CourtListener 10295573•People v. Phang CA1/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/17/24 P. v. Phang CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A169398
v. (Sonoma County
VINH THE PHANG, Super. Ct. No. SCR-14675-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
Vinh The Phang was convicted by a jury of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a)) and sentenced to 25 years to life in prison.1
Phang sought resentencing under section 1172.6.2 After issuing an
order to show cause on the petition and conducting an evidentiary hearing,
the trial court denied the resentencing petition as it found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Phang could still be convicted of first degree murder.
On appeal, Phang challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
court’s findings. We affirm.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95
to section 1172.6, with no substantive changes in the statute. (Stats. 2022
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section 1172.6 throughout
this opinion for ease of reference.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The procedural summary is taken from the opinion from Division Two
of this court in Phang’s direct appeal (People v. Phang (Aug. 4, 1989,
A042181) [nonpub. opn.] (Phang I)) and our more recent opinion on Phang’s
petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage (People v. Phang (Dec. 8,
2022, A165099) [nonpub. opn.] (Phang II)).
The factual summary, however, is based on the evidence adduced at
Phang’s trial which was considered by the trial court. We limit our summary
to those facts relevant to the issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial court
erred in denying Phang’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition.3
General Background
In 1987, Phang was charged by information with first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) for the killing of Johnny Fong, a wealthy businessman from
Hong Kong whose brother was married to Phang’s sister. The information
contained a section 12022.5 allegation that Phang personally used a firearm
in the commission of the offense.
A jury trial took place in early 1988. The jury found Phang guilty of
first degree murder but found not true the section 12022.5 allegation.
Trial Evidence
Fong was a wealthy businessman who lived primarily in Hong Kong
but spent a few weeks per year at his family’s estate in Hillsborough,
California. Fong owned a brown BMW that he kept parked in the driveway
of the Hillsborough estate when he was not in town. He was known to carry
a wallet with him that at times contained large sums of cash up to $2,000.
3 For purposes of our analysis, we, like the trial court, do not take from
or rely on the factual histories set forth in either of the prior opinions. (See
People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 292–293.)
2
Fong was also known to wear a gold Rolex watch on his left wrist when he
resided in Hillsborough.
Fong’s brother was married to Phang’s sister. On three separate
occasions between 1981 and 1983, Phang stayed with members of the Fong
family at their Hillsborough estate (where Fong’s BMW was generally parked
in the driveway). Phang met Fong in 1982 at the Hillsborough estate during
one of Fong’s trips from Hong Kong.
In December 1986, Phang very briefly worked at a restaurant in
Missouri. In March 1987, the restaurant owner’s house was burglarized.
Among the items taken in the burglary were a Browning .380 automatic gun
and ammunition, as well as the checkbook of a student who was living in the
house. The afternoon of the burglary, Phang went to multiple banks to cash
or attempt to cash the student’s stolen checks, for which Phang was charged
with two counts of forgery in Missouri.
Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent dates refer to 1987.
By April, Phang had returned to the West Coast and was with his
sister in Seattle. On April 30, Phang rented a car in Seattle with unlimited
mileage. On May 8, Phang was pulled over in that rental car and cited for
speeding on a highway near Fresno, California. Phang told the officer he was
driving to Los Angeles.
On May 11, Fong returned to the United States from Hong Kong and
arrived at his family’s Hillsborough estate. He spent the night of May 16 at
his friend’s house; Fong and his friend agreed that Fong would sell his BMW
to the friend on May 21 at the friend’s place of work in Petaluma. Only one
other person (not involved in the events recounted here) knew of that plan.
3
On May 19, Phang was again cited for speeding, this time on Highway
101 less than two miles from the Hillsborough estate. Phang told the officer
he was on the way to the airport and appeared to be in a rush.
