Li v. Uber Technologies CA1/5

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Filed 12/10/24 Li v. Uber Technologies CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

YINGNAN LI,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A168618
v.
UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC., (City & County of San Francisco
Defendant and Appellant. Super. Ct. No. CPF23517965)

Yingnan Li initiated arbitration against her former employer, Uber
Technologies, Inc. (Uber), alleging gender discrimination and retaliation.
The arbitrator issued an award granting Uber’s motion for summary
judgment based upon the statute of limitations. Li filed a petition to vacate
the award. The trial court vacated the award as to Li’s termination claims
based on the arbitrator’s legal error in ruling the claims were untimely,
which deprived Li of a hearing on the merits of her unwaivable statutory
claim. We affirm.
BACKGROUND1
In June 2017, Li was hired as a software engineer at Uber. On
December 14, 2018, Li filed an administrative complaint with the

1 Uber filed a request for judicial notice asking that we take judicial

notice of 10 documents filed in court proceedings or in the arbitration. The
factual and procedural background section of Uber’s opening brief largely

1
Department of Fair Employment and Housing (DFEH) alleging sexual
harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation (2018 DFEH complaint).
She received a right to sue letter the same day. On March 7, 2019, Uber
terminated Li.
On August 20, 2019, Li filed a civil lawsuit against Uber, alleging
causes of action for gender discrimination, sexual harassment hostile work
environment, failure to prevent discrimination and harassment, retaliation,
failure to provide equal pay, unlawful and unfair business practices, and
wrongful termination. Uber moved to compel arbitration of all causes of
action except sexual harassment. Li did not oppose the motion to compel
arbitration and instead requested dismissal without prejudice of all of her
claims other than sexual harassment. On November 1, 2019, the court
granted Li’s request for dismissal. On February 22, 2021, the court granted
Uber’s motion for summary judgment on the one remaining claim for sexual
harassment.

relies on the documents it requests be judicially noticed, rather than on the
clerk’s transcript. This is a violation of the California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(C), which requires that reference to factual matters in parties’
briefs be supported by a citation to the appellate record. Uber’s request for
judicial notice admits that none of the documents were submitted to the trial
court. “Reviewing courts generally do not take judicial notice of evidence not
presented to the trial court. Rather, normally ‘when reviewing the
correctness of a trial court’s judgment, an appellate court will consider only
matters which were part of the record at the time the judgment was
entered.’ ” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
434, 444, fn. 3 (Vons).) Uber provides no explanation for its failure to present
to the trial court the documents it now requests we judicially notice for the
first time on appeal. Nor does Uber argue that exceptional circumstances
exist to justify deviating from the general rule. (Ibid.) We deny Uber’s
request for judicial notice and rely upon the documents that were presented
to and considered by the trial court and are part of the appellate record.

2
On March 3, 2021, Li filed a demand for arbitration alleging gender
discrimination and retaliation. On October 13, 2021, during a case
management conference in the arbitration, Uber stated that it intended to
file a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Li’s claims were
untimely. On October 29, 2021, Uber filed its motion for summary judgment,
arguing that Li’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations because she
failed to file her demand for arbitration within one year of receiving her
December 2018 right to sue letter. On November 30, 2021, Li’s counsel
withdrew from the case, and Li was granted extensions to file her opposition
to Uber’s motion.
On February 28, 2022, Li filed a second administrative complaint with
the DFEH alleging sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation
(2022 DFEH complaint). The February 28, 2022 administrative complaint
referred to Li’s March 7, 2019 termination and alleged she was terminated as
a result of sex and gender discrimination and in retaliation for complaining of
discrimination. The DFEH issued Li a right to sue letter on February 28,
2022, which stated Li may bring a civil action under the California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) (FEHA) which
must be filed within one year of February 28, 2022. On July 17, 2022, after
obtaining new counsel, and with the permission of the arbitrator, Li filed an
amended statement of claims referring to her 2022 DFEH complaint,
exhausting her administrative remedies as to her termination. Uber filed a
second motion for summary judgment, addressing Li’s amended statement of
claims.
On November 2, 2022, the arbitrator issued an award granting Uber’s
motion for summary judgment. The arbitrator found that all of Li’s claims
were barred because the arbitration was not filed within one year of the 2018

