CourtListener 10297395•People v. Emanuel CA6
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/19/24 P. v. Emanuel CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H049190
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C1246799)
v.
LOUIS SANCHEZ EMANUEL,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2015, a jury convicted Louis Sanchez Emanuel and his codefendant, Jacob
Craig Whitley, of first degree felony murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a))1 and the trial
court sentenced Emanuel to a term of 25 years to life. On direct appeal, another panel of
this court reversed Emanuel’s sentence and remanded the matter for the trial court to
exercise its discretion, specifically to consider whether to instead impose probation with a
jail term in excess of one year. (People v. Whitley et al. (Nov. 22, 2019, H043651)
[nonpub. opn.], p. 72 (Whitley).) On remand, after rejecting Emanuel’s challenge to his
sentence as constituting cruel and unusual punishment under the state and federal
constitutions, the trial court elected not to impose probation and confirmed that the
original sentence of 25 years to life remained in place.
1
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
On appeal, Emanuel renews his challenge to his sentence as violating the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California
Constitution.
As we explain below, we disagree that Emanuel’s sentence amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment and will affirm the judgment.2
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. Procedure relating to underlying trial
“On April 15, 2015, the Santa Clara County District Attorney filed a second
amended information charging Emanuel and Whitley with one count of first degree
2
We note that Emanuel also devotes a considerable portion of his briefing to
contesting the trial court’s finding, made following an evidentiary hearing on Emanuel’s
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6, that he was a major participant in the
offense and acted with reckless indifference to human life. In a separate appeal, this
court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Emanuel’s section 1172.6 petition,
concluding that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings. (People v.
Emanuel (May 12, 2023, H049147) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Sept. 13, 2023,
S280551 (Emanuel).) As that decision is currently on review before the California
Supreme Court, we lack jurisdiction to address the question and will not discuss it further
herein, except to the extent that the underlying facts inform an analysis of whether
Emanuel’s punishment is disproportionate to his individual culpability.
3
This court granted Emanuel’s request for judicial notice of the trial record and
this court’s opinion in Emanuel’s direct appeal, i.e., Whitley, supra, H043651, as well as
the records in Emanuel’s separate appeal from the trial court’s denial of his petition for
resentencing in Emanuel.
Both parties here rely on the record from Whitley for a description of the
underlying facts and that record also formed the basis for our factual recitation in
Emanuel. We therefore quote at length from Emanuel, as permitted by California Rules
of Court, rule 8.1115(b)(1), “to explain the factual background of the case and not as
legal authority. [Citation.]” (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. City and County of San
Francisco (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 897, 907, fn. 10.)
We derive our recitation of the procedural history from the record in the instant
case, as well as the records in Whitley and Emanuel, where appropriate.
2
murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count 1).[4] After a trial, a jury convicted both men of first
degree felony murder and found true the allegations that Whitley personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm causing death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). In a bifurcated
proceeding, the trial court found true Whitley’s prior strike conviction and prior serious
felony conviction allegations. The trial court sentenced Emanuel to 25 years to life in
prison.[5]” (Emanuel, supra, H049147, rev.gr. at p. 2.)
B. Facts from the underlying trial
“1. The prosecution case
“Mansour Amini and John Cody S.[6] were friends who exercised and smoked
marijuana together. Cody also sold marijuana to Amini numerous times.
“About two weeks before Cody was shot, Amini was at the community college he
attended, when Emanuel and Whitley approached him. Amini had never seen either man
before.[7] After initially saying they were thinking of enrolling, Emanuel told Amini they
were looking to purchase a pound of marijuana. Amini said he could get that for them,
but it would take a couple of weeks. Amini exchanged phone numbers with Emanuel.
“Emanuel called Amini frequently over the next few days asking about the
marijuana. Amini contacted several people who he thought might be able to supply a
4
“The operative information further alleged that Whitley personally used a firearm
in the commission of the offense, resulting in the victim’s death, and also that Whitley
had a prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and a prior serious felony
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)).”
5
“The trial court sentenced Whitley to a total term of 80 years to life.”
