CourtListener 10304082•In re V.S. CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/23/24 In re V.S. CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re V.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.
TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN F088419
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JJV072891C)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. OPINION
G.S.,
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. John P.
Bianco, Judge.
Beth A. Sears, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, and Marit C. Erickson, Deputy County
Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and DeSantos, J.
INTRODUCTION
G.S. (Mother) filed a timely notice of appeal following the termination of her
parental rights to now one-year-old V.S. under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 366.26.1 Mother’s sole claim is that because the Tulare County Health and
Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into whether
V.S. is or may be an Indian child, in compliance with section 224.2, former
subdivision (b),2 the juvenile court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. (ICWA))3 did not apply, necessitating remand.
(Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
The Agency concedes error with respect to its initial ICWA inquiry, and the parties
stipulate to a conditional reversal and remand for an adequate inquiry. (Dezi C., supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
We have reviewed the record and agree with the parties that the juvenile court
erred in finding ICWA does not apply given the absence of a documented, proper,
adequate and duly diligent inquiry, as mandated by California law. (§ 224.2, subds. (b)–
(c); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5); Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125.)
1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise
specified.
2 As addressed in part I.B. of the Discussion, section 224.2 was amended, effective
September 27, 2024, by Assembly Bill No. 81. (Assem. Bill No. 81 (2023–2024 Reg. Sess.)
ch. 656 (Assembly Bill 81) [California Indian Child Welfare Act or Cal-ICWA].) The Agency’s
initial inquiry and the juvenile court’s ICWA finding in this case predated Assembly Bill 81, but,
for the reasons discussed by this court in In re K.H., In re E.C., and In re Jerry R., the inquiry
and finding were deficient under the law as it stood prior to the passage of Assembly Bill 81. (In
re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 598–599 & 602–605 (K.H.); In re E.C. (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 123, 141–142 (E.C.); In re Jerry R. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 388, 428–429 (Jerry R.).)
3 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we [may at times] do the same for consistency,
even though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1 (Benjamin M.),
disapproved in part on another ground in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn. 18
(Dezi C.).)
2.
Therefore, in accordance with the parties’ stipulation, we conditionally reverse the
juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights and remand this matter with
directions to ensure a proper, adequate and duly diligent inquiry in compliance with
California law. (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1125.)
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY4
V.S. was born in September 2023.5 Mother was incarcerated at the time and had a
history of drug use. The Agency was notified of V.S.’s birth and took her into protective
custody at the hospital. Based on Mother’s substance abuse, untreated mental illness,
incarceration, and prior dependency cases involving V.S.’s two half-siblings, the Agency
filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect), (g) (no provision
for support), and (j) (abuse of siblings). Mother denied Native American ancestry when
interviewed at the hospital, and the petition included Judicial Council form ICWA-010(A)
stating that Mother gave no reason to believe that V.S. is or may be an Indian child.
Based on Mother’s response, the Agency’s detention report stated ICWA did not apply.
At the detention hearing held in September 2023, Mother stated she was not aware
of any Native American ancestry and the juvenile court found ICWA did not apply. The
court found a prima facie showing had been made that V.S. was a person described by
section 300 and ordered her detained from Mother and placed in the temporary custody of
the Agency.
At the jurisdiction hearing in February 2024, the juvenile court dismissed the
section 300, subdivision (g), allegation given Mother’s release from custody and
sustained the subdivisions (b)(1) and (j) allegations. The court subsequently held a
disposition hearing and adjudged V.S. a dependent; found by clear and convincing
4 We include only a limited factual summary given that the sole issue on appeal is Mother’s
ICWA claim.
5 C.R. was identified as V.S.’s alleged father at the outset. DNA testing subsequently
excluded him as her biological father and he was dismissed.
3.
evidence that there is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of V.S. if returned to Mother’s home; and
found there were no reasonable means by which her physical health could be protected
without removing her from Mother’s physical custody. The court bypassed reunification
services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and set a section 366.26 hearing for
June 2024.
The juvenile court held a contested hearing under section 366.26 in July 2024.
