CourtListener 10297212•Rauch v. Rode Bros. CA1/2
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/19/24 Rauch v. Rode Bros. CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
MICHAEL RAUCH,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A167265
v.
RODE BROS., INC., (Marin County
Super. Ct. No. CIV2003621)
Defendant and Respondent.
Homeowner Michael Rauch brought suit against multiple defendants in
connection with a remodeling project he undertook at his home in Tiburon,
California. He now appeals a judgment entered against him following the
grant of summary judgment on his claims against one of the defendants,
hardwood flooring installation company Rode Bros., Inc. (Rode), for allegedly
defective work carried out by and under the direction of Rode’s employee,
Larry Klosowski (Klosowski).
Rauch contends there are triable issues of fact concerning Rode’s
liability for Klosowski’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and
agency principles.
We reject his arguments and affirm the judgment.
1
BACKGROUND
1. Rauch’s Allegations
According to the allegations of his operative complaint, Rauch hired a
professional designer, Cathleen Gouveia, to oversee the remodeling project at
his home, and Gouveia brought in Larry Klosowski to perform floor
installation and refinishing work. Rauch alleged Klosowski is a partial
owner and vice-president of Rode, a Los Angeles-based company. He alleged
that another person, Glen Comer, doing business as Wood Floored, was also
involved in performing the flooring work.
On March 2, 2020, Rauch allegedly entered into an oral agreement with
both Klosowski and Rode (as well as Gouveia and Comer) to do the flooring
work for $71,688.
All of these parties allegedly entered into a written contract the same
date, consisting of a March 2, 2020 supplemental change order Gouveia gave
Rauch reflecting a proposal for $71,688 in flooring work. The supplemental
change order is a two-page “proposal” on Gouveia’s letterhead addressed to
Rauch, proposing floor-refinishing work by an unspecified “Floor Artisan” for
a total rate of $71,688, $11,950 of which was to be paid to her as a referral fee
and $59,740 of which was to be paid to the “Floor Artisan.”
On April 6, 2020, Klosowski allegedly gave Rauch a $59,740 written
estimate to perform the flooring work which Rauch orally agreed to as a
supplement to Gouveia’s March 2, 2020 change order, and Rauch instructed
Klosowski, “through Gouveia,” to perform the work. The written estimate,
dated April 5, 2020, is a one-page document addressed to Rauch from “Larry
2
Klosowski.” It lists a mailing address and a personal email address
([xxx]@hotmail.com) for “Larry Klosowski,” and does not mention Rode.1
Rauch alleged Klosowski held himself out as licensed to do the work,
and so did Gouveia, but Klosowski did not in fact have a valid contractor’s
license to do the flooring work (and neither did Gouveia). Rauch allegedly
paid Klosowski $57,758 to do the flooring work but the work was defective.
Rauch filed suit against Gouveia, Klosowski and Rode in
December 2020, asserting five causes of action against Rode: breach of oral
contract (sixth cause of action), breach of written contract (seventh cause of
action), breach of implied warranty (eighth cause of action), negligence (ninth
cause of action), and fraudulent business practices in violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200) based on unspecified
fraudulent misrepresentations (tenth cause of action).2
2. The Summary Judgment Motion
A. Opening Papers
Rode moved for summary judgment. It argued that the breach of
contract claims (both written and oral) and the breach of implied warranty
claim failed as a matter of law because Rode never entered into any contract
with Rauch, written or oral. It argued the negligence claim failed as a matter
of law essentially for the same reason: that is, because Rode entered into no
contract with Rauch and performed no work on the project, it owed Rauch no
1According to undisputed evidence introduced later on summary
judgment, the mailing address listed on the invoice is Klosowski’s home
address, which Klosowski also used as an office for Rode.
2 He brought multiple claims against Gouveia and Klosowski,
including four based on Klosowski’s alleged lack of a valid contractor’s
license. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal.
3
duty of care. It argued the UCL claim failed as a matter of law because Rode
made no representations to Rauch, false or otherwise.
In support of its motion, Rode proffered the declaration of a corporate
officer (Joseph Audino) who stated that the company had nothing to do with
the project and no knowledge of the alleged agreements; never entered into
any contract with Rauch, written or oral, concerning the project; had no
contact with Rauch about the project; made no representations to Rauch
about anything; produced no estimates or proposals concerning the project;
provided no labor, materials or services; submitted no invoices for any of the
work; and received no payment.
Audino also stated that Klosowski did not have authority to enter into
a contract with Rauch in the circumstances alleged in the complaint. In
addition, he stated that Rode always prepares estimates and invoices for its
work under its own letterhead (“Rode Bros., Inc.”), not under “Larry
Klosowski” letterhead.
