Sameyah v. Gishi CA2/1

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Filed 12/30/24 Sameyah v. Gishi CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

DARYOUSH SAMEYAH, B328651

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 22STCV24943)
v.

RAMI GISHI,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steven J. Kleifield, Judge. Affirmed.
Wegman & Levin, Debra J. Wegman and Michael M. Levin
for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Friedman2 LLP, Steven R. Friedman and Michael E.
Friedman for Defendant and Respondent.
________________________
In March 2019, plaintiff and appellant Daryoush Sameyah
was a Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) sergeant. When
eating at a restaurant while off-duty, Sameyah visibly
unholstered his service weapon during an argument with
defendant and respondent Rami Gishi over the noise Gishi and
others at his table were making. Gishi reported the incident to
police, stating among other things that Sameyah had pointed the
gun at him. Video from the restaurant confirmed Sameyah had
drawn his firearm but did not show him point it at Gishi. The
Los Angeles City Attorney (city attorney) prosecuted Sameyah for
simple assault, assault with a firearm, and brandishing a weapon
based on his conduct at the restaurant. A jury found Sameyah
not guilty of all charges.
After his acquittal, Sameyah brought this civil action
against Gishi and his employer, the car dealership Keyes
European, LLC (Keyes). Sameyah alleged a single cause of action
for malicious prosecution, asserting Gishi purportedly caused the
criminal case against Sameyah by falsely telling police what
occurred between them. Gishi filed an anti-SLAPP1 motion to
strike the complaint, which the trial court granted.
Sameyah now appeals. We conclude that Sameyah has not
conclusively and indisputably demonstrated Gishi’s statements to
police were knowingly false or that Gishi’s conduct was otherwise

1 SLAPP is an acronym for “strategic lawsuit against public
participation.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc.
(2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 57.) For clarity, we also refer to a “SLAPP”
or “anti-SLAPP” motion as “a special motion to strike”—the
language used in the statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1)). All unspecified statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

2
illegal, and thus Gishi’s statements are protected conduct under
the anti-SLAPP statute. We further conclude Sameyah fails to
demonstrate his malicious prosecution claim has minimal merit
as required by the second prong of the anti-SLAPP statute. The
independent investigation by law enforcement and the city
attorney’s independent charging decision negate the required
element for malicious prosecution that Gishi caused the pursuit
of criminal charges against Sameyah. We therefore affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. Events Giving Rise to Sameyah’s Criminal Trial
On March 25, 2019, Gishi and six other Keyes employees,
Gerard Kevylian, Tigran Abeghyan, Ilia2 Shapiro, Dante Wood,
Andre Butler, and Vahe Mnatsakanyan were at a restaurant.
Sameyah, his wife Tracey,3 his children Soraya and Amir,
Soraya’s boyfriend Fadi Hawatmeh, and Amir’s girlfriend Nikki
Tahmaseby were seated at an adjacent table. The evidence
submitted in connection with the anti-SLAPP motion shows the
parties and witnesses described differently what occurred next.
According to law enforcement interviews of Sameyah’s
family members, the Keyes employees were drunk, loud, and
vulgar. Sameyah calmly stood up, walked towards their table,
and asked the group to quiet down and stop using profanity.
Gishi responded aggressively and cursed at Sameyah. Gishi then
stood up, clenched his fists, and raised his arms in an aggressive

2 Shapiro’s first name is sometimes spelled “Ilya” in the
record.
3 As Sameyah’s family members share his last name, we
refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion.

3
stance. According to Amir, Gishi stated that he had a gun. Amir
felt worried for his father, who was using a cane, and stood in an
attempt to calm everyone. At one point, Wood approached
Sameyah’s table to try to deescalate the situation. Amir told
Wood, “[M]y dad is a police officer, he does have a gun with him.”
Soraya saw her father unholster his gun and hold it behind his
leg. She had a clear, unobstructed view of him holding the gun
and never saw him point it at Gishi. Sameyah kept the barrel of
the gun pointed down the entire time. She noted her father did
not identify himself as a police officer or show his badge. Tracey
stated Sameyah did not curse or draw his weapon, although she
“saw some hand motion behind his back.” Amir did not see his
father unholster or holster his gun or point it at anyone.
Sameyah declared that he never pointed his gun at Gishi.
Gishi reported the incident to law enforcement on
March 27, 2019. According to a police report dated April 4, 2019,
Gishi stated that Sameyah told Gishi and others at Gishi’s table
to be quiet, and Gishi responded to Sameyah to mind his own
business. Sameyah stood up and approached Gishi’s table. Gishi
also stood up. Sameyah pulled out a gun, pointed it at Gishi, and
stated “let’s go outside.” Gishi told Sameyah to put the gun away
and he would go outside. Gishi returned to his table, and
Sameyah and his family left the restaurant.
On April 3, 2019, Gishi spoke with the police again and
“advised he would like to pursue criminal prosecution in this
matter.”
At some point a few days after the incident, Soraya and her
boyfriend Hawatmeh went to Keyes. Gishi was not present at
the time. According to Shapiro, Hawatmeh screamed at Shapiro
and then jumped in his car and sped off. Shapiro learned from

