In re Jayce M. CA2/2

CourtListener 10305038Calctapp27.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/27/24 In re Jayce M. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re JAYCE M., a Person B335664
Coming Under the Juvenile (Los Angeles County
Court Law. Super. Ct. No.
20CCJP06352A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF
CHILDREN AND FAMILY
SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MIRIAM G.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Tiana J. Murillo, Judge. Affirmed.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Sarah Vesecky, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________

Defendant and appellant Miriam G. (mother) appeals the
denial of her petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 3881 and the termination of parental rights over her son,
Jayce M. (Jayce, born Sept. 2016). Mother argues that the
juvenile court failed to use the opportunity afforded by her
section 388 petition to correct alleged errors made during the
disposition hearing 17 months earlier. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. The Family
Jayce is the only child shared by mother and Justin M.
(father).2 In August 2018, father received full physical and legal
custody of Jayce. At the same time, father obtained a three-year
restraining order protecting himself and Jayce from mother “after

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

2 Father is not a party to this appeal; our factual and
procedural history excludes father’s involvement in the case
except where necessary to provide context for mother’s appeal.

2
she violently attempted to take[] Jayce while he was in” father’s
care.3
Accordingly, mother had no visitation with Jayce. In
August 2019, mother was convicted of second degree robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211) and sentenced to eight years in state prison.
Her eligible parole date was initially set for October 2025, but the
prison later reported that it had been pushed up to January 2025.
In 2020, father and Jayce began living with father’s
girlfriend and two of Jayce’s siblings.4
II. Referral and Detention
On November 30, 2020, father called paramedics for Jayce,
who had suffered severe physical injuries and appeared to be
developmentally delayed. Medical authorities informed the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(DCFS). One week later, Jayce was detained from father and
DCFS placed him with a foster parent.
Mother’s whereabouts were unknown, but DCFS noted that
her period of “incarceration exceeds [f]amily [r]eunification
timelines.”
III. Jurisdiction Petition
In January 2021, DCFS filed the operative amended
jurisdiction petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (a) and
(b)(1). Among other things, the amended petition alleged father
placed Jayce at risk of serious harm by failing to both intervene

3 Mother was suspected in the arson of father’s home, which
“burned down while he was out of town.” Mother reported the
fire to social workers and “requested that Jayce be removed from
father’s care due to him being homeless.”
4 Neither sibling is involved in this appeal.

3
when father’s girlfriend physically abused Jayce (counts a-2 and
b-2) and obtain medical treatment for Jayce’s developmental
issues (count b-3). The petition contained no allegations against
mother.
IV. Mother’s Appearance
Mother did not appear in the case until her arraignment on
April 19, 2021, at which she was appointed counsel. The juvenile
court also authorized monitored visitation.
The following month, DCFS spoke to mother for the first
time. Mother said that she had last seen Jayce two weeks before
she was incarcerated in September 2019, despite the then-active
restraining order against her. Mother admitted that she had
never tried to regain custody of Jayce, but she expressed a desire
“to obtain custody in the future.” In the meantime, she asked
that custody be given to a maternal relative.
The juvenile court ordered DCFS to assess several
maternal relatives for placement, including maternal
grandmother and a maternal aunt, who lived together in Chicago,
as well as three extended relatives residing in Los Angeles
County (the Los Angeles relatives).
On August 3, 2021, DCFS reported that the Los Angeles
relatives all declined placement. DCFS also found maternal
grandmother’s home unsuitable for placement because of her
“extensive [and] substantial child welfare history in Los Angeles
County.”
Meanwhile, mother began telephonic visits with Jayce. By
October 2021, mother and Jayce were having weekly monitored
phone calls, subject to interruptions caused by “facility issues” at
the prison. But these calls eventually became less frequent when
“issues . . . at the jail . . . prevented weekly scheduling.”

