In re G.C. CA4/1

CourtListener 10298412Calctapp20.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/20/24 In re G.C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re G.C., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D084591
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J521416)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

L.C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Alexander Calero, Judge. Conditionally affirmed and remanded with
directions.
Caitlin E. Howard, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Natasha C. Edwards, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
L.C. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and
dispositional orders regarding her infant child, G.C. At the detention hearing

on May 2024,1 the juvenile court exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction
under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA; Fam. Code,2 § 3400 et seq.). The parties do not dispute that the
juvenile court acted properly in doing so.
Two months later, at the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the court asserted permanent subject matter jurisdiction over G.C., found the
dependency petition true, removed custody from Mother, placed G.C. with a
relative in San Diego, and ordered supervised visitation and reunification
services for Mother. On appeal, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in
asserting permanent subject matter jurisdiction because it failed to provide
proper UCCJEA notice to the court in Mexico and an opportunity for it to
assume jurisdiction.
We conclude that neither California nor Mexico has “home state”
jurisdiction (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1)) and only Mexico has “significant connection”
jurisdiction (id., subd. (a)(2)). However, the record is unclear whether Mexico
has declined to exercise jurisdiction after proper notice (id., subd. (a)(3).)
Accordingly, we conditionally affirm the jurisdictional and dispositional
orders and remand for further proceedings on the UCCJEA jurisdictional
issue with directions to void these orders if Mexico assumes jurisdiction after
proper notice.

1 All undesignated date references are to 2024.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.

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FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Background Facts
Shortly after Mother gave birth to G.C. in April 2024, she and G.C.
tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother also admitted to using the
drug throughout her pregnancy.
Although Mother gave birth in California, she and G.C.’s father, A.L.

(Father),3 lived in Mexico. Father reported that he is in a relationship with
Mother, that they have three other children in their care, and that he is not
allowed into the United States. He denied current drug use and explained
that he received treatment after a prior dependency case in Mexico that
ended with family reunification.
Mother confirmed a prior dependency case in Mexico that ended in
family reunification. The paternal aunt, who cared for the children during
the prior dependency, also confirmed the prior dependency case followed by
reunification. The aunt confirmed the parents “have always been in a
relationship.” She explained that G.C.’s siblings remain in Father’s care in
Mexico and, while there were some issues with hygiene and proper sleeping
arrangements, the siblings were fine. She reported visiting them often. The
social worker reportedly attempted to contact Mexico’s child protective
services, but the record contains little information about her efforts.
During Mother’s first contact with the social worker, she was provided
with resources and information on how to obtain services in the United

3 Both Mother and Father confirmed to the social worker that Father is
G.C.’s biological father. Nevertheless, because Father has not provided a
paternity test, he remains the “alleged” Father. He is not a party to this
appeal.

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States. Mother visited with G.C. at the hospital and bonded with him by
touching him, talking to him, and kissing him. She was loving, caring, and
appropriate during her visits. Father expressed interest in having G.C.
placed under his care and informed the social worker that he had supplies for
G.C. Instead, the Agency placed G.C. with a paternal cousin living in the
United States.
B. The Agency’s Petition and the Detention Hearing
In May 2024, the San Diego County Health and Human Services
Agency (Agency) filed a petition on behalf of G.C. alleging that he was within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b)(1) because he tested positive for amphetamine
and methamphetamine at birth. Mother also tested positive for
methamphetamine and admitted using drugs during her pregnancy.
Additionally, Father had a history of substance abuse and failed to stop
Mother’s drug usage during her pregnancy, which resulted in a substantial
risk that G.C. would suffer serious physical harm or illness.
At the detention hearing, the juvenile court stated that it was
“exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction[ ] pending its UCCJEA inquiry
with the courts” in Mexico. The court then found that there was a prima
facie case that G.C. was a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code
section 300, subdivision (b), and detained him out of his parents’ care and
ordered supervised visitation for the parents.
C. The Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
At the initial jurisdiction and disposition hearing in June 2024, the
juvenile court addressed possible UCCJEA issues by noting that it had
“inquired with the appropriate court” in Mexico and relayed it had not yet

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received a response. There is no documentation about these efforts or contact
in the record.
Mother reported challenges with transportation, finding a job, and
learning that she was ineligible to receive Medi-Cal benefits. Because Father
expressed interest in reunification, the Agency submitted a referral to
Mexico’s child protective services requesting voluntary services for Father.
In July 2024, when G.C. was two months old, the juvenile court held a
contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing. The court addressed the
jurisdictional issue presented by the UCCJEA. It stated:
“With regard to the UCCJEA, at the end of May I reached out to
the appropriate [c]ourt in Rosarito asking them to respond by
June 3rd if they had any cases or files. They did not respond. I
assume that they do not have any cases or files, and if I make a
true finding on the petition today, I am prepared to assume
jurisdiction.”