Rode also proffered evidence that:
• Klosowski was not authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of
Rode without authorization and without completing “internal protocols” for
forming contracts (a fact it established through one of its discovery responses,
to be discussed below).
• Klosowski testified in deposition he never told Audino that he
was performing this job or discussed the project with him.
• Rauch did not receive any estimates or invoices for the work on
Rode letterhead, a fact established by the deposition testimony of both Rauch
and his girlfriend Marika Pickles (Pickles), who helped him with the project.3
3Rauch testified in deposition that he thought he’d seen some invoices
produced in discovery that had Rode’s name on them but “I didn’t do a
4
Nor was there any other paperwork or correspondence for the project on
Rode’s letterhead.
• None of the estimates or invoices Klosowski sent Rauch even
mentioned Rode: they contained only Klosowski’s name, his home address in
Mill Valley, California and the email address, “[xxx]@hotmail.com.”
• Klosowski never told Gouveia (or Pickles) that Rode was
performing the work.4
• At the jobsite, there were never any trucks bearing Rode’s name,
or workers wearing Rode clothing.
• All payments for the flooring work were made by means of checks
made payable directly to Klosowski personally, not Rode.5
• Gouveia, not Klosowski or Rode, was the source of any impression
that Rode was involved with the work. She admitted in deposition that she
never saw any documents indicating that Rode was involved other than
documents she herself generated (and that Klosowski provided no paperwork
referencing Rode). She testified in deposition, however, “I know [Klosowski’s]
not the company. But he’s . . . always been affiliated with that for a very long
time.” She testified, “Larry—to me—is Rode Bros. and always has been.”
thorough review of all of that so, you know, I could be mistaken.” No such
invoices were introduced in opposition to summary judgment, and on appeal
the parties do not rely on that portion of Rauch’s deposition testimony for any
purpose.
4 No evidence was introduced with the moving papers as to whether he
ever told Rauch that Rode was involved. But in his opposition papers, Rauch
introduced his own deposition testimony admitting that he could not recall
whether Klosowski ever told him this.
5 Pickles testified in deposition that Gouveia asked Rauch to make the
checks payable to Rode c/o Klosowski but admitted the checks were in fact
made out to Klosowski directly.
5
Pickles testified in deposition she thought Rode was involved but only
because Gouveia had led her to believe that.
B. Opposition Papers
In opposition to the motion, Rauch argued there were triable issues of
fact as to whether Klosowski was actually authorized to enter into the
contract on Rode’s behalf, defeating summary judgment on the contract
claims and implied warranty claims. He also argued there were triable
issues of fact as to whether Rode was vicariously liable for Klosowski’s
conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior, defeating summary
judgment on the negligence and UCL claims.
In support, he introduced:
• Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he (Klosowski) was the
general manager of Rode’s San Francisco branch showroom and also used the
office in his Mill Valley home to conduct business for Rode, as well as a copy
of Klosowski’s business card at Rode, listing Rode’s license number, a
business email ([xxx]@rodebros.com) and an address in San Rafael. He also
introduced Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he set up his
“[xxx]@hotmail” email address to use for Rode business because the server for
his “@rodebros.com” email was unreliable, used the Hotmail email address to
conduct Rode business on a daily basis, and only used his “@rodebros.com”
email about once a week.
• Payroll records showing that Klosowski was drawing a salary
from Rode during all of 2020, while the project was underway.
• Public records from the California Secretary of State identifying
Klosowski as a director, corporate officer (i.e., secretary) and registered agent
for service of process for Rode during the period in which the 2020 remodeling
project was underway, and from the Contractors State License Board
6
identifying Klosowski as a person covered under Rode’s contractor’s license
during that period.6
• Klosowski’s deposition testimony that Klosowski does not have a
contractor’s license in his own name but believed Rode’s contractor’s license
covered him to do flooring work on his own, independent of Rode, since the
state Contractors License Board listed him as a licensed contractor.
• Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he is “not necessarily”
required to get approval before executing contracts on behalf of Rode.
Klosowski testified he was authorized to enter into contracts for Rode, that he
and Audino “always go over the job before anything gets started, so it’s
usually with his approval that the job gets okayed,” but that he doesn’t
“necessarily” need Audino’s prior approval to enter into a contract for Rode as
long as the price was consistent with Rode’s internal price list, and that the
internal price list is the “internal protocol” referred to in Rode’s discovery
response that was introduced with Rode’s moving papers. He also testified he
works with Audino to price and prepare a bid for jobs that are “difficult.”
• Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he had “rarely” taken on
independent flooring work in the past, those other side jobs had been smaller
and different than this project (involving just cleaning and recoating floors),
and he never told Rode about those other side jobs either.
• Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he had worked on four or
five previous projects with Gouveia, all for Rode.
• Evidence that one of the subcontractors Klosowski hired, Glen
Comer, frequently worked with Klosowski for Rode.