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V. Jurisdiction
On May 18, 2022, the matter proceeded to a jurisdictional
hearing.5 Mother, appearing as a nonoffending parent, submitted
to jurisdiction. The juvenile court sustained several allegations
against father and took jurisdiction over Jayce.
VI. Disposition Hearing
On August 5, 2022, the juvenile court conducted a
disposition hearing.
That same day, DCFS reported that mother was “applying
to a . . . program [to] potentially obtain a reduced sentence.” On
that basis, DCFS recommended that the court order family
reunification services for mother. At the hearing, mother
submitted “on [DCFS’s] recommendation[.]”
The juvenile court found “by clear and convincing evidence”
“that it would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being, and special needs . . . of [Jayce] to be
returned to or placed in the home or the care, custody, and
control” of either parent. It thus removed Jayce from both
parents and ordered reunification services.
As to mother, the juvenile court ordered DCFS to make
“reasonable efforts to provide” her with services, along with a
minimum of six hours of visitation weekly during her
incarceration. The trial court also granted mother’s request for
an Interstate Compact Investigation (ICPC) to obtain a formal
placement assessment from the social services agency in
maternal grandmother’s jurisdiction.

5 The matter was continued several times for various
reasons, including locating mother and giving her appointed
counsel additional time to consult with her.

5
VII. Mother’s Reunification Efforts
Over the next six months, mother sent letters to Jayce and
called him when possible. She also participated in “self-help
activities” in prison. However, her application to a transitional
reentry program was denied; mother’s eligible parole date
remained January 2025.
VIII. Termination of Reunification Services
On February 3, 2023, the matter proceeded to a six-month
review hearing.
Mother admitted that Jayce “ha[d] been in placement for
two years[,]” but requested an extension of reunification services.
She argued that because she was “doing her best to be a mother
to [Jayce] while . . . in custody[,]” she deserved “an additional
opportunity to make a plan for her child or . . . work to become
eligible for [a] program that might allow her to be released and
reunify[.]”
The juvenile court denied mother’s request, explaining that
it could not “reasonably foresee that mother w[ould] be released”
during the extension period. The court also noted that although
mother “appear[ed] to be making every effort that she can under
the circumstances of her incarceration[,]” she had been unable to
comply with most of her case plan.
IX. Placement with Maternal Relatives Is Denied
On March 21, 2023, the ICPC concluded; investigators
found that Jayce could not be placed with maternal grandmother
and maternal aunt in Chicago. Jayce’s foster parent, with whom
he was thriving, was designated as his prospective adoptive
parent.

6
In December 2023, mother asked DCFS to contact one of
the Los Angeles relatives who had declined placement in 2021;
the relative declined again.
X. Mother’s Continuing Visitation Efforts
After her reunification services were terminated, mother
continued to call Jayce and send letters. Despite mother’s efforts,
DCFS opined that there was “no significant, positive, and
emotional attachment” between her and Jayce.
On August 4, 2023, the juvenile court granted mother’s
request for in-person visits when possible. The following
November, DCFS informed the juvenile court that it had not been
able to facilitate in-person visits because Jayce was reluctant to
visit mother in prison. The juvenile court subsequently ordered
DCFS to facilitate an in-person visit.
By January 2024, Jayce had begun ending calls with
mother early, usually after two or three minutes. Sometimes he
refused to speak with her. On one occasion, Jayce behaviorally
regressed during a video call with mother.
On January 2, 2024, Jayce visited mother in prison. They
played games and laughed together, but Jayce kept his distance
from mother and refused her attempts to hug him. After the
visit, Jayce behaviorally regressed again.
XI. Mother’s Section 388 Petition
On January 5, 2024, mother filed a section 388 petition
asking the juvenile court to change both its February 3, 2023,
order terminating reunification services and its August 5, 2022,
disposition order removing Jayce from mother.
Mother claimed that her parole eligibility date had been
moved to August 2024, and urged the court to grant her custody
of Jayce “with . . . an appropriate [care] plan with identified