On May 21, Fong left the Hillsborough estate for Petaluma in the BMW
around 9:00 a.m. Fong was carrying his wallet and wearing his Rolex watch,
then worth around $5,000. Fong’s friend was at his place of work in
Petaluma expecting Fong to arrive in the BMW around 10:15 a.m.; he looked
outside at that time and did not see Fong or his BMW.
Around 10:30 a.m., an employee at the Petaluma office noticed a person
underneath a brown BMW in the parking lot and went outside to investigate.
The employee found Fong face down in a pool of blood with his left arm
twisted away at an angle. Fong was later pronounced dead. Two spent .380
shell casings were found nearby. Fong’s wallet and Rolex watch were not
found at the scene or on his person. There were no eyewitnesses to Fong’s
death.
An autopsy revealed Fong had been shot twice in the back of the neck.
The bullets passed through the base of his skull, severing his brain stem and
killing him instantly. Both wounds were contact wounds, meaning that the
muzzle of the firearm was pressed against his skin at the moment of
discharge. The forensic evidence indicated his head was against the
pavement when he was shot.
From May 18 through May 22—both before and after Fong’s May 21
killing—Phang stayed at a motel in San Francisco with his brother, Cuong
The Phang, and another man they had met recently in Los Angeles, Phan
Say Phang.4 There was no evidence at trial that either Cuong or Phan had
4 For ease of comprehension, we refer to Cuong The Phang as “Cuong”
and Phan Say Phang as “Phan.”
4
met Fong, had stayed at the Hillsborough estate, or was familiar with the
BMW.
On May 28, one week after the killing, Phang attempted to cross the
border into Canada from Washington State with Cuong and Phan. Their
vehicle was referred for a search by Canadian customs officials. During the
search, officers found a loaded Browning .380 gun—with the same serial
number as the one stolen in the Missouri burglary—in the trunk and extra
.380 ammunition under one of the seats. Subsequent testing revealed the
Browning .380 was the gun used to kill Fong. Officers also found a briefcase
in the trunk that contained a gold Rolex watch; the watch was later
determined to be Fong’s. Inside that same briefcase, officers also found other
items stolen during the Missouri burglary, as well as Phang’s speeding
citations noted above.
Phang was placed under arrest for smuggling the gun. When the
arresting officer took handcuffs out of his pocket, Phang fled on foot toward
the border. He was later caught by U.S. Customs agents. Cuong and Phan
did not attempt to flee.
Jury Instructions, Verdict, Sentence, and Direct Appeal
The prosecution theory was that Fong had been stalked from the
Hillsborough estate to Petaluma to be robbed and that he was executed to
prevent him from identifying Phang, whom he knew, as his assailant.
(Phang I, supra, at p. 5.) The jury was instructed on three theories of first
degree murder: (1) Phang was the direct perpetrator of the murder; (2) he
was a direct aider and abettor of the murder; and (3) he was guilty under a
felony murder theory, with robbery as the underlying felony. The jury was
not instructed on the (now invalid) natural and probable consequences theory
of aiding and abetting.
5
The jury found Phang guilty of first degree murder. However, it did not
find true the section 12022.5 allegation that Phang personally used a firearm
in the commission of the offense.5
The trial court sentenced Phang to 25 years to life in prison. In 1989,
Division Two of this court affirmed Phang’s conviction on direct appeal.
(Phang I, supra, at p. 12.)
Resentencing Petition Proceedings
In 2021, Phang petitioned for resentencing under section 1172.6.
(Phang II, supra, at p. 4.) He asserted in relevant part that he was charged
and convicted of murder under either the felony murder law or the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, and that he could not currently be
convicted of first degree felony murder because of changes to section 189 as
he was not the actual killer, did not aid and abet the actual killer in the
commission of murder in the first degree, and was not a major participant in
the felony or did not act with reckless indifference to human life. (Id. at
pp. 3–4.) The trial court denied the petition on the basis that Phang had not
made a prima facie case showing he was entitled to resentencing. (Id. at
p. 4.)