6 He also introduced Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he
(Klosowski) wasn’t aware he was the company’s secretary but was aware he
was listed under Rode’s contractor’s license.
7
• Copies of estimates and invoices for the flooring work, all sent
under Klosowski’s personal name, home mailing address and/or Hotmail
email address and none mentioning Rode.
• Copies of Rauch’s checks for the flooring work, all made payable
to “Larry Klosowski.”
• Copies of personal checks Klosowski wrote for payments to
Comer and another subcontractor working on the project (Gabriel
Fernandez), drawn from a personal checking account listing Klosowski’s
home address.
• Gouveia’s deposition testimony that Klosowski met with her and
Pickles at Rode’s office in San Rafael at an unspecified time for an
unspecified purpose.7
• Evidence that Gouveia, Comer and Rauch himself all subjectively
believed that because Klosowski was involved in the project, so was Rode.
Specifically: (1) Gouveia testified she thought the work was being performed
by Rode, Klosowski never told her he was doing the work independently, and
that it was surprising to learn he was claiming he did the work
independently because she’d never known him to do anything like that
before. She testified that “Larry and Rode Brothers to me is the same. It’s
one and the same. . . . [H]e’s always been part of Rode Brothers.” (2) Comer
also testified he thought that because he was working for Klosowski he was
working for Rode; like Gouveia, he testified in deposition “it was the same
thing.” (3) Rauch testified in deposition that he too thought Klosowski and
7 In his appellate brief Rauch asserts Klosowski “invited” them to
Rode’s “showroom” in San Rafael to look at flooring samples and discuss the
potential work. The record citations he provides do not support that factual
representation.
8
the subcontractors Klosowski hired were all working for Rode but couldn’t
remember Klosowski ever telling him that, orally or in writing. He also
testified, “I don’t think [Klosowski] ever specifically said I am Rode Bros., but
I got the impression that, you know, this was his company.”
• Copies of several emails Gouveia wrote in which she indicated,
consistent with her beliefs, that Rode was involved in the project. One was
an email she sent to Rauch transmitting Klosowski’s project proposal,
captioned under the subject line “Relaying Information From Rode Bros.
Floors.” (Italics added.) Another was a billing email she sent to Rauch later
on, stating that “the total for your floors is $59,740 to be paid to Rode Bros.
c/o Larry Klosowski.” (Italics added.) A few months later (in July 2020), she
sent an email to Pickles, stating, “Larry asked me to request from you and
Mike a progress payment of $7981.50 made out to Larry Klosowski c/o Rode
Bros.”8 (Italics added.) Then later (in September 2020) she forwarded an
invoice from Klosowski to Pickles, stating “Larry is requesting a progress
payment of $6000 at this time. . . . You can make the check payable to Larry
on this one.” When Pickles asked, “What is Larry’s name again or company
name for check?,” Gouveia responded, “The company is Rode Bros. but you
can make the check out to him.” (Italics added.)
• Rauch also introduced Klosowski’s admissions in deposition that
there were two times Klosowski was copied on an email from Gouveia
8 Asked about this email in deposition, Gouveia testified she couldn’t
remember if Klosowski specifically asked for the check to be made out this
way (“c/o Rode Bros.”) or whether she just inferred that was how the check
was supposed to be written. She testified, “I just know Larry and Rode Bros.
has always been the same thing to me” and “All I know is that . . . Larry
asked me to get a progress payment from [Rauch and Pickles], so that’s what
this is.”
9
indicating that Rode was involved in the project and did not correct her.
There is no indication in the record that Rauch was copied on or received
either of these emails. One was an email Gouveia sent to another contactor
that referred to Klosowski as “Larry Klosowski from Rode Brothers,” which
he testified he didn’t correct because Gouveia’s email coordinating that other
contractor’s work had nothing to do with him and “I didn’t feel it was
necessary to do so.” The other was a work schedule she prepared that
referred to “Rode Bros. floor work.” Klosowski testified he didn’t correct the
statement in the schedule either and that “I don’t know why she put that in.
She knew I was being paid directly.” He testified he never told Gouveia it
was him, not Rode, doing the work because he didn’t think it was important
to clarify that for her. He testified, “she knew that I was being paid directly
from the homeowner. She saw copies of the checks that were written to me,
so I didn’t believe there was any point” in doing so.