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relatives” during the balance of her incarceration. The petition
did not name any relatives who could care for Jayce.6 In the
alternative, mother asked for reinstated reunification services, or
that “the identified relatives” be assessed for placement.7
On January 26, 2024, the juvenile court held a hearing on
the petition.
Mother appeared remotely and offered testimony. She
claimed that her “current parole eligible date” was in September
2024, but that she expected to be released in August because of
her progress in various prison services. Mother felt that Jayce
was bonded to her, and feared that terminating her parental
rights would be “detrimental to [Jayce’s] mental health because
he’s already getting accustomed” to her presence in his life.
After hearing argument from counsel, the juvenile court
denied mother’s section 388 petition. Even crediting mother’s
testimony that her prison term had been shortened, the court
explained that “a release date that is still eight months away
roughly from today is not a changed circumstance[,]” especially
since mother had been “unable to make an appropriate plan” for
Jayce during her incarceration and would herself “be unable to
care for [Jayce] . . . [who] has extremely high needs” for the
foreseeable future.

6 At the section 388 hearing, mother’s counsel clarified that
mother had found “one friend that she says would take the child,”
although counsel admitted that “at this time I do not have
further evidence of that. I have reached out to the friend without
a response[.]”
7 As noted above, mother’s petition did not identify any
relatives.

8
“Even if there were a finding” of changed circumstances,
the juvenile court did not “believe . . . it would be in [Jayce’s] best
interest” to grant any of the changes mother proposed,
explaining: “I cannot . . . order home-of-parent mother . . . as
mother remains incarcerated and . . . there is no factual evidence
. . . before the court to demonstrate that [she] has or can make an
appropriate plan today . . . . [Regarding a longer period of
reunification services,] I don’t believe it would be in [Jayce’s] best
interest . . . to have to wait that long . . . . Jayce has had a very
traumatic series of events in his very young life. He’s entitled to
permanency . . . and I don’t believe that asking [him] to wait not
just six more months but possibly eight to twelve as there is still
no guarantee . . . that mo[ther] will be released . . . is in [his] best
interest.”
XII. Termination of Parental Rights
On February 15, 2024, the juvenile court held a
permanency planning hearing. (§ 366.26.)
Mother asserted that the parental benefit exception to
adoption applied. The juvenile court disagreed, finding that
while in prison, mother only had limited and inconsistent phone
contact with Jayce. Her “one in-person visit . . . [wa]s the first
[such] visit she’s had with the child in several years of his life.”
The court acknowledged that mother’s “inability to have more
visits is due in part to her custodial status,” but found that wasn’t
“the whole story[,] as [father] did have full custody of [Jayce]
when the case was filed, and mo[ther] has noted she didn’t have
much contact with Jayce before she was arrested in September
2019.”
Moreover, the juvenile court found that mother had not
shown “that [she] and Jayce had formed a bond . . . . As mo[ther]

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testified, she was incarcerated when [Jayce] was two. He’s now
seven. While . . . mo[ther] . . . was non-offending in the
dependency case, the fact here is that [she] was rendered
. . . completely unavailable to parent or to make a solid plan for
her extraordinarily high needs child[.]” “Jayce’s behavior and
reaction to the recent in-person contact further underscore[s]” the
lack of attachment between him and mother.
The juvenile court concluded that mother failed to “show[]
that any hypothetical detriment of severing the parental bond
could not be outweighed by the stability of an adoptive home
. . . especially . . . for Jayce who . . . has been in the dependency
system for quite some time, [and] has ongoing [special] needs[.]”
Accordingly, the court terminated her parental rights.8
XIII. Appeal
Mother timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 388 Petition
A. Applicable Law
Under section 388, subdivision (a)(1), a parent may petition
the juvenile court to change, modify, or set aside a previous order
in dependency proceedings “upon grounds of change of
circumstance or new evidence.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “The parent
bears the burden to show both a legitimate change of
circumstances and that undoing the prior order would be in the
best interest of the child.” (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597,
611–612 (A.A.).)

