracy of plaintiff’s statements. He also
admitted that he did not review plaintiff’s medical records and,
aside from a neck injury plaintiff sustained 10 years ago, he was
unaware of any other medical history for plaintiff. Dr. Ashley
testified that De Quervain’s tenosynovitis has many possible
9
causes, including blunt trauma, fractures, repetitive use/overuse
syndromes, and anatomical variance.
4. Dr. Phillip Tirman
Plaintiff played a portion of Dr. Phillip Tirman’s deposition
for the jury. Tirman, a radiologist, reviewed an MRI of plaintiff’s
spine from 2015 and MRIs of plaintiff’s spine and wrist from
2018. The 2015 MRI showed congenital stenosis6 of plaintiff’s
spine as well as some abnormalities in plaintiff’s spinal discs.
The 2018 MRI of plaintiff’s spine indicated degenerative changes
due to age. The 2018 MRI of plaintiff’s wrist showed the
existence of a cyst but no injury that was consistent with De
Quervain’s. Tirman had no opinion as to the cause of the cyst,
but explained that they are “very, very common.” Tirman
compared the MRIs of plaintiff’s spine from 2015 and 2018 and
concluded there was no significant change to two disc bulges.
Further, he observed “disc desiccation” between the two MRI
dates but concluded that was something that “just happens over
time.” As to plaintiff’s lumbar MRI, Tirman concluded it depicted
a “healthy 45-year-old that has a problem with his L5-S1 facets—
long-term problem.”
6 Stenosis is “a narrowing or constriction of the diameter of a
bodily passage or orifice.” (Merriam-Webster Online Dict.
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/stenosis> [as of
Dec. 30, 2024], archived at <https://perma.cc/L492-XB7H>.)
10
5. Dr. Mark Elzik
Dr. Elzik was an orthopedic hand surgeon retained by
plaintiff as an expert witness. Plaintiff visited Dr. Elzik once in
August 2021, approximately two years after his second wrist
surgery. Based on his examination and review of plaintiff’s
medical records, Dr. Elzik diagnosed plaintiff with De Quervain’s
tenosynovitis, which was caused by the collision. Dr. Elzik’s
opinion was based on his belief that plaintiff did not experience
wrist pain until after the collision. Dr. Elzik acknowledged,
however, that plaintiff’s medical records showed that on
November 8, 2008, plaintiff visited a hospital with a fracture that
caused pain to his right wrist and hand. Further, medical
records from December 2008 showed that plaintiff had swelling to
his right wrist and on February 7, 2011, plaintiff again visited
the hospital and complained of pain to his right hand and wrist.
Dr. Elzik had been hired on two prior occasions by
plaintiff’s counsel, and had testified only as an expert on behalf of
plaintiffs.
D. Verdict
The trial court gave, among other instructions, CACI Nos.
400, Negligence-Essential Factual Elements, and 430, Causation:
Substantial Factor.7 On August 3, 2022, the jury returned a
7 For CACI No. 400, the trial court instructed the jury:
“[Plaintiff] claims that he was harmed by [defendant’s]
negligence. To establish this claim, he must prove all of the
following: [t]hat [defendant] was negligent, that he was harmed,
and that [defendant’s] negligence was a substantial factor in
11
unanimous verdict, finding defendant to be negligent but also
finding that her negligence was not a substantial factor in
causing harm to plaintiff. On September 14, 2022, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of defendant.
E. Procedural History After Trial
1. Memorandum of Costs
On September 30, 2022, defendant filed a memorandum of
costs, which sought a total of $140,090.66. On October 10, 2022,
plaintiff filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs.8 On October 21,
2022, defendant filed an opposition to plaintiff’s motion, including
invoices and other documents in support of the cost items claimed
in her memorandum.
The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion and awarded costs
in the full amount of $140,090.66.
causing [plaintiff’s] harm.” For CACI No. 430, the court
instructed the jury: “A substantial factor in causing harm is a
factor that a reasonable person would consider to have
contributed to the harm. It must be more than a remote or trivial
factor. It does not have to be the only cause of the harm.
Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same
harm would have occurred without that conduct.”
8 An adverse party may challenge an entire cost
memorandum by a motion to strike costs (Rappenecker v. Sea-
Land Service, Inc. (1979) 93 Cal.App.3d 256, 261) and individual
cost items by a motion to tax costs (id. at p. 266). A motion to
strike costs “in purpose and effect amounts to the same thing as a
motion to tax costs, and is so treated.” (Jimenez v. City of Oxnard
(1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 856, 858, fn. 2.)
12
2. Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
and New Trial
On October 7, 2022, plaintiff moved for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), arguing that the jury failed
to follow the law as instructed. He contended that it was
uncontroverted that defendant’s negligence caused him harm.
Plaintiff also contended that the trial court erred by quashing his
subpoena for Dr. Rosen, who would have provided testimony that
was “highly probative evidence in favor of causation.” In support,
plaintiff’s counsel submitted a declaration that purported to
describe his post-verdict conversation with the jury foreperson.9
Plaintiff also moved for a new trial.
Defendant opposed the motions and objected to the
declaration describing the conversation with the foreperson as
inadmissible hearsay. The trial court denied the motions.
Plaintiff timely appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Motion to Quash Subpoena
Plaintiff contends the trial court erred by granting Dr.
Rosen’s motion to quash the subpoena. We review an order
quashing a subpoena for abuse of discretion. (See Krinsky v. Doe
9 Plaintiff’s counsel declared, “After the verdict was read, I
spoke with the [j]ury [f]oreperson . . . in the hallway right outside
the courtroom. When asked what the jury felt [p]laintiff failed to
prove, [the foreperson] stated that [p]laintiff failed to prove that
the collision caused a ‘substantial injury’ to [p]laintiff.”
13
6 (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1161.) To the extent the relevant
facts are undisputed and the issue turns on a question of law, we
apply a de novo standard of review. (Ibid.)
As we note above, there is no reporter’s transcript, or a
suitable substitute, of the hearing at which the trial court issued
the order quashing the subpoena. “[T]he absence of a court
reporter at trial court proceedings and the resulting lack of a
verbatim record of such proceedings will frequently be fatal to a
litigant’s ability to have his or her claims of trial court error
resolved on the merits by an appellate court. This is so because it
is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial
court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the
burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.
[Citations.] ‘This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of
reversible error.’ [Citations.] ‘In the absence of a contrary
showing in the record, all presumptions in favor of the trial
court’s action will be made by the appellate court. “[I]f any
matters could have been presented to the court below which
would have authorized the order complained of, it will be
presumed that such matters were presented.”’ [Citation.] ‘“A
necessary corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate
for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of
the trial court should be affirmed.”’ [Citation.] ‘Consequently,
[the appellant] has the burden of providing an adequate record.
[Citation.] Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against [the appellant].’
[Citation.]” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609.)
14
Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden of providing an adequate
record to review his arguments regarding the order quashing the
subpoena. Accordingly, we affirm that order.
Even assuming that plaintiff could demonstrate the trial
court erred in quashing the subpoena, we would still affirm the
ruling because plaintiff cannot establish prejudice. (Audish v.
Macias (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 740, 751 [“‘“To prevail on appeal,
an appellant must establish both error and prejudice from that
error”’”].) Here, as plaintiff concedes, he could have played Dr.
Rosen’s deposition testimony at trial, just as he did with multiple
other treating and expert witnesses.
B. The Jury’s Finding of No Causation
Plaintiff next contends the jury’s verdict was not supported
by the evidence. According to plaintiff, because two expert
witnesses, Dr. Maugeri and Dr. Ashley, testified that plaintiff’s
injuries were caused by the collision and that testimony was
“uncontradicted,” the jury’s verdict is not supported by
substantial evidence.
“In a case where the trier of fact has determined that the
party with the burden of proof did not carry its burden and that
party appeals, ‘it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof
issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.’
[Citations.] Instead, ‘where the issue on appeal turns on a failure
of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes
whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant
as a matter of law.’ [Citation.] Specifically, we ask ‘whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached”
and (2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
15
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.”’ [Citation.]” (Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp.
