CourtListener 10294485•Hudson v. Regency Air CA4/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/17/24 Hudson v. Regency Air CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
ALEXA HUDSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G062534
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2020-
01143610)
REGENCY AIR, LLC,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
James L. Crandall, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Office of Corbett H. Williams and Corbett H. Williams for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Cone & Kassel and John A. Cone, Jr., for Defendant and
Respondent.
Plaintiff Alexa Hudson was employed by defendant Regency Air,
LLC (Regency Air), where she was paid a salary, worked Monday through
Friday in the office, and sometimes was on call during the weekend.
Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded Hudson, inter alia, overtime
compensation for the hours she worked while on call. On appeal, Hudson
argues the trial court should have awarded her overtime compensation for
the entire time she was on call. She also argues the trial court erred in
denying waiting time penalties under Labor Code section 203 (all
undesignated statutory references are to this code) and denying liquidated
damages under section 1194.2. We disagree and conclude the trial court did
not err. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Regency Air is a private jet chartering business. From August
2018 to July 2019, Hudson worked as a finance assistant and charter sales
representative at Regency Air. She was paid an annual salary of $45,000,
plus $100 per charter booking. She worked at Regency Air’s facility at John
Wayne Airport Monday through Friday.
Hudson also occasionally was on call. Hudson’s employment offer
letter, which she signed, stated the following regarding on-call shifts: “As
part of my job duties, I am scheduled to work an on-call shift during every
other week. This was explained to me at the time I was hired. The work
performed during this on-call period consists of answering the phone after
business hours, and if necessary, inputting scheduling information remotely
on the company iPad. The amount of actual work performed during my on-
call shift varies[,] but it can range from a minimal amount of time, to as
much as 15 hours per week. I understand that I will immediately notify my
supervisor in writing at any time in which my on-call hours reach 15 hours in
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any single week. [¶] When I am on[ ]call, I am not required to be at the
Regency Air offices, and I am generally unrestricted as to my activities. I am
free to shop, go to dinner, sleep, and generally go any place or perform my
own pursuits, provided that I am sober and can receive a call and otherwise
communicate on my mobile phone, and, if necessary, remotely access the
company computer within a reasonable period of time. With permission from
my supervisor, and at the discretion of [Regency Air,] I may also be permitted
to change on-call schedules with other employees in order to permit flexibility
to engage in personal activities. [¶] I understood at the time that I was hired,
that performing on-call duties was part of my job requirements. I also
understand and agree that my compensation is intended to include and
compensate me for the estimated time I would actually work while on[ ]call in
an amount up to 15 hours for each week.”
In May 2020, Hudson filed her complaint against Regency Air.
Hudson asserted causes of action for: (1) failure to pay minimum, straight,
and overtime wages in violation of sections 510, 1194, and 1197; (2) failure to
pay meal break premiums in violation of sections 226.7 and 512, subdivision
(a); (3) failure to pay rest break premiums in violation of section 226.7;
(4) failure to furnish wage statements consistent with the requirements of
section 226; (5) failure to reimburse necessary expenses in violation of section
2802; (6) failure to timely pay all wages due upon termination in violation of
sections 201, 202, and 203; and (7) unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business
practices in violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.
In April 2022, the trial court granted summary adjudication in
favor of Hudson on two issues: (1) Regency Air owed a duty to pay overtime
compensation to Hudson in 2019 because she was a nonexempt employee (the
trial court did not rule on whether she was such in 2018); and (2) Regency Air
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owed a duty to reimburse Hudson a reasonable amount for her cell phone
cost. The summary adjudication briefing is not in the record on appeal.
In July 2022, the case proceeded to a bench trial. Hudson
testified, inter alia, an on-call shift typically, but not always, was from
Saturday at 8:00 a.m. until Monday at 8:00 a.m. When Hudson was on call,
calls to the Regency Air phone number would be transferred to her cell
phone. She said she was expected to answer calls immediately and would
have been reprimanded if she did not. Hudson stated she also had other tasks
while on call, including flight tracking, communicating with pilots,
monitoring and sending e-mails, and trying to book new charters (which
entailed monitoring an industry service and creating quotes). She stated 15
hours was a “very conservative estimate” for how many hours she spent
actively working while on call, and she estimated for an on-call day she would
on average actively work from 6 to 12 to 14 hours a day.
