CourtListener 10297320•People v. Sims CA1/2
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Filed 12/19/24 P. v. Sims CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A167809
v.
CHRISTOPHER SIMS, (San Francisco County
Super. Ct. Nos. SCN 232252,
Defendant and Appellant.
CRI 19015556)
A jury convicted defendant Christopher Sims of burglary and numerous
other felony offenses arising from a home invasion committed by masked
gunmen. Sims contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses
was violated when an expert witness testified about his own analysis of DNA
evidence that connected Sims to the crime scene. Sims also argues there was
insufficient evidence to support his convictions.
We find no error and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
By consolidated information filed in August 2020, the San Francisco
District Attorney charged Sims and codefendant Elias Walker with first
degree residential burglary, multiple counts of first degree robbery and
1
assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and additional offenses.1 Many
enhancements were alleged, including that Sims personally used a firearm in
committing the offenses. At the jury trial, the prosecution presented evidence
of the following.
The Home Invasion
In May 2017, an extended family of Juana M., Daniel M., Antonia R.,
Steven M., and Gabriella A. lived in a house in San Francisco. Juana,
Daniel, and Antonia shared a room, and Steven and Gabriella lived in
another room.
The night of May 21, 2017, Juana, Antonia, and Daniel were in their
room. Juana was in bed when she “heard our door getting kicked in and it
was a man dressed in black holding some type of weapon.” The man wore a
ski mask, and his weapon was “much bigger” than a handgun, “almost like
. . . a machine gun.”2 He took Daniel’s computer and Antonia’s cell phone.
The man “pointed the gun in front of [Juana’s] face,” and she gave him her
phone.
Steven and Gabriella came home as the home invasion was in progress.
Steven opened the front door and saw men in ski masks with guns. Gabriella
was behind Steven. When she saw a masked man with a gun in the house,
Gabriella turned around and ran away. She ran down the street and called
the police. Steven was forced to lie down on the kitchen floor, and his wallet,
1 Codefendant Walker was also convicted of burglary and multiple
additional offenses in connection with the home invasion, and this court
affirmed the judgment in Walker’s case in People v. Walker (May 22, 2024,
A166719) (nonpub opn.) 2024 WL 2312294.
2 Juana described the gun as having “like a box below it”; she agreed
the gun had “a magazine under it.”
2
keys, phone, and everything in his pockets were taken from him. He was hit
in the head with “something very hard” and saw blood in his eyes.
Police Response
Around 10:55 p.m., police were dispatched to the house on a report of a
home invasion. Officers entered the house and announced themselves,
shouting, “SFPD.” Meanwhile, three other officers went to the backyard of a
neighboring house to observe the back of the victims’ house. After police
announced themselves at the victims’ house, the officers in the neighboring
backyard saw the back door of the victims’ house burst open. A suspect in a
ski mask came running out and began firing toward the officers in the
neighboring yard. The shooter went over the rear fence of the victims’
backyard. Officers saw one or two additional suspects run out of the house
following the shooter.3
Soon after the shots were fired, an officer apprehended Sims as he
“c[a]me running through the bushes” on the street behind the victims’ house.
Sims was not wearing a mask or hat, and he did not have any weapons when
he was arrested.
Police Investigation
San Francisco police officers found a Glock 26 pistol with a high-
capacity magazine in the kitchen of the victims’ house and multiple shell
casings in the backyard. Officers searched neighboring backyards and found
a sock hanging on a fence between backyards. Further down the block, an
officer found an empty tire with a sock that appeared to match the sock found
3 One officer testified he saw “two people” come out of the back of the
victims’ house. Another officer saw three suspects run out of the back of the
house—the shooter and then two more individuals.
3
on the fence, a Glock 17 pistol, and a black ski mask “inside the well of the
tire.”
The police recovered surveillance video taken on the street behind the
victims’ house near where Sims was arrested. The video showed a car pull up
and park on the street behind the victims’ house. Two individuals got out of
the car, and one appeared to be carrying a handgun with an extended
magazine. No one returned to the car, but about 15 minutes after parking,
the car drove off, suggesting the driver had remained in the car.
Tool marks on the casings recovered from the victims’ backyard were
consistent with being fired from the Glock 17 pistol found in the tire down the
block.
DNA Evidence
Criminalist Kimberly Wong testified as an expert in DNA analysis.