4
the service department that Hawatmeh had dropped off a car for
service owned by someone named Sameyah. Using Keyes’s
records, Shapiro identified Sameyah as the registered owner of
the car. Gishi thereafter gave that information to police.
On April 4, 2019, Gishi identified Sameyah from a
photographic line-up as the person who had pointed a gun at him.
The reports concerning Gishi’s March 27, April 3, and April 4,
2019 interactions with police do not state that Gishi told police
that Sameyah threatened to kill or shoot him.
On April 4, 2019, police interviewed Kevylian. At the
restaurant, he sat next to Gishi at a 90-degree angle with his
back to Sameyah’s table. Kevylian heard Sameyah tell Gishi and
others at their table to shut up. Sameyah approached their table,
lifted up his shirt to reveal a firearm in a black holster, and
stated, “I’m a policeman, I’ll shoot you.” Kevylian looked away in
fear; before he looked away, he did not see Sameyah point the
gun at anyone. Kevylian identified Sameyah from a photographic
line-up.
On April 4, 2019, the restaurant’s owner provided police
with a surveillance video of the incident; the video had no sound.
The reporting officer described, “I reviewed the footage and
observed [Sameyah] was involved in a conversation with [Gishi]
and the others at [Gishi]’s table. . . . During the incident
[Sameyah] stands up and walks over to [Gishi]’s table and
appears to be speaking to several of the people at the table.
[Gishi] stands up and points towards [Sameyah]’s table, at which
time [Sameyah] can be seen lifting his shirt and unholstering a
black firearm. [Sameyah] appears to hold the firearm behind his
leg momentarily and then re-holstered the firearm.” The police

5
report concluded, “The video footage was consistent with [Gishi’s]
and [Kevylian]’s statements . . . .”
Our review of the surveillance video indicates that the
interaction between the two tables begins with Sameyah looking
towards Gishi’s table. Abeghyan looks back at Sameyah.
Sameyah then speaks to wait staff while gesturing towards
Gishi’s table. Eventually, Sameyah approaches Gishi’s table and
while he is speaking to them, Hawatmeh stands and looks
towards Gishi, who is seated. Gishi then stands up and steps
towards Hawatmeh, pointing a finger at him. Gishi’s attention is
then drawn to Sameyah, who is reaching back with his right arm.
Sameyah’s elbow moves up and behind him. Gishi sits back
down. A portion of Sameyah’s arm, including his right hand, is
obstructed from view for approximately four seconds by Amir who
is standing between Sameyah and the camera. Sameyah steps
towards Gishi. Amir steps away, and the video shows Sameyah’s
arm is pointed downward, straight, with his hand behind his leg.
Sameyah stays in this position for about three to four seconds
before he holsters his gun, an action which is captured clearly on
the video. After Sameyah puts his gun away, he lunges toward
Gishi. For the next approximately 30 seconds, Sameyah steps
towards Gishi, away from Gishi, and then back towards him
again, alternatively pointing his finger at Gishi, leaning over
Gishi, and making motions with his right hand and fingers. The
two are in close proximity to one another before Sameyah
eventually steps back to his table. Shapiro attempts to approach
Sameyah and Amir blocks him. Shapiro points around Amir in
Sameyah’s direction. Abeghyan urges Shapiro to return to his
seat. Sameyah and his party then leave, except for Amir who
remains to pay the bill.

6
As Sameyah was an LAPD sergeant at the time of the
altercation, the matter was transferred to the Internal Affairs
Group (IAG) for further investigation. IAG interviewed a
waitress at the restaurant on April 19, 2019, and on May 17,
2019, interviewed Mnatsakanyan, Abeghyan, Butler, Kevylian,
and Shapiro.
The waitress stated that the Keyes table ordered two
pitchers of beer and two to three bottles of hot sake to share
between the seven of them. They were at the restaurant for
approximately an hour before Sameyah and his party arrived.
She could not seat Sameyah’s party anywhere but next to the
Keyes table. Sameyah was upset by the behavior of the men at
the next table. He told the waitress that she should not serve
them more alcohol because they were already drunk. The
waitress told IAG that she had been a waitress for about four
years, had experience in determining when to stop serving
alcohol to people who were too inebriated, and that the Keyes
table had not yet reached that point. She recalled that her
coworker told the Keyes table they were making too much noise,
and that eventually people from both tables began yelling. She
saw Sameyah had a gun, but she was not sure if he pointed it at
Gishi or kept it pointed down. She did not hear anyone threaten
to kill or hurt anyone. Sameyah’s family voluntarily left the
restaurant.
According to Shapiro, Mnatsakanyan, and Abeghyan,
Sameyah came to their table and angrily told them to quiet down.
Shapiro and Mnatsakanyan each said that during the encounter,
Hawatmeh was aggressive and yelled something along the lines
of “I’ll f**k you up.” This caused Gishi to stand up. Shapiro,
Mnatsakanyan, and Abeghyan did not see Sameyah holding a

7
weapon, did not hear Sameyah identify himself as a police officer,
and did not see Sameyah show a badge.
Butler relayed that Sameyah was behaving in a
threatening manner towards Shapiro, which caused Gishi to
stand up. Butler did not see Sameyah point a gun at anyone or
hear Sameyah state he was a police officer.
Kevylian’s IAG interview was consistent with his April 4,
2019 statement to police. He saw Sameyah approach Abeghyan
and then Gishi. Gishi told Sameyah “to go f**k himself” and
return to his table. Kevylian saw Sameyah reveal his holstered
gun by lifting his shirt and placing his hand on the gun. He
heard Sameyah say he was a cop and he would shoot Gishi.
Kevylian put his head down. Gishi did not threaten Sameyah.
Kevylian saw Hawatmeh come forward and yell at Woods and
Gishi. Woods and wait staff tried to calm Hawatmeh down.
On November 22, 2019, the city attorney filed a
misdemeanor complaint against Sameyah for assault with a
firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2)), simple assault (id.,
§ 240), and brandishing a firearm (id., § 417, subd. (a)(2)).
On September 17, 2020, the city attorney added a fourth
count against Sameyah for making a false report to a peace
officer (Pen. Code, § 148.5, subd. (a)). Although the record is
unclear, it appears this fourth count related to a telephone call
Sameyah purportedly received from a number at Keyes in
December 2019 during which the caller said “You’re gonna die.”
Sameyah reported the alleged threat to law enforcement. When
police obtained a recording of the call from Keyes, it did not
include the threatening statement.
Before trial, the prosecution moved to dismiss count four
pursuant to Penal Code section 1385. The court granted the