Hudson also testified “[p]hone calls were the least time extensive
part of [her] job.” On direct examination, she testified calls at 3:00 a.m. were
“still pretty common because of [their] east coast clients[,]” but on cross-
examination, she testified a 3:00 a.m. call was “not super common” and she
could specifically remember three calls that came in between midnight and
5:00 a.m. Hudson added she was “not saying there was not more, but in the
seven months that [she] was on call, [she] specifically remember[ed] three.”
Hudson further testified she was not required to go into the office
while on call, but she believed she had to be within an hour of the airport
while on call based on a conversation with Karli Swarez, another employee.
Hudson said typically while on call she “stayed home the entire weekend”
because she “was terrified of not having service, not being near [her]
computer, of being anywhere that would make [her] miss a quote that [she]
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had to make, a pilot having a question, or driving through a spotty part of
town that didn’t have service and [she] would miss an important phone call.”
Regency Air called two of its employees, Swarez and Nicole
Worley, to testify. Swarez testified, inter alia, she was generally unrestricted
in her activities and was free to shop, go to dinner, and sleep while on call.
She said she did not believe she had ever spent more than 11 hours working
on a weekend on-call shift, and she could not envision a scenario where it
took Hudson more than 15 hours to complete any of the tasks she was
assigned while on a weekend on-call shift. Swarez further testified, while she
generally would save travelling for when she was not on call, she had
travelled before while on call. Swarez said she did not recall advising Hudson
that Hudson had to remain within one hour of the airport while on call.
However, Swarez stated there was a weekend where she was frustrated as
people were calling her directly while Hudson was on call and in San Diego,
and although she did not remember the details of the conversation, “it makes
sense [Swarez] probably told [Hudson] she shouldn’t be driving so far away,
or something like that.” But Swarez noted Hudson knew Swarez went places,
and Swarez did not “know how [Hudson] would come to think” there was a
rule on geographic limitations.
Worley testified, inter alia, she had “done many things on[ ]call,
gone to many different places and been able to do all the work that is needed
for on[ ]call while engaging fully in [her] personal life.” She said she believed
a person could do almost everything while on call as long as the person had
cell phone reception and was sober. She testified she never worked more than
15 hours while on call and had never heard someone say they were required
to work more than 15 hours while on call. Worley also stated, to her
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knowledge, there is no requirement to being within one hour of the airport
while on call.
In August 2022, the trial court issued its proposed statement of
decision, and Hudson filed certain objections. In September 2022, the trial
court issued its final statement of decision. The trial court stated, inter alia,
“[t]hroughout trial, the parties presented sharply divergent versions of many
of the key events and facts. The [trial] [c]ourt’s findings and conclusions thus
necessarily reflect its evaluation and determination of the credibility of each
of the witnesses who testified.” The trial court found the signed employment
offer letter was a contract of employment and Hudson “was fully
compensated for all her straight time hours per the employment agreement.”
The trial court noted “[t]he key issue in the case is whether
California law requires [Regency Air] to pay [Hudson] for all or some of her
on-call time as overtime.” Given the trial court’s determination Hudson was
nonexempt,1 the trial court found Hudson’s salary was “deemed to cover only
her regular, non-overtime hours” pursuant to section 515, subdivision (d)(2),
and “Regency Air cannot rely on the terms of the employment agreement it
authored to avoid payment of overtime compensation.”
Although the trial court found Hudson was on call for a total of
981.5 hours, it found she was “not entitled to overtime pay for 100% of the on-
call time.” Instead, the trial court noted it “must focus on the extent of the
employer’s control over the employee’s activities.” It further stated the
employment agreement, while not controlling, “suggests the time need[ed] to
1 As discussed, ante, the trial court had determined on summary
adjudication Hudson was nonexempt in 2019, and it determined in its
statement of decision Hudson was nonexempt in 2018. At the start of trial,
Regency Air stated it would not be proceeding with an exemption defense.
