People v. Ramos CA4/1

CourtListener 10306329Calctapp31.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/31/24 P. v. Ramos CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D081526

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCN413172)

JENNIFER MENDOZA RAMOS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kelly Mok, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Gene D. Vorobyov, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jennifer Mendoza Ramos appeals from a judgment of conviction for
first degree murder. She contends the trial court prejudicially erred when
ruling on two motions in limine and committed sentencing error. We reject
both contentions, but we agree the judgment must be modified to correct a
small number of typographical errors in the abstract of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In a Mirandized1 videotaped interview with Sheriff’s deputies, Ramos
admitted that, on April 10, 2020, she took a large kitchen knife from her
apartment, walked a few blocks from her house, and started looking for
someone to kill. The first person she saw was Chad Danielson out walking
his dog. She approached him from behind, grabbed him in a “bear hug,” and
stabbed him in the chest. Danielson tried to defend himself, but Ramos was
able to stab him “again, and again, and again.” She stabbed him until she
knew he would die from his wounds. After she was certain he would die, she
picked up the knife, ran home, and took a shower. Danielson did in fact die
from the seven stab wounds she inflicted to the front and back of his torso.
Ramos claimed the devil told her to kill the first person she saw that
morning. She had never met nor even seen Danielson before she killed him.
He had done nothing to her; she repeatedly described him as “an innocent.”
She described her feelings afterward as “a little bit scared,” but “[m]ostly just
a rush.”
On May 4, 2020, Ramos was charged with first degree murder (Pen.

Code,2 § 187). The operative information alleged an enhancement for

1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.

2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon (§ 12022) and the special
circumstance of lying in wait (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).
Ramos presented a mental health defense at trial. She retained a
psychologist who diagnosed her with delusional disorder, cannabis use
disorder, and amphetamine use disorder. According to the psychologist,
“[t]he hallmark symptom of a delusional disorder” is a “fixed, unwavering
belief about a person, a situation, a phenomenon that is not correct, but that
is [also] not factual and not based in reality.” Another “hallmark feature” of
delusional disorder, however, is that, “aside from the delusions,” a person
diagnosed with the disorder is generally “not otherwise impaired.”
The psychologist opined that Ramos had an ongoing delusional belief
“that she is communicating with Jesus Christ and . . . with Satan.” The
expert, however, “had no current concerns” about Ramos’s “everyday
executive functioning” and “decision-making abilit[y],” including the ability to
“self-regulate,” “inhibit . . . impulsive responses,” “initiate problem solving,”
and “plan and organize.” He specifically agreed she was capable of engaging
in “goal-directed behavior.”
On September 20, 2022, a jury convicted Ramos of first degree murder,
and found true the allegation she personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The jury was unable to reach
a verdict on the lying-in-wait special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(15).)
On December 8, 2022, the trial court sentenced Ramos to prison for 25 years
to life for murder plus a consecutive one-year term for the weapon use
enhancement.

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DISCUSSION
I.
No Error Admitting Autopsy and Crime Scene Photographs
Ramos contends the trial court prejudicially erred when it admitted
into evidence (1) a photo of Danielson on the ground surrounded by rescue
workers after he died, (2) nine photographs from Danielson’s autopsy, and
(3) a series of PowerPoint slides that showed the autopsy photos and related
trial testimony about each stab wound to his body. She contends this visual
evidence—which shows the exact location where Danielson was killed and his
injuries after he died—should have been excluded pursuant to Evidence Code
section 352. In Ramos’s view, the evidence purportedly “had no probative
value on any material disputed issues,” and “[t]he only function of the blown-
up autopsy photographs was to generate sympathy for [Danielson] and
reinforce the sense of horror from this tragic incident while not adding to the
jury deciding whether the killing was first or second[ ]degree murder or
whether the lying-in-wait special circumstance was proven.” She claims the
court’s error under state law had the additional legal consequence of violating
her federal due process rights.
Evidence Code section 352 provides, “The court in its discretion may
exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
probability that its admission will . . . create substantial danger of undue
prejudice.” The question presented here is whether the trial court abused its
discretion when it found the probative value of the autopsy and crime scene
photos outweighed any potential prejudice. (People v. Scheid (1997) 16
Cal.4th 1, 18 (Scheid).) Applying this deferential standard, we find no error.