8 Father’s parental rights were terminated at the same
hearing.

10
To satisfy the first prong, “the change in circumstances
must be substantial.” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th
219, 223.) Merely changing—as opposed to changed—
circumstances will not suffice. (In re Mickel O. (2011)
197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615 (Mickel O.).)
For the second prong, specifically when determining
whether reinstatement of reunification services is in the child’s
best interests, the juvenile court must prioritize “the goal of
assuring [the child’s] stability and continuity[.]” (In re Angel B.
(2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464 (Angel B.); see also In re J.C.
(2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527 (J.C.) [“[A]fter . . . services have
terminated, a” request to reinstate “reunification efforts must
establish how such a change will advance the child’s need for
permanency and stability”].)
B. Standard of review
We review the denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of
discretion. (Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.) Thus,
we must affirm “unless the [juvenile] court exceeded the limits of
legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently
absurd determination. [Citation.]” (In re A.S. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
C. The trial court properly denied mother’s petition
Mother’s petition failed to meet her burden under both
prongs of section 388. As to the first prong, mother testified that
she had secured a new parole eligibility date and could be
available to take physical custody as early as August 2024. Even
accepting that unverified date, an earlier parole eligibility date
would not necessarily guarantee mother’s earlier release. (Pen.
Code, § 3041, subd. (b)(1) [authorizing the parole board to deny
parole under certain conditions].) At most, this new date reflects

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that mother’s circumstances were changing, not changed; that
alone is a sufficient basis for denying a section 388 petition.
(Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 615.)
Mother also failed to carry her burden on the second prong.
Neither releasing Jayce to her custody nor reopening
reunification services would “advance [his] need for permanency
and stability.” (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527.) At the
time of the section 388 hearing, Jayce had been thriving in a
foster home for over three years, and his foster parent was
committed to adopting him. Conversely, Jayce had not lived (or
even had regular visits) with mother since father took sole
custody in 2018. Although it had been almost three years since
mother first appeared in the case, she remained unable to name a
suitable caretaker for Jayce during the balance of her
incarceration. And in the weeks leading up to the hearing, Jayce
started refusing calls with mother and behaviorally regressing
after phone and in-person visits.
Continued pursuit of this rocky, unpredictable reunification
process would not help assure Jayce’s stability and continuity.
(Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 464.) Thus, the juvenile
court properly denied mother’s petition.
D. Mother’s counterarguments
Mother contends that the juvenile court’s disposition orders
are erroneous; because she is a noncustodial parent, mother
claims that the juvenile court should have applied section 361.2,
subdivision (a) when removing Jayce from her care. (§ 361.2,
subd. (a) [“If a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section
361, [it] shall first determine whether there is a parent . . . with
whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or
conditions [leading to dependency] arose . . . who desires to

12
assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the
court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that
placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child”].)
Mother argues that her section 388 petition was “sufficient
to put the [juvenile] court on notice that its disposition orders
. . . needed to be corrected.” We disagree for three reasons:
(1) Mother forfeited her claim of noncompliance with section
361.2; (2) a section 388 petition is not the appropriate mechanism
to address the alleged error; and (3) the disposition orders were
not erroneous.
1. Forfeiture
While mother’s section 388 petition placed the disposition
orders at issue, it did not allege that the juvenile court applied
the wrong legal standard when removing Jayce from mother’s
care. Mother only argued—both in the petition and through
counsel at the hearing—that her incarceration was an
insufficient basis for removal. She thus forfeited any challenge
based on the court’s alleged failure to apply section 361.2. (See
A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 605 [“Failure to object to
noncompliance with section 361.2 in the lower court results in
forfeiture”].)
2. Section 388 is not the appropriate vehicle for
mother’s claim
Even if mother had not forfeited her section 361.2 claim, we
would still affirm the denial of her petition, as section 388 is not
an appropriate mechanism to seek review of that error.
Section 388 permits a party to petition the juvenile court to
change a prior order “upon grounds of change of circumstance or
new evidence.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) A parent may use a section

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388 petition to seek correction of past legal errors, but usually
those errors must stem from new evidence. In such cases, the
parents satisfy their burden to show “changed circumstances” by
presenting newly discovered evidence showing a legal error was
committed in a prior proceeding.9 (See In re Jackson W. (2010)
184 Cal.App.4th 247, 255 [a parent raised past ineffective
assistance of counsel by “alleg[ing] numerous instances of
counsel’s failure to properly represent [the parent]”]; In re R.A.
(2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 826, 834 [a father demonstrated his due
process claim by showing that he “did not receive notice when the
original [jurisdiction] petition was filed”].)
Mother’s section 388 petition presents no new evidence
relevant to the alleged section 361.2 error. The only new facts
described in the petition are mother’s updated release date, her
recent completion of programs in prison, and her suggestion of a
new, unnamed potential caregiver for Jayce. These changes
could provide support for a brand new disposition order (which
mother unsuccessfully sought at the section 388 hearing), but
they do not show that the trial court applied the wrong legal