8
motion; nothing in the appellate record sets forth the basis of the
prosecution’s request or the court’s reasoning for granting the
dismissal. Sameyah contends, without any citation to the record,
that the dismissal resulted from a report by a forensic analyst he
hired who concluded that someone had altered the audio file
related to the call.
B. The Criminal Trial
On November 17, 2021, counsel delivered opening
statements in Sameyah’s criminal trial. Although several
witnesses testified, including Gishi and Kevylian, the record
includes only portions of Gishi’s testimony and portions of the
testimony of a defense expert in police procedure, Scott Allen
DeFoe. The record does not contain reporter’s transcripts for the
opening statements or closing arguments from either the People
or the defense.
According to the excerpts in the record, Gishi testified that
Sameyah “put his hand to the holster, pulled the gun out, aim[ed]
it [at] [Gishi] directly and said, ‘I will kill you.’ ” During cross-
examination, Sameyah’s counsel asked Gishi to identify when on
the video Sameyah pointed a gun at him. Gishi was not able to
do so, and explained, “It’s very dark. I cannot see exactly over
here. He did something. This guy was hiding it so you couldn’t
see him, but there was a gun pointed at me.” Gishi testified that
he spoke to the city attorney multiple times about the case.4

4 The only evidence in the record indicating who initiated
the contact between Gishi and the city attorney or what was
discussed during those interactions is Gishi’s declaration. Gishi
states the city attorney’s office telephoned to inform him that it
would prosecute Sameyah. Gishi later called the city attorney to

9
Sameyah’s counsel asked Gishi whether he told the city attorney
that the police notes of his interview needed to be modified
because he, not Sameyah, had said, “Let’s go outside.” Gishi
answered, “I said it. [Sameyah] didn’t say it,” and that whoever
wrote it down got it wrong.
DeFoe testified that based upon his review of the
restaurant’s videotape, Gishi exhibited prefight indicators,
including his clenched fists and stance. DeFoe further testified
that Gishi’s right hand went behind his back to where he would
have been wearing a gun if he had one. In contrast, Sameyah did
not appear to stand in a manner consistent with aiming a gun at
someone. He opined that Sameyah’s actions were consistent with
police training and did not constitute “a reportable use of force by
the police department.”
According to the court’s minute order, the jury deliberated
for nearly four hours over the course of two days. On
November 30, 2021, the jury found Sameyah not guilty of all
three counts.
C. Sameyah’s Civil Complaint
On August 2, 2022, Sameyah sued Gishi and Keyes for
malicious prosecution. The complaint alleges that Gishi and
other Keyes employees went to the restaurant as part of a work
celebration. They were drunk, loud, and vulgar. Sameyah, who
had broken his ankle and needed a cane to walk, was there with
family members. Sameyah asked restaurant staff “to get the
[Keyes employees] to behave with decorum,” but the staff was
unable to do so. Sameyah then asked the table to enjoy

ask whether he had to appear for trial in response to the
subpoena he received and was told he had to appear.

10
themselves but to cut out the profanity. Gishi responded, “I will
f**k you up and I have a gun.” Hawatmeh asked Gishi not to
speak to Sameyah in that manner. In response, Gishi lunged
towards Hawatmeh, called him a terrorist and told him, “I’ll f**k
you in the ass.” The complaint omits any reference to Sameyah
unholstering his gun.
The complaint alleges Gishi and Keyes are liable for
malicious prosecution because they “falsely accus[ed] [Sameyah]
of multiple crimes, including without limitation, brandishing,
simple assault, assault with a deadly weapon and violation of
Penal Code section 148.5 [knowing false report to police].” The
complaint further alleges that Gishi and Keyes “were actively
involved in causing . . . Sameyah to be arrested and prosecuted.”
They “hid, concealed, altered and destroyed evidence to falsely
accuse and prosecute . . . Sameyah. This is demonstrated by
anomalies in the audio which based on information and belief,
the prosecutor reviewed and determined contained false
information as well, leading to the dismissal of the [section] 148.5
charge against [him].” “The charges were false,” and Sameyah
was cleared of all criminal charges. The complaint alleges the
conduct of Gishi and Keyes was a substantial factor in causing
Sameyah harm, including forcing him to incur fees and costs to
defend himself in the criminal matter. The complaint does not
refer to Gishi testifying at Sameyah’s criminal trial or assert any
claim related to that testimony.
D. Gishi’s Special Motion to Strike
1. The Parties’ Arguments
Gishi filed a section 425.16 motion to strike Sameyah’s
complaint in its entirety. He observed that courts have uniformly
held malicious prosecution claims arise from protected activity,