The court found V.S. was adoptable and the parental-benefit exception did not apply;
terminated the parental rights of Mother; and ordered V.S. be placed for adoption. (Ibid.)
Mother appealed on the ground of ICWA error.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles
A. ICWA
“ICWA was enacted in 1978 by Congress ‘out of concern that “an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families are broken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their
children from them by nontribal public and private agencies.” 92 Stat. 3069, 25 U.S.C.
§1901(4). Congress found that many of these children were being “placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions,” and that the States had contributed to the
problem by “fail[ing] to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the
cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian communities and families.” §§1901(4),
(5). This harmed not only Indian parents and children, but also Indian tribes. As
Congress put it, “there is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence and
integrity of Indian tribes than their children.” §1901(3).’ (Haaland v. Brackeen (2023)
599 U.S. ___ [143 S.Ct. 1609, 1623] (Haaland); accord, Mississippi Choctaw Indian
Band v. Holyfield (1989) 490 U.S. 30, 32–36 (Holyfield); In re Isaiah W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th
1, 7–8 (Isaiah W.).)
4.
“‘[ICWA] thus aims to keep Indian children connected to Indian families. “Indian
child” is defined broadly to include not only a child who is “a member of an Indian
tribe,” but also one who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” §1903(4). If the Indian child lives on a
reservation, ICWA grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction over all child custody
proceedings, including adoptions and foster care proceedings. §1911(a). For other
Indian children, state and tribal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction, although the state
court is sometimes required to transfer the case to tribal court. §1911(b). When a state
court adjudicates the proceeding, ICWA governs from start to finish. That is true
regardless of whether the proceeding is “involuntary” (one to which the parents do not
consent) or “voluntary” (one to which they do).’ (Haaland, supra, 599 U.S. at p. ___
[143 S.Ct. at p. 1623]; accord, Holyfield, supra, 490 U.S. at p. 36.)
“ICWA sets the minimum standards, providing, ‘In any case where State or
Federal law applicable to a child custody proceeding under State or Federal law provides
a higher standard of protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian
child than the rights provided under this subchapter, the State or Federal court shall apply
the State or Federal standard.’ (25 U.S.C. § 1921; accord, Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224,
subd. (d).) ‘The minimum standards established by ICWA include the requirement of
notice to Indian tribes in any involuntary proceeding in state court to place a child in
foster care or to terminate parental rights “where the court knows or has reason to know
that an Indian child is involved.”’ (Isaiah W., supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 8, quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).) ‘ICWA’s notice requirements serve two purposes. First, they facilitate a
determination of whether the child is an Indian child under ICWA.’ (Isaiah W., supra, at
p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).) ‘Second, ICWA notice ensures that an Indian tribe is
aware of its right to intervene in or, where appropriate, exercise jurisdiction over a child
custody proceeding involving an Indian child.’ (Isaiah W., supra, at p. 8, citing 25 U.S.C.
§§ 1911(a), (c), 1912(a).)
5.
“To facilitate notice in appropriate cases, federal law provides, ‘State courts must
ask each participant in an emergency or voluntary or involuntary child custody
proceeding whether the participant knows or has reason to know that the child is an
Indian child. The inquiry is made at the commencement of the proceeding and all
responses should be on the record. State courts must instruct the parties to inform the
court if they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is
an Indian child.’ (25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2023).) California law requires more and,
relevant to the issue raised here, imposes on counties a broad duty of inquiry into whether
a child placed in the temporary custody of the county is or may be an Indian child.
(§ 224.2, subd. (b).)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 407–409, fn. omitted.)
B. Cal-ICWA
“In 2006, ‘persistent noncompliance with ICWA led [our state] Legislature … to
“incorporate[] ICWA’s requirements into California statutory law.”’” (Jerry R., supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 409, quoting In re Abbigail A. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 83, 91.) “‘“In 2016,
new federal regulations were adopted concerning ICWA compliance”’” (Jerry R., supra,
at p. 409, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595), but “[p]rior to that time,
‘neither ICWA itself nor the implementing federal regulations in effect … imposed a duty
on courts or child protective agencies to inquire whether a child involved in a dependency
proceeding was an Indian child’” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, quoting In re T.G. (2020) 58
Cal.App.5th 275, 289 (T.G.). Now, “‘[f]ederal regulations governing ICWA … now
require an ICWA inquiry be made at the inception of dependency proceedings, as well as
at all proceedings that “may culminate” in foster care placement or termination of
parental rights.’” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, quoting In re Rylei S. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
309, 323, fn. 11.)