Wong explained that DNA evidence is processed in “a batch way” at the San
Francisco Crime Laboratory, meaning “different analysts may be performing
different steps of [a] case at any time.” Wong described the four steps that
occur before DNA evidence can be analyzed: (1) extraction, which involves
“adding chemicals or reagents to the swab” resulting in a “DNA extract,” (2)
quantitation, which is estimating how much DNA is present in the DNA
extract, (3) amplification, which is using polymerase chain reaction to “make
many copies of DNA,” and (4) detection, which involves use of an instrument
that “detects the many different locations on the DNA” and produces a graph
called an electropherogram. Once there is an electropherogram, “the next
step is to interpret the data,” which is when a criminalist uses her
“knowledge and [her] experience to determine whether the sample is single
source, meaning there’s only one contributor, or if it’s a mixture, if there’s
4
more than one contributor” and, if possible, the criminalist develops “a major
or minor profile.” This final step is the analysis of the DNA evidence.
In 2017, Wong analyzed DNA evidence from swab samples taken from
the grip area and trigger of the Glock 26 found in the victims’ house, the
high-capacity magazine found in the victims’ house, and the Glock 17 and ski
mask found in the tire down the block.
As to the DNA evidence from the Glock 26 and the high-capacity
magazine found in the kitchen of the victims’ house and the Glock 17 in the
tire down the block, Wong determined there were multiple contributors, and
she was unable to interpret the evidence further because of the complexity of
the mixtures. Wong determined there were at least four contributors to the
DNA mixtures from the Glock 26 and the high-capacity magazine and at
least three contributors to the DNA mixture from the Glock 17. As to the
DNA evidence from the ski mask, Wong was able to interpret “a single major
DNA profile present.” Wong was provided a reference DNA sample from
Sims, and she was able to exclude Sims as the major contributor.4 Two
reports that Wong wrote documenting her analysis and conclusions (prepared
in July and December 2017) were admitted into evidence.
Criminalist Alain Oyafuso testified as an expert in forensic DNA
analysis with STRmix. He explained that STRmix is a computer “program
that utilizes probabilistic genotyping,” which “is a method through the use of
software that aids in DNA interpretation and also giving statistical weights.”
He testified that STRmix is “capable of analyzing mixtures of up to four
4 Later the same year, Wong received a DNA sample from codefendant
Walker, and she determined Walker was included as a possible major
contributor to the ski mask DNA evidence with a random match probability
of one in at least 562 octillion.
5
contributors” where previously “it was really, really rare to try to attempt
that.” The San Francisco Police Department Crime Lab began using STRmix
in 2018.
In 2019, Oyafuso was asked to use STRmix to compare Sims’s and
Walker’s reference DNA samples with the DNA evidence from the Glock 26
and the high-capacity magazine found in the victims’ house and the Glock 17
found in the tire. (He was not asked to analyze evidence related to the ski
mask.) Oyafuso explained that he “didn’t do any of the DNA processing”; he
did “the analysis portion,” which meant he first reviewed the “output from
the instruments” (the electropherograms) to determine the number of
contributors in each of the DNA mixtures obtained from the evidence and
then “input the data into STRmix.” In using STRmix, he assumed the
evidence from the firearms and magazine were mixtures of DNA from four
contributors including at least two males.
For the DNA evidence from the Glock 26 found in the victims’ house,
the STRmix result showed “very strong support for the proposition” that Sims
was a contributor to the DNA mixture.5 For the DNA evidence from the
Glock 17 and the high capacity magazine, the results were “very strong
support for the proposition” that Sims was not a contributor to either of the
5 Oyafuso explained that he would propose a hypothesis (such as
“person X [with a known DNA profile] is a contributor to the sample”), and
STRmix would generate a likelihood ratio. For the proposition that Sims
contributed to the DNA mixture from the Glock 26, the STRmix analysis was
that “[t]he likelihood of obtaining these DNA results is at least 34.6 septillion
times greater if the DNA originated from Mr. Sims and three unrelated
persons from the general U.S. population than if from four random unrelated
persons from the U.S. population.”
6
DNA mixtures.6 A report that Oyafuso wrote in March 2019 documenting his
analysis and conclusions was admitted into evidence.