6
“To protect the victim’s privacy, we first refer to him by his given name and the
first initial of his surname. In the rest of the opinion, we refer to the victim as Cody, the
name used to identify him at trial. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4).)”
7
“Whitley told Amini his name was ‘Louis’ although that was Emanuel’s first
name, and also that Emanuel was his ‘cousin.’ ”
3
pound of marijuana and ultimately Cody said he could get that much for Amini. Cody
said that Amini would receive $200 for brokering the deal.
“Amini and Cody met with Emanuel and Whitley at a restaurant to discuss the
deal. Amini and Cody showed Emanuel and Whitley a sample of the marijuana.
Emanuel took a photo of the sample and said he and Whitley planned to ship the pound
of marijuana to their uncle in Las Vegas.
“Emanuel offered to pay either $2,200 or $2,600 for the marijuana. Amini knew
‘there was something wrong’ because a pound of marijuana sold for around $1,800.
Amini and Cody were ‘confused’ by the offered price, and Amini ‘didn’t have a good
feeling at that time’ about the situation.
“Two or three days later, Amini and Cody met with Emanuel and Whitley at the
restaurant again. Emanuel and Whitley got into Cody’s truck and drove with him and
Amini to Cody’s supplier’s house to pick up the marijuana. When they arrived, Emanuel
and Whitley said they did not have the money for the marijuana.
“Emanuel and Whitley asked which house belonged to the supplier, but Cody said
the supplier would not meet with them unless they had the money. The men agreed to
meet the following day, December 11, at a park to complete the deal.
“On the morning of December 11, Amini and Cody exchanged numerous texts,
including several angry messages from Amini when it appeared that Cody was backing
out of the deal. Amini received a call from Emanuel and Whitley as well as text
messages about doing the deal.
“Cody picked up Amini, and they drove in Cody’s truck to the park, arriving
around 2:30 p.m. While in the truck, Cody showed Amini the pound of marijuana,
packaged in a plastic bag inside a ‘Vans’ shoebox. Amini called Emanuel’s phone and
spoke to Whitley, who said they were on their way and were around the corner.
4
“While Amini and Cody were waiting in the truck, they started to argue about
when they would smoke marijuana after finishing the deal. Cody suddenly threw
Amini’s gym bag out of the truck, spilling Amini’s marijuana stash. Amini and Cody got
out of the truck, and after Cody ‘got in [Amini’s] face’ for about a minute, Cody got in
his truck and drove away.
“Amini believed Cody was trying to cut him out of the marijuana deal. Amini
called and sent multiple text messages to Cody inquiring about his whereabouts and the
$200 he was owed for the deal. Amini also texted and called Emanuel, but there was no
response.[8]
“Between 3:00 and 3:20 p.m., a witness heard what she thought was a gunshot,
followed by the screeching of tires, and she saw Cody’s truck traveling at high speed
from one side of the street to the other. Cody ‘fell out and rolled down the street and
landed in the gutter’ before the truck collided with a tree. Another witness came out of
her house after hearing screeching tires followed by a loud noise and thought there had
been a car accident. She saw Cody’s truck on the sidewalk against a tree and Cody face
down on the ground, not moving. The witness called 911 and told Cody that she had
summoned help. Cody was ‘moaning,’ but not using words.
“The forensic pathologist testified that Cody died at the scene from a close-range[9]
gunshot wound to the right side of his neck that perforated his carotid artery. Cody also
had multiple blunt force injuries on his body, including an abrasion on his left forehead
and other abrasions and lacerations on his head consistent with being struck by a solid
blunt object. Cody would have lost consciousness within minutes of being shot.
8
“Cody texted Emanuel’s phone at 2:37 p.m., saying he was ‘at the park right now
with it. We do this without this fool [Amini]. I’ll get you for 21 instead of 22.’ ”
9
“Based on the gunpowder stippling on Cody’s face, the barrel of the gun was
within three feet of his face when it was fired.”