6.
“Subsequently, the California Legislature enacted Assembly Bill No. 3176,[6]
effective January 1, 2019, which ‘“made conforming amendments to its statutes,
including portions of the Welfare and Institutions Code related to ICWA notice and
inquiry requirements.”’” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, quoting K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 595.) “Assembly Bill 3176 repealed former sections 224.2,
pertaining to notice, and 224.3, pertaining to inquiry, and reenacted them in different
form. (Stats. 2018, ch. 833, §§ 4–7.) Section 224.3 now governs notice and
section 224.2 inquiry.” (Jerry R., supra, at p. 410, fn. omitted.) The legislation “revised
and recast the duties of inquiry and notice, in accordance with federal law, and, relevant
to inquiry, ‘revise[d] the specific steps a social worker, probation officer, or court is
required to take in making an inquiry of a child’s possible status as an Indian child.’” (Id.
at p. 411, quoting Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Assem. Bill 3176, Stats. 2018, ch. 833, p. 1.)
Very recently, faced with continuing difficulties and inconsistencies in this area of
the law, the Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 81, effective September 27, 2024.7
Assembly Bill 81 “create[d] a comprehensive act to protect and preserve Indian families
in California and to aid in improving implementation of applicable state and federal
laws.” (§ 224, subd. (c).) The legislation expressly recognized, “Despite the passage of
the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Senate Bill 678 (Stats. 2006, Ch. 838), and
Assembly Bill 3176 (Stats. 2018, Ch. 833), California continues to experience
inconsistent implementation of the Indian Child Welfare Act and its related state law
protections, thus continuing the harm and breakup of Indian families. Variation in
6 “Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 3176).” (Jerry R.,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 410, fn. 11.)
7 The amendments to section 224.2 between Assembly Bill No. 3176 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) and Assembly Bill 81 did not affect subdivision (b). (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 410–411, fn. 12 [Assem. Bill No. 686 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2020; Assem. Bill
No. 2944 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), eff. Sept. 18, 2020; & Assem. Bill No. 2960 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.), eff. Jan. 1, 2023].)
7.
practice undermines tribal sovereignty, furthers destructive impacts on tribes and tribal
communities, puts the lives of Indian children and families at disproportionate risk for
multiple adverse outcomes, and fails to address systemic racism.” (Id., subd. (b).) In
addition to advancing the goals of clarity and consistency under California law (id.,
subd. (c)), Cal-ICWA resolved the split of appellate authority over whether or not the
duty of initial inquiry under section 224.2, former subdivision (b), arises when a child is
taken into protective custody by warrant under section 340, expressly providing that it
does (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(2)). (See Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 403–404
[addressing In re Robert F. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 492, review granted July 26, 2023,
S279743 & In re Delila D. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 953, review granted Sept. 27, 2023,
S281447 & agreeing with Delila D. that the duty of initial inquiry applies regardless of
how the child is taken into custody].)
As amended, section 224.2 provides, in relevant part, “The court, county welfare
department, and the probation department have an affirmative and continuing duty to
inquire whether a child for whom a petition under Section 300, 601, or 602 may be or has
been filed, is or may be an Indian child.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The duty to inquire begins for
a county when first contacted regarding a child, including, but not limited to, asking a
party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child
may be an Indian child, and upon a county department’s first contact with the child or the
child’s family, including extended family members as defined in paragraph (1) of
subdivision (c) of Section 224.1. At the first contact with the child and each family
member, including extended family members, the county welfare department or county
probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is or may be an Indian
child.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)
“If a child is placed into the temporary custody of a county probation department
pursuant to Section 307, or received and maintained in temporary custody of a county
welfare department pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or taken
8.
into or maintained in the temporary custody of a county welfare department pursuant to
paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 306, or if they were initially taken into
protective custody pursuant to a warrant described in Section 340, the county welfare
department or county probation department has a duty to inquire whether that child is an
Indian child. Inquiry includes, but is not limited to, asking the child, parents, legal
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members, others who have an interest in the
child, and the party reporting child abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an
Indian child and where the child, the parents, or Indian custodian is domiciled.” (§ 224.2,
subd. (b)(2).)