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perform the on-call duties ranges from ‘minimal to 15 hours[,]’” the two other
Regency Air employees who testified said “they spent a maximum of 11 hours
per on-call shift[,]” and Hudson “admitted in her deposition that she was able
to conduct nonwork and personal activities during her on[-]call shifts.”
Ultimately, the trial court found Hudson worked 11 hours for 10 on-call shifts
and 15 hours for 9 on-call shifts in 2019, which amounted to overtime
compensation of $8,197.70, and 11 hours for 8 on-call shifts in 2018, which
amounted to overtime compensation of $2,856.48.
The trial court denied liquidated damages under section 1194.2
and denied waiting time penalties under section 203. The trial court also
awarded $765 for unreimbursed expenses, denied Hudson’s claim for
damages under section 226, and ordered Hudson’s counsel to calculate the
interest due and file a motion for attorney fees.
In April 2023, the trial court entered judgment awarding Hudson
$118,599.34, which consisted of the $11,819.18 in the statement of decision,
$95,350 in attorney fees, $4,373 in prejudgment interest, and $7,057.16 in
costs.
DISCUSSION
I.
ON-CALL TIME
The trial court concluded Hudson was not entitled to overtime
compensation for all on-call time and instead limited her overtime
compensation to the amount of time she worked while on call. Hudson
contends she should have been awarded compensation for all on-call time. We
conclude the trial court did not err.
“It is well established that an employee’s on-call or standby time
may require compensation.” (Mendiola v. CPS Security Solutions, Inc. (2015)
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60 Cal.4th 833, 840 (Mendiola).) “California courts considering whether on-
call time constitutes hours worked have primarily focused on the extent of
the employer’s control. [Citations.] Indeed, [the California Supreme Court
has] stated that ‘[t]he level of the employer’s control over its employees . . . is
determinative’ in resolving the issue.” (Ibid.)2 “Courts have identified various
factors bearing on an employer’s control during on-call time: ‘“(1) whether
there was an on-premises living requirement; (2) whether there were
excessive geographical restrictions on employee’s movements; (3) whether the
frequency of calls was unduly restrictive; (4) whether a fixed time limit for
response was unduly restrictive; (5) whether the on-call employee could easily
trade on-call responsibilities; (6) whether use of a pager could ease
restrictions; and (7) whether the employee had actually engaged in personal
activities during call-in time.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Courts have also taken
into account whether the ‘[o]n-call waiting time . . . is spent primarily for the
benefit of the employer and its business.’” (Id. at p. 841, fn. omitted; see also
Gomez v. Lincare, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 508, 523 (Gomez).) “[W]hen the
relevant facts are not in dispute, what qualifies as hours worked is a question
of law, reviewed de novo.” (Mendiola, supra, at p. 840.) However, “[w]hether
and to what extent employees are able to use on-call time for personal
activities is a question of fact.” (Seymore v. Metson Marine, Inc. (2011) 194
Cal.App.4th 361, 374, disapproved on another ground in Mendiola, supra, at
p. 846.)
2 Hudson contends, and Regency Air does not dispute, that Wage
Order 4 applies here, which defines hours worked as “the time during which
an employee is subject to the control of an employer, and includes all the time
the employee is suffered or permitted to work, whether or not required to do
so. . . .” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, § 11040, subd. (2)(K).)
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In Mendiola, the plaintiffs were guards who provided security at
construction worksites, and depending on the day, part of their work shift
was spent on active patrol and the rest was spent on call while residing in a
trailer at the worksite. (Mendiola, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 837.) The California
Supreme Court concluded all of the guards’ on-call hours were hours worked.
(Id. at p. 841.) The Court highlighted the guards “were required to ‘reside’ in
their trailers as a condition of employment[,]” “spend on-call hours in their
trailers or elsewhere at the worksite[,]” and “were obliged to respond,
immediately and in uniform, if they were contacted by a dispatcher or became
aware of suspicious activity.” (Ibid.) The Court also noted the “[g]uards could
not easily trade on-call responsibilities[,]” and “[e]ven if relieved, guards had
to report where they were going, were subject to recall, and could be no more
than 30 minutes away from the site.” (Ibid.) Moreover, the Court stated,
“[r]estrictions were placed on nonemployee visitors, pets, and alcohol use”
and “the guards’ on-call time was spent primarily for the benefit of” the
employer. (Ibid.)
