CourtListener 10304689•People v. Huston CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/26/27 P. v. Huston CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C100334
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 14F07830)
v.
SHAQUILLE HUSTON,
Defendant and Appellant.
In November 2017, defendant Shaquille Huston was convicted of first degree
murder. He appeals the trial court’s denial of his third petition for resentencing under
now Penal Code section 1172.6. (Undesignated section references are to the Penal
Code.) His appellate counsel filed a brief raising no arguable issues under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 and asks that we exercise our discretion to review the
record for arguable issues on appeal.
1
Defendant filed a supplemental brief contending he “was entitled to a Banks/Clark
sufficiency review,”1 and requesting us to issue an “order to show cause and prove a
reason for ineligibility for resentencing.” We review these contentions and conclude
none have merit. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Defendant’s Underlying Conviction
In November 2014, defendant and three companions robbed two victims of
marijuana and an amplifier. One of the victims was shot and killed. (People v. Stroupe
(Feb. 24, 2021, C086068) [nonpub. opn.] (Stroupe).)
In November 2017, a jury found defendant guilty of first degree murder with a
special circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery.
However, the jury found not true an allegation that defendant personally used a firearm.
The jury also convicted defendant of robbery, again finding not true a personal firearm-
use allegation. (Stroupe, supra, C086068.) During trial, the jury was instructed on
homicide solely on a felony-murder theory. The jury instructions on the robbery-murder
special circumstance included the Banks factors, but not the Clark factors.
The trial court sentenced defendant to life without the possibility of parole for the
first degree murder with the robbery-murder special circumstance. It also sentenced him
to the lower term of two years for the robbery that was stayed. (Stroupe, supra,
C086068.)
On appeal, this court rejected defendant’s argument that the evidence was
insufficient to support the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding that (1) he
1 People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788, 803 (Banks) [identifying factors to guide juries
on whether defendant was a “major participant”]. People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522,
618-623 (Clark) [identifying factors to guide juries on whether a defendant acted with
“reckless disregard”].
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intended to aid and abet the robbery before or at the time of the killing, or (2) that he was
a major participant in the crime who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(Stroupe, supra, C086068.) This court also rejected defendant’s argument that the jury
instructions regarding the special circumstance were conflicting, instead finding there
was no reasonable likelihood that the jury interpreted the instructions as allowing it to
find the special circumstance true without also finding defendant was the actual killer,
intended to kill, or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life. (Ibid.) This court modified the judgment to strike a fine and affirmed the judgment
as modified. (Stroupe, supra, C086068.)
2. The 2019 and 2021 Section 1172.6 Petitions
Defendant filed a first section 1172.6 petition in January 2019; the trial court
denied it in April 2019. This court dismissed defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s
denial of the first petition, reasoning the trial court lacked jurisdiction to consider the
petition given that defendant’s direct appeal was still pending. (People v. Huston (Apr.
17, 2020, C089573) [nonpub. opn.].)
In December 2021, defendant filed a second section 1172.6 petition. The trial
court denied the second petition in August 2022, noting that the jury had found true the
robbery-murder special circumstance. As such, the trial court reasoned that the jury
necessarily found true that defendant either acted with intent to kill as an aider and
abettor or was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life,
meaning defendant was necessarily still guilty of murder even after the amendments to
sections 188 and 189. There is nothing in the record indicating defendant appealed the
trial court’s denial of the second petition.
3. The 2023 Section 1172.6 Petition
Defendant filed a third section 1172.6 petition in September 2023. The trial court
appointed counsel and ordered briefing.
3
The prosecution argued in its brief that the third petition was successive because
neither the facts nor the law had changed since the prior filing. In addition, defendant
was ineligible for relief given the jury found true the robbery-murder special
circumstance after the Banks and Clark decisions had been issued.
Defendant responded that the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding and
subsequent affirmation by this court did not preclude the petition, especially since the
appellate standard is different than the standard to be applied in considering a
section 1172.6 petition. Defendant noted that the jury had not been instructed on the
Clark factors regarding reckless indifference. Citing People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698 (Strong), defendant also argued that a prior finding upholding a special circumstance
is not necessarily a basis for denying a petitioner’s section 1172.6 petition on a prima
facie basis. Finally, defendant argued that his petition was not successive because the
trial court had previously taken “the wrong side of a circuit split each time” in
considering his prior petitions.
During the January 2024 prima facie hearing, the trial court noted there had been
no change in the applicable law or facts since defendant’s second petition and found the
third petition was barred because it was successive. But even if it was not successive, the
trial court stated it would still deny the third petition because the jury found the robbery-
murder special circumstance to be true. And, given that defendant’s trial took place in
2017, after Banks and Clark had been decided, the jury had properly been instructed with
felony-murder instructions. Under the circumstances, the jury necessarily found beyond
a reasonable doubt that defendant was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Since defendant would still be guilty of murder even after the
amendments to sections 188 and 189, he was ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law.
