CourtListener 10305028•W.S. v. K.M. CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/27/24 W.S. v. K.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
W.S., C099628
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 201261)
v.
K.M.,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant K.M. files two notices of appeal from an August 2023 judgment. But
she raises no appellate issues from the August 2023 judgment in the argument section of
her brief. Instead, her argument section raises appellate issues from a February 2023
order that is not encompassed in either notice of appeal. Because K.M.’s notices of
appeal do not give us jurisdiction to review the February 2023 order and she does not
properly raise arguments to the August 2023 judgment in the argument section of her
brief, we affirm.
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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We have no reporter’s transcript or proper substitute (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rules 8.134, 8.137), so we derive the following background from the clerk’s transcript.
All dates are in 2023.
After plaintiff W.S.’s father died, W.S. (son) filed a request for a civil harassment
restraining order against K.M., who is referred to in the record variously as father’s
roommate, girlfriend, and/or life partner. (Code Civ. Proc., § 527.6.) Claiming that K.M.
threatened to shoot son when son went to father’s property, son asked the court to order
K.M. to: (1) not contact or harass son; (2) stay at least 300 yards away from son; and
(3) move out of father’s home. Acting in propria persona, K.M. filed a response to the
request, refusing to agree to any of son’s requested orders and claiming father told her she
would get father’s home. The court held a hearing at which K.M. appeared, and it set the
restraining order request for trial on February 17.
The following week, son filed a request to modify the restraining order to prohibit
K.M. from removing or selling father’s property. Son’s counsel withdrew that request
and filed a declaration in support of the restraining order asserting that K.M. had
converted some of son’s personal property.
Following the February 17 trial at which K.M. did not appear, the court granted
son a three-year restraining order (the February order). The February order required
K.M. to: (1) not contact or harass son; (2) stay at least 100 yards away from son; (3)
move out of father’s home; and (4) return any property K.M. took from father’s home.
The order also declared son the rightful owner of a 1956 Ford and required that any
document reflecting K.M. as the car’s owner be changed.
On March 10, the court signed son’s order requiring K.M. to return various
personal property to son (the March order). Two months later, K.M. retained counsel and
filed a motion to vacate the March order, arguing it was obtained due to K.M.’s mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. After an evidentiary hearing on August 18,
2
the court vacated the March order and ordered K.M. to transfer two vehicles to son and
pay a certain amount for another vehicle K.M. had sold or traded in. The ensuing
judgment was signed on August 22 (the August judgment) and K.M., again acting in
propria persona, timely appealed it.
DISCUSSION
K.M. contends the trial court erred in issuing the February order because:
(1) there was no credible threat of future harm to son; (2) the move-out and property
return requirements are not proper subjects for a civil harassment restraining order; and
(3) the court improperly allowed son’s counsel to act on K.M.’s behalf at a hearing
leading up to the February 17 trial. We cannot reach these contentions.
K.M.’s notices of appeal identify a single document as the source of her appeal:
the August judgment. We see no basis to construe the very specific notices of appeal as
embracing the separately appealable February order. (In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th
70, 76 [policy of liberally construing a notice of appeal does not apply if the notice is so
specific it cannot be read as reaching a judgment or order not mentioned at all]; Code
Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1), (6).) Because our jurisdiction on appeal is limited to the
August judgment, we lack jurisdiction to review the February order. (Faunce v. Cate
(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170.) And because K.M. does not properly articulate
arguments regarding the August judgment in the argument section of her brief, we apply
the presumption that the August judgment is correct.1 (Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
1 We do not consider additional points appearing in the statement of facts of K.M.’s
opening brief that are not set forth in the argument section under a separate heading or
subheading. The statement of facts is an inappropriate place for argument. Instead, each
point of argument must appear under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the
point. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule. 8.204(a)(1)(B); Schaeffer Land Trust v. San Jose City
Council (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 612, 619, fn. 2 [“We do not address claims interwoven in
3
DISPOSITION
The August 22, 2023 judgment is affirmed. Son (respondent W.S.) is entitled to
his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
HULL, Acting P. J.
/s/
KRAUSE, J.
a statement of facts unless they are discussed [elsewhere] under an appropriate
heading”].)
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