11
and that his statements about what occurred were protected
activity because they were “made before a . . . judicial proceeding”
or “in connection with an issue under consideration . . . by a[n]
. . . official proceeding authorized by law” as described in section
425.16, subdivision (e)(1) and (2). He argued his statements to
the police and during the criminal trial had been truthful, and
that in any event, courts have found even potentially false
accusations to be protected activity unless evidence conclusively
establishes the statement’s falsity.
As to the second prong of the anti-SLAPP test, Gishi
argued that Sameyah could not adduce evidence showing a
probability that Sameyah would prevail on his malicious
prosecution claim. Gishi argued he did not commence or direct
Sameyah’s criminal prosecution; the police investigated, and the
city attorney filed charges. Nor could Sameyah demonstrate that
he was prosecuted without probable cause or that Gishi acted
with malice. Rather, Gishi’s involvement was limited to
truthfully reporting the matter to the authorities, responding to
questions from LAPD and IAG during their investigations, and
testifying at trial pursuant to a subpoena compelling his
appearance. LAPD and the city attorney had the video footage of
the incident as well as witness interviews and could satisfy
themselves whether there was probable cause to bring charges
against Sameyah. Gishi further argued that the litigation
privilege under Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) protected
his communications with the police and his testimony.
Gishi submitted a declaration averring that he told the
police the truth, testified truthfully at trial, and that his
involvement in the prosecution was limited to reporting the
matter and serving as a witness. Gishi declared that the city

12
attorney “inform[ed] [him] that the [c]ity [a]ttorney had decided
to criminally prosecute . . . Sameyah based upon the video the
police had obtained as well as the eyewitness accounts of the
other people at the restaurant on March 24, 2019.”5 Gishi also
submitted, among other things, copies of the surveillance video,
the police reports (including the one in which authorities
concluded “[t]he video footage was consistent with [Gishi’s] and
[Kevylian]’s statements”), and transcripts of witness interviews
by law enforcement.
In opposition, Sameyah argued that Gishi lied when he told
the police that “Sameyah pointed a gun at . . . Gishi,” and under
Lefebvre v. Lefebvre (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 696, making a false
police report is not protected activity. Sameyah argued that “[a]s
a result of the false information provided by [d]efendant Gishi,
. . . criminal charges were brought against [Sameyah].” “Gishi

5 Sameyah objected to Gishi’s statement relaying what the
city attorney had told him as hearsay. The record does not
include a ruling on this objection or any other evidentiary
objections, and lacks any indication that Sameyah asked the
court to rule on his objections after he made them. Sameyah did
not renew his objection on appeal. Accordingly, we may consider
Gishi’s statement. (See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th
512, 534 [explaining in a summary judgment case that objections
not ruled on are deemed overruled, preserving the issue for
appeal, but “with the burden on the objector to renew the
objections in the appellate court,” fn. omitted]; Flatley v. Mauro
(2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 307, fn. 4 [explaining in an anti-SLAPP
context that when a trial court does not rule on evidentiary
objections and the record does not reveal that the objecting party
pressed for a ruling, the “objections are therefore deemed
forfeited and we consider [the potentially inadmissible]
declarations in their entirety”].)

13
was actively involved in concealment, and altered evidence to
falsely accuse [Sameyah] of pointing a gun at him, so that
[Sameyah] would get arrested and prosecuted.” Based on
DeFoe’s trial testimony, Sameyah also argued that he acted in
self-defense and that unholstering his gun and holding it behind
his leg was not a use of force reportable to LAPD. Sameyah did
not address whether Gishi’s trial testimony was protected
activity.
As to the second prong, Sameyah argued Gishi commenced
and directed the prosecution against Sameyah because he sought
to press charges and provided false information to the
authorities. Sameyah claimed that the city attorney did not
independently assess the evidence when bringing charges but
instead relied on Gishi’s false assertion that Sameyah pointed a
gun at him. Sameyah also argued that Gishi and Keyes provided
police with a “ ‘doctored’ ” recording of a telephone call from
Keyes to Sameyah, causing the city attorney to amend the
misdemeanor complaint to include a count against Sameyah for
making a false police report.
Sameyah argued there was no probable cause to pursue the
charges because the jury acquitted him and the city attorney
dismissed count 4. He further argued that Gishi acted with
malice because Gishi provided false information to the police,
committed perjury at the criminal trial, claimed he sought
medical treatment for the March 25, 2019 incident but never
produced medical records to substantiate this claim, and
“[e]ngaged in an [a]ssault on the Sameyah [f]amily, fueled by his
[h]atred of Sameya’s [f]uture [s]on[-]in[-l]aw that Gishi
[m]istakenly [b]elieved was an Arab Muslim.” (Underscoring

14
omitted.) Sameyah cited no evidence in support of these
arguments concerning malice.
2. The Trial Court’s Ruling
On February 17, 2023, the trial court granted Gishi’s
special motion to strike. It found Gishi’s report to the police was
not “indisputably illegal” and thus was protected activity. It also
found Sameyah did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing
because he could not satisfy the required element for his
malicious prosecution claim that the criminal prosecution by the
city attorney had been commenced at Gishi’s direction. The trial
court did not address whether the litigation privilege protected
Gishi’s conduct.6
DISCUSSION
A. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The Legislature enacted section 425.16 “[t]o combat
lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of free speech and petition
rights.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State University
(2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060.) The anti-SLAPP statute provides
that “cause[s] of action against a person arising from any act of
that person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free
speech under the United States Constitution or the California
Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to
a special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the

6 The court’s minute order indicates that the court denied
Keyes’s joinder in the anti-SLAPP motion. Keyes is not a party
to this appeal, and we thus consider only Gishi’s special motion to
strike.