Mother appeared at the hearing telephonically. Her counsel noted
visitation was difficult because it was “a multi-national case and getting
across the border is extremely difficult for members of the family.” The court
sustained the petition, declared G.C. a dependent, and ordered visitation and
reunification services for Mother.
DISCUSSION
A. Relevant Legal Principles
“It is well settled in California that the UCCJEA is ‘the exclusive
method of determining the proper forum in custody disputes involving other
jurisdictions.’ ” (Segal v. Fishbein (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 692, 702; In re A.C.
(2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668.) One primary purpose of the UCCJEA is
“ ‘ “to encourage states to respect and enforce the prior custody
determinations of other states, as well as to avoid competing jurisdiction and

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conflicting decisions.” ’ ” (Segal v. Fishbein, at p. 702.) To that end, the
UCCJEA “takes a strict ‘ “first in time” ’ approach to jurisdiction.” (Id. at
p. 703; In re Marriage of Fernandez-Abin & Sanchez (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th
1015, 1040.) “The general rule of the UCCJEA, subject to certain delineated
exceptions, is that once the court of an appropriate state—that is, one having
jurisdiction under its terms—has made an initial child custody
determination, that court obtains exclusive, continuing subject matter
jurisdiction over the child.” (A.H. v. Superior Court (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th

504, 523.)4 Foreign countries are treated as states for the purpose of
determining jurisdiction. (§ 3405, subd. (a).)
“ ‘ “[A] court ‘has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody
determination’ if it is the child’s home state.” ’ ” (Segal v. Fishbein, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 703, fn. 6, quoting § 3421, subd. (a)(1).) As relevant here,
“[i]n the case of a child less than six months of age, the term [‘home state’]
means the state in which the child lived from birth with [a parent or a person
acting as a parent].” (§ 3402, subd. (g).) “ ‘Person acting as a parent’ ” is “a
person, other than a parent, who: (1) has physical custody of the child or has
had physical custody for a period of six consecutive months, including any
temporary absence, within one year immediately before the commencement
of a child custody proceeding; and (2) has been awarded legal custody by a

4 A “ ‘ “[c]hild custody determination” means a judgment, decree, or other
order of a court providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation
with respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial,
and modification order. The term does not include an order relating to child
support or other monetary obligation of an individual.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Initial
determination” means the first child custody determination concerning a
particular child.’ ” (A.H. v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 523.)

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court or claims a right to legal custody under the law of this state.” (§ 3402,
subd. (m).)

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A court can alternatively exercise UCCJEA jurisdiction under a
“significant connection” provision where (1) a court of another state does not
have home state jurisdiction “or a court of the home state of the child has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more
appropriate forum . . .” and (2) both of the following are true: “(A) The child
and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting
as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere
physical presence. [¶] (B) Substantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.”

(§ 3421, subd. (a)(2); see In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 668.)5
“When a California court asserting temporary emergency jurisdiction is
aware that a child custody determination has been made by another
jurisdiction, the California court ‘shall immediately communicate with the
other court.’ (§ 3424, subd. (d).) ‘To make an appropriate order under the
[UCCJEA], the California court needs to know whether the sister state court
wishes to continue its jurisdiction and how much time it requires to take
appropriate steps to consider further child custody orders.’ [Citations.] ‘The
court may allow the parties to participate in the communication. If the
parties are not able to participate in the communication, they must be given
the opportunity to present facts and legal arguments before a decision on
jurisdiction is made.’ (§ 3410, subd. (b).)” (In re Cristian I. (2014)

5 The two other alternative bases for a California court to make an initial
child custody determination are where: “All courts having jurisdiction under
paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that
a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child” and “[n]o court of any other state would have jurisdiction under
the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2) or (3).” (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3), (a)(4);
see In re A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at pp. 668–669.)