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DFEH right to sue letter. The award states, in relevant part, “The subject
matter of this arbitration is essentially the same as the allegations of the
initial 2018 DFEH charge, including her termination, and filing a second
charge in February of 2022, covering the same conduct, cannot restart the
clock. Ms. Li cannot revive expired claims by filing a new DFEH complaint
based on the same facts.”
Li filed a petition to vacate the award on the basis that the arbitrator
exceeded her power by issuing an award violating her unwaivable statutory
rights. She argued that her claims were timely based upon her 2022 DFEH
right to sue letter and that the arbitrator incorrectly found that the
limitations period began from the date of Li’s 2018 DFEH right to sue letter,
which was issued prior to her termination in March 2019.
The trial court granted, in part, Li’s petition to vacate. The order
states: “Plaintiff filed her first [DFEH] complaint on December 14, 2018,
prior to her termination, and belatedly filed her demand for arbitration on
March 3, 2021. While arbitration was pending, and after respondent had
filed a summary judgment motion, petitioner filed a second DFEH complaint.
The new DFEH complaint in part regarded plaintiff’s termination, which
occurred after her original complaint. [¶] Petitioner was terminated on
March 7, 2019, and the (newly enacted three-year) limitations deadline for
her to file a complaint with DFEH as to that was March 7, 2022. Plaintiff
timely filed her second DFEH complaint on February 28, 2022. [¶] The
arbitrator allowed petitioner to amend her complaint, and petitioner agreed
that the arbitrator should rule on respondent’s summary judgment motion
based on the second DFEH complaint. [Citation.] [¶] The arbitrator ruled
that petitioner could not rely on the 2022 DFEH notice to resurrect claims
that had lapsed. The arbitrator stated: ‘the subject matter of this arbitration

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is essentially the same as the allegations of the initial 2018 DFEH charge,
including her termination, and filing a second charge in February of 2022,
covering the same conduct, cannot restart the clock.’ Actually, plaintiff’s
2018 DFEH complaint could not have addressed her termination, because it
did not occur until 2019. [¶] In Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Sup. Ct.
(2010) 48 Cal.4th 665, the arbitrator committed a ‘clear error of law’ by ruling
that an employee’s claim was time-barred, thus depriving him of a hearing on
the merits. (Id. at 670.) Pearson holds that when ‘an employee subject to a
mandatory employment arbitration agreement is unable to obtain a hearing
on the merits of his FEHA claims, or claims based on other unwaivable
statutory rights, because of an arbitration award based on legal error, the
trial court does not err in vacating the award.’ (Id. at 680.) [¶] In similar
circumstances here, the arbitrator stated that the subject matter of the
arbitration was ‘essentially the same’ as petitioner’s ‘2018 DFEH charge,’
‘including her termination,’ so all claims were time-barred. But petitioner
was not terminated until months after her 2018 DFEH complaint. [¶] The
award is vacated as to petitioner’s termination claims but otherwise
confirmed.”
DISCUSSION
I. Appealability
Although the parties did not initially brief the issue of appealability, we
are obligated to determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal.
(Kirk v. Ratner (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 1052, 1060.) Code of Civil Procedure
section 1294 provides that “[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from: [¶] (a) An
order dismissing or denying a petition to compel arbitration. . . . [¶] (b) An
order dismissing a petition to confirm, correct or vacate an award. [¶] (c) An
order vacating an award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered. [¶] (d) A