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The probative value of the evidence was high. (Evid. Code, § 352.) As
Ramos admits, the main issues in dispute at trial were (1) whether the killing
was first or second degree murder, and (2) whether the lying-in-wait special
circumstance allegation was true beyond a reasonable doubt. To obtain a
conviction for first degree murder as opposed to second degree murder, the
People were required to prove the killing was “willful, deliberate, and
premeditated.” (Pen. Code, § 189.) To prove the lying-in-wait special
circumstance, the People were required to prove (1) Ramos concealed her
purpose from Danielson, (2) waited and watched for an opportunity to act,
and (3) made a surprise attack on him from a position of advantage. (Pen.
Code, § 190.2, subd. (a)(15); People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 330.)
Here, the photo of Danielson’s body with rescue workers right after he
died showed the overall condition of his body after the attack and its relative
position at the crime scene. The nine autopsy photos showed the exact
location and depth of the stab wounds. Together, the photos provided strong
support for the prosecution’s theory that Ramos planned and deliberated a
surprise attack on Danielson. The photos corroborated her confession she
snuck up on him from behind, placed him in a “bear hug,” and stabbed him in
the chest before he could try to defend himself. They showed she was able to
overpower him and forcefully stab him a total of seven times all over his torso
despite the fact she was out of shape, and he was a physical education
instructor. Jurors could infer from this visual evidence that Ramos engaged
in planning activity before the murder and deliberately and strategically
placed herself in a position where she could quickly and suddenly surprise
Danielson and overcome him with deep, lethal blows before he could
successfully defend himself.

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The evidence was also highly probative on the question of Ramos’s
mental health defense. During her interview with Sheriff’s deputies, Ramos
seemed to have a clear memory of the entire attack. She not only provided a
detailed description of the murder, including that she inflicted six to eight
stab wounds, she actually acted out the murder while she was being
videotaped and showed the detective exactly how she remembered stabbing
Danielson. A visual comparison between Ramos’s videotaped reenactment
and the autopsy pictures of the seven stab wounds that were inflicted during
the actual attack would certainly have been probative on the question of the
accuracy of Ramos’s memory and whether her ability to premeditate and
deliberate was affected by her mental illness. To the extent the location and
nature of the stab wounds aligned with her memory, that alignment would
have been strongly supportive of the prosecutor’s theory she was not so out of
her senses at the time of the murder to be unable to premeditate and
deliberate or plan a surprise attack. We conclude the evidence had obvious
and significant value.
Ramos argues the evidence nevertheless lacked probative value in the
sense that it was purportedly cumulative. She contends the forensic
pathologist’s verbal testimony about the injuries at trial “aptly covered [the]
issue” as it “went on for 20 pages” in the reporter’s transcript. We strongly
disagree. “Seeing is believing,” as the saying goes. Prosecutors are not
required to prove details about the fact or manner of death solely from the
testimony of live witnesses in lieu of photographic evidence. (Scheid, supra,
16 Cal.4th at p. 16.) The jury here was “entitled to see how the physical
details of the scene and body supported the prosecution theory.” (People v.
Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 706.) In particular, the forensic pathologist
opined that Danielson’s wounds were consistent with “the person who