5
“Responding officers found blood in the vehicle as well as on the right front tire,
wheel well, and front bumper. An accident reconstruction expert opined that, after falling
out of the truck, Cody’s body was caught underneath it and dragged until it came to rest
against the curb. Inside the truck, officers found an unusable amount of marijuana as
well as an empty shoebox with the brand name ‘Supra.’[10]
“Around the time of the crime, Emanuel had an ‘on and off’ relationship with
Breanna Santos. Santos testified that she recalled being interviewed by police at least
twice about the events surrounding the murder in December 2012. Santos, however,
repeatedly claimed she could not recall what she said to police or anything that occurred
the day of the shooting. Following a hearing outside the presence of the jury, the trial
court found that Santos’s inability to recall was disingenuous and her testimony was
‘evasive to say the least.’ The trial court then permitted one of the officers who
interviewed Santos, San Jose Police Sergeant Stewart Davies, to testify about her
statements during those interviews.
“Sergeant Davies testified that he interviewed Santos twice, once on December 12,
2012 and again on December 14, 2012. Santos initiated the December 12 interview by
calling the police and voluntarily showing up at the police station. Santos explained she
wanted to talk to the police because a phone registered in her name had been used by
Whitley to ‘set something up’ and the ‘text messages . . . would cause the police to come
looking for her.’
“During the December 12 interview, Santos told police that, on December 11 (the
day of Cody’s death), Santos returned to Emanuel’s house to pick up their son around
4:00 p.m. Emanuel and Whitley were both there and Santos asked Whitley to return the
phone. Whitley told her he had ‘shot a white boy’ at a park, repeating ‘ “I shot him” ’
10
“During his testimony, Amini was shown a picture of this shoebox and denied
seeing it in Cody’s truck that day.”
6
three times. According to Santos, Emanuel confirmed that Whitley was telling the truth
and had shot somebody.
“Police asked Santos to return for a second interview on December 14. Based on
their investigation, the officers believed that Santos had lied about Emanuel not being
present at the shooting. At the December 14 interview, the police confronted Santos with
phone records, and she admitted that Emanuel had her phone on December 11 and had
not loaned it to Whitley on that day. She also said that Emanuel suggested telling police
the story about Whitley having the phone.
“Sergeant Davies testified further that, during the December 14 interview, Santos
said she returned to Emanuel’s house around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. When she arrived,
Whitley and Emanuel were in Emanuel’s room and Whitley said, ‘ “I shot him. I shot
him.” ’ Emanuel told Santos ‘ “[Whitley] did shoot him,” ’ and the shooting happened at
the park. Santos asked Emanuel what happened, and Emanuel replied, ‘ “[Whitley] just
shot him and then we came home.” ’ Emanuel also said ‘ “[t]hat shit was crazy.” ’
“When Santos asked Whitley why he shot the person, Whitley replied, ‘ “I don’t
know. I don’t know. I shot him.” ’ Emanuel told Santos that Whitley ‘ “had set
something up to meet a guy at Cherry Park . . . to get some weed.” ’ When Cody refused
to give them the marijuana, Emanuel told Santos he told Whitley, ‘ “let’s go,” ’ but
Whitley would not walk away. Whitley hit Cody with the gun to get him to let go of the
marijuana, and Cody started fighting back. Emanuel told Santos that ‘ “[Whitley] said he
[was] pointing the gun down, he was trying to aim down, but the guy hit his hand, it went
up and [Whitley] pulled the trigger and he said he shot him in his neck.” ’
“Emanuel told Santos that he asked Whitley, ‘ “What the fuck you doing?” ’ After
the gun went off, Emanuel ‘started panicking,’ and he and Whitley went to Emanuel’s
house. When Santos ‘started panicking’ about Whitley’s and Emanuel’s use of the phone
7
that was in her name, Emanuel ‘ “started crying and saying that, ‘I didn’t do nothing,
though. I didn’t do nothing.’ ” ’
“Sergeant Davies testified Santos told the police that Emanuel and Whitley said
‘ “they got rid of the phone” ’ and suggested that Santos ‘ “report the phone lost.” ’
Santos told the police that Emanuel had had long dreadlocks when she dropped off their
son with him that day, but when she returned that afternoon, he had cut off his
dreadlocks.
