CourtListener 10288895•People v. Madden CA2/2
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Filed 12/5/24 P. v. Madden CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B328978
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. MA081588)
JAMAAL TYREE MADDEN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Robert G. Chu, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded with directions.
Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2021, defendant and appellant Jamaal Tyree Madden
took part in a street race that ended in a fatal car crash. A jury
subsequently convicted defendant of two counts of second degree
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a); counts 1 & 2),1 one count of
hit and run driving resulting in death or serious injury (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2); count 3), and one count of driving a
motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license (Veh. Code, § 12500,
subd. (a); count 5). Defendant was sentenced to a total of 30
years to life plus four years six months in state prison.
On appeal, defendant raises several arguments against the
judgment: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted various pieces
of evidence; (2) defendant’s right to effective counsel was violated
by his trial counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct;
and (3) the cumulative effect of these errors prevented defendant
from receiving a fair trial. Defendant also contends that the trial
court erred by imposing (1) consecutive sentences on his two
murder convictions and (2) maximum and consecutive sentences
on the two determinate terms.
We agree that the trial court erroneously relied on
unproved aggravation factors when selecting the upper terms of
imprisonment for defendant’s two determinate sentences
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2)), and reverse and remand for resentencing on
that basis. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution’s case-in-chief
A. The accident
On the night of June 8, 2021, Spechelle P. (Spechelle) hired
a car from a ridesharing service. Rideshare driver Lesther D.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
(Lesther) picked Spechelle up from her home just before
midnight.2
Approximately half an hour later, a black Dodge
Challenger (the Challenger) crashed into Lesther’s car, a Toyota
Corolla (the Corolla). The collision caused the Corolla to slam
into a pole and burst into flames. The driver of the Challenger
fled the scene before emergency responders arrived. Spechelle
and Lesther died at the scene.
B. 911 calls
Multiple people called 911, reporting the accident, that
“cars . . . were racing,” and that one car had fled from the scene.
C. Bystanders
At the time of the collision, Raymundo Torres (Torres) and
Axel Ramirez (Ramirez) were eating in a restaurant when they
saw flames outside. They immediately rushed to the scene and
saw the crashed Challenger near the Corolla, which had caught
on fire.
Torres and Ramirez found a man standing next to the
Challenger, retrieving items from the front seat. They asked the
man if he was alright, and he responded “I think so.”
Less than one minute later, an Infiniti with a muffled
muffler pulled up to the scene of the accident. The man ran from
the Challenger and jumped into the passenger seat of the Infiniti.
The Infiniti immediately fled the scene.
2 California Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b) requires appellate
courts to “consider referring to” certain individuals “by first name
and last initial” to protect their privacy. Accordingly, we refer to
the victims in this case by their first names and last initials, and
thereafter by first names only. No disrespect is intended.
3
Turning their attention to the growing fire spreading from
the Corolla, Torres and Ramirez heard Lesther screaming in
pain. They and other bystanders tried to help him, but the
flames were too intense.
D. Emergency responders
Lyle Koegler (Koegler), a fire captain at the Los Angeles
Fire Department, responded to the collision scene.
Upon arriving, Koegler saw the Corolla engulfed in fire
that was spreading to roadside vegetation. He also saw a body
and a severed, charred arm lying in the street. After Koegler and
his colleagues extinguished the fire, they discovered a second
body burning in the bushes.
Koegler described the collision scene as “one of the worst
ones [he] ha[d] seen” in his 25 years of firefighting experience.
E. Investigation
1. The accident scene
Detective Elizabeth Sherman, a traffic investigator with
the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department (LASD), arrived at
the scene roughly two hours later. Based on her “the scene
investigation, the area of impact . . . the damage to the vehicles,
witness statements, as well as [her review of surveillance]
video[s] [from nearby buildings,]”, Detective Sherman concluded
that “the driver of the Challenger was travel[l]ing at a high rate
of speed, collided into the rear end of the Corolla which was
driving significantly slower . . . . [¶] The first impact caused the
Corolla to erupt into flames, caused it to be pushed into a light
pole and eventually come to rest in the brush[.]”
2. The Challenger
The driver’s side airbag in the Challenger was bloodied in
the crash; a DNA test revealed that the blood belonged to
4
defendant. Additionally, Detective Sherman found defendant’s
state identification card wedged between the dashboard and the
windshield of the Challenger. Defendant did not have a valid
driver’s license.
