People v. Mosqueda CA2/7

CourtListener 10293172Calctapp16.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/16/24 P. v. Mosqueda CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B333863

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA141231-02)
v.

MANUEL MOSQUEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Margaret Miller Bernal, Judge. Reversed
with directions.
Jonathan Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Nima Razfar and Nicholas J. Webster, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

In April 2017 Manuel Mosqueda pleaded no contest to
attempted murder. He also admitted gang and weapon
allegations.
In December 2022 Mosqueda petitioned the superior court
to resentence him under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The
superior court appointed counsel for Mosqueda, ordered the
parties to submit briefs, and held a hearing. The court ruled
Mosqueda was ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law and
denied the petition without issuing an order to show cause.
We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Mosqueda and His Brother Attack Victims in a Car
The testimony of the witnesses at the preliminary hearing
was that Mosqueda, his brother, and several other Hispanic men
drove up in three or four cars and boxed in a car with four people
in it. Mosqueda, his brother, and some of the Hispanic men
walked up to and surrounded the car and claimed they were from
the South Side Whittier criminal street gang.
Mosqueda’s brother went to the right side of the trapped
car, pointed a revolver at the occupants, and struck two of the
passengers in the head and face with the pistol. Mosqueda’s
brother also asked the occupants for their money and their cell
phones. Mosqueda went to the left side of the car, broke the
driver’s side window, and stabbed the driver in the shoulder with
a knife. One of the passengers shouted, “Let’s get out of here,”

1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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and the driver accelerated and drove away, damaging his car in
the process.
One of the victims knew and recognized Mosqueda and his
brother from the neighborhood and identified them in six-pack
photographic lineups. She identified Mosqueda as the one who
broke the driver’s side window and stabbed the driver.

B. Mosqueda Pleads No Contest to Attempted Murder
The People charged Mosqueda and his brother with one
count of attempted murder, one count of assault with a deadly
weapon, multiple counts of assault with a firearm, and one count
of attempted robbery. The People also charged Mosqueda with
one count of vandalism (for breaking the car window). The
People alleged various firearm and gang enhancements.
Mosqueda pleaded no contest to attempted murder. He
also admitted that he committed the crime for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang with
the specific intent to promote, further or assist in criminal
conduct by gang members, within the meaning of section 186.22,
subdivision (b)(1), and that he used a deadly or dangerous
weapon, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
Counsel for Mosqueda (but not Mosqueda) stipulated to a factual
basis for the plea “based on the police reports, information, and
preliminary hearing transcript.” The trial court sentenced
Mosqueda to a prison term of 16 years, consisting of the lower
term of five years, plus 10 years for the gang enhancement and
one year for the weapon enhancement.

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C. The Superior Court Summarily Denies Mosqueda’s
Petition for Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
Mosqueda filed a petition for resentencing, which the
superior court deemed a petition under section 1172.6. The
People filed an opposition, arguing the evidence from the
preliminary hearing showed that Mosqueda was the only one who
used a knife to stab the driver of the car and that there was “no
evidence in the record that [anyone] other than . . . Mosqueda
was the person who engaged in the use of the knife.” The People
also argued that, by “admitting he personally used the
knife, . . . Mosqueda necessarily admitted that he was the direct
perpetrator who acted with malice because there is no evidence at
the preliminary hearing supporting any other scenario.”
The superior court denied the petition without issuing an
order to show cause. The court stated it had “read the
preliminary hearing transcript, counsel’s memorandum, as well
as the plea transcript.” The court said it was basing its decision
on the preliminary and plea hearing transcripts and the
memoranda of counsel, as well as Mosqueda’s “personal use of the
knife, which was indicated not only by his plea, but the testimony
of multiple witnesses in the preliminary hearing transcript.” The
court stated Mosqueda “stabbed [the driver], and the
[section] 1172.6 petition as to . . . Mosqueda is dismissed as a
matter of law.” Mosqueda timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder by eliminating the

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natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a person guilty of murder and significantly narrowing the
felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder.
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 467-468 (Arellano);
People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 449 (Curiel); see People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708 [felony murder]; People
v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843 [natural and probable
consequences].) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on a person’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule. (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); Arellano, at pp. 467-468; Curiel, at
p. 449.) Effective 2022, the Legislature amended section 1172.6
to apply to persons convicted of “attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine.” (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a); see People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 223,
fn. 3; People v. Rodriguez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 451, 457.)
Section 1172.6 authorizes a person convicted of felony
murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, or attempted murder under the natural and probable
consequences doctrine to petition the superior court to vacate the
defendant’s conviction and to resentence the defendant on any
remaining counts if he or she could not now be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of the legislative changes to
the definitions of murder. (See Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 468-469; Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 449-450.) If a
section 1172.6 petition contains all the required information, the
court must appoint counsel to represent the petitioner if
requested. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (b)(3); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 962-963 (Lewis); People v. Foley (2023)

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97 Cal.App.5th 653, 659.) The People must then file a response
to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the court must
hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief under section 1172.6, “‘“the court takes
petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary
assessment regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to
relief if his or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court
must issue an order to show cause.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 971; see Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at pp. 463-464.) The court
may consider the record of conviction, which will “necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under section [1172.6],
allowing the court to distinguish petitions with potential merit
from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis, at p. 971; see
Curiel, at pp. 463-464.) “In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’” (Lewis, at p. 972; see People v. Gallardo
(2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 296, 301.) “‘If the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief, the trial court may dismiss the petition. [Citation.] If,
instead, the defendant has made a prima facie showing of
entitlement to relief, “the court shall issue an order to show
cause.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).)’” (Arellano, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 469.) We review de novo an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6 without issuing an order to show cause. (People
v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1170; People v. Bodely
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)