Jury Verdict and Sentence
The jury found Sims guilty of burglary (Pen. Code,7 § 459; count 7); four
counts of first degree robbery in concert (§§ 211, 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 8
[Steven], 11 [Antonia], 14, [Daniel], and 16 [Juana]); four counts of assault
with a semiautomatic firearm (§ 245 subd. (b); counts 9 [Steven], 17
[Antonia], 18 [Daniel], 20 [Juana]); assault with force likely to cause great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count 10 [Steven]; and attempted criminal
threats (§§ 664, 422; lesser included offense of count 13 [Steven]).8 As to the
offenses other than the four assaults with a semiautomatic firearm, the jury
found true the allegation that Sims personally used a firearm.
The trial court sentenced Sims to 16 years, four months in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Oyafuso’s Testimony
Sims contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was
violated when Oyafuso testified “based on testing done by a non-testifying
6 For codefendant Walker, the STRmix results were “moderate support
for the proposition” that Walker was a contributor to the DNA evidence from
the Glock 26; “strong support for the proposition” that Walker was a
contributor to the DNA evidence from the Glock 17; and “very strong support
for the proposition” that Walker was not a contributor to the DNA evidence
from the high-capacity magazine.
7 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
8 Counts 1 through 6 were alleged against codefendant Walker only. As
to count 12 (charge of inflicting injury on an elder, Antonia), the trial court
granted Sims’s motion for acquittal. The jury found Sims not guilty of counts
15 and 19 (charges related to Gabriella).
7
witness about which Oyafuso had no personal knowledge.” (Capitalization
omitted.) We find no confrontation clause violation.
1. The Sixth Amendment Right to Confront Witnesses
“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees a criminal
defendant the right to confront the witnesses against him.” (Smith v.
Arizona (2024) 602 U.S. 779, 783 (Smith).) “In operation, the Clause protects
a defendant’s right of cross-examination by limiting the prosecution’s ability
to introduce statements made by people not in the courtroom.” (Id. at pp.
783–784.) The confrontation clause “applies in full to forensic evidence. So a
prosecutor cannot introduce an absent laboratory analyst’s testimonial out-of-
court statements to prove the results of forensic testing.” (Id. at p. 783.)
But the confrontation clause “ ‘applies only to testimonial hearsay,’ ”
which imposes two limits to its scope. (Smith, supra, 602 U.S. at p. 784.)
First, the evidence must be “testimonial,” and, second, it must be hearsay.
(Id. at pp. 784–785.)
“[T]o be testimonial the out-of-court statement must have been made
with some degree of formality or solemnity.” (People v. Lopez (2012) 55
Cal.4th 569, 581 (Lopez), citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36,
51, and Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009) 557 U.S. 305, 310.)
“Generally speaking, a . . . statement is testimonial if made ‘with a primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” (People v.
Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 168, quoting Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S.
344, 358.) For example, when “[a]n accuser . . . makes a formal statement to
government officers,” the statement is testimonial. (Crawford, supra, 541
U.S. at p. 51.) Affidavits are testimonial, and the United States Supreme
Court has held that a “ ‘certificate[] of analysis’ ” is a testimonial statement
where the certificate states a forensic analyst’s conclusion that a substance is
8
an illegal drug and the certificate has been sworn to by the analyst.
(Melendez-Diaz, supra, 557 U.S. at pp. 308, 310.)
On the other hand, our Supreme Court has held that less formal
statements, such as notations in an unsigned lab report, do not qualify as
testimonial. In Lopez, criminalist John Willey “testified that he had reviewed
a laboratory report by his colleague, Jorge Peña, who had analyzed [the]
defendant’s blood sample”; the report concluded the defendant’s blood sample
had a blood-alcohol concentration of 0.09 percent, and Willey testified, “based
on his own ‘separate abilities as a criminal analyst,’ [that] he too concluded
that the blood-alcohol concentration in defendant’s blood sample was 0.09
percent.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 574.) Our high court concluded the
relevant “portions of that report were not made with the requisite degree of
formality or solemnity to be considered testimonial.” (Id. at pp. 582.) For
example, the court reasoned that a notation in the lab report linking the
defendant to the blood sample was “nothing more than an informal record of
data for internal purposes,” which was “not prepared with the formality
required by the high court for testimonial statements.” (Id. at p. 584; see also
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. at p. 311, fn. 1 [“we do not
hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in
establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of
the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s case”].)
To be hearsay, the out-of-court statement must be made by a person.
The Lopez court further held that the portion of the lab report that consisted
solely of “data generated by a gas chromatography machine” did not implicate
the confrontation clause because such machine-generated results were not
the statements of a person. (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 583 [pages of lab
report consisting of such data contained “no statement by Peña, express or
9
implied”].) The court “agree[d] with those federal appellate courts that have
upheld the use of [machine-generated] printouts. (See U.S. v. Moon (7th Cir.
