People v. Williams-Hull CA3

CourtListener 10306327Calctapp31.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/31/24 P. v. Williams-Hull CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----

THE PEOPLE, C099934

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No.
STKCRFE20210009839)
v.

GYNNA WILLIAMS-HULL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Appointed counsel for defendant Gynna Williams-Hull asked this court to review
the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.) We will remand the matter for the trial court to calculate
and award presentence custody credit and otherwise affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In July 2021, when defendant was 19 years old, she drove a companion to the
victim’s location, so the companion could shoot the victim multiple times and kill him.

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Defendant then drove the actual killer away from the scene to avoid arrest. Defendant
was a direct aider and abettor and shared the actual killer’s intent to kill the victim.
Defendant was charged with murder. (Pen. Code,1 § 187.) It was further alleged
that, during the commission of the crime, a principal was armed with a firearm.
(§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
In June 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to second degree murder. As part of the
plea, the trial court dismissed (1) the firearm enhancement and (2) a separate criminal
case pending against defendant that is not at issue in this appeal.
The September 2022 probation report noted defendant had no prior criminal
record. It also stated that defendant was ineligible for probation due to the murder charge
and recommended denying probation. The report further explained defendant was
presumptively ineligible for probation pursuant to section 1203, subdivision (e)(2) (a
person who used or attempted to use a deadly weapon upon a human being in connection
with the current crime); (e)(3) (a person who willfully inflicted great bodily injury or
torture in the commission of the current crime). The report then stated: “This officer
considered California Rule of Court 4.413. The defendant is ineligible for probation.”
The report also attached multiple character reference letters for defendant.
In her November 2023 sentencing brief, defendant asked the trial court to place
her on probation, arguing there were no circumstances rendering her ineligible for
probation. Defendant further argued there were multiple mitigating circumstances,
including: (1) she was not personally armed with a weapon during the crime (2) she had
not used a weapon during the crime, (3) she did not personally inflict physical or
emotional harm to the victim, (4) she did not demonstrate criminal sophistication or
professionalism, (5) she played a less aggressive role than the codefendant, (6) she had no

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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prior criminal record, (7) she was willing to comply with probation, (8) she was young
when she committed the crime, (9) the sentence would have “grave collateral
consequences” on her life, (10) she was remorseful, and (11) she had testified against the
codefendant. (Cal. Rules of Court,2 Rule 4.414.) For purposes of preserving a record for
any future parole hearing, defendant further argued she “suffered a seriously deprived
childhood,” which led to mental health and substance abuse issues.
During the sentencing hearing later that month, the trial court confirmed it had
read defendant’s sentencing brief. Defendant again asked the court to order probation.
She also reminded the court that, despite what the probation report said, she was eligible
for probation. In addition, she described multiple mitigating circumstances, including
that she had taken steps to better herself while incarcerated.
The trial court denied probation stating, “[t]his is clearly not a probation case.”
The court noted it had considered the probation report and the numerous letters submitted
on defendant’s behalf. The court observed that there are “lots of people” who have rough
childhoods, “but they don’t commit murder and you did.”
The court then sentenced defendant to state prison for 15 years to life. (§ 187,
subd. (a).) The court also imposed a $300 restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), a
corresponding $300 parole revocation fine (suspended unless parole is revoked)
(§ 1202.45), a $40 court operations fee (§ 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)), a $30 criminal conviction
assessment fee (Gov. Code, § 70373), and $13,316.35 in victim restitution ($5,816.35 for
one victim plus $7,500 for the California Victim Compensation Board) (§ 1202.4,
subd. (f)). The court stated defendant was ineligible for presentence custody credit
because of the murder conviction. The court denied defendant’s request to delay
remanding her to the custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