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B. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Mosqueda’s
Petition Under Section 1172.6 Without Issuing an
Order To Show Cause
Mosqueda argues the superior court erred in summarily
denying his petition by relying on testimony the People presented
at the preliminary hearing. He contends the “superior court’s
reliance on evidence presented at [the] preliminary hearing in
assessing whether his resentencing petition made a prima facie
showing of eligibility for relief was inconsistent with the terms of
the statute, which limits such an assessment to readily
ascertainable facts in the record of conviction. In a plea case like
this one, such facts are to be found in the charging document and
the explicit terms of the plea agreement, including any
admissions. Factfinding based on preliminary hearing evidence,
as well as any new or additional evidence presented by the
parties, and the resolution of crucial factual issues is reserved for
the evidentiary hearing.”
Acknowledging the law “is unsettled,” the People argue the
superior court “may properly consult the preliminary hearing
transcript where the petitioner pleaded guilty or no contest in
making the section 1172.6 prima facie inquiry to determine
whether it is possible that the petitioner’s conviction rested on
any now-invalid legal theory.” The People contend that here, at
“the preliminary hearing, the evidence established that only one
person used a knife and stabbed [the driver], and that no other
person had a knife.”
California appellate courts are divided on whether the
superior court can consider a preliminary hearing transcript at
the section 1172.6 prima facie stage. Some courts have said yes.
(See, e.g., People v. Mares (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 1158, 1167,

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review granted May 1, 2024, S285232; People v. Pickett (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 982, 990, review granted Oct. 11, 2023, S281643;
People v. Patton (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 649, 658, review granted
June 28, 2023, S279670; People v. Nguyen (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th
1154, 1166-1167.) Some courts have said no. (See, e.g., People
v. Alazar (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1106; People v. Williams
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 375, 397-398, review granted Sept. 11,
2024, S286314; People v. Estrada (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 328,
339; People v. Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 991-992.) The
Supreme Court in Patton agreed to decide the issue. Until then
we agree with Alazar, Williams, Estrada, and Flores (except
perhaps in the unusual situation where the defendant testifies at
the preliminary hearing and states he or she was the actual killer
or acted with malice) and conclude the superior court erred in
denying Mosqueda’s petition at the prima facie stage by
considering the testimony at the preliminary hearing.
As the court in People v. Williams, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
375, review granted, explained: “At the preliminary hearing, the
court may weigh the evidence and assess witness credibility, but
it may not reject the prosecution’s evidence ‘unless the evidence is
“‘inherently implausible, the witnesses [have been] conclusively
impeached, or the demeanor of the witnesses [is] so poor that no
reasonable person would find them credible.’”’ [Citation.] Thus,
the preliminary hearing generally offers the defense little
incentive to present contrary evidence. Moreover, at the
preliminary hearing, the defense is limited to calling witnesses
who, ‘if believed, would be reasonably likely to establish an
affirmative defense, negate an element of a crime charged, or
impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness or the statement

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of a declarant testified to by a prosecution witness.’” (Id. at
p. 397.)
For these reasons, the court in Williams explained, “the
preliminary hearing transcript does not conclusively establish a
defendant’s guilt, let alone any particular theory of guilt. At
most, the transcript and the court’s holding order establish there
is probable cause to believe a defendant committed the charged
offense under at least one of the theories presented by the
prosecution. However, the preliminary hearing evidence does not
limit the prosecution’s trial strategy. Even where the
preliminary hearing evidence suggests the defendant is the
actual perpetrator, an information containing a generic charge of
murder or attempted murder would still permit the prosecution
to proceed at trial under a felony murder, natural and probable
consequences, or other imputed malice theory eliminated by” the
legislative changes to the definition of murder. (People v.
Williams, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at p. 398, review granted.)
The People suggest Mosqueda is ineligible for resentencing
under section 1172.6 because he admitted he personally used a
weapon, within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1).
That admission, however, did not make Mosqueda ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law. The defendant’s “bare admission
of the enhancement[ ] for personal use of a deadly weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)) [does] not establish that he acted with the
intent to kill or refute that he was convicted on a theory of
imputed malice. . . . The enhancement[ ] alleged under
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1), . . . require[s] only a general
intent to use a deadly weapon . . . .” (People v. Estrada, supra,
101 Cal.App.5th at p. 338; see People v. Offley (2020)
48 Cal.App.5th 588, 598 [“Because an enhancement under

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section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not require that the
defendant acted either with the intent to kill or with conscious
disregard to life, it does not establish that the defendant acted
with malice aforethought.”]; see also People v. Saavedra (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 444, 449 [defendant’s admission he “discharged a
firearm into an occupied vehicle does not conclusively establish
that he did so with actual malice or any particular mental
state”].)
The superior court’s order denying Mosqueda’s petition
under section 1172.6 was based primarily on the testimony of
witnesses at the preliminary hearing. The superior court erred in
relying on that testimony and the admission of the weapon
allegation to find Mosqueda is ineligible for relief under
section 1172.6 as a matter of law and denying his petition
without issuing an order to show cause.

DISPOSITION

The order is reversed. The superior court is directed to
issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.

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