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inflicted [them] walk[ing] up from behind and reach[ing] around [Danielson’s]
body and making stabbing wounds backwards.” “Because the photographic
evidence [of the victim’s wounds] could have assisted the jury in
understanding and evaluating the testimony presented to them, the trial
court’s determination that such evidence had sufficient probative value to
warrant its admission was not erroneous” on the ground it was “merely
cumulative.” (See People v Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 938.) The jury was
thus entitled to see the autopsy photos that provided the foundational
evidence for the pathologist’s opinion.
Ramos claims the evidence should have been excluded because of a
purported “defense stipulation” that Ramos killed Danielson by stabbing him
multiple times. We observe no support in the record for this contention. A
concession at closing argument, conducted after the close of evidence—which
is what we have here—is not a stipulation. Regardless, “[t]he general rule is
that the prosecution in a criminal case cannot be compelled to accept a
stipulation if the effect would be to deprive the state’s case of its
persuasiveness and forcefulness.” (People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983,
1007.)
Ramos, moreover, misses the point here. It is true the parties did not
dispute the “cause of death.” It was essentially uncontested Danielson died
from seven stab wounds. But the crime scene and autopsy photos were
relevant to prove more than the manner of death. The evidence was relevant
to prove the manner of attack. Ramos concedes this was the critical dispute
at trial. As we have explained, the crime scene and autopsy photos were
highly probative on the question of whether the attack was premeditated and
deliberated and/or undertaken by surprise from a position of advantage.

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Finally, the evidence was not unduly prejudicial. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“[V]ictim photographs and other graphic items of evidence in murder cases
always are disturbing.” (Scheid, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 19.) The trial court
here made a point of winnowing the photos down from more than 100 to nine.
The court allowed only one photo showing the body at the scene of the crime.
The court eliminated duplicates of the autopsy photos and allowed only one
that showed blood from the injuries before the body was cleaned off. And all
of the photos in the PowerPoint presentation were ones that had otherwise
been admitted at trial. We have independently reviewed all of these exhibits.
In our view, the evidence tended to prove the mental state elements of first
degree murder and the lying-in-wait special circumstance in a way that was
not “gratuitously inflammatory.” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622,

678.) We find no abuse of discretion.3
II.
Harmless Error to Admit Victim’s Photograph
Ramos contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated her
federal due process rights when it admitted a sentimental family photograph
of the victim, his wife, and their two dogs. Our high court has “repeatedly
cautioned against the admission of photographs of murder victims while alive
unless the prosecution can establish the relevance of such items.” (People v.
DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1230 (DeSantis).) We conclude any error was
harmless.

3 Because we find no state evidentiary error, we necessarily find the trial
court’s ruling did not have the additional legal consequence of violating
Ramos’s federal due process rights. (See People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th
428, 438–439 (Partida).)

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Ramos sought in limine to exclude an “inflammatory” photograph of
Danielson pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. The photograph in
question shows Danielson and his wife smiling together while holding their
two dogs. The trial court found the photograph probative on the issue of
Danielson’s height, weight, and physical build during the incident, and
because it showed the dog he was walking when he was attacked.
We agree that Danielson’s level of physical fitness was relevant to
Ramos’s ability to fight with him and could potentially support the inference
she deliberately decided she needed to approach him from behind by surprise
to kill him. But we do not agree the photograph is probative on this question.
Danielson is pictured from the side. His chest is entirely obscured because he
is holding his dog. His body is covered by loose clothing with the exception of
his elbow, forearm, and a small portion of the back of his calf. His height is
not discernable, because most of the lower half of his body is not within the
frame of the photograph. Nor is his height discernable in comparison to his
wife in the picture. The couple does not appear side by side and the lower
half of her body is also not within the photograph’s frame.
We conclude the photograph’s only probative value is that one of the
dogs in the picture is the one Danielson was walking when he was killed.
This value is de minimus, however, given the small dog did not engage with
Ramos during the attack. On the other hand, as noted, the photograph is a
touching and sentimental one. We therefore agree with Ramos that,
balanced against its minimal probative value, it was unduly prejudicial.
(Evid. Code, § 352.)
We do not agree, however, the error was so serious as to violate due
process. “[T]he admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law,
results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally

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unfair.” (Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 439.) The addition of a single
photograph showing the couple when Danielson was alive did not render the
trial fundamentally unfair. This is especially true here, given the jury was
destined to encounter Danielson’s wife and hear her testimony about her
relationship with him. She was a percipient witness who saw the latter part
of the murder. She gave gut-wrenching testimony about seeing her husband
murdered before her eyes. The addition of a single, sentimental photograph
to testimony that was already unavoidably heart-wrenching did not render
the trial fundamentally unfair. (DeSantis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1231
[concluding there was no “diminution” in “the reliability of the guilt
determination” despite the possibility a photograph “creat[ed] sympathy for
the victims”].)
We hold the error was harmless under any standard for assessing
prejudice. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18; People v. Watson
(1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.) This was not a close case in which the jury’s sympathy
for the victim could potentially lead it to improperly convict Ramos of first
degree murder as opposed to second degree murder. The evidence of
premeditation and deliberation was overwhelming, and it came in the form of
Ramos’s own words during her videotaped interview.
Before leaving her house, Ramos thought about whether she should use
the knife she kept in her room or a “smaller one.” She decided the knife in
her room was “the perfect one to do it with,” because the victim “had to die.”
After going outside, she decided to walk a few blocks away from her
neighborhood to avoid killing anyone she grew up with. During her
videotaped interview, she admitted she knew right from wrong and that it
was a choice to kill Danielson. As she was stabbing Danielson, she had a
moment of self-doubt, but “thought to [her]self,” “he has to die,” so she “kept

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stabbing him” until she was certain he would in fact die. She described
stabbing Danielson and only stopping when she knew he was dying. After
the attack, she had the presence of mind to pick up the knife from the ground
before she left, she hid from Sheriff’s deputies when she heard sirens because
otherwise she “might get locked up,” and she immediately changed out of her
clothes and showered when she got home because “they were bloody.” Her
own expert agreed she was capable of engaging in “goal-directed behavior”
and had “no current concerns” about her “everyday executive functioning”
and “decision-making abilities,” including the ability to “self-regulate,”
“inhibit the impulsive responses,” “initiate problem solving,” and “plan and
organize.”
This is not a close case where sympathy for the victim could have led a
jury to improperly convict a person of first degree murder instead of second
degree murder. The admission of the photograph was harmless under either
Chapman or Watson.
III.
No Sentencing Error
Ramos contends the trial court abused its discretion when it declined to
dismiss the one-year weapon enhancement for personal use of a deadly
weapon pursuant to section 1385. We reject her contention because it is
based on an unfair reading of the record. In doing so, we exercise our
discretion to entertain Ramos’s argument on appeal despite her failure to
object below. (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161–162, fn. 6.) We
do this because the Legislature made changes to section 1385 the year Ramos
was sentenced. Those changes led to a conflict in the Courts of Appeal over
the proper manner for exercising discretion pursuant to section 1385, and the

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conflict was only recently resolved by the California Supreme Court. (People
v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1028 (Walker).)
As noted, the jury found true the sentence enhancement allegation that
Ramos personally used a knife in violation of section 12022, subdivision
(b)(1). At sentencing, the trial court considered whether to dismiss the
enhancement in the interest of justice pursuant to section 1385 and made
four relevant findings. The court found (1) “th[e] crime was connected to
mental illness,” (2) “[Ramos’s] prior performance on probation has been poor,”
(3) her adult convictions were “increasing in seriousness,” and (4) she is a
“serious danger to the community.” (Italics added.) The court then stated,
“Having [weighed] the aggravating factors along with the mitigating factor,
the [c]ourt finds that it is not in the furtherance of justice to strike the
enhancement, and I am going to impose the additional one year for the
personal use of a deadly weapon.”
The California Supreme Court recently explained how the weighing
process works under section 1385 when there is no finding that dismissal of
an enhancement will endanger public safety. “[I]f the court does not find that
dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated
mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence
of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless neutralize even the great
weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the
enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.’ ” (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at

p. 1029.)4

4 Walker was decided after the opening brief was filed and forecloses
Ramos’s main arguments in the opening brief. We address the arguments
she continues to assert in the reply brief.