“Destinee Kindle testified that she was Whitley’s ‘[o]n, off’ girlfriend in
December 2012. On the evening of December 11, Whitley called Kindle and asked her
to pick him up at Emanuel’s house. Whitley told Kindle that he and Emanuel were
involved in a shooting and showed her a news story about the shooting. Whitley
explained that he was trying to rob someone of marijuana, and accidentally shot him in
the neck though he intended to shoot him in the foot. Whitley told Kindle that Emanuel
was with him when the shooting took place.
“Police interviewed Kindle on December 14, after Whitley was arrested at her
house. On cross-examination, Kindle admitted that when police told her Whitley had
shot someone, she pretended to be surprised by that because she ‘didn’t want to believe it
[to be true].’ Kindle told police that Whitley had not talked to her about the shooting.
“2. The defense case
“Whitley did not present any witnesses. Emanuel presented three witnesses but
their trial testimony was not relevant to the issues addressed in the petition for
resentencing, i.e., whether he was a major participant in the offense and acted with
reckless disregard for human life.[11]” (Emanuel, supra, H049147, rev.gr. at pp. 2–8.)
11
“Emanuel presented an expert in social psychology and psychological factors
related to police interrogation techniques, a police detective who testified about Amini’s
(continued)
8
C. Direct appeal and proceedings on remand for resentencing
On direct appeal from his conviction, Emanuel raised multiple claims of error,
including that “the trial court erroneously denied Emanuel’s request for probation with a
multi-year jail term based on a mistaken belief about the relevant law; and [] Emanuel’s
sentence of 25 years to life is grossly disproportionate to his individual culpability and
thus violates state and federal prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment.” (Whitley,
supra, H043651 at p. 11.) Another panel of this court rejected Emanuel’s other claims of
error but concluded that the trial court “misunderstood the scope of its [sentencing]
discretion under [People v.] Bailey [(1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 828]” and therefore reversed
and remanded the matter for the trial court to “consider whether to exercise its discretion
under Bailey to impose probation with a jail term that may exceed one year or 25 years to
life in prison.” (Whitley, supra, H043651at pp. 70, 72.) The Whitley court expressly
stated that, because it was reversing Emanuel’s sentence, it was not addressing his claim
that his sentence of “25 years to life is grossly disproportionate to his individual
culpability and thus violates state and federal prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment.” (Id. at p. 72, fn. 33.)
On remand, Emanuel’s supplemental sentencing memorandum argued that his
sentence of 25 years to life violated the state and federal constitutional prohibitions
against cruel and unusual punishment. The prosecutor responded that Emanuel’s cruel
and unusual punishment claim exceeded the scope of this court’s remand in Whitley and
was forfeited as it was not raised at Emanuel’s initial sentencing. In addition, the
prosecutor argued that the claim lacked substantive merit given the circumstances of the
murder.
identification of Emanuel, and Emanuel’s mother, who testified he was home at the time
of the shooting.”
9
On April 5, 2021, the trial court conducted the hearing on remand. In that hearing,
the trial court stated that it would deny Emanuel’s claim that a sentence of 25 years to life
was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishment regardless of whether that claim
was beyond the scope of the remand. After going over the various factors that would
militate in favor of and those that would militate against granting probation, the court
denied probation and ruled that “[t]he original sentence would remain.”
Emanuel timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
Emanuel argues that his sentence of 25 years to life is disproportionate to his
individual culpability for Cody’s death and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment
under the Eighth Amendment of the federal Constitution and article I, section 17, of the
California Constitution. As explained below, we disagree.
A. Forfeiture
We first address the question, raised by Emanuel in his opening brief, whether he
has forfeited his constitutional argument by failing to raise it at his initial sentencing, and
his associated argument that, if we find this claim forfeited, his trial counsel provided
constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Attorney General, in his briefing, does not
maintain that Emanuel has forfeited his cruel and unusual punishment argument.