“For a court presiding over any juvenile proceeding that could result in placement
of an Indian child with someone other than a parent or Indian custodian, including
proceedings where the parents or Indian custodian have voluntarily consented to
placement of the child, the duty to inquire begins at the first hearing on a petition. At the
commencement of the hearing, the court shall ask each party to the proceeding and all
other interested persons present whether the child is, or may be, an Indian child, whether
they know or have reason to know that the child is an Indian child, and where the child,
the parents, or Indian custodian are domiciled, as defined in Section 224.1. Inquiry shall
also be made at the first appearance in court of each party or interested person who was
not present at the first hearing on the petition. The inquiry and responses shall occur on
the record. The court shall instruct the parties and persons present to inform the court if
they subsequently receive information that provides reason to know the child is, or may
be, an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (c).)
II. Standard of Review
“‘The juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply to the proceeding rests on
two elemental determinations, “subject to reversal based on sufficiency of the evidence.”’
(K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra,
9.
85 Cal.App.5th at p. 142; Adoption of M.R. (2002) 84 Cal.App.5th 537, 542;
rule 5.482(c).)[8] First, ‘[t]he court must find there is “no reason to know whether the
child is an Indian child,” which is dependent upon whether any of the six circumstances
set forth in subdivision (d) of section 224.2 apply.’ (K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting
§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; rule 5.482(c)(1).) Second, ‘[t]he
juvenile court must … find a “proper and adequate further inquiry and due diligence .…”’
(K.H., supra, at p. 601, quoting § 224.2, subd. (i)(2); accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143;
rule 5.482(c)(1).)
“The juvenile court’s finding on the second element ‘requires the … court to
“engage in a delicate balancing of” various factors in assessing whether the … inquiry
was proper and adequate within the context of ICWA and California law, and whether …
[there was] due diligence.’ (K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 601, quoting In re
Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640; accord, E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 143; In re
Ezequiel G. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 984, 1004–1005.) Therefore, we employ a hybrid
standard and review the court’s determination for substantial evidence and abuse of
discretion. (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, at p. 143; In re Ezequiel G.,
supra, at p. 1003.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 427.)
III. Analysis
A. Error
“‘“[N]otice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating ICWA’s purpose .…” (In re
T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 288 (T.G.), citing Isaiah W., supra, [1 Cal.5th] at p. 8.)
However, it is typically “not self-evident whether a child is an Indian child”
(Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 741), and “the question of membership is
determined by the tribes, not the courts or child protective agencies” (T.G., supra, at
8 Assembly Bill 81 effected only minor technical changes to subdivision (i) of
section 224.2.
10.
p. 294). To ensure notice in cases in which it is known or there is reason to know an
Indian child is involved (25 U.S.C. § 1912(a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224.3, subd. (a)), the
law imposes an affirmative and ongoing duty to inquire whether a child subject to
dependency proceedings is or may be an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (a))’ [citation] .…”
(Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 411, quoting K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 588.) Under California law, agencies have a broad duty of inquiry and documentation.
(Jerry R., supra, citing § 224.2, subd. (b) & Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(5).)
“[C]omplying with the duty of inquiry and documentation under ICWA is unlikely
to ‘prove onerous’ in most cases [citation], [but] in no event may we interpret the law to
relieve the court or the agency of complying with the plain directives imposed by statute
and rule (K.H., supra, [84 Cal.App.5th] at p. 620; see § 224.2; [Cal. Rules of Court,]
rules 5.480–5.482). There may be cases in which there is no one else to ask beyond [one
or both] parents [and a few relatives], but, if that is so, the record must be developed to
reflect that fact and supported by documentation. ([Cal. Rules of Court,
[r]ule 5.481(a)(5).) Properly developed and documented, ‘the court has relatively broad
discretion to determine [that] the … inquiry was proper, adequate, and duly diligent on
the specific facts of the case.’ (K.H., supra, at p. 589; accord, E.C., supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at p. 157.)” (Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 428.)