• Invoices from some suppliers, some but not all of which
mentioned Rode: (1) one invoice from a supplier (Galleher LLC) identifying
Rode (in Los Angeles) as the customer, along with four others from the same
supplier listing Klosowski’s name and home address in Mill Valley and a
cancelled check to the supplier drawn from Klosowski’s personal checking
account listing his home address; (2) a $153.66 invoice from another supplier
(W.D. Lockwood) identifying “Rode Bros.” and “Larry Klosowski” as the
customer, listing Klosowski’s home address in Mill Valley and his Hotmail
email address; (3) a $91.56 invoice from OnlineMetals.com identifying the
billing and shipping address as “Larry Klosowski, Company Name: Rode
Bros. Floors” and listing Klosowski’s home address in Mill Valley and a
phone number (415-[xxx]-[xx]98); and (4) an invoice from an unspecified
10
supplier identifying “Larry Klosowski” as the customer, at Rode’s business
address in San Rafael, California.
• And, finally, a November 18, 2020 demand letter Rauch’s lawyer
sent to Klosowski at his home address and Hotmail email address, asserting
that Klosowski had done the work without a valid contractor’s license and
had failed to give Rauch a written contract for the work, along with
Klosowski’s response, transmitting a copy of online search results from the
Contractor’s State License Board showing him listed under Rode’s
contractor’s license.
C. Reply Papers
In reply, Rode introduced Klosowski’s deposition testimony that he took
on this project independently of Rode because it was during the early days of
the pandemic in 2020, and he was worried he wouldn’t be earning
commissions revenue from Rode, which was an important supplement to his
salary; the project began as a small job, and he would take on smaller jobs
without Rode’s involvement to help pay his bills; and he performed the job
without Rode’s knowledge. Rode also introduced Klosowski’s deposition
testimony that when he contracts for work on Rode’s behalf without prior
approval, he forwards the information to Rode for inputting into Rode’s
system, payments for all such work are by means of checks made out to Rode,
and he deposits such payments into Rode’s bank account and also forwards a
copy to Rode’s Los Angeles office.
D. Ruling
The trial court rejected Rauch’s claims for breach of contract (six and
seventh causes of action) and breach of implied warranty (eighth cause of
action) because, as a matter of law, there was no contract between Rauch and
Rode. It ruled that Rauch “has failed to raise a triable issue of material fact
11
regarding the existence of a contract between [himself] and Rode. There is no
evidence that Rode was a contracting party. Rode did not submit a proposal
for the job, did not sign a contract for the job, and was not paid for the job.”
The court also rejected Rauch’s contention that Rode, as a principal,
was responsible for the contract entered into by its agent, Klosowski. It ruled
that “the evidence reflects that Klosowski was doing this job on his own,
separate from his work at Rode and with the mistaken belief he could use
Rode’s license for independent work. There is no evidence that Klosowski
ever held himself out as a representative of Rode when he contracted with
[Rauch], or that [Rauch] relied on any representations by Klosowski that he
was working on behalf of Rode.” “[A]t most,” it ruled, there was evidence that
Gouveia herself “was under the mistaken belief based on her past
interactions with Klosowski that Rode would be the party doing the work”
but that “[her] belief, and any representations she made to [Rauch or his
girlfriend] about Rode’s involvement, are insufficient to bind Rode.”
The court ruled that Rode was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on the negligence cause of action (ninth cause of action) because Rauch failed
to raise a triable issue of fact under the doctrine of respondeat superior, for
the same reasons. It reasoned that the undisputed evidence “shows that
Klosowski was not engaged in an enterprise undertaken by his employer but
was rather engaged in activity for his own personal financial benefit,” citing
Baptist v. Robinson (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 151, 161-162 (Baptist).
The trial court ruled Rode was entitled to judgment as a matter of law
on the fraudulent businesses claim (tenth cause of action), because there was
no evidence of any false representation by Rode, and also because the
doctrine of vicarious liability is inapplicable to claims under the UCL.
12
Rauch appealed from the summary judgment order, and we
subsequently entered an order amending the court’s ruling to declare that
judgment is entered nunc pro tunc in favor of Rode.
DISCUSSION
Rauch argues: (1) there are numerous triable issues of material fact
showing that Rode is responsible for Klosowski’s negligence under the
doctrine of respondeat superior; (2) there are triable issues of material fact
showing Rode is responsible for Klosowski’s negligence, breaches of contract
and breaches of implied warranty because he was Rode’s ostensible agent;
and (3) the trial court improperly determined triable issues of fact and made
errors of law under the doctrine of respondeat superior and agency principles.
He also asserts that under Labor Code section 2750.5, Klosowski was
working for Rode on the project.
I.
“Summary judgment is governed by well-established standards.
‘ “Summary judgment is properly granted when there is no triable issue as to
any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A defendant seeking summary
judgment bears the initial burden of proving the ‘cause of action has no merit’
by showing that one or more elements of plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be
established or there is a complete defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subds. (a), (o)(2); [citations].) Once the defendant’s burden is met, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of fact exists as to that cause
of action.” ’ ” (Alameda Health System v. Alameda County Employees’
Retirement Assn. (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1173 (Alameda Health
System).)