Because we use our discretion to resolve Emanuel’s claim on the merits, we need not and
will not address the issue of forfeiture and therefore also need not address the issue of
ineffective assistance of Emanuel’s trial counsel. (People v. Urbano (2005) 128
Cal.App.4th 396, 404.)
B. Beyond the scope of the remand
The Attorney General argues Emanuel’s claim is not cognizable on appeal because
it exceeded the scope of the remand set forth in Whitley. The court in Whitley did not
direct the trial court to conduct a full resentencing of Emanuel. Instead, the court
10
remanded the matter after concluding that the trial court “misunderstood the scope of its
[sentencing] discretion under [People v.] Bailey [(1983) 140 Cal.App.3d 828]….”
(Whitley, supra, H043651 at p. 70.) Accordingly, on remand, the trial court was only
asked to consider whether to exercise its discretion to impose probation with a county jail
term that could exceed one year or let stand the original sentence of 25 years to life. (Id.
at p. 75.)
Emanuel argues that the remand was not restricted to the issue of the trial court’s
discretion to impose probation. He points out that, as to his codefendant, the Whitley
decision stated the following: “[T]he matter is remanded to the trial court for the limited
purpose of exercising its discretion under section 12022.53, subdivision (h), to determine
if Whitley’s firearm enhancement should be stricken in the furtherance of justice. If the
trial court strikes Whitley’s firearm enhancement, it shall resentence Whitley
accordingly. If the court declines to strike the firearm enhancement, the trial court shall
reinstate the original sentence.” (Whitley, supra, H043651 at pp. 75–76.) However, as to
his sentence, the Whitley opinion did not state that remand was for a “limited purpose”
nor did it state that resentencing was predicated on how the trial court ruled on Emanuel’s
request for probation. (Id. at p. 75.)
As noted above, we use our discretion to address Emanuel’s constitutional
challenge to his sentence on the merits and therefore we need not resolve this question.
We will assume without deciding that Emanuel was permitted to raise this challenge on
remand.
C. Applicable law and standard of review
“Cruel and unusual punishment is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
Punishment is cruel and unusual if it is so disproportionate to the crime committed that it
shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity. [Citation.]”
11
(People v. Mantanez (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 354, 358, fns. omitted; see also Ewing v.
California (2003) 538 U.S. 11, 20–23 (Ewing).)
“The Eighth Amendment, which forbids cruel and unusual punishments, contains
a ‘narrow proportionality principle’ that ‘applies to noncapital sentences.’ ” (Ewing,
supra, 538 U.S. at p. 20, quoting Harmelin v. Michigan (1991) 501 U.S. 957, 996–997.)
“ ‘The Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence. Rather, it forbids only extreme sentences that are “grossly disproportionate” to
the crime. [Citations.]’ ” (Ewing, at p. 23.)12
California’s Constitution imposes a similar standard. “[I]n California, a
punishment may violate . . . the Constitution if, although not cruel or unusual in its
method, it is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the
conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.” (In re Lynch (1972) 8
Cal.3d 410, 424, superseded by statute on another ground, fn. omitted.) “The main
technique of analysis under California law is to consider the nature both of the offense
and of the offender. [Citation.] The nature of the offense is viewed both in the abstract
and in the totality of circumstances surrounding its actual commission; the nature of the
offender focuses on the particular person before the court, the inquiry being whether the
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant’s individual culpability, as shown
12
Emanuel concedes that the trial court’s findings that he was a major participant
in the robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life acts to foreclose his
federal Eighth Amendment challenge to his sentence as cruel and unusual. He raises the
matter to preserve it for federal habeas review. As we noted in footnote 2, ante, the
California Supreme Court is currently reviewing our prior opinion in which we concluded
that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s findings on this issue. (Emanuel,
supra, H049147, rev.gr.) We address the underlying facts to the extent necessary to
analyze whether Emanuel’s punishment violates the Eighth Amendment under the
proportionality principle described in Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at pages. 20–23.
12
by such factors as age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind.
[Citation.]” (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 494 (Martinez).)