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Defendant obtained a certificate of probable cause on appeal.
DISCUSSION
Appointed counsel filed an opening brief setting forth the facts of the case and
asked this court to review the record and determine whether there are any arguable issues
on appeal. (People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 436.) Defendant was advised by
counsel of the right to file a supplemental brief within 30 days of the date of filing the
opening brief. More than 30 days have elapsed, and we have received no communication
from defendant.
1. Custody Credits
We turn first to the issue of custody credits. A defendant is entitled to credit
against his or her sentence for all actual days of presentence custody. (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 30; §§ 2900, subd. (c), 2900.1, 2900.5, subd. (a).)
“Calculation of custody credit begins on the day of arrest and continues through the day
of sentencing.” (People v. Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) Ordinarily, a
defendant may also earn conduct credit for work and good conduct during presentence
custody. (§ 4019; People v. Duff (2010) 50 Cal.4th 787, 793.) Notwithstanding
section 4019, section 2933.2 expressly precludes individuals convicted of murder from
earning any conduct credit. (§ 2933.2, subds. (a), (c); see also People v. Taylor (2004)
119 Cal.App.4th 628, 646-647 [although a defendant who has been convicted of murder
is entitled to credit for actual days spent in custody prior to sentencing, he or she is not
entitled to § 4019 conduct credit].)
Here, the trial court declined to award any custody credit, stating “there is no pre-
custody credits, based upon the murder charge.” Although the trial court was correct that
defendant was not entitled to presentence conduct credit, it was error to fail to award
defendant actual presentence custody credit. The September 2022 probation report states
defendant was arrested on September 4, 2021, but there is no calculation of presentence
custody credits. We will remand the matter for the limited purpose of permitting the trial

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court to calculate and award the correct amount of custody credits. (See People v.
Salazar (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 1557 [the trial court is “in the best position to
determine” the correct calculation of custody credits because it “ ‘ “has ready access to
the information necessary to resolve [any] dispute” ’ ”].)
2. Trial Court’s Denial of Probation
We next turn to the issue of whether the trial court properly exercised its discretion
in denying probation in light of the probation report’s statement that defendant was
ineligible for probation, based on its analysis of section 1203 and rule 4.413.
Whether to grant or deny probation is generally within the trial court’s broad
discretion and will ordinarily not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 278.) Still, when a defendant is
convicted of murder, he or she is (1) ineligible for probation if he or she personally used a
firearm during the crime (§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1)(A)) and (2) presumptively ineligible for
probation if one of the circumstances enumerated in section 1203, subdivision (e) exists.
(See People v. Alvarez (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 403, 409 [finding the defendant was not
presumptively ineligible for probation when none of the circumstances enumerated in
§ 1203 existed].) If one of those enumerated circumstances exists, probation “shall not
be granted” except “in unusual cases in which the interests of justice would best be
served if the person is granted probation.” (§ 1203, subd. (e).) While rule 4.414 sets out
the criteria a court must consider when a defendant is eligible for probation, rule 4.413
sets out the criteria a court must consider when a defendant is presumptively ineligible
for probation.
Here, the probation officer referenced two circumstances in support of the
conclusion that defendant was presumptively ineligible for probation: the defendant
(1) used or attempted to use a deadly weapon upon a person while committing the current
crime or (2) willfully inflicted great bodily injury or torture while committing the current
crime. (§ 1203, subd. (e)(2), (e)(3).) However, there is no evidence that defendant

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personally used a deadly weapon during the crime, or that she personally inflicted great
bodily injury during the crime. (See People v. Alvarez, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 408-
409 [§ 1203, subd. (e)(2) requires personal use of a deadly weapon].)
In any event, whether defendant was eligible for probation is a question of law to
be determined by the trial court—not the probation department. A probation officer’s
views on the law are simply suggestions that have no bearing on the court’s ultimate
determination, which is our concern on appeal. We review independently whether the
trial court properly found a defendant presumptively ineligible for probation. (People v.
Nuno (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 43, 50.)
Here, notwithstanding the statement in the probation report that defendant was
ineligible for probation, we conclude the trial court did not deem defendant to be
ineligible. The court confirmed it had reviewed defendant’s sentencing brief, which
contained extensive argument that she was not presumptively ineligible for probation and
there were multiple mitigating circumstances under rule 4.414 that warranted granting
probation. Defendant made similar arguments during her sentencing hearing. In stating
this was “clearly not a probation case,” the trial court also explained that there are many
individuals who, like defendant, have difficult childhoods, but do not go on to commit
murder. Under the circumstances, we conclude the court did not deem defendant to be
ineligible for probation but instead understood and then applied its discretion in denying
probation.
Having undertaken an examination of the entire record, we find no other arguable
error that would result in a disposition more favorable to defendant.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded for the trial court to calculate and award presentence
custody credit. The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected abstract of judgment

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showing the award of custody credit and to forward a certified copy to the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.

/s/
WISEMAN, J.*

We concur:

/s/
EARL, P. J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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