13
“In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment,
we apply a de novo standard of review, ‘considering all the evidence set forth
in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made
and sustained,’ ‘liberally constru[ing] the evidence in support of the party
opposing summary judgment,’ and ‘resolv[ing] doubts concerning the evidence
in favor of that party. [Citation.]’ ” (Bowen v. Burns & McDonnell
Engineering Co., Inc. (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 759, 766; accord, Alameda
Health System, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 1174.) “We will find no error in
a trial court’s grant of summary judgment ‘if all the papers submitted show
that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ (§ 437c, subd. (c).)”
(Bowen, at p. 766.) “Summary judgment is no longer a disfavored procedure,
but ‘is now seen as “a particularly suitable means to test the sufficiency” of
the plaintiff's or defendant’s case.’ ” (Alameda Health System, at p. 1174.)
“ ‘ “As with an appeal from any judgment, it is the appellant’s
responsibility to affirmatively demonstrate error and, therefore, to point out
the triable issues the appellant claims are present by citation to the record
and any supporting authority.” ’ ” (Franklin v. Santa Barbara Cottage
Hospital (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 395, 403.) “Mere suggestions of error without
supporting argument or authority other than general abstract principles do
not properly present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002)
100 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1078.) An appellant must “convince us, by developing
his arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the
record, that the trial court committed reversible error.” (Bishop v. The
Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.)
14
II.
Respondeat Superior
Rauch argues, first, that there is a triable issue of material fact as to
whether Klosowski’s conduct was within the course and scope of his
employment with Rode, and thus whether Rode is vicariously liable for
Klosowski’s alleged negligence. Having independently reviewed the evidence
submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, we disagree.
A. Legal Principles.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, “ ‘an employer may be held
vicariously liable for torts committed by an employee within the scope of
employment.’ [Citation.] The doctrine contravenes the general rule of tort
liability based on fault. [Citation.] Under certain circumstances, the
employer may be subject to this form of vicarious liability even for an
employee’s willful, malicious, and criminal conduct. [Citation.] Three policy
justifications for the respondeat superior doctrine have been cited—
prevention, compensation, and risk allocation. They do not always apply.”
(Patterson v. Domino’s Pizza, LLC (2014) 60 Cal.4th 474, 491.)
The doctrine does not apply, however, “where the misconduct does not
arise from the conduct of the employer’s enterprise but instead arises out of a
personal dispute.” (Farmers Ins. Group v. County of Santa Clara (1995)
11 Cal.4th 992, 1006 (Farmers).) “[A]n employer will not be held vicariously
liable where . . . ‘ “it clearly appears that neither directly nor indirectly could
[the employee] have been serving his employer” ’ ” at the time of the alleged
tort. (Id. at p. 1008.) “In such cases, the risks are engendered by events
unrelated to the employment, so the mere fact that an employee has an
opportunity to abuse facilities . . . necessary to the performance of his or her
duties does not render the employer vicariously liable.” (Id. at p. 1006;
15
accord, Slater v. Friedman (1923) 62 Cal.App. 668, 671-672 (Slater) [no
vicarious liability if employee is “pursuing his own ends exclusively” even if
alleged tort “could not have been committed without the facilities afforded to
the [employee] by his relation to his [employer]”]; Musgrove v. Silver (2022)
82 Cal.App.5th 694, 708 (Musgrove) [“[A]n employee’s conduct is not within
the scope of employment merely because he ‘use[s] . . . property or facilities
entrusted to him by’ his employer”].)
The “scope of employment” issue arises in many different factual
contexts, such as whether an employee was on or off duty at the time of
committing an alleged tort (see, e.g., Marez v. Lyft (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 569
(Marez) [accident involving employee of ride-share company driving company-
loaned car off-hours while returning home from another job]; Musgrove,
supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at pp. 700, 713 [personal chef who furnished drugs and
alcohol after working hours to employer’s executive assistant while on luxury
trip]), or whether an alleged tort committed while an employee is working
deviates from their employment duties to such an extent that it cannot be
said to arise from pursuit of the employer’s enterprise (see, e.g., Farmers,
supra, 11 Cal.4th 992 [sexual harassment committed during work hours at
defendant’s workplace]). The issue here, however, is which “enterprise” is
liable for negligently performed work. That is to say, the issue is whether an
employee was performing work on behalf of his regular employer or on behalf
of an independent, side venture.
The parties cite and discuss only two cases addressing this context:
Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th 151 which affirmed summary judgment for
an employer in this context, and PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink,
Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro, LLP (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 384 (PCO)
16
which reversed summary judgment for an employer. Both cases turn
principally on their facts, and we discuss each in turn.