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judgment entered pursuant to this title. [¶] (e) A special order after final
judgment.”2 The trial court’s order states, “The award is vacated as to
petitioner’s termination claims but otherwise confirmed.” Thus, the order
appears to partially vacate the arbitration award. Section 1294 does not
allow an appeal from an order only partially vacating an arbitration award.
(Sunnyvale Unified School Dist. v. Jacobs (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 168, 174.)
Li’s petition to vacate also included a request for a new arbitration hearing.
Although the trial court’s order does not expressly order “rehearing in
arbitration,” it appears that the practical effect of the order is that a further
arbitration proceeding will occur. This suggests that the trial court’s order is
not a final determination of the rights of the parties but, rather, a
nonappealable intermediate ruling. (Griset v. Fair Policial Practices Com.
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 697.)
We requested supplemental briefing asking the parties to address the
question of appealability of the order partially vacating the arbitration
award, particularly given that the parties contemplate further arbitration
proceedings. Li argues the appeal should be dismissed because the trial
court’s order does not have the required “ ‘finality’ ” to be appealable under
section 1294, subdivision (c). She asserts that the substance and effect of the
trial court’s order is to send the parties back to arbitration to resolve her
termination claims. (Griset, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 698 [“ ‘It is not the form
of the decree but the substance and effect of the adjudication which is
determinative’ ” of the question of whether a judgment or order is final and
appealable].)

2 Statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise

stated.

6
Uber’s opening brief argued that the order was appealable under
section 1294, subdivision (c) as an “ ‘order vacating an award.’ ” However, in
its supplemental brief, Uber argues for the first time that the procedural
provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.) (FAA) govern
and that the order is appealable under United States Code, title 9, section 16,
either as a “ ‘final decision with respect to an arbitration’ ” (9 U.S.C.
§ 16(a)(3)) or as an order “ ‘vacating an award’ ” (9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E)). The
arbitration agreement states that it is “governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.” It also states that “[a] court of competent
jurisdiction shall have the authority to enter a judgment upon the award
made pursuant to the arbitration,” and it does not require that the parties’
enforcement proceedings be in federal courts rather than state courts. Here,
both parties proceeded in the San Francisco Superior Court under the
procedural rules of the California Arbitration Act (Code Civ. Proc., § 1280
et seq.) (CAA). In Cable Connection, Inc. v. DIRECTV, Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th
1334, the Supreme Court concluded that a clause in an arbitration agreement
stating it is “ ‘governed by the United States Arbitration Act’ ” was
insufficient to adopt the FAA’s enforcement procedures. (Id. at pp. 1350–
1351, fn. 12.) As here, the agreement in Cable Connection did not specify
whether enforcement proceedings were to be brought in state or federal court
and it permitted enforcement in “ ‘any court of competent jurisdiction.’ ”
(Ibid.) The parties in Cable Connection also proceeded in the lower courts on
the theory that the CAA was controlling. (Ibid.) We find that under the
similar circumstances here the parties did not intend for the FAA’s
procedural provisions regarding enforcement to apply.3

3 We are unpersuaded by Uber’s reliance on Rodriguez v. American

Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, which interpreted an

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Uber argues the order is also appealable under section 1294,
subdivision (c), which provides for an appeal from an “order vacating an
award unless a rehearing in arbitration is ordered.” It asserts that the order
does not mention rehearing and therefore the order is appealable. (See
Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. v. Woodman
Investment Group (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 508, 514–515 [finding order
vacating award without expressly ordering rehearing is appealable even
though a subsequent minute order clarified the court intended “ ‘rehearing of
the arbitration between all parties’ ”]; Michael v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins.
Co. (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 925, 932 [finding order vacating award appealable
when order did not expressly order further arbitration proceedings but court
orally granted defendant’s request to compel further arbitration], abrogated
on other grounds in Haworth v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 372, 382–
383 & fn. 6.) Although it appears from the record and the status of the
parties’ dispute that further arbitration proceedings are anticipated, the trial
court’s order does not expressly require a rehearing in arbitration. Thus, the
order is not exempt from section 1294, subdivision (c) for this reason.
Next, we must determine whether the order partially vacating the
arbitration award is appealable. Section 1294 does not specifically allow an
appeal from such orders. However, Uber urges that we should treat the order
as effectively vacating the arbitration award and proceed to consider the
merits of the appeal. It cites Sunnyvale Unified School Dist., supra, 171
Cal.App.4th 168, in which the court found that an order partially vacating an
arbitration award was, in effect, an order vacating the award and, therefore,