The Challenger was registered to a car rental company.
Approximately two weeks prior to the collision, the Challenger
was rented by defendant’s brother, Caleb Madden (Caleb).3
Shortly thereafter, defendant got pulled over while driving it; he
was given a verbal warning for speeding.
About six hours after the fatal crash, Caleb informed the
rental company that the Challenger had been stolen. The rental
company told him to file a police report, but Detective Sherman
found that no law enforcement agency had ever been notified of
the stolen car.
Detective Sherman ultimately concluded that defendant
was the driver of the Challenger. He was arrested three weeks
later.
3. Defendant’s postarrest statements
Detective Sherman and another LASD detective, Detective
Hall,4 interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest. Defendant
claimed that he had been in Las Vegas at the time of the
accident. He also repeatedly asked the detectives how long a
sentence he could expect if he was convicted.
Defendant admitted that driving fast and racing other cars
was dangerous and could cause death. When pressed, he said
3 Because defendant and his brother share the same last
name, we refer to Caleb by his first name. No disrespect is
intended.
4 Detective Hall’s first name does not appear in the record.
5
that it was dangerous to race on public roads because “[o]ther
people[’s] life besides your life is in your hands[.]”
F. Other evidence admitted at trial
1. Prior traffic violations
The prosecution introduced evidence of two prior traffic
accidents involving defendant. In the first incident, which took
place in October 2020, defendant rear-ended a car that was
stopped to make a left turn (the 2020 accident).
A witness testified that shortly before the accident, he was
driving at 55 or 60 miles per hour when defendant’s car sped
past, going “quite a bit” faster than him; he was scared because
he “didn’t know [the car] was there until it passed me.” A few
minutes later, he saw that the car had collided with another car.
The driver of the other car did not see defendant’s car
before the collision. About 15 or 20 minutes after the accident,
defendant approached the driver of the other car, who was sitting
by the side of his car waiting for paramedics to arrive.
The police officer who responded to the accident scene
determined that defendant was likely driving faster than the
speed limit, given the damage to both vehicles. Defendant
proffered competing evidence from an accident reconstruction
expert, who opined that defendant was not speeding at the time
of the crash.
The second incident occurred two weeks before the crash,
when defendant was pulled over for straddling between two lanes
and speeding while driving the Challenger (the 2021 traffic stop).
Defendant was driving approximately 20 miles over the posted
speed on a city street. The officer gave defendant a verbal
warning.
6
Defendant did not object to the admission of this evidence.5
2. Crime scene and autopsy photographs
Throughout trial, the prosecution introduced a total of
17 photographs of the crime scene and the victims.6 Defendant
did not object to any of them.
The first group of photographs (the crime scene photos)
included (1) one photograph of a body concealed by the roadside
brush fire (Exh. 5); (2) one photograph showing both bodies at the
scene after the fire was extinguished (Exh. 6); (3) one photograph
of a severed, charred arm (Exh. 7); and (4) one photograph of the
burned car, which also showed a portion of one of the victims’
bodies (Exh. 41).
The second group (the autopsy photos) included (1) eight
photographs of the thermal injuries on different parts of both
victims’ bodies (Exhs. 15A-B, 16, 20A-E); (2) three photographs of
the blunt force injuries sustained by the victims (Exhs. 18, 21A-
B); (3) one photograph showing where a victim had suffered
5 Defendant’s sole concern regarding the traffic stop for
speeding was that the officer (1) performed “a compliance check”
of the Challenger for a potential parole or probation violation,
and (2) mentioned gangs. The trial court excluded any evidence
of these issues, but allowed “the traffic stop and the reason for
that stop . . . to come in.”
6 When the prosecution filed its trial brief, it advised that the
prosecution would “seek to admit a limited number [of] autopsy
photographs as well as collision scene photographs that include
the deceased victims.” Defendant did not file a written objection.
Later, at a pretrial hearing, the trial court signaled that it was
not going “to . . . exclude those types of photos.” Defendant’s trial
counsel said that he would not object to those photographs being
passed to the jury.