In this case, the record reflects that inquiries were made of Mother and maternal
grandfather, and both denied Native American ancestry. The record also reflects that
Mother has three other children, one of whom is an adult who was interested in having
V.S. placed with her at one point and one of whom is a teenager. However, there is no
documentation that either was asked about possible Native American ancestry, and there
is no documentation concerning whether there are additional family members or
interested parties available to ask. As the Agency concedes, this very limited inquiry is
insufficient under the law. (§ 224.2, subd. (b)(1)–(2); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a).)
11.
“‘General information from the family about its ancestry frequently provides the
only available basis to believe an Indian child may be involved. [Citation.] Additional
investigation may not develop further information establishing the need for ICWA notice,
but it is essential to the enforcement of the court’s and child protective agency’s
“affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” to construe broadly the duty to make further
inquiry.’” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 147, quoting T.G., supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at
p. 295.)
B. Remedy
“ICWA and Cal-ICWA are unique statutory schemes that are intended to protect
Native American heritage, cultural connections between tribes and children of Native
American ancestry, the best interests of Indian children, and the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1125, citing In re Isaiah W.
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7–8; 25 U.S.C. § 1902; & Welf. & Inst. Code, § 224, former
subd. (a).) As previously stated, “‘Notice to Indian tribes is central to effectuating
ICWA’s purpose, enabling a tribe to determine whether the child involved in a
dependency proceeding is an Indian child and, if so, whether to intervene in, or exercise
jurisdiction over, the matter.’” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1133, quoting T.G., supra, 58
Cal.App.5th at p. 288.) “‘Although the duty of inquiry is a continuing one [citation], as
we have seen in countless cases, … if the inquiry is inadequate at the outset, the
likelihood that the opportunity to gather relevant information will present itself later in
the proceeding declines precipitously.’” (Dezi C., supra, at p. 1140, quoting K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 609.)
Therefore, “error resulting in an inadequate initial Cal-ICWA inquiry requires
conditional reversal with directions for the child welfare agency to comply with the
inquiry requirement of section 224.2, document its inquiry in compliance with [California
Rules of Court,] rule 5.481(a)(5), and when necessary, comply with the notice provision
of section 224.3. When a Cal-ICWA inquiry is inadequate, it is impossible to ascertain
12.
whether the agency’s error is prejudicial. [Citations.] ‘[U]ntil an agency conducts a
proper initial inquiry and makes that information known, it is impossible to know what
the inquiry might reveal.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1136, quoting K.H., supra,
84 Cal.App.5th at p. 617.)9
On remand, “‘the juvenile court [must] direct the [Agency] to conduct a proper,
adequate, and duly diligent inquiry under section 224.2, subdivision (b) …, and document
its inquiry in the record in compliance with [California Rules of Court,]
rule 5.481(a)(5).’” (E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 621; accord, Jerry R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 431.) “‘So long as
the court ensures the inquiry is reasonable and of sufficient reach to accomplish the
legislative purpose underlying ICWA and [Cal-ICWA], the court will have an adequate
factual foundation upon which to make its ICWA finding. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).)’”
(E.C., supra, at p. 157, quoting K.H., supra, at p. 621; accord, Jerry R., supra, at p. 431.)
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights is conditionally
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the court for the limited purpose of ensuring
compliance with the inquiry and documentation provisions set forth in section 224.2 and
California Rules of Court, rule 5.481. If, after determining that a proper, adequate and
duly diligent inquiry was made, the court concludes that ICWA does not apply, the court
shall reinstate its order terminating Mother’s parental rights. If, instead, the court
concludes that ICWA applies, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and Cal-
ICWA.
9 This case, like Dezi C. and our decisions in K.H., E.C., and Jerry R., involves a patently
insufficient inquiry. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1141; K.H., supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at
p. 620; E.C., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 147–148; Jerry, R., supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at pp. 427–
429.)
13.
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