Conversely, in Gomez, the plaintiffs’ job responsibilities included
transporting liquid and compressed oxygen and setting up related medical
equipment in patient homes, and there also was an on-call policy. (Gomez,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 512.) The plaintiffs argued they were “entitled to
overtime wages for the entire time they were on call during the evenings and
weekends waiting for patient calls, but when they were not actually
responding to pages telephonically or in person.” (Id. at p. 523.) A panel of
this court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument, concluding the “factors favor[ed] a
determination that the on-call waiting time did not unduly restrict plaintiffs’
ability to engage in personal activities.” (Id. at pp. 523–524.) As the court
explained, the employer “did not impose an on-site living requirement,” “did
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not impose excessive geographic restrictions on plaintiffs[,]” and “[t]he time
limits set for plaintiffs’ responses to pages—30 minutes to respond by
telephone and two hours to respond to a patient’s home—[were] not unduly
restrictive.” (Id. at p. 524) The court also noted “[o]n-call employees were
permitted to trade on-call responsibilities” and the “[p]laintiffs were provided
pagers[.]” (Ibid.) Moreover, the court underscored the “[p]laintiffs’ depositions
confirmed they had engaged in some personal activities while on call; [the
court did] not believe plaintiffs’ unilateral decisions to avoid personal
activities while on call changes the fact that they did engage in some
activities and could have continued to do so.” (Ibid.)
Here, we conclude the on-call shifts did not subject Hudson to the
control of Regency Air such that all of her on-call time—as opposed to only
the time she was working while on call—are compensable hours worked.
Notably, there was no on-premises requirement while Hudson was on call,
which is similar to Gomez and unlike Mendiola. Moreover, as the trial court
found, Hudson “admitted in her deposition that she was able to conduct
nonwork and personal activities during her on[-]call shifts.” Hudson also was
permitted to and did trade on-call shifts with other employees.
Hudson asserts the facts here are “radically different” from
Gomez because she was expected to answer calls and respond to e-mails
immediately. We are not persuaded this makes all of Hudson’s on-call time
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hours worked, notwithstanding the other factors. Indeed, as discussed, ante,
Hudson testified calls were the “least time extensive part of [her] job.”3
II.
WAITING TIME PENALTIES UNDER SECTION 203
Under section 203, subdivision (a), “[i]f an employer willfully fails
to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with [s]ections 201,
201.3, 201.5, 201.6, 201.8, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee
who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a
penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an
action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than
30 days.” However, “[u]nder long established law, an employer cannot incur
civil or criminal penalties for the willful nonpayment of wages when the
employer reasonably and in good faith disputes that wages are due.”
(Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1056, 1065
(Naranjo II).) Under the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement
regulations, “[a] good faith dispute that any wages are due will preclude
imposition of waiting time penalties under [s]ection 203.” (Cal. Code Regs.,
3 Hudson also contends “she was required to remain within a 1-
hour drive to” the airport while on call, but the testimony on whether there
was such a geographic restriction was conflicting. As Hudson did not object
on the basis that the trial court omitted a finding on a geographic restriction,
we infer an implied factual finding there was no geographic restriction. (See
Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 59–60.)
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tit. 8, § 13520.)4 “Courts have likewise uniformly recognized a good faith
defense to penalties under section 203.” (Naranjo II, supra, at p. 1078.) Here,
the trial court denied penalties under section 203, stating “[t]he statute
specifically requires the failure to pay all compensation due at the time of
discharge to be willful” and Regency Air “had a good faith belief that [its]
employment agreement was in compliance with the law.”