In 2022, we reversed and remanded for the trial court to issue an order
to show cause and conduct a hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d), as Phang’s petition was facially sufficient and alleged the essential facts
necessary to establish a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief. (Phang
II, supra, at pp. 8–9.)
5 As to the allegation, the verdict form read: “We, the Jury, further find
that said Defendant personally used/did not use a firearm, to wit, a .380 Cal.
Pistol, within the meaning of Penal Code Section 12022.5.”
6
Upon remand, in 2023, the trial court issued an order to show cause
and set a hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (d). The prosecution filed
a return to the order to show cause, asserting the evidence showed Phang
was guilty of first degree murder under a theory of law that remained valid,
either as a direct aider and abettor of Fong’s murder or under a felony
murder theory.
On September 5, 2023, the trial court held the section 1172.6
evidentiary hearing. Without objection, the prosecution introduced the
following evidence at the hearing: (1) the criminal complaint; (2) the
preliminary hearing transcripts; (3) all exhibits introduced at the preliminary
hearing; (4) the Information; (5) the jury trial transcripts; (6) all exhibits
introduced at the jury trial; (7) the jury instructions given; (8) the jury
verdicts; (9) all stipulations reached during the prosecution of the case; and
(10) the abstract of judgment. Neither party presented new evidence at the
hearing. The prosecution asserted Phang was the “linchpin” of the plan to
rob and kill Fong and was critical to the planning and execution, having set it
in motion and provided the murder weapon. It argued he was guilty of first
degree murder under current law as the direct aider and abettor or under a
felony murder theory as a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
On December 4, 2023, the trial court denied the resentencing petition.
In its order, the court made factual findings based on its assessment of the
trial evidence, consistent with the above factual recitation. Based on those
facts, the trial court found Phang guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first
degree murder on two independent bases valid under current law: (1) as a
direct aider and abettor of the murder, and (2) under a felony murder theory.
7
First, the court found the evidence, although largely circumstantial,
showed Phang directly aided and abetted the murder under an express
malice theory:6
“The evidence indicates that petitioner was instrumental in
planning the robbery and murder. It was petitioner who knew the
victim, knew that he had money and valuables to steal, and knew
where Mr. Fong lived and what kind of vehicle he drove. It was
petitioner who had the means and opportunity to commit the
robbery and murder. There is circumstantial evidence that
petitioner was at the scene of the murder, as he was the one
familiar with Mr. Fong and his presence would be instrumental in
identifying Mr. Fong as the target of the crime. Additionally,
petitioner was in possession of Mr. Fong’s Rolex watch when he
was apprehended at the Canadian border, further indicating that
petitioner was present at the scene of the murder. Petitioner was
also in possession of the murder weapon and matching
ammunition before and after the murder, and petitioner had
previously obtained the firearm by way of a burglary months
earlier. Thus, it is sufficiently clear that petitioner provided the
murder weapon and the ammunition to be used, and that
petitioner was present at the scene of the murder.
“The evidence indicates that the motive of the murder was
robbery, and that petitioner’s participation was necessary because
he was the one who could recognize the victim and his car. The
evidence indicates that, in the days prior to the murder, petitioner
engaged in stalking/surveillance of Mr. Fong, as petitioner was
cited for speeding within a couple of miles of Mr. Fong’s residence.
“The evidence indicates that the murder was a premeditated
and intentional execution style murder, and that the plan was for
it to be an execution style murder, and that petitioner shared the
intent to commit a premeditated murder. Since petitioner and Mr.
Fong were relatives and familiar with each other, the reasonable
inference is that the execution style shooting of Mr. Fong was done
to prevent Mr. Fong from being able to identify petitioner as one of
the principles in the robbery. Thus, the evidence indicates that
petitioner shared the premeditated intent to kill. For purposes of
6 The court did not reach the issue of whether Phang was guilty under
an implied malice theory of aiding and abetting.