7
“traumatic amputation or separation of a portion of the arm”
(Exh. 17); and (4) one photograph showing an accumulation of
soot in one of the victims’ windpipe (Exh. 19). The autopsy
photos were all introduced during the coroner’s testimony.
3. Jail phone call
On January 24, 2023, defendant called his family from jail
(the phone call). Defendant and his mother strategized about the
upcoming trial. His mother told him, “You gotta get smart. I told
you, you walk in [the courtroom] looking remorseful.” Defendant
asked, “But you want me to walk in there crying?” His mother
said, “You could cry if you need to . . . [¶] . . . you can cry if you
want to.” Defendant responded, “What am I gonna cry for? ****,
I’m still alive! Cuz [sic], I don’t give a **** if they give me a
million years in prison, I’m still alive, ****.”
The prosecution moved to introduce the phone call into
evidence. Defendant objected, arguing that his statements
during the call were irrelevant and prejudicial. The trial court
overruled the objection, “finding th[e] [phone call] relevant and
probative after a weighing process under [section] 352” of the
Evidence Code.
At trial, defendant renewed his objection to the phone call.
He contended that the phone call was minimally probative but
“inflammatory[.]” The trial court again overruled the objection.
II. Defense
A. Dr. Haig Kojian
Dr. Kojian, a psychologist who had evaluated defendant,
opined that defendant had attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
and tested within the borderline for an intellectual disability
diagnosis. Dr. Kojian felt that defendant was “lacking” in his
8
capacity to make decisions, have foresight, and assess
consequences.
Dr. Kojian also opined that persons of defendant’s age had
not yet reached full neurological maturity.7
B. Defendant’s testimony
Defendant testified on his own behalf. He admitted that he
had been driving at 130 miles per hour the night of the accident
while racing with a friend, but denied having any subjective
awareness that someone could get injured or die as a result of his
driving. He conceded that he “kn[e]w [street racing was]
dangerous, of course.”
Defendant fled the scene of the accident because he “knew
it was bad” and he “didn’t want to go to jail.” He didn’t call the
authorities or report the accident, claiming that he “didn’t know
what the outcome” of the accident “was[,]” until he saw a warrant
for his arrest on charges of murder.
Regarding the 2020 accident, defendant testified that he
initially “had someone at the scene take [him] from that . . . scene
and go someplace else[,]” but he “came back eventually” to “check
and see if everyone was all right.” He volunteered that he
“stayed” at that accident “[be]cause [he] kn[e]w . . . it wasn’t a big
deal.”
Lastly, with respect to the phone call, defendant testified
that he did not mean what he said; he “was just trying to protect
[his] family” by “making them feel I’m all right.”
III. Sentencing
Following defendant’s conviction, the matter proceeded to
sentencing. The trial court noted that “[a]s a result of
7 Defendant was 18 years old at the time of the fatal car
crash.
9
. . . defendant’s callous disregard for the safety of others, and
flagrant violations of the vehicle codes, two innocent human
beings were killed[.]” Accordingly, his crimes “involved great
violence, great bodily harm and other acts disclosing a high
degree of cruelty, viciousness and callousness.”
The trial court expressed concern that “defendant had
repeatedly committed acts where it seems like he doesn’t care
about the consequences of his actions. [¶] He does not have a
valid driver’s license and yet he continues to drive. He ends up
rear-ending another vehicle due to his driving. He’s pulled over
by law enforcement for driving at an unsafe speed. Then instead
of learning his lesson, he’s racing on city streets and ends up
striking another car, causing that other car to be fully engulfed in
flames.”
And, “[i]nstead of stopping to help, . . . defendant gets his
belongings out of the car and flees the scene in another car, which
shows that the manner in which the crime was carried out
indicates planning, sophistication, or professionalism . . . and,
again, shows . . . defendant not caring about the consequences of
his actions. [¶] He made no efforts to contact law enforcement on
the night of the crash or any time before he was arrested.”
The trial court noted that “the most shocking thing was
. . . [defendant’s] lack of remorse . . . throughout this trial.
Throughout the trial, I saw him laughing. I saw him throwing up
hand signs towards individuals in the audience numerous times
as if the proceedings were a joke to him.” Accordingly, the trial
court found that “defendant would be a danger to others if not
imprisoned.”
The trial court acknowledged multiple factors in mitigation,
including defendant’s youth and mental health diagnoses.