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224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097–1098.)
We are not bound by the juvenile court’s findings regarding subject
matter jurisdiction but independently reweigh the jurisdictional facts. (In re
A.C. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 854, 860.) Failure to comply with the procedural
requirements of the UCCJEA is subject to harmless error analysis. (Cristian
I., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1102–1103.) The appellant must show it is
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to her would have been
reached in the absence of the error. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836; In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 717–718 [harmless error test set
forth in Watson applies to UCCJEA procedural error].)
B. Analysis
There is no dispute that the juvenile court properly exercised
temporary emergency jurisdiction. (§ 3424, subd. (a).) The parties, however,
dispute whether the court properly exercised permanent subject matter
jurisdiction.
1. Mother did not forfeit her jurisdictional argument.
The Agency first argues that Mother forfeited her UCCJEA
jurisdictional argument because she did not raise it below. We disagree.
Although intended to encourage parties to bring errors to the court’s
attention so that they may be corrected, “application of the forfeiture rule is
not automatic.” (In re S.B. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293.) Here, the UCCJEA
issue was before the court, it made some form of UCCJEA inquiry, and it
assumed permanent jurisdiction based on the Mexico court’s failure to
respond. Although Mother’s trial counsel could have done more to object to
the court’s assertion of jurisdiction, the UCCJEA imposes independent
obligations on the court “even without proactive advocacy by litigants.” (In re
L.C. (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 728, 738 [forfeiture doctrine did not bar mother’s

9
challenge to juvenile court’s compliance with UCCJEA even though she failed
to object on this ground in lower court].)
Applying the forfeiture doctrine in these circumstances would not serve
the purpose of UCCJEA. “[T]he comity-driven purpose of the UCCJEA is to
avoid jurisdictional conflict between states, promote interstate cooperation,
litigate custody where the children and family have the closest connections,
avoid relitigation of another state’s custody decisions, and facilitate
enforcement of another state’s custody decrees. [Citation]” (In re L.C., supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 738–739.) Both the goals of the UCCJEA and the
overall statutory scheme would be frustrated by the application of the
forfeiture doctrine here. (Id. at p. 739.)
Although the Agency directs us to In re J.W. (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 347,
the UCCJEA jurisdictional issue there was not raised or addressed by the
parents, San Bernadino county’s child and family services or the court at the
detention hearing or the jurisdiction and disposition hearing. (Id. at pp. 353–
355.) The issue was not raised until the appeal after the 366.26 hearing
concluded and parental rights were terminated. (Id. at pp. 355, 367 [“the
UCCJEA does not require that a parent . . . should be allowed to silently
accede to jurisdiction, or neglect to raise it, for years while parental fitness is
adjudicated, only to assert a lack of jurisdiction for the first time after a
termination order”].) Here, by contrast, the court was aware of the issue
when the case began and addressed it at the detention hearing and
subsequent hearings, including the jurisdiction and disposition hearing.
Moreover, the matter is still at an early stage and the case is ongoing in the
juvenile court.
In these circumstances, the controlling authority is In re L.C., supra, 90
Cal.App.5th at pp. 737–739 [finding no forfeiture and concluding that In re

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J.W. failed to consider several reasons “why the forfeiture doctrine should not
apply to the UCCJEA issue”—“chief among them the purpose of forfeiture
rules generally, the comity-drive purpose of the UCCJEA, and the
comprehensive statutory scheme that our Legislature enacted when adopting
the UCCJEA”].) We therefore conclude that Mother did not forfeit the
UCCJEA jurisdictional issue.
2. Neither Mexico nor California is the home state.
A court may make exercise permanent subject matter jurisdiction if it
is the child’s home state. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(1).) Because G.C. was less than
six months old at the time his dependency petition was filed, his home state
is the state he lived from birth with a parent or person acting as a parent.
(§ 3402, subd. (g).)
Because G.C. has never lived in Mexico, it is not his home state under
the statute. (In re R.L. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 125, 140 [“Because [the child]
never lived in Mexico, Mexico does not have home state jurisdiction.”].)
Additionally, California is not his home state because neither of his parents
have lived with him from birth in California. (§ 3402, subd. (g).) At the time
G.C. was born, his parents lived in Mexico. Although Mother traveled to
California for his birth, she returned to Mexico afterward. His Father lives
and works in Mexico and is unable to cross the border.
Moreover, G.C. has not lived in California with a “[p]erson acting as a
parent,” as defined the statute. (§ 3402, subd. (m).) G.C.’s brief hospital stay
following birth and the Agency’s protective custody since it filed the petition
do not make California his home state. (In re R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th 125,
138–140.) On this point, In re R.L., is instructive. (Ibid.) There, the mother
alternated living between Nevada and Mexico, but primarily lived in Mexico
in the months before the child was born. (Id. at pp. 138–140.) She traveled