8
finding guilt, this Court need not specifically identify who was the
‘actual shooter.’
“The evidence further indicates that petitioner’s flight to
Washington State and to Canada after the murder was because he
had participated in the commission of the murder as a direct aider
and abettor with express malice. The evidence also indicates that
the reason petitioner sought to flee upon being apprehended at the
border was because he knew evidence seized from his vehicle tied
him directly to the murder.”
Second, the court found Phang guilty under a felony murder theory
because he was a major participant in the robbery and acted with reckless
indifference to human life, as defined under current law. The court found he
played a major role in planning the robbery, provided the gun, was present at
the scene, and chose not to call it off. On appeal, Phang does not contest the
trial court’s finding that he was a major participant.
As to reckless indifference, the court found:
“Petitioner knew that the gun he had stolen would be used
during the robbery. Petitioner was at the scene of the murder and
had an opportunity to stop both the robbery and the murder. As
indicated earlier, this Court finds that execution style murder was
planned as part of the robbery to avoid the robbery victim
identifying petitioner. Thus, petitioner was aware of the likelihood
of a killing during the robbery. Petitioner made no efforts to
minimize the possibility of violence during the robbery and did not
render any aid to the victim after the shooting. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds that petitioner acted with ‘reckless
indifference’ to human life.”
9
DISCUSSION
Phang contends substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
finding that he is guilty of first degree murder under current law. We
disagree and affirm.
I. Applicable Law
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 ‘to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
959.) The Legislature accomplished this in part by amending statutes related
to the felony murder rule (§ 189) and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine (§ 188).7 (Lewis, at p. 959.)
Section 189, as amended, limits liability under a felony murder theory
to “actual killer[s]” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)), those who, “with the intent to kill,”
aid or abet “the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree”
(id., subd. (e)(2)), and those who were “major participant[s] in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2” (id., subd. (e)(3)). (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).)
Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure for those previously convicted
of murder under the former law to seek retroactive relief under the law as
amended by filing a petition under section 1172.6. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
7 The amendment to section 188 is not at issue here as the jury was not
instructed on the natural and probable consequences theory at Phang’s trial,
as previously noted.
10
at p. 708; § 1172.6.) To obtain relief under section 1172.6, a person convicted
of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine must show in relevant part that he “could not presently be convicted
of murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
In ruling on a resentencing petition, the trial court determines whether
the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is
guilty of murder under a theory that remains valid after the amendments to
the substantive definition of murder. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3); People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 952 (Vargas)).
We review the trial court’s factual findings for substantial evidence and
the court’s application of the law to those facts de novo. (People v. Wilson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 903, 916.) Under the substantial evidence standard,
“ ‘ “we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” [Citation.] We
determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Vargas, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) In making that determination, we presume every fact
in support of the judgment the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the
evidence. (Ibid.)
“Substantial evidence . . . ‘ “includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ” (Vargas, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) Hence, regardless of whether the prosecution relied
upon direct or circumstantial evidence, “if the trier of fact’s determination is
11
supported, reversal is not warranted, even where ‘ “ ‘the circumstances might
also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hill
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1066.)
With this legal framework in mind, we address the trial court’s finding
that Phang could still be convicted of first degree murder on a felony murder
theory and conclude it is supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we
shall affirm on that basis, and we do not address the court’s aiding and
abetting finding.
II. Felony Murder – Major Participant Acting with Reckless
Indifference
First degree felony murder occurs when a murder is committed in the
perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain enumerated felonies,
including robbery. (§ 189, subd. (a).) As previously noted, a defendant can be
convicted of first degree felony murder under current law if he was a major
participant in the underlying enumerated felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (Id., subd. (e)(3).)