10
However, the court found that “the circumstances in aggravation
far outweigh any mitigation in this case.” Accordingly, the trial
court “[w]ithout hesitation this court will impose the maximum
sentence allowable under the law.”
IV. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Alleged evidentiary error
Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting
evidence of his two prior traffic violations; graphic photographs
from the crime scene; and the phone call. To the degree any of
his evidentiary objections was forfeited, defendant contends he
received ineffective assistance of counsel.
A. General legal principles
“No evidence is admissible except relevant evidence,” and
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute, all relevant evidence
is admissible.” (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 351.) Evidence is relevant if
it has “any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.”
(Evid. Code, § 210.) Although a trial court “‘has broad discretion
in determining the relevance of evidence . . . [, it] lacks discretion
to admit irrelevant evidence.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Riggs
(2008) 44 Cal.4th 248, 289.)
The trial court also has discretion to exclude relevant
evidence under Evidence Code section 352 “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
When evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission
violates the fundamental concepts of justice, due process is
11
implicated. (Perry v. New Hampshire (2012) 565 U.S. 228, 237.)
“Evidence introduced by the prosecution will often raise more
than one inference, some permissible, some not; we must rely on
the jury to sort them out in light of the court’s instructions. Only
if there are no permissible inferences the jury may draw from the
evidence can its admission violate due process. Even then, the
evidence must ‘be of such quality as necessarily prevents a fair
trial.’ [Citations.] Only under such circumstances can it be
inferred that the jury must have used the evidence for an
improper purpose.” (Jammal v. Van de Kamp (9th Cir. 1991)
926 F.2d 918, 920, fn. omitted (Jammal); People v. Hunt (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 811, 817 [approvingly quoting the Jammal
language].)
B. Standard of review
A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. (People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 9–10.)
Typically, a ruling erroneously admitting evidence does not
require reversal unless it is reasonably probable that a more
favorable result would have occurred had the evidence been
excluded. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).)
If the error was so egregious that it fundamentally impaired the
fairness of a defendant’s trial and thereby violated due process,
the error is instead reviewed pursuant to the standard in
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 (Chapman). Under
Chapman, the reviewing court asks whether the constitutional
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at p. 24.)
C. Forfeiture
The People contend that defendant forfeited any challenge
to the admissibility of the crime scene and autopsy photographs
because he failed to object at trial. We agree. (People v. Stevens
12
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 325, 333 [failure to object to the admission of
evidence at trial forfeits an appellate claim that that evidence
was improperly admitted].) However, because defendant alleges
that this forfeiture was caused by the ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of his
claims. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 146
(Crittenden) [courts may consider forfeited claims to forestall
ineffective assistance of counsel arguments].)
D. The trial court properly admitted evidence of the
prior traffic violations
Evidence of a defendant’s “commission of other crimes, civil
wrongs or bad acts is not admissible to show bad character or
predisposition to criminality, but may be admitted to prove some
material fact at issue such as . . . knowledge[.]” (People v. Cage
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 273 (Cage); Evid. Code, § 1101, subd. (b).)
A trial court’s discretionary decision to admit “other crimes
evidence” for a permissible purpose cannot be “disturb[ed] . . . on
appeal absent a showing that it exercised its discretion in an
arbitrary manner resulting in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
(People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th 542, 587 (Scully).)
Here, the prosecution proceeded on a theory of implied
malice murder, which requires, among other things, that
defendant “kn[e]w[] that his conduct endanger[ed] the life of
another” and “act[ed] with conscious disregard for life.” (People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).) When a defendant is
charged with implied malice murder after causing a fatal car
accident, prior instances of reckless driving are admissible to
prove that the defendant knew his driving was dangerous.
(People v. Ortiz (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 104, 112 (Ortiz) [“[C]ourts
have recognized repeatedly that a motor vehicle driver’s previous
13
encounters with the consequences of recklessness on the highway
. . . sensitizes him to the dangerousness of such life-threatening
conduct”].)
The 2020 accident and the 2021 traffic stop both show that,
at the time of the fatal crash, defendant knew that his reckless
driving—and particularly, speeding—endangered others. (See,
e.g., People v. Eagles (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 330, 338–340 (Eagles)
[evidence that, on a prior occasion, a defendant had been seen
speeding and weaving in and out of traffic was admissible in his
trial for vehicular manslaughter].)