2008) 512 F.3d 359, 362 [‘the instruments’ readouts are not “statements,” so
it does not matter whether they are “testimonial” ’]; U.S. v. Washington (4th
Cir. 2007) 498 F.3d 225, 231 [‘the raw data generated by the machines do not
constitute “statements,” and the machines are not “declarants” ’]; see also
Bullcoming [v. New Mexico (2011) 564 U.S. 647, 673] (conc. opn. of
Sotomayor, J.) [the prosecution’s introduction only of ‘machine-generated
results, such as a printout from a gas chromatograph,’ may not violate the
defendant’s confrontation right].)” (Lopez, at p. 583.) Our high court
explained, “Because, unlike a person, a machine cannot be cross-examined,
here the prosecution’s introduction into evidence of the machine-generated
printouts shown in pages two through six of nontestifying analyst Peña’s
laboratory report did not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s right to
confrontation.” (Ibid.; accord People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1168
[citing Lopez and finding no confrontation clause violation where a witness
testified about her own analysis of “the X-ray film output of a DNA test,”
which had been prepared by a nontestifying analyst], abrogated on another
point by People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 391, fn. 3.)
2. Analysis
Here, Sims acknowledges that Oyafuso conducted his own independent
analysis of machine-generated DNA data in the form of electropherograms.
As Oyafuso explained, he did “the analysis portion,” analyzing “the results
that come out after the DNA samples are run on the instruments.” He
described the electropherograms as “peaks on a graph.” The machine-
generated electropherograms are not the statements of a person, and
Oyafuso’s reliance on them in reaching his own conclusions does “not
10
implicate the Sixth Amendment’s right to confrontation.” (Lopez, supra, 55
Cal.4th at p. 583.)
In addition, we agree with the Attorney General that the
electropherograms (and any attendant notations linking the data to either
the evidence found at the crime scene or Sims) were not made with the
requisite degree of formality to be considered testimonial. (See Lopez, supra,
55 Cal.4th at p. 582.) As the Attorney General argues, the preliminary data
produced in the lab, including the electropherograms, were “unsworn and
informal, intended for later analysis and were not meant to substitute [for]
in-court testimony.”
Sims relies on People v. Ogaz (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 280 (Ogaz), but the
case does not support his claim. In Ogaz, forensic scientist Michelle Stevens
conducted drug testing of substances recovered from the defendant, prepared
a one-page report of her “analytical results and interpretations” in which she
stated that the substances contained heroin and methamphetamine, and
signed the report. (Id. at p. 285, capitalization omitted.) At trial, the report
was admitted into evidence, although Stevens did not testify. Instead,
Stevens’s supervisor, Thomas Dickan, who had reviewed and initialed the
report, testified about the report and its contents. (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal held this violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses,
concluding Stevens’s report was a testimonial statement. (Id. at pp. 286,
292.)
The Ogaz court distinguished Stevens’s report from the lab report in
Lopez, noting that Stevens signed her report, “demonstrat[ing] she was
willing to stand behind the information reflected therein.” (Ogaz, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 291.) The court also found a “distinguishing feature of
Stevens’s report is that it is not comprised primarily of machine generated
11
data, as in Lopez,” but rather the report “contain[ed] the substantive
conclusions Stevens reached as a result of the testing she conducted, which is
precisely what she would have been expected to testify about had she
appeared at trial.” (Ogaz, at p. 291.)
The court further observed that there would have been no “problem if
Dickan had formulated his own independent opinions based on the data that
Stevens produced during the testing process.” (Ogaz, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th
at p. 293.) In other words, Stevens’s testimony would not have been
necessary if Dickan had conducted independent analysis of the data. “But,”
the court continued, “this [wa]s not a situation where an expert witness
reviewed the work of another analyst and came to his or her own conclusion
about the matter at hand. (Cf. Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at []p. 587 (conc. opn.
of Werdegar, J.) [‘The demands of the confrontation clause were properly
satisfied in this case by calling a well-qualified expert witness to the stand
. . . who could testify to the means by which the critical instrument-generated
data was produced and could interpret those data for the jury, giving his own,
independent opinion as to the level of alcohol in defendant’s blood sample.’];
People v. Barba (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 712 [expert witness independently
drew conclusions from test results obtained by another worker in her lab];
People v. Steppe (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1116 [lab’s technical reviewer gave
her own independent opinion based on testing performed by another
technician]; People v. Huynh (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 285, [medical expert
witness formed her own independent opinions from photographs taken by
coworker and did not relay the opinions of her coworker to the jury]; People v.
