Frost v. Regner CA4/3

CourtListener 10291335Calctapp10.12.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 12/10/24 Frost v. Regner CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JANE FROST, as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G062950

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2015-
00767040)
VANNA P. REGNER, as Trustee,
etc. et al., OPINION

Defendants and Respondents.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of
Orange County, Glenn R. Salter, Judge. Affirmed.
Jane Frost, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Obrand Law Group and Michael Obrand for Defendants and
Respondents Edward Escano, Scott MacDonald, and Pickford Real Estate,
Inc.
No appearance for Defendants and Respondents Vanna P. Regner
and Mark Carlson.
* * *

Roughly five years after entry of judgment against her based on a
jury verdict, plaintiff Jane Frost moved for statutory and equitable relief
from the judgment. The trial court denied the motion, finding the judgment
was not void on its face and equitable relief was not warranted under the
circumstances. Frost claims the trial court’s resulting order is inadequate for
appellate review and that the court’s denial of her motion amounts to an
abuse of discretion because she demonstrated extrinsic fraud. On the record
before us, which is adequate for review, we find no error and affirm the
challenged order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The underlying dispute between the parties relates to the 2012
sale of a residential property by defendant Vanna Regner to Frost. After
dealing with sewer drainage issues at the property during the two years
following the sale, Frost sued Regner for breach of contract, intentional
misrepresentation, and intentional fraudulent concealment. Among other
things, the complaint alleged Regner knew and actively concealed that there
were significant plumbing problems which made the property uninhabitable
without substantial repairs to its plumbing system. Amendments to the
complaint added as defendants two real estate agents involved in the 2012
sale, Edward Escano and Scott MacDonald, as well as companies for which
they allegedly were agents, including Pickford Real Estate, Inc. (Pickford),
and added breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims against
those added defendants.

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Frost’s claims were tried to a jury in August 2017. At the close of
Frost’s case, Escano, MacDonald, and Pickford successfully moved for
nonsuit. The jury ultimately returned a special verdict in Regner’s favor on
Frost’s remaining claims. The trial court entered judgment in accordance
with the jury’s verdict and the granted nonsuit. An amended judgment
entered a few months later included an award of costs to the nonsuit
defendants, as well as costs and attorney fees to Regner.
Frost timely appealed from the judgment. The appeal was later
dismissed after Frost failed to file an opening brief.
In September 2022, after Frost’s trial counsel was relieved as
counsel of record by the trial court and Frost filed a separate lawsuit against
him, Frost filed a motion seeking to set aside the judgment pursuant to Code
of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d)1, and the court’s inherent
equitable powers. She claimed the judgment was void due to “[f]raud [u]pon
the [c]ourt” by Regner, Escano, and her own trial counsel. More specifically,
although somewhat difficult to decipher, a declaration by Frost filed in
conjunction with the motion stated: (1) Regner intentionally lied in a pretrial
deposition and at trial; (2) Regner and Escano intentionally concealed a 2011
letter from a plumber who testified at trial which concerned necessary work
on the property’s sewer system; and (3) her trial counsel failed to show her
the plumber’s letter and failed to present to the jury non-sewer related
disclosures made by Escano. Escano, MacDonald, and Pickford opposed the
motion, contending Frost failed to demonstrate the judgment was void on its

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

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face and equitable relief could not be granted because Frost was claiming
intrinsic, not extrinsic, fraud.
The court held multiple hearings on the motion and gave Frost
the opportunity to provide additional supporting evidence.2 After taking the
matter under submission, it issued an order denying the motion. In finding
the judgment was not void, the court explained that lack of truthfulness by a
party testifying at trial is not a viable basis for finding a judgment to be void
and neither is the discovery of a new document. Additionally, although the
court found “troubling on a first read” Frost’s claims about alleged
concealment of the 2011 plumber letter by Regner and Escano, it noted Frost
was “unclear as to when the existence of the letter became known and
whether her attorney had a copy of it at trial.” It further concluded she failed
to demonstrate extrinsic fraud and explain how the letter could have “turned
the tide in her favor had the jury seen it.” The court indicated it also
considered whether equitable relief was appropriate under the circumstances,
but it found no basis for such relief.
Frost timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Frost contends her motion seeking relief from the judgment
should have been granted because “she successfully asserted fraud to
invalidate [it].” She claims the defendants and the lawyers hid the 2011
plumber letter from her and that Regner and Escano lied about various
things at trial. We find no ground for disturbing the challenged order.

2 The record on appeal includes hearing minute orders but does

not include a transcript of the hearings.