Moreover, the 2021 traffic stop demonstrates that despite
causing a car crash by speeding seven months earlier, defendant
persisted in driving recklessly by speeding and driving between
lanes. And even though he received a verbal warning about
speeding from the officer who pulled him over, two weeks later he
was speeding again—this time in the street race that caused the
fatal crash. The 2021 traffic stop thus illustrates defendant’s
“conscious disregard” for the lives he jeopardized by driving
recklessly. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 988.) Accordingly, the
trial court did not err in admitting evidence of these incidents.
Defendant raises four arguments against our conclusion.
First, he argues that the prior incidents were too dissimilar to the
fatal crash to shed light on defendant’s knowledge of the risks
posed by his actions. Defendant asserts, without explanation,
that his “conduct on the night of the incident was qualitatively
different than . . . speeding or driving at an unsafe speed[.]” He
ignores that the fatal crash was caused by driving at unsafe
speeds, which also led to both the 2020 accident and the 2021
traffic stop. In the 2020 accident, defendant rear-ended a car
while speeding, the exact consequence of his racing the night of
14
the fatal crash. And, in any event, prior incidents of reckless
driving need not be identical to demonstrate defendant’s
knowledge of the risks of such behavior. (Ortiz, supra,
109 Cal.App.4th at p. 112 [prior convictions for driving under the
influence were relevant to show the defendant’s knowledge of the
risks of reckless driving, even though he was not intoxicated
during the fatal accident].)8
Second, defendant contends that the prior incidents were
not sufficiently severe to impress upon defendant the risks of
reckless driving, citing, People v. Saucedo (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
505 (Saucedo). In that case, an appellate court held that the
defendant’s prior acts of “speeding, spinning tires, failing to stop
at a stop sign, driving on a sidewalk and stopping in an
intersection, running a red light and driving without a license”
were inadmissible to prove knowledge because “there [wa]s no
evidence that [the defendant] suffered any serious consequences
. . . [or] was ever required to attend any educational programs
about the dangers of reckless driving.” (Id. at p. 518.)
But defendant did experience serious consequences; in the
2020 accident, defendant rear-ended another car at high speed,
and paramedics were called to the scene to assess the condition of
the other driver. (See Eagles, supra, 133 Cal.App.3d at p. 340
[“‘Evidence of excessive speed resulting in a near collision is
relevant to knowledge of risk . . . of excessive speed’”]; contra,
8 Because we find the prior incidents were sufficiently
similar to the crash, any error in the trial court’s failure to
“assess[] the similarities between the prior and current offenses”
was harmless. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
15
Saucedo, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 518 [prior incidents
inadmissible to prove knowledge of risk because “[t]here [wa]s no
evidence that . . . [defendant] came close to injuring anyone” on
those occasions].) Evidence of the 2020 accident was thus
admissible to prove defendant’s knowledge of the dangers posed
by his driving.9
And, assuming arguendo that the verbal warning issued
during the 2021 traffic stop was not a sufficiently severe
consequence to notify defendant of the hazards of speeding,
evidence of that incident was separately admissible to prove
defendant’s conscious disregard for human life.10 (See Cage,
supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 273 [other act evidence is admissible to
prove any “material fact at issue”].)
9 Defendant briefly argues that the prior incidents should
have been excluded as cumulative because it is “basic knowledge”
that “driving too fast for road conditions could result in an
accident” (although defendant simultaneously insists that “his
purported knowledge w[as] hotly contested at trial”). The case
defendant cites for this proposition is inapposite, particularly
given the plethora of authority approving the admission of
multiple traffic priors in vehicular homicide cases. (Compare
People v. Hendrix (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 216, 243–244 [evidence
of a defendant’s prior contact with police officers was unnecessary
to prove that he understood “rudimentary” facts about how
officers interact with suspects] with Ortiz, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th
at p. 110 [no error in admitting “seven past incidents in which
[the] defendant had either been convicted of reckless driving,
convicted of reckless drunk driving, or been observed driving
recklessly”].)
10 Defendant does not argue that Saucedo, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th 505, or any other authority prohibits the use of
the 2021 traffic stop to prove his conscious disregard for life.