When the Legislature amended section 189 pursuant to Senate Bill
1437 to incorporate the major participation and reckless indifference
requirements into the felony murder doctrine, it codified the California
Supreme Court’s interpretations of the major participant requirement in
People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and the reckless indifference
requirement in People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 710.) As Phang concedes there was substantial evidence that
he was a major participant in the robbery that led to the murder, we address
his challenge to the court’s reckless indifference finding.
“Reckless indifference to human life is ‘implicit in knowingly engaging
in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.’ ” (In re Scoggins
12
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 676.) This “encompasses both subjective and objective
elements.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) The subjective element
concerns a defendant’s “conscious disregard of risks known to him.” (Ibid.)
The objective element concerns whether that disregard “ ‘involved a gross
deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person in the
actor’s situation would observe.’ ” (Ibid.)
In Clark, the Court identified the following nonexhaustive
considerations when determining whether a defendant acted with reckless
indifference to human life, including: whether he knew a weapon would be
used or used a weapon himself; whether he was physically present at the
crime and had an opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim; the
duration of crime; whether he knew of a cohort’s likelihood of killing; and
whether he attempted to minimize the risk of violence during the felony.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618–623.) “ ‘[T]he greater the defendant’s
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Id. at p. 615.)
Phang contends he did not act with reckless indifference to human life
primarily based on his assertion that the evidence plausibly showed that he
was not present at the scene of the murder and instead gave the .380
Browning gun to Phan and Cuong for them to merely rob Fong, without
planning to kill him. However, presuming every fact in support of the
judgment the trial court could reasonably deduce from the evidence (Vargas,
supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951), substantial evidence supports the court’s
finding of reckless indifference.
The court reasonably determined the evidence showed Phang was
“instrumental” in planning the robbery, as he was the only one of out of
Phan, Cuong, and himself who knew Fong, was aware he carried money and
13
valuables to steal, and knew where Fong lived and what kind of vehicle he
drove. There was also ample evidence to support the court’s finding that
Phang provided the .380 Browning gun he had previously stolen to be used
during the robbery. Phang was apprehended at the border with the .380 gun
used to kill Fong and Fong’s Rolex watch one week after the incident and
attempted to flee when arrested, which the court reasonably found was
evidence of his guilt. Further, there is substantial evidence to support the
court’s finding that the perpetrators committed an “execution style murder”
based on the autopsy showing that Fong was lying face down on the
pavement when he was shot twice in the back of the neck and instantly
killed.
These facts were sufficient to conclude Phang knowingly engaged in a
criminal activity known to carry a grave risk of death. (In re Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 676.) Phang’s planning and involvement were indispensable
to the robbery. He not only knew a gun would be used but provided that gun.
(See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The “execution style murder” also
indicates the killing was not merely a result of an unexpected struggle during
the robbery but an instance where Fong’s death was either planned or, at the
very least, likely to occur. (See id. at p. 621.) Additionally, even crediting
Phang’s assertion that the evidence did not conclusively show he was at the
scene of the crime, his lack of presence would not preclude a finding that he
acted with reckless indifference. (See id. at p. 618 [noting “ ‘no one of these
considerations is necessary’ ” for a finding of reckless indifference].)
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, as we must, we conclude a rational trier of fact could find that
Phang acted with reckless indifference to human life by consciously
disregarding known risks of robbing a family member, and grossly deviating
14
from the standard of conduct of a law-abiding person by planning the scheme,
providing the gun, and participating significantly in a robbery that led to an
execution style murder. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 615, 617;
Vargas, supra, 84 Cal.App.5th at p. 951.) Accordingly, we reject Phang’s
challenge to the court’s reckless indifference finding.
As the trial court’s felony murder finding was alone sufficient to deny
Phang’s resentencing petition, we need not, and do not, reach the court’s
finding that Phang was guilty of murder on an express malice aiding and
abetting theory.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Phang’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition is
affirmed.
15
PETROU, J.
WE CONCUR:
TUCHER, P. J.
FUJISAKI, J.
A169398/People v. Phang
16
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