CourtListener 10292746•People v. Campos CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/13/24 P. v. Campos CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B330131
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. Nos. BA496857,
v. BA497487, SA104410)
LUIS ALONSO JAIME
CAMPOS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Terry Bork, Judge. Affirmed.
James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Viet H. Nguyen, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Luis Alonso Jaime Campos appeals from the trial court’s
orders revoking his probation in three cases and sentencing him
to a total of five years eight months in prison. He argues the trial
court abused its discretion in sustaining the prosecutor’s hearsay
objections to questions seeking testimony from Campos’s
employer that would have supported Campos’s argument he was
at work the day of the incident that led to the probation
violations. He also argues the abstract of judgment erroneously
lists one of his convictions as a violent felony. His first argument
is correct, but the court’s error was harmless. His second
argument, as the People concede, is also correct. Therefore, we
affirm the trial court’s orders and direct the court to correct the
error in the abstracts of judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Campos Is Convicted of Committing Various Crimes
and Is Placed on Felony Probation in Three Cases
Campos was on felony probation for convictions he suffered
after pleading no contest to charges in three separate cases. In
the first case the court convicted Campos of grand theft of an
automobile (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (d)(1))1 and burglary (§ 459).
The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Campos
on probation for two years.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In the second case the court convicted Campos of
transporting, importing, or selling a controlled substance
(methamphetamine) (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)).
The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Campos
on probation for two years.
In the third case the court convicted Campos of burglary
(§ 459), making a criminal threat (§ 422), and fleeing or
attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer (Veh. Code, § 2800.2,
subd. (a)). The court imposed and suspended execution of a four-
year sentence for Campos’s burglary conviction and imposed
concurrent terms for the other two (misdemeanor) convictions.
The court placed Campos on probation for two years.
The terms and conditions of Campos’s probation in all three
cases included not using or threatening to use force or violence
against anyone.
B. Campos Violates the Terms and Conditions of His
Probation
On February 9, 2023, while Campos was on probation for
all three cases, Daniel Issak was working as a property manager
and went to check on one of his vacant residential properties.
When he arrived in the afternoon between 3:30 p.m. and
4:00 p.m., he found Campos, along with another man and a
woman, inside the house. The three people left the house and
came outside, where Campos confronted Issak in the street and
indicated he wanted to fight.
Campos said that the property was in his gang’s territory
and that he could provide protection. Issak said he could take
care of the property himself. Campos was wearing a pouch or
crossbody bag across his chest, and he unzipped it to show Issak
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a gun with a black handle. Issak became concerned for his
safety. The two people with Campos restrained him and told him
to relax. Issak left.
But before he did, he took pictures of Campos and the two
people with him. When he called the police four days later, on
February 13, 2023, he gave the pictures to the police. Issak also
identified Campos in a six-pack photographic lineup. Issak
testified he was “100 percent certain,” both at the police station
when he identified Campos and at trial, Campos was the
individual who threatened him with a gun on February 9, 2023.
Campos denied that he was at the property on February 9,
2023 or that he ever met Issak. Campos testified at the probation
violation hearing he was at a construction site, working as a
security guard, from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. on that date.
Campos called Jose Rivas, who testified Campos worked for
him as a security guard at three locations: a construction site,
a marijuana dispensary, and a gentlemen’s club. Rivas testified
that on February 9, 2023 Campos was scheduled to work at the
construction site from 3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., his usual shift,
although Rivas could not say where Campos was every minute of
that eight-hour period. Rivas stated that Campos was supposed
to text him at the beginning of a shift and at the end of a shift
and that Campos did so on February 9, 2023. Rivas testified that
if one of his security guards was missing, he would get a call from
the client. He also said he would not know if Campos had left the
construction site during his shift.
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C. The Trial Court Finds Campos Violated the Terms
and Conditions of His Probation and Sentences Him
On May 18, 2023 the People filed a motion asking the court
to revoke Campos’s probation in all three cases. The People
alleged that on February 9, 2023, after Issak confronted Campos
for trespassing, Campos said he was a gang member and “this
was his hood,” brandished a firearm, and threatened to kill Issak.
The trial court found the People proved by a preponderance
of the evidence Campos violated the terms and conditions of his
probation in all three cases. The court found that Issak “had a
significant opportunity to see [Campos] close up and in person in
broad daylight on a public street, heard him speak [and] saw
him” and that Issak “had a significant basis to enable him to
make an eyewitness identification,” despite what the court called
the “frailties and foibles that are involved with eyewitness
identifications.” The court also found credible Issak’s testimony
and his identification of Campos in the six-pack photographic
lineup. The court found that Campos’s testimony was “less
credible” and that Rivas’s testimony was not “credible or
compelling.” The court ruled Campos violated the terms and
conditions of his probation in all three cases by brandishing a
weapon, using extortion to scare Issak, converting property,
trespassing, “or any one of the four.”
At sentencing the court stated that it considered “the
violation conduct to be exceedingly dangerous and threatening”
and that the violation occurred while Campos was on probation
in three cases. The court ordered into effect the four-year prison
term previously imposed in one of the cases, plus terms of
one year and eight months, respectively, in the other two cases,
5
for an aggregate prison term of five years eight months. Campos
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred in Sustaining the Prosecutor’s
Hearsay Objection, but the Error Was Harmless
Campos raises one argument regarding the merits of the
trial court’s ruling he violated the terms of his probation. It
arises out of this exchange during the hearing, while Rivas,
Campos’s employer, was testifying:
“Q: If an employee was to leave a job site for an extended
period of time, would you expect that there would be some
pushback from the client?
“[The prosecutor]: Objection. Calls for hearsay and calls
for speculation.