16
Third, defendant claims that his testimony about initially
fleeing the scene of the 2020 accident and later returning was
irrelevant to establishing knowledge of risk and should have been
excluded. Here again, defendant’s statements go to his conscious
disregard for human life rather than knowledge of risk. His
account of the 2020 accident shows that defendant knew he
should have stayed at the crash scene and “check[ed] [to] see if
everyone was all right[;]” instead, he fled and did not return.
Defendant even clarified that he only “stayed” at the 2020
accident “[be]cause [he] kn[e]w . . . it wasn’t a big deal[,]”
implying that he fled from the fatal car crash because he knew
that it was a comparatively grievous accident. Defendant’s
testimony was thus properly admitted as evidence of his
conscious disregard for the victims’ lives.
Lastly, defendant tries to persuade us that he actually “had
no prior reckless driving incidents” because (1) he presented
expert testimony that he was not speeding in the 2020 accident
and (2) he was not cited for speeding during the 2021 traffic stop.
But the trial court instructed the jury that it was not obligated to
believe defendant’s reconstruction expert. (CALCRIM No. 332.)
And a person’s reckless driving need not be officially sanctioned
to be admissible as other act evidence. (Evid. Code, § 1101, subd.
(b) [evidence of “a crime, civil wrong, or other act” is admissible
“to prove some fact . . . other than [a defendant’s] disposition to
commit such an act”].) [Italics added.]
E. The trial court properly admitted the photographs
into evidence
“‘The applicable rule’” when admitting allegedly gruesome
photographs “‘is simply one of relevance, and the trial court has
broad discretion in determining such relevance. [Citation.]
17
“‘[M]urder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical
evidence in such a case are always unpleasant’” [citation], and we
rely on our trial courts to ensure that relevant, otherwise
admissible evidence is not more prejudicial than probative
[citation]. A trial court’s decision to admit photographs under
Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the
prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their
probative value.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Scully (2021) 11 Cal.5th
542, 590 (Scully).)
“‘“To determine whether there was an abuse of discretion,
we address two factors: (1) whether the photographs were
relevant, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that the probative value of each photograph outweighed
its prejudicial effect.”’ [Citation.]” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 590.) Having examined all of the photographs, we find that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion.
The crime scene photos “were relevant to corroborate and
illustrate the testimony of several witnesses who saw the crime
occur” and “the testimony of the investigating officers about the
condition in which they found the crime scene[.]” (Scully, supra,
11 Cal.5th at pp. 590–591.)
They also shed light on defendant’s state of mind in the
immediate aftermath of the collision.11 The crime scene photos
show the staggering scale of the crash: the incinerated Corolla,
11 Regardless, trial courts are not obligated to exclude
gruesome images just because, as defendant argues, they lack
“specific probative value to the . . . theory of the case.” (See, e.g.,
People v. Johnson (2015) 61 Cal.4th 734, 767 (Johnson) [no abuse
of discretion in admitting a crime scene photograph that “‘simply
showed what had been done to the victim’”].)
18
the charred roadside, the severed limb in the road. These
photographs make it clear that this was an extraordinarily
dangerous accident. Notwithstanding defendant’s testimony that
he “didn’t know what the outcome was[,]” it would have been
obvious to anyone present that the people in the Corolla were
seriously hurt.
Yet defendant did not attempt to help the victims or call
emergency services. Instead, he tried to remove his personal
effects from the Challenger, hopped into another car, and fled the
scene. Given the magnitude of the wreck, as demonstrated by the
crime scene photos, defendant’s behavior evinces “a callous
indifference to human life.” (People v. Palomar (2020)
44 Cal.App.5th 969, 978 (Palomar) [failure to assist victims
supports a defendant’s conviction for implied malice murder].)
The autopsy photos were also relevant, as they illustrate
the horrific manner of the victims’ deaths and corroborate the
coroner’s testimony. (People v. Marsh (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 987,
998 (Marsh) [“Gruesome or not, admission of relevant autopsy
photographs is in the sound discretion of the trial court, even
where they are only cumulatively used to graphically portray
injuries already detailed in the testimony of a doctor witness”].)
Such evidence is admissible even where, as here, the causes of
death are undisputed and/or supported by nonpictorial evidence.