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plaintiff has established that there is a probability that the
plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
When considering whether to strike a claim, courts
undertake a two-prong analysis. “First, the defendant must
establish that the challenged claim arises from activity protected
by section 425.16. [Citation.]” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th
376, 384.) Second, “[i]f the defendant makes the required
showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
merit of the claim by establishing a probability of success.”
(Baral v. Schnitt, supra, at p. 384.)
We review de novo the trial court’s grant or denial of a
special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute. (Park v.
Board of Trustees of California State University, supra, 2 Cal.5th
at p. 1067.)
B. Prong One: Sameyah’s Cause of Action for Malicious
Prosecution Arises from Protected Activity
“ ‘ “ ‘The plain language of the anti-SLAPP statute dictates
that every claim of malicious prosecution is a cause of action
arising from protected activity because every such claim
necessarily depends upon written and oral statements in a prior
judicial proceeding.’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (Area 55, LLC v. Nicholas &
Tomasevic, LLP (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 136, 151.) However, if
“either the defendant concedes, or the evidence conclusively
establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or petition
activity was illegal as a matter of law, the defendant is precluded
from using the anti-SLAPP statute to strike the plaintiff’s
action.” (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.)
The appellate court in Lefebvre v. Lefebvre, supra, 199
Cal.App.4th 696 applied Flatley to hold an indisputably false
police report was not protected activity. In Lefebvre, a wife and a

16
witness filed false police reports that the husband had threatened
to kill the wife and their children. (Id. at p. 700.) Nine days after
receiving the report, “acting in reliance upon the criminal reports
from [the wife] and [the witness],” authorities charged the
husband with making a criminal threat. (Ibid.) At the time of
the verdict in the criminal trial, the jurors, “acting of their own
volition,” read a statement into the record that there was a
“ ‘shocking’ ” “ ‘absence of any real investigation by law
enforcement,’ ” “ ‘[t]here was no credible evidence supporting the
indictment,’ ” and that “ ‘prosecuting this as a crime was not only
a waste of time, money, and energy, for all involved, but is an
affront to our justice system.’ ” (Ibid.) The jury recommended
restitution to the defendant. (Ibid.) The judge who presided over
the criminal trial granted the husband’s motion for a finding of
factual innocence pursuant to Penal Code section 851.8,
subdivision (e). (Ibid.) Based upon this record, the Lefebvre court
determined the evidence conclusively established the wife’s and
witness’s statements to police were illegal activity and thus not
protected speech within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.
(Id. at pp. 701, 706.)
Relying on Flatley and Lefebvre, Sameyah argues Gishi’s
statements are not protected speech because Gishi violated
(1) Penal Code section 118 by committing perjury at trial,
(2) Penal Code section 132 by tampering with the recording of the
December 2019 call from Keyes and providing that recording to
police,7 and (3) Penal Code section 148.5 by knowingly making a

7 Neither Gishi nor Sameyah specifically addresses whether
providing physical evidence, such as an audio recording, to police
constitutes protected activity. Because providing an audio

17
false police report. We consider each of these alleged crimes
below.
We begin with Penal Code section 118 and Gishi’s allegedly
perjurious testimony at trial. The first step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis requires “identifying all allegations of protected activity,
and the claims for relief supported by them.” (Baral v. Schnitt,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396.) Sameyah’s complaint does not refer
to Gishi’s trial testimony at all, let alone assert it as a basis for
the malicious prosecution claim. Sameyah’s allegations instead
focus entirely on what occurred leading up to the criminal trial
and do not reference what occurred during the trial other than
Sameyah’s acquittal. We thus need not consider whether the
evidence conclusively demonstrated as a matter of law that Gishi
committed perjury when he testified at trial because that conduct
is not alleged.
Penal Code section 132 states, “Every person who upon any
trial, proceeding, inquiry, or investigation whatever, authorized
or permitted by law, offers in evidence, as genuine or true, any
. . . instrument in writing, knowing the same to have been forged
or fraudulently altered or ante-dated, is guilty of felony.”
Sameyah contends the evidence conclusively shows Gishi violated
this statute because, during the investigation, “police received a
recording of the call made by the Keyes . . . telephone system”
that “purported to disprove [Sameyah’s] report that he was
threatened,” and Sameyah’s expert opined “the audio file is not a

recording to police as part of an ongoing investigation is akin to
making a statement to police, we conclude for purposes of this
case it is protected activity. (See Comstock v. Aber (2012) 212
Cal.App.4th 931, 941 [“The law is that communications to the
police are within SLAPP”].)

18
continuous, original, authentic recording.” None of this
conclusively establishes that Gishi acted illegally. Nothing in the
record indicates that Gishi made any alterations to the recording
or that Gishi provided the recording at issue to the police.
Sameyah argues we should infer that Gishi altered the evidence
or directed someone to do so. Sameyah interacted with multiple
Keyes employees at the restaurant. To single out Gishi and
engage in the proposed speculative leaps requested by Sameyah
disregards the requirement that evidence of illegality be
“conclusive” to remove otherwise protected conduct from the anti-
SLAPP statute. (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 320.)
We turn lastly to Penal Code section 148.5, which makes it
a misdemeanor to make a knowingly false report to police. Penal
Code section 148.5’s “ ‘requirement of scienter protects witnesses
who honestly misperceive facts’ ” while punishing those who
knowingly give false information to police officers. (People v.
Stanistreet (2002) 29 Cal.4th 497, 511.)
Sameyah argues the following evidence conclusively
demonstrates that Gishi knew his statements to police were false:
Gishi (1) did not report the incident to police until two days after
it occurred; (2) repeatedly demanded Sameyah be prosecuted;
(3) failed to recant his statement that Sameyah pointed the gun
at him after learning the videotape contradicted that statement;
(4) used Keyes’s computer files to assist police in identifying
Sameyah as the perpetrator; (5) hired a lawyer to file a civil suit
against Sameyah; (6) tampered with the audio recording of the
December 2019 call from Keyes; and (7) testified falsely at trial.
These contentions taken separately or together fail to
conclusively demonstrate Gishi made a knowingly false
statement to investigators, or even that he made a false