Baptist held that a winery was not vicariously liable for a car accident
involving one of its employees who was driving to pick up grapes to make his
own wine label, even though the employee was allowed to make small batches
of wine for personal use and was using some of the winery’s equipment (some
wine barrels) to transport the grapes. (See Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 162-169.) The court noted that nobody at the winery had given him
permission to use the equipment or knew he was doing that, and he did not
tell anyone at the winery about the accident because he didn’t think it
concerned the winery because he was not working for the winery at the time
of the accident. (Id. at p. 163.) The court concluded that although the
employee was traveling to pick up grapes, “he was not ‘ “engaged in the
enterprise undertaken by his employer,” ’ but rather was procuring grapes for
making his own stock of wine.” (Ibid.) It explained, “He was not on any
‘special errand’ for his employer, but was on a personal errand for his own
benefit on his own time. His trip . . . was not in pursuit of his employment
duties and responsibilities as assistant winemaker at the Winery. He had
not yet started his work day for the Winery. [Citation.] Nor was this a
situation where the employee was attending to his own business and the
business of his employer at the same time. [Citation.] [His] wine was for his
own use and for gifts to family and friends. It was not distributed or sold
through the Winery and did not produce any profit for the Winery business.
In sum, the ‘main purpose’ of [the employee’s] trip to Gilroy . . . was not to
further the employer’s enterprise, but to procure grapes for himself.” (Ibid.)
Baptist also rejected the plaintiff’s arguments that there were multiple
triable issues of fact, including as to whether the employee’s personal
17
winemaking benefitted the employer in various ways so as to create vicarious
liability. (See Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 163-169.) For example,
it held the fact that the employee’s personal winemaking helped him improve
his winemaking skills was “not the type of tangible benefit that can provide
the nexus necessary to bring [his] conduct at the time of the accident within
the course and scope of his employment,” because “any benefit to the Winery
from [his] improving his skills by making his own wine could be derived only
indirectly and over time.” (Id. at pp. 164, 165.) The employee
“was . . . engaged in an errand of his own at the time of the accident” and so
“[e]ven if there was some benefit the employer might ultimately derive from
[him] improving his own winemaking abilities, the purpose of his trip . . . was
purely personal and his employer thus cannot be vicariously liable.” (Id. at
pp. 165-166.) Baptist also rejected as “entirely speculative and
thus . . . ‘insufficient to establish a triable issue of material fact’ ” the
plaintiff’s contention that the employee’s side winemaking venture could
generate a profit for the winery. (Id. at p. 166.)
By contrast, PCO, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th 384, reversed a grant of
summary judgment to a law firm and one of its non-equity partners. The
partner, Shapiro, had allegedly assisted associates of a client he had
represented in criminal proceedings in secreting funds the client had
unlawfully obtained. (Id. at pp. 388-389.) The plaintiffs contended that in
representing the client and arranging to take the client’s funds, Shapiro was
acting on behalf of the law firm, whereas the firm contended Shapiro had
been acting on behalf of a criminal law practice he maintained separate and
apart from the law firm. (Id. at p. 389.) The trial court granted summary
judgment for the law firm on the ground that when Shapiro participated in
the removal and use of cash from the client’s residence he was acting outside
18
the scope of his duties as a partner of the law firm. (Id. at p. 390.) The
appellate court reversed because, despite undisputed evidence that the
monies paid to date for the representation had been payable directly to
Shapiro and deposited into his personal bank accounts, the plaintiffs had
raised a triable issue of fact by submitting correspondence and records of
court appearances indicating Shapiro had been acting on behalf of the firm
when he represented the client.9 (Id. at pp. 389, 392.) Based on that
evidence, the court observed, a reasonable trier of fact could find Shapiro
acted in his capacity as a member of the law firm and at the client’s request
to protect the funds, from which the client’s bail and the firm’s legal fees
would be paid. (Id. at p. 390.) It reasoned that “both are activities ‘typical of
or broadly incidental’ to the practice of a white-collar criminal defense lawyer
[citation] and therefore sufficient to render the [law] [f]irm liable under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.” (Id. at p. 394.)
“ ‘Ordinarily, the determination whether an employee has acted within
the scope of employment presents a question of fact; it becomes a question of
law, however, when “the facts are undisputed and no conflicting inferences
are possible.” ’ ” (Farmers, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1019.) As next discussed,
that is the case here.
9 The evidence also included the firm’s website promoting Shapiro as
head of its white-collar criminal defense practice, a retainer agreement
between the client and the firm relating to the criminal charges against the
client, bills for outstanding costs sent by the firm to the client and Shapiro’s
use of the firm’s letterhead in corresponding with the federal prosecutor
about the client’s criminal case. (PCO, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 392-
393.)
19
B. Rode’s Evidence
The trial court correctly concluded that Rode’s evidence demonstrated
that Klosowski was not acting within the course and scope of his employment
when he performed the flooring work for Rauch.