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Before reaching the merits of Frost’s substantive challenge, we
address her preliminary argument that the trial court’s order is insufficient
to enable effective appellate review. First, the trial court’s order includes a
fairly detailed two-page analysis of the facts, Frost’s arguments, and its
reasoning as to why it denied the requested relief. Second, Frost did not
include in the appellate record a transcript of the hearings at which the court
considered her motion. Under such circumstances, we presume there was no
irregularity in the trial court’s decision making unless the record indicates
otherwise, and we presume the trial court made all factual findings necessary
to support its order. (California Pines Property Owners Assn. v. Pedotti (2012)
206 Cal.App.4th 384, 392 [challenged order presumed correct and appellate
court makes all inferences in favor of order unless expressly contradicted by
record]; Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543 [pro per
litigant held to same standards as attorneys]; Estate of Fain (1999) 75
Cal.App.4th 973, 992 [no reporter’s transcript on appeal means appellate
court presumes absence of error in proceedings].) For these reasons, we find
the record adequate for review.
Turning to Frost’s statutory based request for relief from the
judgment, under section 473, subdivision (d), a “court may, . . . on motion of
either party after notice to the other party, set aside any void judgment or
order.” “A judgment [or order] is void to the extent it provides relief ‘which a
court under no circumstances has any authority to grant.’” (Doppes v. Bentley
Motors, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1009.) Examples of void judgments
include those entered when the court “‘lack[ed] fundamental authority over
the subject matter, question presented, or party.’” (Vitatech Internat., Inc. v.
Sporn (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 796, 807 (Vitatech).) There is no time limit for
making a motion which seeks relief under section 473, subdivision (d).

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(Tearlach Resources Limited v. Western States Internat., Inc. (2013) 219
Cal.App.4th 773, 779.)
Although one of the bases on which Frost based her motion was
section 473, subdivision (d), none of her assertions concerned the trial court’s
fundamental jurisdiction. She likewise did not make any other argument that
the judgment was one that no court under any circumstances could have
entered. Instead, she claimed various circumstances amounted to fraud
which, in turn, necessitated a set aside of the judgment. We see no grounds
for disturbing the court’s denial of the statute based portion of Frost’s set
aside motion. (See Vitatech, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 807 [court’s section
473, subdivision (d) authority to vacate is limited to void judgments and
orders]; Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 495-496
[trial court has no discretionary power under section 473, subdivision (d) to
set aside judgment not void on its face].)
We likewise find no error in the trial court’s decision to not grant
Frost equitable relief from the judgment.3 Denial of such relief is reviewed for
an abuse of discretion. (Sakaguchi v. Sakaguchi (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 852,
862.) That is, we look to see whether the trial court’s decision exceeded the
bounds of reason, with all presumptions in favor of the correctness of the
court’s decision and Frost bearing the burden of demonstrating clear abuse.

3 Frost rightly did not seek relief under section 473, subdivision

(b), which permits a court to set aside a judgment due to “mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Relief under that section must
be brought no later than six months after entry of judgment. (Id.; Rappleyea
v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980.) Frost filed her motion roughly five
years after entry of judgment in this case.

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(In re Marriage of Wipson (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 136, 141; Shields v. Siegel
(1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 334, 337-338.)
“[U]nder well established law[,] the court may grant relief under
its inherent equitable power only if, due to the fraud of the opponent or by
[the aggrieved party’s] own mistake, the aggrieved party was deprived of a
fair adversary hearing and was prevented from presenting his claim or
defense, or as the authorities put it, if the fraud or mistake was ‘extrinsic.’”
(DeMello v. Souza (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 79, 85.) “‘The clearest examples of
extrinsic fraud are cases in which the aggrieved party is kept in ignorance of
the proceeding or is in some other way induced not to appear. [Citation.]’
[Citation.] Other examples include ‘concealment of the existence of a
community property asset, failure to give notice of the action to the other
party, and convincing the other party not to obtain counsel because the
matter will not proceed (and then it does proceed).’” (Hudson v. Foster (2021)
68 Cal.App.5th 640, 664.)
By contrast, “‘[a] showing of fraud practiced in the trial of the
original action will not suffice.’” (Estate of Sanders (1985) 40 Cal.3d 607, 614.)
Classic examples of such fraud, referred to as intrinsic fraud, include “‘the
introduction of perjured testimony or false documents in a fully litigated
case.’” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.)
The reason for this rule is that there must be an end to litigation. (Kachig v.
Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 632, citing Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129.)
A trial is a party’s opportunity for making the truth appear notwithstanding
conflicting evidence. (Pour Le Bebe, Inc., at p. 829.) A party and their counsel
must be prepared to expose, for example, perjured testimony and falsified
documents. (Ibid.) If one fails in that task and then subsequently does not

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bring or fails on a motion for a new trial, and the judgment eventually
becomes final, one is generally without remedy. (Ibid.)
Here, Frost was represented by counsel in the time leading up to
and throughout trial. Her claims that Regner or other witnesses lied to the
jury, even if true, are not grounds for equitable relief from the judgment.
Equally unavailing are her assertions that Regner and Escano concealed a
2011 plumber letter which she believes demonstrated a serious problem with
the property’s sewer system, and that her own lawyer failed to give her that
letter before trial. Whatever the circumstances may have been from the time
Frost purchased the property through the time leading up to trial, the record
is clear Frost’s own attorney admitted the letter into evidence at trial and
questioned Escano about it. Under these circumstances, although Frost
understandably may be frustrated and upset with the jury’s verdict, there
simply was no showing of extrinsic fraud depriving her of a fair opportunity
to present her claims. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying her equitable relief from the judgment.

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DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order is affirmed. Respondents Escano,
McDonald, and Pickford Real Estate, Inc. are entitled to costs on appeal;
respondents Regner and Carlson are not awarded costs because they did not
appear in this appeal.

DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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