(See Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 591 [“‘[A]utopsy photographs
are routinely admitted to establish the nature and placement of
the victim’s wounds and to clarify . . . testimony . . . regarding the
crime scene and the autopsy, even if other evidence may serve
the same purposes’”]; Johnson, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 767 [“[T]he
prosecution [i]s not obligated to “accept antiseptic stipulations in
lieu of photographic evidence.”’ [Citation.]”].)
19
Moreover, the photographs were not unduly prejudicial.
Multiple witnesses, including bystanders Torres and Ramirez,
firefighter Koegler, and LASD Detective Sherman testified to the
gravity of the collision and the severity of the injury to the
victims. “[G]iven the witnesses’ detailed description of the
circumstances of the crime scene and the [victims’] condition[s],
the photographs corroborating such testimony are not so
gruesome or inflammatory as to have impermissibly swayed the
jury.” (Scully, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 591.)
Defendant urges us to follow Marsh, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d
987, arguing that, in that case, “the trial [court] violated section
352 [of the Evidence Code] by admitting autopsy photographs”
where “the autopsy surgeon’s testimony was adequate to make
the prosecution’s point.” But in Marsh, the autopsy photographs
not only had limited probative value, they were also unusually
grisly and provocative. (Marsh, supra, 175 Cal.App.3d at p. 999
[“These photographs are gruesome solely because of the autopsy
surgeon’s handiwork . . . . In other words, their inflammatory
nature has been greatly enhanced by the manner in which the
surgeon chose to ‘pose’” the victim’s body].)
Defendant’s case is distinguishable. As in other instances
when autopsy photographs were properly admitted, the images
“‘“at issue here are gruesome because the charged offenses were
gruesome, but they did no more than accurately portray the
shocking nature of the crimes . . . .’ [Citations.]”’” (People v.
Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1272.) Although these photos,
like all photographs of murder victims, are “disturbing” (Scully,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 591), the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting them.
20
F. No prejudicial error in admitting evidence of the
phone call
Assuming arguendo that the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of the phone call, the error was harmless under any
standard of review. (Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24; Watson,
supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) The record contains ample other
evidence of defendant’s indifference towards the victims:
Although defendant testified that that he knew the accident was
“bad”, he made no attempt to help the victims at the scene or
report the accident to authorities. Instead, he tried to conceal
evidence of his involvement by removing personal belongings
from the Challenger, fleeing the scene of the crime, and, upon
arrest, lying about his whereabouts the night of the crash.
(Palomar, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 978 [failing to assist a
wounded victim manifests “a callous indifference to human life”];
People v. Famalaro (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1, 35 [trier of fact may
“infer consciousness of guilt from any attempts by defendant to
conceal evidence”]; People v. Leon (2015) 61 Cal.4th 569, 607
[same, as to a defendant’s flight after the crime].) In the face of
this evidence, the admission of the phone call, even if erroneous,
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman, supra,
386 U.S. at p. 24.)
Defendant argues that the phone call fatally undermined
his primary defense—namely, that his “impaired mental abilities
. . . created reasonable doubt that he knew his actions posed a
risk of death and acted in conscious disregard of human life.” He
contends that the phone call was especially impactful because it
carried the same weight as a confession, effectively using
defendant’s “own words . . . to shatter his defense.” (See People v.
Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 86 (Neal) [confessions are “‘much more
21
likely to be affect the outcome of a trial than . . . other categories
of evidence, and thus is much more likely to be
prejudicial . . . .’”].)
But even if we accepted defendant’s analogy, the phone call
was not the only piece of evidence that undercut his defense. The
record is replete with other statements by defendant that
contradict his impairment defense. Shortly after his arrest,
defendant told detectives that street racing and speeding on
public roadways was “dangerous” because “[o]ther people[’s] life
besides your life is in your hands[.]” At trial, defendant
confirmed that, at the time of the accident, he knew that street
racing at 130 miles per hour was dangerous.
Defendant also testified that after causing a prior, less
severe traffic accident, he returned to the scene shortly after
fleeing “to check and see if everyone was all right[;]” yet he did
not do the same after this crash, which was far more injurious.
He said that he “stayed” for “the first one” “[be]cause [he] kn[e]w
. . . it wasn’t a big deal.” But at the fatal crash, he “knew it was
bad” and left without ever returning or reporting the accident to
authorities. He later lied to detectives about where he was the
night of the accident “[b]ecause . . . [he] didn’t want to go to jail.”