The California Supreme Court has “distilled three analytical techniques to aid [a
court’s] deferential review of excessiveness claims: (1) an examination of the nature of
the offense and the offender, with particular attention to the degree of danger both pose to
society; (2) a comparison of the punishment with the punishment California imposes for
more serious offenses; and (3) a comparison of the punishment with that prescribed in
other jurisdictions for the same offense. [Citations.]” (In re Palmer (2021) 10 Cal.5th
959, 973 (Palmer).) “Disproportionality need not be established in all three areas.”
(People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 230.) “Whether a punishment is cruel or
unusual is a question of law for the appellate court, but the underlying disputed facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the judgment. [Citations.]” (Martinez, supra, 76
Cal.App.4th at p. 496.)
D. Emanuel’s sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment
In this case, Emanuel’s challenge is based on the first of the three prongs set forth
in Palmer, supra, 10 Cal.5th 959. 13 Citing People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441
13
Emanuel does not provide us with any information regarding the second or third
analytical prongs for evaluating whether a particular sentence is unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual, i.e., “a comparison of the punishment with the punishment California
imposes for more serious offenses[,]” and “a comparison of the punishment with that
prescribed in other jurisdictions for the same offense. [Citations.]” (Palmer, supra, 10
Cal.5th at p. 973.) As to the second prong, there is no more serious offense under
California law than first degree murder and, aside from premeditated first degree murder,
there is nothing against which Emanuel can compare his punishment. (See, e.g., People
v. Brown (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 461, 478 [“ ‘murder has always been recognized as the
most serious of crimes’ ”]; Williams v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 584, 593
[“murder [is] . . . one of the most serious offenses even when special circumstances are
not alleged”].) As to the third prong, even if Emanuel had cited case authority or statutes
which showed that other states would have imposed a more lenient sentence for the same
crime, this would not mandate reversal. “This state constitutional consideration does not
(continued)
13
(Dillon) and Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782 (Enmund), Emanuel argues that his
sentence is disproportionate to his individual culpability. He was not the person who shot
Cody, nor was there any evidence he possessed a weapon or even knew that Whitley was
carrying a firearm before Whitley pulled it out. In addition, the evidence showed that
Emanuel attempted to persuade Whitley to walk away when Cody refused to give up his
marijuana, telling Whitley, “ ‘[L]et’s go.’ ” (Emanuel, supra, H049147, rev.gr. at p. 6.)
We think both Dillon and Enmund are inapposite to this case. The defendant in
Dillon was “an unusually immature youth” of 17 when he committed the underlying
offense for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment. (Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at
pp. 451, 487–488.) The California Supreme Court concluded that, due in large part to the
defendant’s age and immaturity, this sentence violated the California constitution’s
prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17). (Dillon, supra,
at p. 489.) It is well-established that the law imposes more restrictions on the punishment
that may be meted out to juveniles than to adults. (See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama (2012)
567 U.S. 460, 471–472 (Miller) [recognizing that “children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of sentencing” due to diminished capacity and greater prospects
for reform].) Unlike the defendant in Dillon, Emanuel was not a juvenile.
Enmund, supra, 458 U.S. 782, is distinguishable in that the defendant in that case,
a getaway driver for a planned robbery, was sentenced to death. (Id. at p. 785.) The U.S.
Supreme Court noted that, under Florida law, it was “irrelevant … [that the defendant]
did not himself kill and was not present at the killings; also beside the point was whether
he intended that the [victims] be killed or anticipated that lethal force would or might be
require California to march in lockstep with other states in fashioning a penal code. It
does not require ‘conforming our Penal Code to the “majority rule” or the least common
denominator of penalties nationwide.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Martinez (1999) 71
Cal.App.4th 1502, 1516.)
14
used if necessary to effectuate the robbery or a safe escape.” (Id. at p. 788.) The court
found Enmund’s sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because he “himself did not
kill or attempt to kill” nor did the record “warrant a finding that Enmund had any
intention of participating in or facilitating a murder.” (Id. at p. 798.) Here, however, in
addition to the fact that Emanuel was sentenced to 25 years to life, not death, Emanuel
also was present during the armed robbery that culminated in Cody’s death.