(2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 129, 163–164.)
“‘[E]xpert testimony, like any other, may be rejected by the
trier of fact, so long as the rejection is not arbitrary.’
(Conservatorship of McKeown (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 502, 507–
510.) Thus, ‘as a general rule, “provided the trier of fact does not
act arbitrarily, he may reject in toto the testimony of a witness,
even though the witness is uncontradicted. [Citations.]”
[Citation.] This rule is applied equally to expert witnesses.’
(Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890.) The
exceptional principle requiring a fact finder to accept
uncontradicted expert testimony as conclusive applies only in
professional negligence cases where the standard of care must be
established by expert testimony.” (Howard v. Owens Corning
(1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 621, 632.)
Here, plaintiff did not allege professional negligence and
the jury could therefore reasonably reject Dr. Maugeri and Dr.
Ashley’s testimony that plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
collision. Indeed, both experts conceded their opinions were
based on the assumption that plaintiff accurately reported his
medical history. Plaintiff admitted, however, that even before
the collision, he experienced chronic neck and back pain and
migraines; and his medical history included two prior visits to the
hospital for pain in his right wrist, which had been caused by a
fracture. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the
evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached such that he was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Plaintiff’s challenges to the trial court’s denial of his JNOV
motion and his motion for new trial are premised on his
16
contention that substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
finding as to causation. We reject those arguments for the
reasons stated above.
C. Memorandum of Costs
Plaintiff next contends that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to tax costs because, in his view, a number of the
itemized costs were unrecoverable.
1. Applicable Law
Section 1033.5, subdivision (a) provides a list of items
allowable as costs pursuant to section 1032.10 “An award of costs
shall be subject to the following: [¶] (1) Costs are allowable if
incurred, whether or not paid. [¶] (2) Allowable costs shall be
reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation rather than
merely convenient or beneficial to its preparation. [¶]
(3) Allowable costs shall be reasonable in amount. [¶] (4) Items
not mentioned in this section and items assessed upon
application may be allowed or denied in the court’s discretion.”
(§ 1033.5, subd. (c).) The losing party may file a motion to
dispute any or all items in the prevailing party’s costs
memorandum by a motion to strike or tax costs. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1700(b).)
Witness fees for experts not ordered by the court are not
allowed as costs, “except when expressly authorized by law.”
10 Section 1032, subdivision (b) provides that the prevailing
party is entitled to recover costs. It is undisputed that defendant
is the prevailing party here.
17
(§ 1033.5, subd. (b)(1).) Section 998, subdivision (c)(1), is one
such express authorization: “If an offer made by a defendant is
not accepted and the plaintiff fails to obtain a more favorable
judgment or award, the plaintiff shall not recover his or her
postoffer costs and shall pay the defendant’s costs from the time
of the offer. In addition, in any action or proceeding other than
an eminent domain action, the court . . . , in its discretion, may
require the plaintiff to pay a reasonable sum to cover postoffer
costs of the services of expert witnesses, who are not regular
employees of any party, actually incurred and reasonably
necessary in either, or both, preparation for trial . . . , or during
trial . . . , of the case by the defendant.”
We review a cost award for abuse of discretion. (El Dorado
Meat Co. v. Yosemite Meat & Locker Service, Inc. (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 612, 617.) We also review the trial court’s
determination of the reasonableness of a section 998 offer for
abuse of discretion. (Regency Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. City of
Los Angeles (2006) 39 Cal.4th 507, 531.) If, however, “the
determination of whether costs should be awarded is an issue of
law on undisputed facts, we exercise de novo review.” (City of
Long Beach v. Stevedoring Services of America (2007) 157
Cal.App.4th 672, 678.)
2. Reasonableness of Section 998 Settlement Offers
Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in awarding
defendant expert witness fees because defendant’s settlement
offers were made in “bad faith.” As we discuss above, defendant
offered plaintiff the following amounts under section 998 to settle
18
the action: on November 14, 2018, $30,00111; and on November
25, 2019, $100,000. Plaintiff declined both offers.