As an initial matter, Hudson asserts the trial court applied the
wrong test because it stated Regency Air “had a good faith belief that [its]
employment agreement was in compliance with the law.” We disagree. While
the trial court did not use the exact words “good faith dispute,” it found
Regency Air “had a good faith belief that [its] employment agreement was in
compliance with the law[,]” and if the compensation outlined in the
employment agreement complied with the law, then Regency Air would not
have owed compensation to Hudson. Additionally, some courts have referred
to a good faith belief in a defense, instead of the exact words “good faith
dispute,” when considering willfulness. (See Choate v. Celite Corp. (2013) 215
Cal.App.4th 1460, 1468 [“an employer’s reasonable, good faith belief that
wages are not owed may negate a finding of willfulness”].) Thus, we interpret
the trial court’s statement as applying the proper test for willfulness and
concluding there was a good faith dispute.
4 “A ‘good faith dispute’ that any wages are due occurs when an
employer presents a defense, based in law or fact which, if successful, would
preclude any recovery on the part of the employee. The fact that a defense is
ultimately unsuccessful will not preclude a finding that a good faith dispute
did exist. Defenses presented which, under all the circumstances, are
unsupported by any evidence, are unreasonable, or are presented in bad
faith, will preclude a finding of a ‘good faith dispute.’” (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8,
§ 13520, subd. (a).)
12
The trial court’s ruling on a good faith dispute is reviewed for
substantial evidence. (See Naranjo v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 937, 946 (Naranjo I).) “When a party raises a substantial
evidence challenge, a reviewing court begins with the ‘“presumption that the
record contains evidence to sustain every finding of fact.”’ [Citation.] To
overcome the trial court’s factual findings, [Hudson] must ‘“demonstrate that
there is no substantial evidence to support the challenged
findings.” . . . . Accordingly, if . . . “some particular issue of fact is not
sustained, [Hudson is] required to set forth in [her] brief all the material
evidence on the point and not merely [her] own evidence. Unless this is done
the error is deemed to be [forfeited].”’” (Ibid.)
Here, we conclude Hudson has forfeited her argument by failing
to set forth all of the material evidence as to good faith as opposed to merely
her own evidence. (See Naranjo I, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 946 [concluding
plaintiff forfeited substantial evidence challenge to a finding of good faith
dispute by “fail[ing] to point to any evidence that may have supported the
trial court’s finding”].) The parties litigated at the summary adjudication
stage whether Hudson was exempt from the duty to pay overtime in 2019,
and the trial court ultimately concluded Hudson was not exempt in 2019. But
the fact the trial court decided Hudson was a nonexempt employee in 2019 at
the summary adjudication stage means it found there was no triable issue of
material fact; it does not automatically mean Regency Air’s arguments did
not constitute a good faith dispute. Moreover, Hudson’s failure to sufficiently
set forth Regency Air’s arguments at summary adjudication is compounded
by the fact Hudson has not included in the record on appeal any of the
briefing or supporting materials from the summary adjudication stage. (See
Hernandez v. California Hospital Medical Center (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 498,
13
502 [recognizing appellant “has the burden of providing an adequate record”
and “[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the
issue be resolved against” appellant].) While the summary adjudication order
shows the trial court ultimately sided with Hudson on the exemption issue,
the full scope and strength of Regency Air’s arguments5 cannot be properly
evaluated here without the corresponding record.6
III.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER SECTION 1194.2
Under section 1194.2, subdivision (a), “[i]n any action under
[s]ection 98, 1193.6, 1194, or 1197.1 to recover wages because of the payment
of a wage less than the minimum wage fixed by an order of the commission or
by statute, an employee shall be entitled to recover liquidated damages in an
amount equal to the wages unlawfully unpaid and interest thereon. Nothing
in this subdivision shall be construed to authorize the recovery of liquidated
5 In its summary adjudication order, the trial court concluded
Hudson was a nonexempt employee in 2019 because her $45,000 salary was
not twice the minimum wage, which would have been $45,760 after the
minimum wage increased in 2019 (Hudson did not argue her salary was less
than twice the minimum wage in 2018). Regency Air apparently argued the
$100 compensation Hudson received for each booking should be factored into
the salary test, but the trial court disagreed.
6 Hudson points to Regency Air’s agreement at the start of trial to
not proceed with an exemption defense at trial. To the extent Hudson is
suggesting this conclusively demonstrates there was never a good faith
dispute as to exemption, we disagree as Regency Air had already lost the
issue as to Hudson’s nonexempt status in 2019 at summary adjudication.