agreement to arbitrate “ ‘pursuant to the FAA’ ” as an agreement to adopt the
FAA’s procedural provisions. (Id. at p. 1122.) Rodriguez was decided before
Cable Connection, and we find it inconsistent with Cable Connection.

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it was appealable. (Id. at p. 175.) Here, the arbitration award granted
Uber’s motion for summary judgment based upon the statute of limitations,
and the trial court’s order vacated the award as to Li’s termination claims.
We accept Uber’s concession that the trial court’s order effectively vacated
the arbitrator’s grant of summary judgment to Uber, and we find the order
appealable as an order vacating an arbitration award. (§ 1294, subd. (c).)
II. Trial Court Correctly Vacated Award Based on Pearson Dental
Supplies, Inc. v. Superior Court
A. FEHA Statute of Limitations
Government Code sections 12960 and 12965 provide the statutory
deadlines for claims under the FEHA. Government Code section 12960
requires an employee to exhaust the administrative remedy by filing an
administrative complaint with the Civil Rights Department (formerly the
DFEH) within three years after the alleged unlawful action occurred.4
(Gov. Code, §§ 12960, subds. (b), (e), 12925, subd. (b).) Government Code
section 12965 sets a one-year statutory deadline for an employee to file a civil
action after the department issues a right to sue letter. (Gov. Code, § 12965,
subd. (c)(1)(C).)
B. Summary of Relevant Dates Regarding First and Second
DFEH Administrative Complaints
On December 14, 2018, Li filed her first administrative complaint with
the DFEH, alleging sexual harassment, gender discrimination and
retaliation, and she received a right to sue letter the same day. On March 7,

4 Prior to January 1, 2020, the limitations period for filing an

administrative claim was one year. (See Gov. Code, § 12960, former
subd. (d).) “Effective January 1, 2020, the Legislature amended section
12960 to ‘enlarge[] the time for filing a [DFEH] claim to three years from the
date of the challenged conduct.’ ” (Guzman v. NBA Automotive, Inc. (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 1109, 1116, fn. 7; see Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e)(5).)

9
2019, Li was terminated. On August 20, 2019, Li filed a civil lawsuit. Uber
moved to compel arbitration of all claims except sexual harassment. On
November 1, 2019, the court granted Li’s request to dismiss without prejudice
all claims other than sexual harassment. On March 3, 2021, Li filed a
demand for arbitration, alleging gender discrimination and retaliation. On
February 28, 2022, Li filed a second administrative complaint with the
DFEH, alleging sexual harassment, gender discrimination, and retaliation,
which referenced her March 7, 2019 termination, and she was issued a right
to sue letter the same day. On July 17, 2022, Li filed an amended statement
of claims in the arbitration referring to her 2022 DFEH complaint,
exhausting her administrative remedies as to her termination.
C. Analysis
California has a strong public policy preference for arbitration as a
speedy, efficient, and final means of dispute resolution. (Moncharsh v. Heily
& Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 9.) In accordance with this preference, judicial
review of arbitration awards is limited to the grounds stated in sections
1286.2 and 1286.6. (Moncharsh, at pp. 26–28.) Relevant here is section
1286.2, subdivision (a), which states, “[T]he court shall vacate the award if
the court determines . . . : [¶] . . . [¶] (4) The arbitrators exceeded their powers
and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the
decision upon the controversy submitted.” “Arbitrators may exceed their
powers by issuing an award that violates a party’s unwaivable statutory
rights or that contravenes an explicit legislative expression of public policy.”
(Richey v. AutoNation, Inc. (2015) 60 Cal.4th 909, 916.) Whether an
arbitrator exceeded his or her powers is reviewed on appeal de novo. (Id. at
p. 918, fn. 1.)