“It is the general rule that where a party shows a prima
facie entitlement to costs, the burden is on an objector to prove
the costs should be disallowed. [Citations.] Where, as here, the
offeror obtains a judgment more favorable than its offer, the
judgment constitutes prima facie evidence showing the offer was
reasonable and the offeror is eligible for costs as specified in
section 998. The burden is therefore properly on plaintiff, as
offeree, to prove otherwise.” (Elrod v. Oregon Cummins Diesel,
Inc. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 692, 700.) In light of the strong
evidence regarding plaintiff’s preexisting injuries, plaintiff cannot
demonstrate that defendant’s offers were unreasonable.
Accordingly, the trial court did not err by awarding expert
witness fees as costs to defendant.
3. Reasonably Necessary Costs
Plaintiff challenges various of the cost item awards on the
grounds that they were not reasonably necessary. Specifically, he
challenges the court’s award of: (1) filing fees for an unsuccessful
motion for a change of venue; (2) filing fees for a motion which
defendant later withdrew; (3) fees for service of process on
witnesses who did not testify at trial; (4) costs for trial exhibits
11 Plaintiff contends the trial court erred when it awarded
expert witness fees for costs incurred prior to defendant’s
November 25, 2019, settlement offer. Plaintiff’s contention is
meritless as it is undisputed that defendant made her first
section 998 offer on November 14, 2018.
19
that defendant did not introduce at trial; and (5) expert fees for
witnesses who did not testify at trial.
“Whether a cost item was reasonably necessary to the
litigation presents a question of fact for the trial court and its
decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Ladas v. California
State Auto. Assn. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 761, 774.) Allowable
costs include filing and motion fees. (§ 1033.5, subd. (a)(1).)
Further, a court has discretion to award costs for trial exhibits.
(§ 1033.5, subd. (c)(4); Segal v. ASICS America Corp. (2022) 12
Cal.5th 651, 667.) Finally, as we discuss above, expert fees are
allowable under section 998.
We reject plaintiff’s contention that defendant was not
entitled to recover filing fees for an unsuccessful or withdrawn
motion. (See Naser v. Lakeridge Athletic Club (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 571, 576 [affirming allowance of award of jury fee as
costs even though no jury trial took place because defendant
“could not have known [when it paid the jury fee] that a jury trial
would be unnecessary. The fee was a reasonable litigation
expense and was recoverable under section 1033.5, subdivision
(a)(1)”].) Similarly, we reject plaintiff’s contention that the trial
court abused its discretion when it awarded fees to secure the
testimony of witnesses who did not testify at trial, expert fees for
witnesses who did not testify at trial, and costs for exhibits that
defendant did not introduce at trial. (See Garcia v. Tempur-Pedic
North America, LLC (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 819, 824–825; Segal v.
ASICS America Corp., supra, 12 Cal.5th 651 at p. 667 [costs for
exhibits not used at trial awardable at trial court’s discretion
under § 1033.5, subd. (c)(4)]; Jones v. Dumrichob (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 1258, 1266 [no abuse of discretion where trial court
20
awarded claimed expert witness fees under § 998, even though
experts did not appear at trial].)
4. Documentation of Costs
Plaintiff additionally contends that the trial court should
have taxed several of defendant’s requested cost items on the
grounds that defendant did not submit adequately detailed
documents in support. For example, plaintiff contends that the
invoices that defendant submitted in support of her requests for
costs for witness fees to Jeff Bruno, whom defendant explained
she retained in order to address plaintiff’s loss of income and
earning capacity claims, did not provide an adequate description
of the services Bruno performed or his hourly rate.12
“‘[T]he mere filing of a motion to tax costs may be a “proper
objection” to an item, the necessity of which appears doubtful, or
which does not appear to be proper on its face. [Citation.]