Here, as in Baptist, Rode’s evidence showed that Klosowski carried on
the flooring work as a personal pursuit, wholly independent of his work for
Rode. Its evidence demonstrated there was no contract of any kind between
Rode and Rauch for the flooring work; the estimates, invoices and payments
were in Klosowski’s name alone; Rode was not compensated for the work and
knew nothing about it; Klosowski did not follow internal protocols for
treating this as a contract he secured for Rode (such as using Rode
letterhead, entering the contract into Rode’s system and depositing payments
into Rode’s bank account); and Klosowski undertook the work not as part of
his job responsibilities but for his own personal purposes. In these
circumstances, Rode carried its burden as the moving party, and the burden
shifted to Rauch to show a triable issue of one or more material facts bearing
on whether Klosowski was acting in the course of his employment for Rode.
(See Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 163.) Other authorities are in
accord, and Rauch does not meaningfully distinguish any of them.10 (See
Marez, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 582 [ride-share operator not vicariously
10 At best, he asserts that, unlike in Baptist and Marez, there is
evidence Klosowski procured the work through Gouveia, “who had hired Rode
multiple times before” and so “it is at least inferable that Rode benefited from
Klosowski maintaining such a commercial relationship with Gouveia.” We
are not persuaded. The point is supported by no discussion of any legal
authority and warrants no discussion. Further, it is precisely the kind of
intangible, speculative “benefit” that Baptist held insufficient to withstand
summary judgment. (See Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at pp. 164-166.)
20
liable for accident involving employee driving company-loaned car; evidence
was undisputed driver “was engaged in a purely personal activity at the time
of the accident” and so there was “no connection” between his actions at the
time of the alleged tort and employer’s business]; Slater, supra, 62 Cal.App.
668 [taxi company not vicariously liable for accident where evidence was
undisputed cab driver picked up passengers after working hours for personal
gain and there was no evidence of any benefit to taxi company; affirming
order denying new trial and judgment for employer after bench trial].)
C. Rauch’s Evidence
We also agree with the trial court that Rauch failed to submit sufficient
evidence to create a triable issue of fact on this issue.
Relying on PCO, Rauch contends that the absence of any payment to
Rode is not dispositive of the issue. He asserts there is a triable issue of fact
as to whether Klosowski was acting in the scope of his employment for Rode
based primarily on evidence that Klosowski was an employee and officer of
Rode at all times, used Rode’s license to do the work, carried out a line of
work identical to that of his employer, and used Rode’s “normal channels
of . . . business” to carry out the work (including Rode’s showroom, vendors
and subcontractors); Klosowski failed to correct statements by Gouveia to
third parties that Rode was the contractor on the job; and the mailing
address on the written estimate Klosowski gave Rauch was Klosowski’s home
address that Klosowski also used to carry out business for Rode.
We are not persuaded. Using an employer’s resources does not make
an employer vicariously liable (Musgrove, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 708;
Slater, supra, 62 Cal.App. at pp. 671-672) nor does working in the same line
of business, as Baptist illustrates. The issue, as in Baptist and PCO, is
whether the employee was acting in pursuit of the employer’s interests at the
21
time of the tort or in pursuit of a side business. “[T]he dispositive question is
what was the primary purpose of the activity that produced the injury.”
(Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 165; accord, PCO, supra,
150 Cal.App.4th at p. 394 [issue is whether reasonable jury could conclude
employee’s actions were intended “at least indirectly to serve the interests of
[employer]”].)
Rauch cites no evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that
Klosowski was working for Rode when he performed the flooring work rather
than for himself. Unlike in PCO, there is no evidence of any contract
between Rode and Rauch, no evidence Klosowski did anything in Rode’s
name or on its letterhead, and no evidence from which a trier of fact could
infer that Klosowski made any attempt to get Rode paid for the work he
personally performed. Moreover, Rode introduced undisputed evidence about
the purpose of this work: Klosowski testified he picked up the work as a side
job during the pandemic to earn extra income.
At best, Rauch points to some evidence that third parties, including
Gouveia, thought Rode was involved in the flooring work (based only on their
past experiences with Klosowski), and that Klosowski thought he could
operate independently under Rode’s contractor’s license. But Rauch cites no
legal authority suggesting such circumstances are of any legal significance for
purposes of determining whether Klosowski’s torts were committed within
the actual course and scope of his employment for Rode.11
11 We note there is no evidence Rode knew and allowed Klosowski to
use its contractor’s license for the flooring work at issue here, nor indeed for
any work that inured solely to Klosowski’s financial benefit. And even if
there had been such evidence, it would not be dispositive. Even the holder of
a professional license who knowingly allows a third party to operate under its
license is not absolutely liable for the third party’s conduct. (Associated
22
Although Rauch does not focus on them, we also note that some of the
third-party invoices he introduced in opposition to summary judgment
contain scattered references to Rode. Rauch wisely does not contend that a
handful of documents from other contractors creates a triable issue of fact.12
Accordingly, Rauch has failed to demonstrate the trial court erred in
granting judgment as a matter of law for Rode on the negligence cause of
action under respondeat superior principles.