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The trial court relied upon Pearson Dental Supplies, Inc. v. Superior
Court (2010) 48 Cal.4th 665 (Pearson) and vacated the award because the
arbitrator erroneously found that Li’s termination claims were untimely. In
Pearson, the employee was terminated on January 31, 2006. (Id. at p. 670.)
In April 2006, he filed an administrative complaint with the DFEH, alleging
age discrimination. (Ibid.) On April 14, 2006, the DFEH issued a right to
sue letter. (Ibid.) On October 2, 2006, the employee filed a complaint in
court asserting age discrimination and related claims. (Ibid.) On April 12,
2007, the trial court granted the employer’s motion to compel arbitration.
(Id. at p. 674.) On June 13, 2007, the parties selected an arbitrator. (Ibid.)
The employer filed a motion for summary judgment in the arbitration
proceeding, arguing that the claim was time-barred under the one-year
period provided in the arbitration agreement because the claim was filed over
a year after the employee’s termination on January 31, 2006. (Pearson,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 671.) The employee opposed the motion, arguing that
the one-year period in the arbitration agreement was shorter than the statute
of limitations provided under the FEHA, which permits complaints to be filed
within one year of the date the DFEH issues a right to sue letter. (Gov. Code,
§ 12965, subd. (c).) The employee also argued that the one-year period had
not run because it was tolled under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12
from the time the lawsuit was filed to 30 days after the order compelling
arbitration became final. (Pearson, at p. 671.) The arbitrator granted
summary judgment, finding that the employee’s “ ‘failure to submit his
claims and disputes to binding arbitration within the one-year period as
required by the [arbitration agreement] or within the tolling period
prescribed in Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12 has resulted in a waiver

11
of his right to proceed in this arbitration against his employer . . . .’ ” (Id. at
pp. 671–672.)
Our Supreme Court found the award should be vacated because the
arbitrator committed a “clear error of law” that amounted to an act in excess
of his powers. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 669–670.) It held that
“when, as here, an employee subject to a mandatory employment arbitration
agreement is unable to obtain a hearing on the merits of his FEHA claims, or
claims based on other unwaivable statutory rights, because of an arbitration
award based on legal error, the trial court does not err in vacating the award.
Stated in other terms, construing the CAA in light of the Legislature’s intent
that employees be able to enforce their right to be free of unlawful
discrimination under FEHA, an arbitrator whose legal error has barred an
employee subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement from obtaining a
hearing on the merits of a claim based on such right has exceeded his or her
powers within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2,
subdivision (a)(4), and the arbitrator’s award may properly be vacated.”
(Id. at p. 680.)
It is undisputed that Li was terminated on March 7, 2019. Under
Government Code section 12960, subdivision (e)(5) as amended effective
January 1, 2020, Li had until March 7, 2022, to exhaust her administrative
remedies regarding her termination by filing a complaint with the DFEH.
(Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e)(5).) It is undisputed that on February 28, 2022,
Li filed her DFEH complaint alleging her March 7, 2019, termination was in
violation of the FEHA. She obtained a right to sue letter on February 28,
2022. Based on these undisputed facts, and Pearson’s holding, the trial court
found that the arbitrator’s determination that Li’s termination claims raised
in her 2022 DFEH complaint were time-barred because they were