19
statement. Items (1), (2), (4), and (5) do not tend to prove that
Gishi knowingly lied to police, much less conclusively
demonstrate that fact. Also, as to item (2), the record evidence
indicates that Gishi told police that he wanted to pursue a
prosecution of Sameyah only once, on April 3, 2019, and Sameyah
does not cite to any other requests in the record.
As to item (3), Sameyah cites no evidence indicating that
Gishi saw the surveillance video before he spoke with the police
or indeed, any time prior to the criminal trial. Sameyah states
only, “It is reasonable to infer that at some point [Gishi] learned
that the videotape contradicted his story.” The video largely
corroborates Gishi’s statements to police. Sameyah indisputably
drew his firearm during a verbal altercation with Gishi and
aggressively approached while Gishi was seated. Although the
video does not show Sameyah point his gun at Gishi, it also does
not continuously show Sameyah’s arm. Even if we infer Sameyah
did not point his gun at Gishi during the portion of the video
when Sameyah’s arm was hidden, the video does not conclusively
establish that at the time Gishi spoke to police he knew this
allegation was false and not simply a misperception of an
emotionally charged incident.
As to item (6) concerning the audio recording, as previously
explained Sameyah adduced no evidence linking Gishi to the
purported alterations to that audio recording or its provision to
law enforcement. Thus, that recording fails to show that Gishi
knowingly provided a false police report.
As to item (7), Sameyah appears to suggest that Gishi’s
recalcitrance to acknowledging Sameyah did not point the gun at
him when confronted with the video at trial could cause a trier of
fact to doubt Gishi’s credibility and thereby infer that he

20
knowingly lied to police when describing the incident two and a
half years earlier. Even if true, that does not conclusively
establish the issue as a matter of law as Flatley requires.
Because the evidence does not conclusively demonstrate
that Gishi’s conduct in providing information to police was illegal
as a matter of law, Gishi’s statements to police were protected
activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute.
C. Prong Two: Sameyah Did Not Demonstrate a
Probability of Prevailing on His Claim for Malicious
Prosecution
1. Guiding Principles Concerning Prong Two
A “plaintiff’s second-step burden is a limited one. The
plaintiff need not prove [his] case to the court [citation]; the bar
sits lower, at a demonstration of ‘minimal merit’ [citation]. At
this stage, ‘ “[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve
conflicting factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the
plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient claim and made a prima
facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment.
It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates the
defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s
claim as a matter of law.” ’ [Citations.]” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 891.) Although a plaintiff
need only demonstrate minimal merit to his claim (see Navellier
v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94), the plaintiff is “required to
produce admissible evidence from which a trier of fact could find
in his favor, as to every element” of the challenged claim. (Lee v.
Kim (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 705, 721, italics omitted.)

21
2. Elements of a Cause of Action for Malicious
Prosecution
In the context of this case, “[m]alicious prosecution ‘consists
of initiating or procuring the arrest and prosecution of another
under lawful process, but from malicious motives and without
probable cause.’ ” (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 12
Cal.3d 710, 720, italics omitted.) “Although a criminal
prosecution normally is commenced through the action of
government authorities, a private person may be liable for
malicious prosecution under certain circumstances based on his
or her role in the criminal proceeding. ‘The relevant law is clear:
“One may be civilly liable for malicious prosecution without
personally signing the complaint initiating the criminal
proceeding.” [Citation.] “ ‘The test is whether the defendant was
actively instrumental in causing the prosecution.’ ” [Citations.]
“Cases dealing with actions for malicious prosecution against
private persons require that the defendant has at least sought
out the police or prosecutorial authorities and falsely reported
facts to them indicating that [the] plaintiff has committed a
crime.” (Sullivan v. County of Los Angeles, supra, at p. 720.)’
[Citation.]” (Zucchet v. Galardi (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1466,
1481-1482; see CACI No. 1504 [defining active involvement as
falsely reporting facts to police that indicate the plaintiff
committed a crime after learning that there was no probable
cause that the plaintiff had committed a crime].)
To prove his cause of action for malicious prosecution,
Sameyah must demonstrate that the criminal proceeding was
(1) commenced by or at the direction of Gishi, (2) initiated
without probable cause, (3) initiated with malice, and
(4) concluded in Sameyah’s favor. (Greene v. Bank of America