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to California to deliver the baby and the child was detained after the baby
tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine. (Id. at p. 132.) The
Court of Appeal explained that neither Mexico nor California was the home
state. (Id. at p. 140.) “[A] temporary hospital stay in a state incident to
birth, by itself, is insufficient to confer home state jurisdiction.” (Id. at
p. 139.) Moreover, “a social services agency does not become ‘a person acting
as a parent’ for purposes of home state jurisdiction by detaining a child in
protective custody in an emergency.” (Id. at p. 131.) Under the statute, a
person “acting as a parent” must have physical custody of the child or have
had physical custody of the child for six months “within one year immediately
before the commencement of a child custody proceeding.” (Id. at p. 140, citing
§ 3402, subd. (m), italics added..) As in A.L., because “the Agency did not
have physical custody of [the child] immediately before it initiated the
dependency action,” the California court cannot assume home state
jurisdiction. (Id. at pp. 139–140.)
Here, similar to In re R.L., G.C.’s home state is neither Mexico nor
California.
3. Mexico, not California, has a significant connection.

Even though G.C’s home state is neither Mexico nor California, section
3421 subdivision (a)(2) allows a court to exercise jurisdiction under its
“significant connection provision.” (In re. R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at
p. 140.) As noted, the requirements of this provision include that “[t]he child
and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting
as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere
physical presence” and “[s]ubstantial evidence is available in this state
concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.”
(§ 3421, subd. (a)(2).)

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Here, neither of G.C.’s parents have a significant connection to
California that satisfies this provision. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(A); In re R.L.,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at p. 140.) Father cannot enter the United States and is
a resident of Mexico. While Mother entered the United States to give birth,
she returned to Mexico afterward and remained there as the dependency
proceedings proceeded. In addition, because Mother did not live in
California, she could not access reunification services there. Because the
requirements of subsection (a)(2) were not established, the juvenile court did
not have subject matter jurisdiction under this subdivision. (See Brown v.
Brown (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 358, 365–366 [holding that there was “no basis
for California jurisdiction” because “[n]either her birth here nor her
involuntary presence during the dependency proceedings establishes a
significant connection with California” and “[h]er parents do not live here.”].)
Mexico, on the other hand, has a significant connection with both
parents and, because the family had a prior dependency case there, it has
substantial evidence concerning the care and protection the parents provide
their children, as well as the parents’ training, and personal relationships.
The paternal aunt, who has custody of one of G.C.’s siblings, resides in
Mexico and participated in the prior dependency action as a caregiver to two
other siblings. The maternal grandparents and a maternal aunt and uncle
also reside in Mexico. Father was employed in Mexico and Mother sought
employment in Mexico. Even though he was a newborn, G.C.’s significant
community, familial, social, and cultural ties are all in Mexico. (Compare
Brown, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at 365–366 [holding that there was a
“significant connection” with Austria where the “minor’s best interest and
significant contacts are clearly in Austria, not California”] with In re R.L.,
supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at 141, 145 [Mexico did not have jurisdiction where the