12
“ ‘essentially the same’ ” as the discrimination allegations in her December
2018 DFEH complaint was erroneous and required the award to be vacated.
We agree with the trial court’s order. Although Li filed her 2018 DFEH
complaint in December 2018, alleging sex and gender discrimination, she was
not terminated until March 7, 2019. Her second DFEH complaint included
the allegations that “as a result of the discrimination [she] was terminated”
and that her termination was retaliatory. Obviously, Li’s 2018 DFEH
complaint could not have included any allegations based upon her March 7,
2019 termination. Under the FEHA, Li had until March 7, 2022, to file her
DFEH complaint alleging discriminatory and retaliatory termination.
(Gov. Code, § 12960, subd. (e)(5).) Li’s February 28, 2022, DFEH complaint
was timely, and she had one year from the February 28, 2022, DFEH right to
sue letter within which to initiate arbitration regarding her discriminatory
and retaliatory termination. (Gov. Code, § 12965, subd. (c)(1)(C).) As in
Pearson, the arbitrator committed a “clear error of law” when it found Li’s
termination claims time-barred and the error deprived Li of the ability to
obtain a hearing on the merits of her FEHA claim. (Pearson, supra, 48
Cal.4th at pp. 670, 680.) Thus, the arbitrator exceeded its powers within the
meaning of section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), and the award was properly
vacated. (Pearson, at p. 680.)
Uber argues that Li waived her right to challenge the arbitrator’s
award because she submitted the issue to the arbitrator. We disagree. None
of the decisions on which Uber relies to support its waiver argument involved
a party’s unwaivable statutory rights under the FEHA. (Porter v. Golden
Eagle Ins. Co. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1286 [uninsured motorist
insurance compensation dispute]; Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20
Cal.App.5th 376, 381 [business dispute]; Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp.

13
6–7 [employment contract dispute between attorney and former law firm
regarding sharing of attorney fees]; University of San Francisco Faculty Assn.
v. University of San Francisco (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 942, 945 [pension plan
dispute]; Cohen v. TNP 2008 Participating Notes Program, LLC (2019) 31
Cal.App.5th 840, 849–850 [business dispute alleging breach of promissory
notes and guaranty, intentional misrepresentation, and breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing]; J.C. Gury Co. v. Nippon Carbide Industries
(USA) Inc. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1300, 1303–1304 [business contract
dispute alleging product defects].)5 We find that Li’s submission of the issue
of timeliness to the arbitrator did not waive her right to seek to vacate the
award on the basis that the arbitrator made a legal error that prevented Li
from obtaining a hearing on the merits of her FEHA claim. (Pearson, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 680.)
Uber also attempts to distinguish Pearson by arguing that the
arbitrator did not ignore a statutory mandate when it determined that Li’s
claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Uber claims that the statute
of limitations does not protect Li and therefore the arbitrator could not have
violated Li’s “ ‘right’ ” to the statute of limitations. We reject Uber’s
argument. Li’s position is that the arbitrator wrongly decided that the
deadline to file her arbitration demand began to run from the December 2018
DFEH letter even though she was not terminated until March 7, 2019, and
did not receive a right to sue letter regarding her termination until
February 28, 2022. This legal error resulted in the loss of her ability to have

5 Throughout its brief, Uber cites unpublished California appellate

court decisions in violation of California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. We do
not consider these decisions, and we remind counsel that persistent citation
to unpublished decisions in violation of rule 8.1115 may warrant sanctions.
(People v. Williams (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1521, 1529.)

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a hearing on the merits of her discrimination claims and violated her
unwaivable statutory rights under the FEHA. We find that the arbitrator
erroneously determined that Li’s termination claims were untimely, contrary
to the deadlines provided under the FEHA. The FEHA provisions governing
timing of filing administrative claims and lawsuits are statutory mandates
that may, as here, result in an employee’s inability to have a hearing on the
merits of his or her discrimination claims when the arbitrator misapplies the
statute. (Pearson, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 680.)
Nor are we persuaded by Uber’s argument that Pearson’s analysis only
applies when the arbitrator fails to explain its decision in writing and that,
therefore, it is not applicable here because the arbitrator issued a written
decision. Pearson’s holding does not state that it is limited to situations when
the arbitrator fails to explain its decision in writing. (Pearson, supra, 48
Cal.4th at p. 680.) There, the arbitrator issued a ruling granting a summary
judgment motion, which stated the plaintiff’s “ ‘failure to submit his claims
and disputes to binding arbitration within the one-year period as required by
the Dispute Resolution Agreement or within the tolling period prescribed in
Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.12 has resulted in a waiver of his right
to proceed in this arbitration against his employer. . . .’ ” (Pearson, at pp.
671–672.) The Supreme Court found the arbitrator committed a clear error
of law by improperly interpreting section 1281.12 (Pearson, at pp. 674–675)
in violation of the employee’s unwaivable statutory rights. (Ibid.) Similarly
here, the arbitrator erroneously determined, based on undisputed facts, that
Li’s 2018 right to sue letter began the limitations period for her claims
alleging wrongful and retaliatory termination in March 2019.
Uber argues that the arbitrator’s decision was correct even if it
deprived Li of an unwaivable statutory right. It claims that the arbitrator