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Relying on this authority, Ramos claims the trial court was required to
give “great weight” to the mitigating circumstance that the crime was
connected to mental illness, because it purportedly made no “danger to public
safety” finding under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). Her contention is
unfounded. The trial court here specifically found Ramos is a “serious danger
to the community.” The court, as a result, was not required to give great
weight to mitigating circumstances when considering whether to dismiss the
enhancement. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1036.) As the high court said,
in most cases, “ ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal would
further the interests of justice,’ notwithstanding the applicability of any
mitigating factors[.]” (Id. at p. 1033.) The court therefore did not abuse its
discretion when it declined to dismiss the enhancement.
Ramos contends the trial court’s finding she “is a serious danger to the
community” is not supported by substantial evidence, because she is serving
an indeterminate sentence and cannot be released “until a parole board
decide[s] that her release would not endanger the community.” She asserts,
“[t]here is no rational theory under which striking the one-year enhancement,
which does not impact the 25-to-life sentence, would endanger [the] physical
safety of any person, considering that when [she] gets out is up to the parole
board.” According to Ramos, “[s]triking of the enhancement could advance a
parole hearing date, but it would not undermine the indeterminate nature of
[her] sentence unless, after [she] serves the statutorily prescribed minimum
term, the [parole board] finds that her release does not endanger public
safety.”
Ramos’s argument is untenable. By her logic, considerations of public
safety would never apply to defendants serving indeterminate sentences,

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because the defendants’ release in such situations will always be subject to
parole board review. As a result, by her logic, public safety considerations
would apply to defendants serving determinate sentences only. But the plain
language of section 1385 does not make such a novel distinction. Absent
express language limiting the public safety inquiry to determinate sentences,
we do not believe the Legislature intended to treat defendants with
indeterminate sentences more favorably than those with determinate
sentences when considering whether to dismiss an enhancement. Our
interpretation of the statute is consistent with the statutory scheme as a
whole. When an indeterminate sentence is imposed, the assessment of
whether a risk to public safety is expected to diminish by the time the base
term is served—or whether the addition of more time pursuant to the
enhancement is needed before the risk abates—ensures parole hearings are
not conducted until there is a baseline possibility that a prisoner is no longer
a public safety threat. Finally, Ramos appears to claim the record lacks
substantial evidence she is a danger to public safety. She claims the trial
court would have been “hard-pressed” to find dismissal of the enhancement
“would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others” as required
by section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). “A trial court abuses its discretion when
the factual findings critical to its decision find no support in the evidence.”
(People v. Cluff (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 991, 998.) Here, however,
overwhelming evidence supported the court’s conclusion Ramos is a threat to
public safety. As the court pointed out, the crime was “a cold, violent,
premeditated killing of a complete stranger that was just out walking his
dog.” Ramos admitted she felt a “rush” after the murder. And Ramos
specifically told the detective who interviewed her that she plans to kill
again: “[H]e’s not the first one I’m going to kill, let me tell you that, because

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I’m the devil reincarnated and you guys know I am.” We uphold the trial
court’s ruling.
IV.
Typographical Errors in Abstract of Judgment
Finally, both parties agree the abstract of judgment does not reflect the
court’s oral pronouncement that “[a]ll fines and fees” were stayed. We agree
as well and we modify the judgment accordingly. The court is directed to
correct the abstract of judgment to reflect its oral pronouncement. Where
there is a discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of judgment and a

minute order or the abstract of judgment, the oral pronouncement controls.5
(People v. Farrell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reflect the restitution fine of $300, the
court security fee of $40, and the criminal conviction assessment fee of $30
were stayed. As modified, the judgment is affirmed. The trial court is
directed to forward an amended abstract of judgment reflecting the

5 The minute order correctly states “[a]ll fines and fees are stayed.”

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modifications to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The
judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

DO, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

RUBIN, J.

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