22
(2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 922, 931.) Sameyah must also
demonstrate he was harmed, and that Gishi’s conduct was a
substantial factor in causing that harm. (See CACI No. 1500.)
“ ‘ “When . . . the claim of malicious prosecution is based
upon initiation of a criminal prosecution, the question of probable
cause is whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendant
. . . to suspect the plaintiff . . . had committed a crime.”
[Citation.]’ ” (Greene v. Bank of America, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th
at p. 931; see Sheldon Appel Co. v. Albert & Oliker (1989) 47
Cal.3d 863, 878 [“the probable cause element calls on the trial
court . . . to determine whether, on the basis of the facts known to
the defendant, the institution of the prior action was legally
tenable”].)
“ ‘The “malice” element . . . relates to the subjective intent
or purpose with which the defendant acted in initiating the prior
action. [Citation.] The motive of the defendant must have been
something other than that of bringing a perceived guilty person
to justice . . . .’ ” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006)
39 Cal.4th 260, 292.) It “is not limited to actual hostility or ill
will toward [the] plaintiff but exists when the proceedings are
instituted primarily for an improper purpose.” (Albertson v.
Raboff (1956) 46 Cal.2d 375, 383.)
3. The City Attorney Filed Charges After an Independent
Investigation
Sameyah has not made a showing of minimal merit that
Gishi was actively involved in causing Sameyah to be prosecuted.
“ ‘[I]n most cases, a person who merely alerts law enforcement to
a possible crime . . . is not liable if . . . law enforcement, on its
own, after an independent investigation, decides to prosecute.’ ”
(Cox v. Griffin (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 440, 452, quoting Williams

23
v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 893, 898.) A
prosecutor’s independent investigation acts as “a superseding
cause” and “protects a complainant from liability for malicious
prosecution.” (Lugo v. Pixior, LLC (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 511,
515.) As the Lugo court stated in holding the trial court should
have granted an anti-SLAPP motion striking a malicious
prosecution claim, it is an “airtight defense that, before the
[prosecuting entity] filed charges, police conducted an
investigation that was independent of” the defendant. (Ibid.)
Here, law enforcement conducted just such an independent
investigation. Police did not simply take Gishi at his word and
call it a day without doing anything else. They spoke to multiple
witnesses who participated in and/or witnessed the altercation,
including witnesses favorable to Sameyah. Police obtained a
video of the incident early in their investigation, on April 4, 2019,
long before the city attorney filed any charges, and reviewed it to
see what it showed.8 The video indisputably demonstrated that
Sameyah drew and exhibited his firearm during his verbal
altercation with Gishi. It also established that Sameyah

8 The record does not indicate when investigators provided
the video to the city attorney. However, a prosecutor has a duty
not to institute a charge that he or she knows is not supported by
probable cause. (Rules of Prof. Conduct, rule 3.8.) Naturally
related to this duty is that a prosecutor reviews the available
evidence prior to filing charges. We presume an official duty is
regularly performed unless specific evidence overcomes that
presumption. (See In re Jenkins (2023) 14 Cal.5th 493, 514,
citing Evid. Code, § 664.) Sameyah does not argue the city
attorney did not review the video before filing the complaint
against him. To the contrary, he presumes the city attorney did
so before filing charges.

24
aggressively stepped towards Gishi, stood near him, and spoke to
him in an angry manner. It did not show that Sameyah pointed
his gun at Gishi. Indeed, no witness save Gishi asserted that
Sameyah pointed a gun at Gishi.
After this investigation, and after the police provided the
investigative results to the prosecutor, the city attorney filed a
criminal complaint against Sameyah on November 22, 2019. As a
matter of law, this independent investigation and the city
attorney’s actions after it “completely shielded [Gishi] from
liability,” as “the initiative and discretion governing the
investigation resided” with governmental entities. (Lugo v.
Pixior, LLC, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 517.)
Sameyah suggests the city attorney’s investigation was not
independent because Gishi badgered the city attorney into filing
charges. Sameyah contends that Gishi reported the incident to
police, said he wanted Sameyah criminally prosecuted, gave to
police Sameyah’s personal identifying information, had multiple
communications with law enforcement, and tried to get the city
attorney to change the content of the transcript of his interview
(which is not included in the record) as to who said “let’s go
outside.”9 Sameyah argues that based on these actions “it is
reasonable to infer [Gishi] pressured the prosecutor.”

9 Sameyah has not demonstrated why who said, “let’s go
outside,” is relevant to the independence of the law enforcement
investigation. In any event, it is clear from the video and witness
interviews that both Sameyah’s party and Gishi’s party had
moments of speaking aggressively towards the other. Sameyah
also argues Gishi’s alleged alteration of the audio recording of the
December 2019 call demonstrates he was actively instrumental
in Sameyah’s prosecution. As discussed above, there is no

25
Even when we draw all inferences from this evidence in
Sameyah’s favor, it does not demonstrate a probability that
Sameyah can establish the city attorney failed to conduct an
independent investigation. Contact between the ostensible
victim and law enforcement “does not negate independence” as
investigators necessarily need to speak with such individuals.
(Lugo v. Pixior, LLC, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 517.) It is not
reasonable to infer from the contacts between Gishi and police
that Gishi sought impermissibly to pressure law enforcement.
And even if we posit that Gishi did try to pressure the prosecutor
through these actions, there is no evidence indicating that
anyone capitulated to that pressure.
Sameyah next suggests the investigation was not
independent because it relied on Gishi’s false claim that Sameyah
pointed the gun at Gishi in prosecuting Sameyah.10 A criminal
prosecution that depends even in part on a false allegation may
potentially give rise to a malicious prosecution claim. (See
Singleton v. Perry (1955) 45 Cal.2d 489; Greene v. Bank of

evidence that Gishi altered the recording or that he was the one
who gave it to police.
10 Sameyah argues that because he was a police officer and
thereby entitled to use force reasonable under the circumstances,
the prosecution against him could have proceeded only if he had
pointed the gun at Gishi. This argument assumes without
support that the only way Sameyah’s conduct could be deemed an
unreasonable use of force is if he pointed the gun at Gishi. Where
an appellant fails to support an argument with appropriate legal
authority and reasoned argument, we do not consider it. (E.g.,
L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 621.)