15
was correct in “law and equity” when it determined that all of Li’s claims
were time-barred because they were not filed within one year of the
December 2018 right to sue letter. Uber again cites several unpublished
California appellate court decisions for the position that a new right to sue
letter does not revive the statute of limitations for claims that were already
covered by a prior DFEH complaint. The one published decision Uber cites
(Acuna v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1402) actually
supports Li. In Acuna, the employee filed three DFEH complaints at
different points alleging various forms of discrimination and retaliation, and
she received three separate right to sue letters. (Id. at pp. 1413–1414.) Her
third DFEH complaint was filed in October 2008, after her July 2008
termination, and it alleged she was terminated for retaliatory reasons.
(Id. at p. 1418.) The employee filed her lawsuit within a year of the date of
her third right to sue letter, but over a year from the date of her two earlier
right to sue letters. (Id. at pp. 1413–1414.) The court found some of the
employee’s claims untimely because they were not filed within one year of the
two earlier right to sue letters. (Id. at pp. 1416–1417.) However, it rejected
the employer’s argument that the retaliatory termination claim also was
untimely because she did not file her lawsuit within one year of the dates of
her two earlier right to sue letters and explained, “[T]he critical point is that
Acuna filed her lawsuit within one year of the third right-to-sue notice. The
notice pertained to Acuna’s third DFEH complaint alleging conduct that
occurred after the first two DFEH complaints were filed and after she
received the first two right-to-sue notices.” (Id. at p. 1419.) Here too Li’s
2022 DFEH complaint alleged conduct that occurred after her 2018 DFEH
complaint.

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Uber claims that Li understood her 2018 right to sue letter applied to
her termination claim because she alleged wrongful termination in her civil
lawsuit filed in August 2019. Uber asks that we take judicial notice of Li’s
court complaint. However, as we discuss ante, Uber did not ask the trial
court to take judicial notice of this complaint or of any of the other documents
it now asks us to judicially notice. Nor does Uber provide any reason for its
failure to do so or argue that exceptional circumstances exist to justify
deviation from the rule that an appellate court considers only matters that
were before the trial court. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 444, fn. 3.) Our
de novo review of the trial court’s order does not extend to review of evidence
not before the trial court.
Uber further argues that the arbitrator’s decision was correct under
principles of equity. It argues that the only reason Li gave for requesting
extensions to respond to Uber’s motion for summary judgment was that she
needed to obtain new counsel and that the arbitrator correctly determined
the extensions were not granted so that Li could “ ‘cure a defect’ ” in her
complaint. Uber again relies upon a document that was not presented to the
trial court. Even more significantly, Uber fails to provide any authority
suggesting that an arbitration award based on legal error that violates an
employee’s unwaivable statutory rights under the FEHA and prevents the
employee from obtaining a hearing on the merits of her discrimination claim
may nonetheless be upheld based on equitable principles. We reject Uber’s
arguments.

17
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed. Uber’s request for judicial notice is
denied. Li shall recover her costs on appeal.

Jackson, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

Simons, J.
Chou, J.

A168618/Li v. Uber Technologies, Inc.

18

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