III.
Agency
Next, Rauch argues there are triable issues of material fact showing
Rode is responsible for Klosowski’s negligence, breaches of contract and
breaches of implied warranty because he was Rode’s ostensible agent. As
such, Rauch argues, he had ostensible authority to be hired and work on the
project on Rode’s behalf.
There are two types of agency under California law: actual and
ostensible. Actual agency exists “when the agent is really employed by the
principal.” (Civ. Code, § 2299; see also id., § 2316 [“[a]ctual authority is such
Creditors’ Agency v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 374, 402.) Rather, “the fact that
the license is so used [with permission] is one factor to be considered in
determining whether there was an ostensible agency” (ibid.), which is a
separate theory we address infra.
12 In light of the undisputed evidence we have discussed, including
that all the invoices and estimates for the flooring work were in Klosowski’s
personal name, there were never any communications by Rode or Klosowski
to Rauch or to those working on Rauch’s behalf (i.e., Gouveia and Pickles)
that Rode was the flooring contractor Rauch had hired, no contract between
Rode and Rauch, and undisputed evidence Rode had no knowledge of the
project whatsoever, no rational jury could infer on the basis of a handful of
unauthenticated third-party invoices that Klosowski undertook this project
as part of his job responsibilities for Rode.
23
as a principal intentionally confers upon the agent, or . . . allows the agent to
believe himself to possess”].) By contrast, ostensible agency exists “when the
principal intentionally, or by want of ordinary care, causes a third person to
believe another to be his agent who is not really employed by him.” (Id.,
§ 2300 (italics added); see also id., § 2317 [“[o]stensible authority is such as a
principal, intentionally or by want of ordinary care, causes or allows a third
person to believe the agent to possess”].)
Below, the only agency theory Rauch raised in opposition to the
summary judgment motion was that Klosowski had actual authority to
contract, and did contract, on Rode’s behalf, but he does not reprise that
argument on appeal and thus has abandoned it. He did not oppose the
summary judgment motion in the trial court on a theory of ostensible agency,
and it is too late for him to do so now. “In a summary judgment appeal, a
party is ordinarily not permitted to change her position and adopt a new and
different theory.” (Olson v. La Jolla Neurological Associates (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 723, 739 [apparent agency theory not raised in opposition to
summary judgment held forfeited]; see also, e.g., Nicoletti v. Kest (2023)
97 Cal.App.5th 140, 147 [“[b]ecause [appellant] did not make the argument in
the summary judgment proceedings below, the argument is forfeited on
appeal”]; Baptist, supra, 143 Cal.App.4th at p. 171.) This is especially so
where, as here, the new theory turns on issues of fact not presented below.
(LaChapelle v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 977, 983;
see Kaplan v. Coldwell Banker Residential Affiliates, Inc. (1997)
59 Cal.App.4th 741, 748 [existence of ostensible agency is question of fact].)13
We thus decline to consider the ostensible agency theory.
13 Ostensible agency must rest on actions undertaken by the principal
that mislead a third party, not actions undertaken by the ostensible agent.
24
IV.
Labor Code Section 2750.5
Finally, Rauch argues that Klosowski is presumptively Rode’s employee
on the project under Labor Code section 2750.5. That statute provides, in
relevant part, “There is a rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of
proof that a worker performing services for which a license is required
pursuant to Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 7000) of Division 3 of the
Business and Professions Code, or who is performing such services for a
person who is required to obtain such a license is an employee rather than an
independent contractor.” (Lab. Code, § 2750.5.)
As Rode points out, this theory was not raised below either and so it too
is forfeited. We decline Rauch’s invitation to consider it for the first time on
appeal.
Finally, Rauch asserts that the trial court committed numerous errors
of law, and improperly weighed the evidence. Our independent review of the
record persuades us that the material evidence concerning the legal issues
Rauch has raised on appeal was not in dispute nor subject to conflicting
inferences, and judgment for Rode was warranted as a matter of law for the
reasons already stated.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs.
(See Civ. Code, §§ 2300, 2317; Emery v. Visa Internat. Service Assn. (2002)
95 Cal.App.4th 952, 961.) Rauch cites no evidence that Rode did anything to
create the impression that Klosowski had authority to enter into the flooring
contract on Rode’s behalf.
25
STEWART, P. J.
We concur.
MILLER, J.
DESAUTELS, J.
Rauch v. Rode Bros., Inc. (A167265)
26
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