However, “[i]f the items appear to be proper charges, the verified
memorandum is prima facie evidence that the costs, expenses
and services therein listed were necessarily incurred by the
defendant [citations], and the burden of showing that an item is
not properly chargeable or is unreasonable is upon the [objecting
party].” [Citations.]’ (Nelson v. Anderson[ (1999)] 72 Cal.App.4th
[111,] 131.)
“‘If the items in a cost memorandum appear proper, the
verified memorandum is prima facie evidence the expenses were
necessarily incurred by the’ prevailing party. (Benach v. County
12 Plaintiff additionally challenges the adequacy of the
evidence that supported defendant’s request for other expert fees
and court reporter fees.
21
of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 858.) To controvert
this evidence, the burden is on the objecting party to present
evidence showing the contrary. (Ibid. [‘Benach’s unsubstantiated
declaration fails to satisfy this burden[ ]’]; see Jones v.
Dumrichob, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th [at p.] 1266 [matters in
memorandum or pleading [do] not meet burden].)” (Whatley-
Miller v. Cooper (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1103, 1115.) “‘[M]ere
statements’ in a motion to strike and attorney declaration ‘are
insufficient to rebut the prima facie showing.’” (Rojas v. HSBC
Card Services Inc. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 860, 896.)
Here, defendant’s verified memorandum of costs was prima
facie evidence of her entitlement to an award for the items
claimed. And, plaintiff did not meet his burden to demonstrate
otherwise. (See Nelson v. Anderson, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at
p. 131.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff additionally challenges the trial court’s award of
$67,515 in costs for expert witness fees because defendant’s
submitted invoices totaled only $64,420. Plaintiff, however,
raised this calculation argument only in his reply to defendant’s
opposition to his motion to tax costs. Because plaintiff did not
object to defendant’s calculations until his reply, we conclude he
has forfeited the argument on appeal. (K.C. Multimedia, Inc. v.
Bank of America Technology & Operations, Inc. (2009) 171
Cal.App.4th 939, 949–950.)
5. Awarding Costs at Court’s Discretion
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by awarding costs at
its discretion pursuant to section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4).
Without detailing each of plaintiff’s arguments, we provide here
22
an example of the types of challenges to the costs award he raises
on appeal: (1) the court should not have awarded $265 for a
canceled videographer because plaintiff had hired his own
videographer and therefore defendant should not have ordered
one; and (2) the court should not have awarded expert costs for
Dr. Stuart Kuschner because, in plaintiff’s view, Kuschner spent
too much time reviewing medical records.
Our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the costs
defendant sought under section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(4) were
reasonably necessary at the time they were incurred. (See, e.g.
Garcia v. Tempur-Pedic North America, LLC, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 825 [witnesses’ failure to appear for deposition
was not a reason to deny costs]; Rojas v. HSBC Card Services
Inc., supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [reasonableness of amount
of costs awarded reviewed under abuse of discretion standard].)
6. Awarding Costs for Expenses Explicitly Excluded
Plaintiff also argues that the trial court erred by failing to
tax costs that were explicitly excluded under section 1033.5.
a. Subpoenaed Records
Plaintiff argues that $20,805.89 in costs related to
subpoenaing records, which defendant explained were for
business records for a deposition, should be taxed because
defendant did not use these records at trial. Plaintiff additionally
contends that defendant could not recover costs for both
subpoenaed records and trial exhibits. We disagree. “[O]btaining
23
business records through a deposition subpoena is a ‘deposition’
within the plain meaning of the Civil Discovery Act.” (Naser v.
Lakeridge Athletic Club, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 578.) And,
the cost of “taking” depositions is an allowable cost. (§ 1033.5,
subd. (a)(3).) We find no abuse of discretion.
b. Investigative Services
Plaintiff contends that $1,633.30 for Paramount
Investigative Services and $2,887.50 for Marshall Investigative
Group should be taxed. Defendant concedes that those costs were
related to investigative services, which are excluded costs.
(§ 1033.5, subd. (b)(2).) Accordingly, we will modify the judgment
to reduce the costs award by $4,520.80.
24
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reduce the cost award by
$4,520.80, for a total award of $135,569.86. As so modified, the
judgment is affirmed. Defendant is awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
25
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