9 A section 388 petition can also address unusually grave
legal errors that fatally undermine a parent’s ability to develop
evidence that a proposed modification would be in her child’s best
interest. (See, e.g., In re Hunter S. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1497,
1507–1508 [abuse of discretion to deny a petition asking the
juvenile court to correct its failure to enforce a mother’s visitation
rights for three years].) In these extreme circumstances,
appellate courts have relieved the petitioning parent of her
burden to present evidence on both prongs of section 388.
(Hunter S., supra, at p. 1508.) Because mother does not
contend—and we do not find—that such exceptional
circumstances are present here, she cannot advance her petition
without satisfying her evidentiary burden.

14
standard when making its initial removal findings 17 months
earlier.10
3. The juvenile court did not err at the disposition
hearing, and in any event, the alleged error
would have been harmless
In the interest of thoroughness, we note that even if
mother’s section 361.2 claim could be raised via a section 388
petition, the juvenile court’s disposition orders were not in error.
Because Jayce was not residing with mother when “the
events or conditions arose that brought the child within the
provisions of [s]ection 300” in November 2020, “the court was
required under section 361.2 to place [him] with [mother] unless
such placement would be ‘detrimental to [his] safety, protection,
or physical or emotional well-being[.]’” (In re Adam H. (2019)
43 Cal.App.5th 27, 32 (Adam H.).)
However, “[i]t is the noncustodial parent’s request for
custody that triggers application of section 361.2 . . . ; where the
noncustodial parent makes no such request, the statute is not
applicable.” (A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 605.) Mother
concedes that she did not request custody of Jayce or otherwise
“assert [her] rights under section 361.2 at the disposition
hearing.” Because she did not trigger section 361.2, the juvenile
court did not err by failing to apply it.
Even if mother had requested custody, noncompliance with
section 361.2 would be harmless. (See Adam H., supra,
43 Cal.App.5th at p. 32 [failure to comply with section 361.2 is

10 Our conclusion does not leave mother without means to
correct the alleged error; she could have appealed the disposition
orders or filed a “writ following the setting of the section 366.26
hearing.” (A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.)

15
subject to harmless error review].) “An incarcerated parent has
the same right as other parents to be given the opportunity to
request custody under section 361.2,” but the juvenile court may
deny placement if that parent is unable “to make appropriate
arrangements for the care of the child [during her] incarceration.”
(A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 606; In re Noe F. (2013)
213 Cal.App.4th 358, 368 (Noe F.).)
As mother conceded in her section 388 petition, she “was
unable to make an appropriate [care] plan at the time of
[d]isposition[.]” In fact, mother could not make any arrangement
for Jayce’s care throughout these proceedings; in three years, she
named five maternal relatives as potential caregivers, all of
whom either declined or were found unsuitable. Thus, while the
juvenile court did not apply section 361.2, that statute would
have supported the court’s finding that granting mother custody
would be detrimental to Jayce. (Cf. Noe F., supra,
213 Cal.App.4th at p. 367 [“[I]nsufficient evidence supports
removal . . . from” an incarcerated parent where she “identified
two suitable caregivers . . . who[] were willing to take the child”].)
Under these circumstances, any failure to apply section
361.2 was harmless. Thus, we cannot conclude that the juvenile
court abused its discretion in denying mother’s purported request
to correct the error.
II. Termination of Parental Rights
Mother only raises one argument against the termination
of her parental rights—namely, that the juvenile court’s
erroneous denial of her section 388 petition violated her due
process rights. Having already determined that the juvenile
properly denied the petition, we affirm the termination of
mother’s parental rights.

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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, Acting P. J.
ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

________________________, J.
RICHARDSON

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