26
America (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)11 But Sameyah, who
has the burden to adduce evidence to demonstrate a probability
of prevailing (Lee v. Kim, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at p. 721), offers
no evidence to suggest that police or the prosecutor relied on
Gishi’s claim that Sameyah pointed a gun at Gishi. For example,
the record does not include the opening and closing statements
from the criminal trial, which would have reflected the
prosecution’s theory of the case.
Nothing in the information suggests the filed charges relied
on Sameyah pointing a gun at Gishi. Indeed, whether Sameyah

11 Sameyah relies on Greene v. Bank of America, supra, 216
Cal.App.4th 454 throughout his briefs. There, a bank manager
called 9-1-1 and falsely reported that the plaintiff had threatened
to blow up the bank. The plaintiff was prosecuted for making a
criminal threat. Unlike the case before us, which includes video
evidence of what occurred, Greene was “ ‘a he said, she said,’
situation” between the bank manager and the plaintiff. (Id. at
p. 464.) The opinion, however, does not describe law
enforcement’s investigation, and, thus, Greene is inapposite as to
the impact of an independent investigation. Further, the opinion
is distinguishable because it was evident that law enforcement
relied on the bank manager’s falsehood in arresting and
prosecuting the matter. (Id. at p. 465.) Here, such evidence is
lacking.
Sameyah also relies on Greene to argue “that a defendant
with—at best—some belief that a misdemeanor is being
committed [cannot] make up evidence of an entirely different and
much more serious crime.” (Greene v. Bank of America, supra,
216 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.) Because we conclude Sameyah fails
to demonstrate minimal merit to his argument that the
prosecution relied on Gishi’s claim that Sameyah pointed the
gun, we need not consider that Gishi’s police report included both
correct and assertedly incorrect information.

27
pointed his gun at Gishi was entirely unnecessary to establish
Sameyah’s guilt on the charges filed against him. An assault
pursuant to Penal Code section 240 “is an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the
person of another.” (Ibid.) In other words, it does not require use
of a gun at all. Sameyah’s actions sufficed to show probable
cause for assault without any need to prove he pointed the gun at
Gishi.
Assault with a firearm under Penal Code section 245,
subdivision (a)(2) requires the use of a firearm but it does not
require the defendant point the gun at the victim. The
prosecutor must prove: “1. The defendant did an act with [a
firearm] that by its nature would directly and probably result in
the application of force to a person; [¶] . . . [¶] 2. The defendant
did that act willfully; [¶] 3. When the defendant acted, [he] was
aware of facts that would lead a reasonable person to realize that
[his] act by its nature would directly and probably result in the
application of force to someone; [¶] [and] [¶] 4. When the
defendant acted, [he] had the present ability to apply force [likely
to produce great bodily injury] to a person.” (CALCRIM No. 875.)
A defendant holding a gun in a position that enables him to use it
before the other party can defend himself—as Sameyah did here
by unholstering his weapon to have it at the ready—is sufficient.
(See, e.g., People v. Cruz-Partida (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 197, 210
[“displaying a gun . . . in the general direction of others is
sufficient to provide the mens rea for an assault charge where
there is animus between the defendant and the targeted party
and/or the surrounding circumstances are fraught”].)
Similarly, the crime of brandishing pursuant to Penal Code
section 417 does not require that the defendant point a gun at the

28
victim. Rather, the prosecutor must prove: “1. The defendant
drew or exhibited a [firearm] in the presence of someone else; [¶]
[and either] [¶] . . . [¶] 2. The defendant did so in a rude, angry,
or threatening manner [or] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . The defendant
[unlawfully] used the [firearm] in a fight or quarrel.” (CALCRIM
No. 983.) Here, there was ample evidence that Sameyah
exhibited his firearm at the restaurant in a rude, angry, and/or
threatening manner, and further did so during a quarrel,
sufficient for the city attorney to state a legally tenable count of
brandishing.
In addition to lacking legal support, Sameyah’s argument
that the prosecution depended on Gishi’s claim that Sameyah
pointed the gun at Gishi defies common sense. It presumes in
the absence of any corroborating evidence that a prosecutor
necessarily relied upon the perception of a single witness under
the influence of alcohol in deciding whether to bring charges and
what charges to bring, rather than accounting for a contradictory
video of the incident and the fact that no other witness said they
saw Sameyah point his gun at Gishi.
Sameyah has not adduced evidence that the police and city
attorney failed to conduct an independent investigation, and,
thus, has not demonstrated a probability of prevailing as to the
essential element that Gishi’s allegedly false police report caused
his prosecution.
4. Sameyah Adduced No Evidence That Gishi Was a
Substantial Factor in Sameyah Being Charged with
Making a False Police Report
Lastly, Sameyah has not established a probability of
prevailing based upon the city attorney’s decision to amend the
misdemeanor complaint to add a count for providing a false

29
report to law enforcement. Sameyah contends this count arose
because Gishi caused a doctored audio recording to be provided to
law enforcement. As stated previously, there is no evidence tying
Gishi to the call, the purportedly doctored recording, or its
provision to law enforcement. Thus, Sameyah has failed to
adduce any evidence that Gishi was a substantial factor in
causing Sameyah harm arising from the call or the allegedly
altered evidence.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the trial court’s order granting Gishi’s special
motion to strike pursuant to section 425.16. Gishi is awarded his
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J. KLATCHKO, J.*

* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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