Defendant appeals from the order of the trial court denying his third petition for
resentencing.
4
DISCUSSION
We evaluate the specific arguments presented but need not independently review
the record. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 228-232.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437), which became
effective on January 1, 2019, “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or
was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference
to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); see also § 189, subd. (e) [a
defendant who neither was the actual killer nor acted with the intent to kill may be held
liable for murder only if he or she was a “major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life”].)
Senate Bill 1437 also added section 1172.6 that allows those convicted of murder
under a now-invalid theory of murder to petition the trial court to vacate the conviction
and resentence the defendant. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) Upon submission of a section
1172.6 petition, “the court shall hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has
made a prima facie case for relief. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing that the
petitioner is entitled to relief, the court shall issue an order to show cause.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
The prima facie inquiry under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) is “limited.”
(People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) The court “ ‘ “takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding whether the petitioner
would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were proved.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The
court may rely on the record of conviction in determining whether defendant has made a
prima facie showing, and “ ‘if the record, including the court’s own documents,
“contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified
in making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner.” ’ ” (Ibid.; see also
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People v. Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52 [it is appropriate for a court to deny a
defendant’s resentencing petition if the record shows the defendant is ineligible for relief
as a matter of law].) Still, the court “should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ ” (Lewis, at p. 972.)
We independently review the denial of a section 1172.6 petition at the prima facie
stage. (People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
In his supplemental brief, defendant appears to argue he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing. In support of his argument, defendant cites In re Taylor (2019)
34 Cal.App.5th 543, which vacated a habeas corpus petitioner’s 1994 felony-murder
special-circumstance true finding because the evidence was insufficient to establish the
petitioner acted with reckless indifference to human life in light of the factors
subsequently identified in Clark. (In re Taylor, at pp. 546, 557, 563.) The In re Taylor
court declined to decide whether the defendant was therefore entitled to have his murder
conviction vacated under Senate Bill 1437, instead finding the defendant needed to file a
section 1172.6 petition in the trial court. (In re Taylor, at pp. 561-562.)
To the extent defendant here is arguing he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing
because the evidence was insufficient to establish under Banks and Clark that he aided
and abetted as a major participant and with reckless indifference to human life, this court
already rejected this argument in defendant’s direct appeal from his original conviction.
(Stroupe, supra, C086068.) Regardless, we decline to consider the issue because
defendant here has appealed from a section 1172.6 petition, and section 1172.6 “does not
permit a petitioner to establish eligibility [for resentencing] on the basis of alleged trial
error.” (People v. DeHuff (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
To the extent defendant is arguing the trial court erred in determining he is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, we disagree. In Strong, our
Supreme Court considered the effect a jury’s true finding on a robbery-murder special-
circumstance allegation would have on a section 1172.6 petition. (Strong, supra,
6
13 Cal.5th at p. 698.) The court held that such findings made before Banks and Clark
would not preclude a defendant from making a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6 because those two decisions “represent the sort of significant change that
has traditionally been thought to warrant reexamination of an earlier-litigated issue.”
(Strong, at pp. 710, 717.)
However, such findings made after Banks and Clark will “ordinarily establish a
defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 and thus preclude the
defendant from making a prima facie case for relief.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 710.) In addition to clarifying who can be held liable for felony murder, section 189,
subdivision (e)(3) now ties the definitions of “major participant” and “reckless
indifference” to the felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (d)), meaning
section 189 now incorporates the clarifications to those terms as explained in Banks and
Clark. (Strong, at pp. 708, 710.) Thus, although the mandatory jury instructions did not
change after Banks and Clark, “much else about the trial environment did.” (Strong, at
p. 719.) More specifically, the clarifications of Banks and Clark altered arguments,
evidence, and strategies available to trial counsel, including optional additional jury
instructions. (Strong, at pp. 719-720.)
As our Supreme Court has explained, “a relevant jury finding is generally
preclusive in section 1172.6 proceedings, i.e., it ‘ordinarily establish[es] a defendant’s
ineligibility for resentencing under Senate Bill 1437 and thus preclude[s] the defendant
from making a prima facie case for relief.’ ” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433,
453-454.)
Here, defendant’s trial took place after Banks and Clark were decided, meaning
the robbery-murder special circumstance was litigated in the “trial environment” changed
by those decisions. Defendant’s trial counsel had the opportunity to make arguments
about the Banks/Clark factors, present evidence guided by those factors, and even request
optional jury instructions inspired by those factors. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
7
pp. 719-720.) Moreover, defendant had the opportunity on direct appeal to address
whether sufficient evidence supported the jury’s true finding on the robbery-murder
special circumstance. As such, defendant is precluded from relitigating the issue in his
section 1172.6 petition, and he is bound by the jury’s true finding that he either was the
actual killer, intended to kill, or was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. Regardless of whether defendant’s third petition is
successive, defendant would still be guilty of murder today, making him ineligible for
resentencing relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying defendant’s petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 is affirmed.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MAURO, J.
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