Emanuel points out that he was only 21 years old at the time of the murder and the
United States Supreme Court has often indicated that a defendant’s youth is an important
factor to consider in the context of analyzing whether a punishment is cruel and unusual
under the Eighth Amendment. Emanuel also notes that California has recognized the
growing research on brain development in relation to decision making and amended the
youth offender parole statute (§ 3051) to extend its application to those who committed
their offenses when they were 25 years old and under. We are not persuaded.
As the trial court noted, Emanuel set up the meeting in which he and Whitley,
having pretended to be interested in purchasing a large quantity of marijuana from Cody,
would instead rob him. Emanuel was present when the attempted robbery took place but
failed to intervene when Whitley pulled out a weapon, struck Cody in the head, and then
shot him. Afterward, Emanuel made no effort to assist Cody or call for medical aid but
fled the scene. Having reached a place of safety, Emanuel took additional steps to ensure
that he would not be identified and arrested, e.g., cutting off his dreadlocks, getting rid of
the phone that he used to set up the purported marijuana purchase, and instructing Santos
to lie to police.
While there was evidence that Emanuel began to walk away and told Whitley
“ ‘let’s go’ ” when Cody refused to give up the marijuana, the sentencing court may very
15
well have rejected Santos’s testimony on that subject.14 “The trial court is considered to
be in the best position to conduct the resentencing hearing.” (Peracchi v. Superior Court
(2003) 30 Cal.4th 1245, 1254.) “[A] defendant’s interest in a full and fair sentencing
hearing usually is best served when the hearing is presided over by the same judge who
heard the evidence at trial. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1261.) In this case, the same judge
who presided over Emanuel and Whitley’s trial also presided over Emanuel’s
resentencing hearing. It is undisputed that Emanuel had planned this robbery for two
weeks (Emanuel, supra, H049147, rev.gr. at p. 2), enticing Amini and Cody with tales
about buying the marijuana for an uncle in Las Vegas and offering well over market
price. (Id. at p. 3.) Viewing these underlying facts in the light most favorable to the
judgment (Martinez, supra, 76 Cal.App.4th at p. 496), it is clear that Emanuel’s
punishment is not so disproportionate to his individual culpability that it would violate
the California Constitution’s prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const., art.
I, § 17) or so “ ‘grossly disproportionate’ ” to Emanuel’s crime that it would violate the
Eighth Amendment (Ewing, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 23).
We are not persuaded by Emanuel’s citation to various United States Supreme
Court opinions15 highlighting the importance of a defendant’s youth in the context of an
Eighth Amendment challenge. These cases stand for the proposition that certain
14
“At trial, ‘it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the
credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that determination
depends.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 996.) The trial judge,
at Emanuel’s resentencing, was similarly empowered to decide how much or little
credence to give to the testimony of Emanuel’s and Whitley’s respective girlfriends,
Santos and Kindle, both of whom either lied to or attempted to mislead the police during
the investigation.
15
Specifically, Emanuel cites Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 568–570;
Graham v. Florida (2010) 560 U.S. 48, 76; Miller, supra, 567 U.S. 460 at pages 473–
474; and Montgomery v. Louisiana (2016) 577 U.S. 190, 210.
16
punishments may not be extended to juveniles, but do not stand for the proposition that an
adult offender like Emanuel is similarly protected. (See, e.g., People v. Perez (2016) 3
Cal.App.5th 612, 617–618 [the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole is constitutional for a 20-year-old defendant]; People v. Argeta (2012) 210
Cal.App.4th 1478, 1482 [the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole
is constitutional for an 18-year-old defendant].)
Emanuel was not sentenced to death or life without the possibility of parole nor
was he a minor at the time he participated in the attempted robbery and fatal shooting of
Cody. His sentence of 25 years to life, while lengthy, was not disproportionate to his
culpability and does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
17
______________________________________
WILSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
____________________________________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.
____________________________________
DANNER, J.
The People v. Emanuel
H049190
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