Holmes [(2012)] 212 Cal.App.4th 431 [expert witnesses reached their own
conclusions based on testing data generated by other analysts].)” (Ogaz, at p.
293.)
12
The present case is easily distinguished from Ogaz. In Ogaz, the
scientist who analyzed the evidence wrote a report about her conclusions, and
the report was admitted into evidence even though she did not testify. Here,
the reports that were admitted into evidence were prepared by Oyafuso and
Wong, who both testified at trial. The electropherograms on which Oyafuso
relied were “machine generated data,” and the only “substantive conclusions”
were those Oyafuso himself reached as a result of the analysis he conducted,
which is precisely what he did testify about at trial. (Cf. Ogaz, supra, 53
Cal.App.5th at p. 291 [Stevens’s report was “not comprised primarily of
machine generated data,” and contained “substantive conclusions Stevens
reached as a result of the testing she conducted, which is precisely what she
would have been expected to testify about had she appeared at trial”].) And
there is no question that Oyafuso “formulated his own independent opinions
based on the data that [another criminalist] produced during the testing
process.” (Id. at p. 293.) In Ogaz, the court found the testifying witness
Dickan was “a ‘mere conduit’ for Stevens’s opinions” (ibid.) but in this case,
Oyafuso was the only criminalist who held the opinion that Sims likely
contributed to the DNA evidence from the Glock 26, and he reached his
opinion based on his own analysis.
In short, while Sims’s argument suggests that every criminalist
involved in the processing of forensic evidence must testify to comport with
the confrontation clause, neither Lopez nor Ogaz supports his position.9 We
9 To the contrary, in Lopez, a lab assistant, Brian Constantino,
“prepared the [blood] sample for testing,” and “a second analyst, Jorge Peña,
prepared the sample and conducted a blood-alcohol analysis by means of a
gas chromatograph.” (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 598 (dis. opn. of Liu, J.).)
Yet, our high court found no confrontation clause violation although neither
Constantino nor Peña testified. (Id. at pp. 574, 584.)
13
conclude the admission of Oyafuso’s testimony did not violate Sims’s right to
confront witnesses.10
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Next, Sims contends the evidence was insufficient to support his
convictions. We disagree.
1. Standard of Review
“To assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we review the whole record to
determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.
[Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the
10 In his opening brief, Sims’s argument regarding Oyafuso’s testimony
is under the single heading, “Appellant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation
rights were violated by Oyafuso’s testimony which was based on testing done
by a non-testifying witness about which Oyafuso had no personal knowledge.”
(Capitalization omitted.) California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B)
requires each party to “[s]tate each point under a separate heading or
subheading summarizing the point.” “This is not a mere technical
requirement; it is ‘designed to lighten the labors of the appellate tribunals by
requiring the litigants to present their cause systematically and so arranged
that those upon whom the duty devolves of ascertaining the rule of law to
apply may be advised, as they read, of the exact question under
consideration, instead of being compelled to extricate it from the mass.’ ” (In
re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.) “Failure to provide proper headings
forfeits issues that may be discussed in the brief but are not clearly identified
by a heading.” (Pizarro v. Reynoso (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 172, 179.)
To the extent Sims also intended to raise a separate claim of state law
evidentiary error on the ground the electropherograms were inadmissible
hearsay, we may deem the argument forfeited because he failed to identify
the claim in a heading or subheading in his opening brief. But, in any event,
the electropherograms are not the statement of a person and, therefore, are
not hearsay. (Lopez, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 583.) “Simply put, ‘[t]he
Evidence Code does not contemplate that a machine can make a statement.’ ”
(People v. Goldsmith (2014) 59 Cal.4th 258, 274.)
14
verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such
that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced
from the evidence. . . . We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary
conflicts; we look for substantial evidence.’ ” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43
Cal.4th 327, 357 (Zamudio).) “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ the . . . verdict.” (Ibid.)
“ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3
Cal.5th 1, 57.) “The same standard [of review] governs in cases where the
prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence. . . . ‘Although it is
the [fact finder]’s duty to acquit a defendant if it finds the circumstantial
evidence susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which suggests
guilt and the other innocence, it is the [fact finder], not the appellate court
that must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 357–358.)
“ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings,
the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also be
reasonably reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of
the judgment.” ’ [Citations.] ‘Circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
connect a defendant with the crime and to prove his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 933, 934 [rejecting
a claim of insufficiency of the evidence for a murder conviction where the only
evidence was that a pair of sunglasses bearing the defendant’s fingerprints
15
was found next to the victim’s body and that the defendant lived nearby and
had been seen observing the victim’s house in the past].)
2. Analysis
Here, surveillance video showed that three individuals arrived together
on the street behind the victims’ house and one of the individuals was seen
carrying a handgun with an extended magazine. The testimony of the
victims and police officers at the scene established that two or three masked
gunmen invaded the victims’ home and robbed and assaulted them.11 Within
minutes after the perpetrators were seen fleeing through the back of the
victims’ house, Sims was found emerging from the bushes on the street
behind the victims’ house (near where the car was previously parked). The
perpetrators left a Glock 26 in the victims’ house, and Sims’s DNA was found
on the firearm. The circumstances that Sims was found coming out of the
bushes near the victims’ house immediately after the home invasion, together
with his DNA being found on a weapon used in the home invasion, provide
substantial circumstantial evidence that Sims was one of the perpetrators
and that he used the firearm in committing the crimes in the victims’ house.
In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Sims argues that
Oyafuso’s testimony about the DNA from the Glock 26 was unreliable. He
points out that Oyafuso testified that he “assumed” there were four
contributors to the DNA mixture from the Glock 26 in conducting the
STRmix analysis, and that “in reality no one knows the true number of any
11 Juana testified she could hear “two or three people that were talking
amongst themselves.” Steven was not sure how many masked gunmen
“rushed” him and “laid [him] down on the kitchen floor,” but he testified, “it
was more than one” person. One officer saw two suspects flee from the back
of the victims’ house, while another officer saw three suspects run out of the
house.
16
number of contributors. It’s one of those things where you come up with your
answer or what you think is the answer based on the data that’s in front of
you.”12 Sims also cites cross-examination in which defense counsel
questioned the correctness of Oyafuso’s determination that there were four
contributors to the Glock 26 DNA mixture. For example, Oyafuso agreed
that some of the peaks on the electropherograms for the DNA mixture from
the Glock 26 were below the “stochastic threshold,” which meant he “could be
missing information.”
But “ ‘[c]onflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ”
(Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) “The weight to be given to the
opinion of a witness is a question of fact for the jury. The jury are the
exclusive judges of the credibility of witnesses,” and this “rule applies to
expert witnesses.” (People v. Loop (1954) 127 Cal.App.2d 786, 800.) In this
case, it was for the jury to assess the credibility and reliability of Oyafuso’s
testimony.13
12 However, Oyafuso went on to testify that the data supported his
determination that there were four contributors to the DNA mixture and that
he had not seen evidence to support a conclusion that there were five
contributors to the DNA mixture.
13 Notably, Sims does not challenge the reliability of STRmix as a
method of analyzing DNA evidence. (See People v. Davis (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 694, 717, 722 [concluding “the STRmix method has gained
general acceptance within the relevant scientific community” and noting,
“Disputes about the accuracy, reliability, or validity of a testing method
‘provide grist for adversarial examination, not grounds for exclusion.’ ”].)
17
Sims also argues that the presence of his DNA on the Glock 26 does not
establish his presence at the scene at the time of the incident. He suggests
the DNA could have been deposited on the firearm days or years earlier. This
argument ignores the fact that he was found emerging from the bushes
behind the victims’ house after the perpetrators fled through the back of the
house. Evidence of Sims’s presence near the crime scene within minutes of
the home invasion coupled with the evidence that his DNA was on a firearm
found inside the house provides sufficient evidence that he was inside the
victims’ house during the home invasion.
Finally, Sims claims his presence near the victims’ house and the fact
that his DNA was found on the Glock 26 do not support a finding that he
participated in or aided and abetted the crimes. He asserts the evidence
established “three men were in the house, but the testimony supported only
that two of the men participated in the assaults and robberies inside the
house.” We are not persuaded. The surveillance video showing three
individuals arriving together and Juana’s and Steven’s testimony about the
actions of the perpetrators provide sufficient evidence that the three men who
entered the victims’ house were acting together with an intent to rob the
victims.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
18
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
A167809, People v. Sims
19
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