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mother’s “stay in Mexico was tenuous,” the alleged father “did not express an
interest in paternity until [the child] was more than a year old,” and his
relatives were unwilling to care for the child “until paternity was established”
and they “had reason to doubt” his paternity.].)
We conclude that only Mexico had subject matter jurisdiction under the
“significant connection” provision of the UCCJEA at the time G.C.’s
dependency petition was filed. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(2)(A).)
4. It is not clear whether Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction.
In these circumstances, the only way for the California juvenile court to
assume jurisdiction was if Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction. (§ 3421
subd. (a)(3); In re Gino C (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th at 959 (In re Gino C.).) But
the record here is missing any evidence that the court in Mexico actually
declined to exercise jurisdiction. There is no evidence that the juvenile court
notified the court in Mexico of the nature of the dependency proceedings or
inquired as to whether Mexico wanted to exercise jurisdiction.
On the contrary, the record merely establishes that the juvenile court
reached out to the court in Mexico “asking them to respond by June 3rd if
they had any cases or files. They did not respond. I assume that they do not
have any cases or files, and if I make a true finding on the petition today, I
am prepared to assume jurisdiction.” There is nothing to indicate if the
court’s contact was by phone, email or in writing and it did not provide the
specifics of the request other than to ask whether the Mexico court “had any
cases or files.” Specifically, there is no evidence that the juvenile court’s
notice inquired whether Mexico wished to assert jurisdiction. (See In re L.C.,
supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 737, fn. 4 [“A court exercising emergency
jurisdiction under section 3424 is required to contact and provide notice to
another state’s court to determine whether the other state wishes to assert

14
jurisdiction under section 3421.”].) Because the record is insufficient to
determine whether the court’s attempted contact sufficiently complies with
the requirements of the UCCJEA (In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
1088, 1099), we will remand with directions to the court to make that
determination and, if Mexico has not been provided adequate notice, to
provide proper notice and an opportunity for Mexico to assume jurisdiction.
(In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, 599–600.)
Our approach is similar to the approach taken by this court in In re
A.M., where there was “nothing in the record to indicate that this court ever
contacted a Mexican court.” (In re A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 598.)
The court there affirmed the juvenile court’s jurisdictional and dispositional
orders but remanded for the limited purpose of contacting and providing
notice to Mexican authorities to determine whether Mexico wished to assume
jurisdiction, and if so, to void the jurisdictional and dispositional orders. (Id.
at pp. 599–600.); see also In re Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 966
[remanded to the juvenile court to conduct further proceedings where “the
only apparent avenue for the court to obtain home state jurisdiction over the
children is for Mexico to decline to exercise its home state jurisdiction.
(§ 3421, subd (a)(3).) Since the court opted to remain passive and did not
contact Mexico, Mexico has not been given an opportunity to decide whether
to exercise its home state jurisdiction.”]; In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th
1166, 1176 [remanded to the juvenile court to determine whether it could
“assert continuing jurisdiction” where the “record is unclear whether the
juvenile court attempted to communicate with the Saudi Arabian court at
any time before or after the jurisdictional hearing”].)

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5. Failure to give proper notification is not harmless.
“Failure to comply with the procedural requirements of the UCCJEA is
subject to harmless error analysis.” (In re. R.L., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th at
p. 143.) Mother must demonstrate that it is reasonably probable that a result
more favorable to her would have been reached in the absence of the error.
(Ibid.)
As discussed, with the current record before us, it is not possible to tell
whether the juvenile court erred in exercising permanent subject matter
jurisdiction. There is at least a reasonable probability the Mexico courts
would assume jurisdiction, especially in light of the prior dependency
proceeding in Mexico involving G.C.’s siblings who still live there. If forced to
litigate the dependency action in California, rather than Mexico where she
and her family live, Mother would be at a significant disadvantage in terms
of successful reunification. (Christopher D. v. Superior Court (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 60, 69.) Thus, the improper exercise of jurisdiction would
amount to a prejudicial error in contravention of the “law’s strong preference
for maintaining the family relationship if at all possible.” (In re Rebecca H.
(1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 825, 843.)
DISPOSITION
The jurisdictional and dispositional orders are conditionally affirmed
and the matter is remanded to the juvenile court for the purpose of (1)
determining whether notice to Mexico was proper; (2) if so, determining
whether Mexico declined to exercise jurisdiction; (3) if not, providing proper
notice to Mexico and an opportunity for it to assume jurisdiction; (4) if Mexico
assumes jurisdiction and commences proceedings, proceeding in conformity
with the UCCJEA and voiding the jurisdictional and dispositional orders; and

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(5) if Mexico declines or has already declined to assume jurisdiction after
proper notice, assuming permanent jurisdiction under section 3421,
subdivision (a)(3) and proceeding accordingly.

BUCHANAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

O'ROURKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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