“The Court: Sustained.
“Q: In the past, has it been your experience that if there’s
an issue with [a] security guard that . . . you would get a call from
the client?
“[The prosecutor]: Objection. Calls for hearsay.
Relevance. Speculation.
“The Court: It does call for hearsay, and the answer is
stricken.”
Campos argues that his “primary defense regarding the
probation violations was that he was not at the incident location
and [Issak] misidentified him as the person who threatened him
and displayed the firearm.” Campos called Rivas to corroborate
Campos’s testimony he was not at Issak’s property on
February 9, 2023. Though Rivas admitted he could not say
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where Campos was at all times on that date, counsel for Campos
tried to establish with these questions that, “if an assigned
security person did not show up at an assigned location, or for
some reason left the location, it was customary for the client—the
person or entity that controlled the location—to contact him to
report the absence.” Not direct, or even the strongest, evidence
Campos did not leave his job at the construction site on
February 9, 2023, but circumstantial evidence with some
probative value on that point.
The trial court’s rulings sustaining hearsay objections to
these questions were error. The questions did not call for a
statement, let alone an out-of-court statement. (See People v.
Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 831 [“Hearsay is an out-of-court
statement offered to prove the truth of its content.”].) The
questions did not ask Rivas to repeat an out-of-court statement
by a client. They asked only whether Rivas would receive some
kind of communication from a client if an employee left the job
site or had some kind of issue.2
The trial court’s error, however, was harmless. We review
the erroneous exclusion on a hearsay objection for prejudice
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (People v.
Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1104; see People v. Bradford (1997)
15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [any error in the trial court’s exclusion of
statements “not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule” is
reviewed for prejudice under Watson].) Where, as here, the “trial
2 To the extent the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s
objection to the first question on the ground it called for
speculation, such a ruling was also error. Rivas had personal
knowledge of when he had problems with his employees or when
clients complained.
7
court’s erroneous ruling is not a refusal to allow a defendant to
present a defense, but only rejects certain evidence concerning
the defense, the error is nonconstitutional and is analyzed for
prejudice under Watson,” which is that “the judgment should be
reversed only if it is reasonably probable that defendant would
have obtained a more favorable result absent the error.” (People
v. Garcia (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 124, 133.)
The evidence Campos threatened Issak with violence on
February 9, 2023 was strong. (See People v. Homick (2012)
55 Cal.4th 816, 872 [any error in the admission of hearsay
testimony “was harmless in light of the strong evidence of
defendant’s guilt”]; People v. Houston (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 279,
296 [error in ruling on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is
harmless where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming].) Issak
had a clear, lengthy, and close-up view of Campos on February 9,
2023, took a picture of him at the property, and identified him in
a six-pack photographic lineup and at the probation violation
hearing. Issak testified he was 100 percent certain both times
the person who threatened him and brandished a gun on
February 9, 2023 was Campos. And Rivas admitted he did not
know where Campos was most of the time on that date. It is not
reasonably probable that, had the trial court allowed Rivas to
answer the questions, the court would not have found Campos
violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
Moreover, counsel for Campos was able to get the
erroneously excluded testimony into evidence at another point in
Rivas’s testimony:
8
“Q: And you . . . would expect if the security guard is
missing that you would get a call from the client?
“A: Correct. And—
“[The Prosecutor]: Objection. Calls for speculation. Calls
for hearsay.
“The Court: Overruled.
“Q: Is that correct?
“A: Correct.”
This testimony allowed counsel for Campos to make the
same point he wanted to make with the excluded evidence: Had
someone noticed Campos was missing from work between
3:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. on February 9, 2023, Campos’s employer
would have learned about it. (See People v. Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th
448, 553 [error in excluding a witness’s testimony did not
prejudice the defendant “because the evidence defendant now
challenges was admitted through another witness”]; People v.
Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 846-847 [any error in excluding
testimony was harmless where the jury heard evidence on the
same issue]; People v. Lee (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 829, 840 [any
error “in excluding the response to [a] specific question” was
harmless because the response “came into evidence through a
previous question”]; People v. Helton (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1141,
1146 [any error in excluding hearsay evidence was harmless
where the excluded evidence was “merely cumulative of properly
admitted evidence”]; see also People v. Bryant, Smith and
Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 415 [any error in admitting a
hearsay statement was harmless where another witness’s
“statements conveyed the same information”]; People v. Thomas
(2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 461, 464 [“The trial court erred by
admitting one hearsay statement, but the error was harmless
9
because its content was the same as other properly admitted
evidence.”].)
B. The Trial Court Should Correct the Abstracts of
Judgment To State Campos’s Burglary Conviction
Is Not a Violent Felony
Campos argues, the People concede, and we agree the
abstracts of judgment erroneously state that, in the case where
the trial court imposed the four-year term for burglary, the
burglary conviction was for a violent (as well as a serious) felony.
Although Campos was convicted of first degree burglary, he did
not admit the allegation a person was present during the
burglary, which meant his conviction for burglary was not for a
violent felony (though it was for a serious felony). (See People v.
Mani (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 343, 367, fn. 7 [“residential burglary
when someone is home is a violent felony offense”]; People v.
Bedolla (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 535, 541 [first degree burglary is a
violent felony “where another person, not an accomplice, was
present during the burglary’s commission”]; cf. People v. Johnson
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 674, 680 [first degree burglary is a serious
felony].) The trial court should correct the three abstracts of
judgment to reflect that Campos’s burglary conviction was a
serious, but not a violent, felony.
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DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed. The trial court is directed to
prepare amended abstracts of judgment in all three cases to state
Campos’s conviction for burglary was for a serious, but not a
violent, felony and to send the correct abstracts of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
SEGAL, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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