Hudson also notes Regency Air’s answer did not assert exemption as an
affirmative defense, but based on the limited record before us, the issue of
exemption clearly was part of the litigation at the summary adjudication
stage.
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damages for failure to pay overtime compensation.” The trial court denied
liquidated damages under section 1194.2 because it found Hudson was fully
compensated for all straight time and the statute states nothing in it “shall
be construed to authorize the recovery of liquidated damages for failure to
pay overtime compensation.” (§ 1194.2, subd. (a).)
“We independently review questions of statutory construction.
[Citation.] In doing so, ‘it is well settled that we must look first to the words
of the statute, “because they generally provide the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent.” [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous our inquiry ends. “If there is no ambiguity in the language, we
presume the Legislature meant what it said and the plain meaning of the
statute governs.” [Citations.] In reading statutes, we are mindful that words
are to be given their plain and commonsense meaning. [Citation.] We have
also recognized that statutes governing conditions of employment are to be
construed broadly in favor of protecting employees. [Citations.] Only when
the statute’s language is ambiguous or susceptible of more than one
reasonable interpretation, may the court turn to extrinsic aids to assist in
interpretation.’” (Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc. (2012) 53 Cal.4th
1244, 1250 (Kirby).)
Here, we conclude the trial court properly denied liquidated
damages. The plain, unambiguous language of section 1194.2, subdivision (a),
means liquidated damages do not apply here. As the trial court correctly
recognized, section 1194.2, subdivision (a), states “[n]othing in this
subdivision shall be construed to authorize the recovery of liquidated
damages for failure to pay overtime compensation.” “The term ‘overtime
compensation’ ordinarily refers to the statutory and administrative obligation
to pay employees one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for work in
15
excess of eight hours a day or 40 hours a week (and double the regular rate
for work in excess of 12 hours a day or in excess of eight hours on any seventh
day of a workweek).” (Kirby, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1252.) That is what was
at issue here—Hudson was awarded overtime compensation for the overtime
hours she worked while on call. Thus, the statute’s prohibition on liquidated
damages for “failure to pay overtime compensation” applies.
Notwithstanding this statutory language, Hudson contends
section 1194.2 must be read in conjunction with section 515, subdivision
(d)(2), which provides “[p]ayment of a fixed salary to a nonexempt employee
shall be deemed to provide compensation only for the employee’s regular,
nonovertime hours, notwithstanding any private agreement to the contrary.”
According to Hudson, section 515, subdivision (d)(2), means she was paid
nothing for her overtime on-call hours, and thus, she should be able to
recover liquidated damages for her overtime on-call hours because she was
paid less than minimum wage. Hudson’s argument, however, disregards the
prohibition on section 1194.2, subdivision (a), applying to “failure to pay
overtime compensation.” Again, we conclude the plain, unambiguous
meaning of that sentence encompasses the situation here, even if Hudson’s
salary is deemed to only cover her regular hours.
Hudson points to three federal district court cases as support for
her interpretation. In Sillah v. Command Intern. Sec. Services (N.D.Cal.
2015) 154 F.Supp.3d 891 (Sillah), the district court stated, “[a]lthough the
California Labor Code does not permit a plaintiff to recover liquidated
damages for failure to pay overtime, [citation] a plaintiff who brings a claim
for failure to pay overtime may recover liquidated damages under [section]
1194.2 if the plaintiff also shows that the plaintiff was paid less than the
minimum wage.” (Id. at p. 914.) To the extent this sentence can be
16
interpreted as supporting the application of liquidated damages to Hudson’s
overtime hours here, we disagree for the reasons discussed. Nor do we find
persuasive for such a proposition the two other federal cases cited by
Hudson—Maravilla v. Rosas Brothers Construction, Inc. (N.D.Cal. 2019) 401
F.Supp.3d 886, 898 and Marquez v. NLP Janitorial, Inc. (N.D.Cal. Feb. 15,
2019, No. 16-cv-06089) 2019 U.S.Dist. Lexis 25373, at *19—as both of those
cite to Sillah.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its costs on
appeal.
MOTOIKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’LEARY, P. J.
MOORE, J.
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