These statements, combined with defendant’s behavior
immediately following the crash, show that he “‘“‘kn[e]w that his
conduct endanger[ed] the li[ves] of []other[s] and . . . act[ed] with
conscious disregard for life[,]’”’” the state of mind necessary to
convict him of implied malice murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th
at p. 988 (Reyes) [internal citations omitted].) The phone call was
ultimately “‘unimportant in relation to everything else the jury
considered on the issue in question, as revealed in the record.’
[Citation.]” (Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 87.) Thus, any
22
assumed error in the phone call’s admission was harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.
II. Alleged denial of the right to effective counsel
Defendant alleges that he was denied his constitutional
right to effective counsel because of his trial attorney’s failure to
object to the prosecutor’s misstatements of law during closing
arguments.
A. Applicable law
“When attacking the prosecutor’s remarks to the jury, the
defendant must show that, ‘[i]n the context of the whole
argument and the instructions’ [citation], there was ‘a reasonable
likelihood the jury understood or applied the complained-of
comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In
conducting this inquiry, we “do not lightly infer” that the jury
drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging
meaning from the prosecutor’s statements. [Citation.]’” (People
v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 667 (Centeno).)
“A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to alleged
prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s
inaction violated the defendant’s constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel.” (People v. Lopez (2008)
42 Cal.4th 960, 966.) To establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that his counsel’s representation fell below the
standard of a competent advocate, and a reasonable probability
exists that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been
different. (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216–218
(Ledesma).)
23
B. Standard of review
In determining whether counsel’s performance was
deficient, we exercise deferential scrutiny and “assess the
reasonableness of counsel’s acts or omissions . . . under the
circumstances as they stood at the time that counsel acted or
failed to act.” (Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 216.) We must
reject a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel “if the record
sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner
challenged unless (1) counsel was asked for and failed to provide
a satisfactory explanation or (2) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th
833, 880 (Burgener).)
C. Analysis
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor committed
misconduct by saying the following in the rebuttal portion of her
closing argument:
“[I]mplied malice murder can be an accident. I submit to
you that that is exactly what [it] [is] because the intent is not to
hurt or kill somebody. It’s your actions. [R]egardless of what you
thought might happen, your actions are so dangerous that the
natural and probable consequences could be that somebody dies.
[¶] . . . The problem is the action that you did that caused the
deaths. That’s what you have to consider. That’s what the intent
is about. In this case, it is not if he was braking; it is whether or
not he was speeding, and excessive speed at that, and whether or
not he was racing. And are those intentional actions, the ones
that he disregarded, making it a murder? [¶] . . . [A] mental
state . . . must be formed before the act that causes the death is
committed. Again, in this case, the speeding.”
24
Defendant urges us to read this segment of the prosecutor’s
rebuttal argument in a vacuum, which we cannot do. (Centeno,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 667.) He argues that this portion of the
closing argument caused the jury to misunderstand the law of
implied malice, by characterizing implied malice murders as
“accidents” and by minimizing the importance of defendant’s
mental state. But, read in context, there is no “‘reasonable
likelihood’” that the jury understood the prosecutor’s comments
as defendant does. (Ibid.)
The prosecutor used the word “accident” to communicate
that a perpetrator of implied malice murder does not set out to
kill someone; instead, they deliberately commit an act, the
natural and probable consequences of which are dangerous to life.
The intent requirement (i.e., deliberation) attaches to the act (i.e.,
speeding), not the consequence of the act (i.e., the death of
another). That is a correct statement of the law. (Reyes, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 988.)
Later in her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury
“the four things [it] need[ed] to consider for implied malice” were
whether (1) “defendant intentionally committed the act . . . [of]
racing and speeding”; (2) “the natural and probable consequences
of that act are dangerous to human life”; (3) defendant “kn[e]w
that it was dangerous”; and (4) defendant “deliberately d[id] that
act with a conscious disregard for human life.” This language is
lifted almost verbatim from the standard jury instruction on
implied malice. (CALCRIM No. 520.)
Additionally, the jury was properly instructed on the
required elements of implied malice murder. And the trial court
told the jury that “[i]f the attorneys discuss the law and it is
different from my instructions on the law, you must rely on the
25
law as I have stated it to you.” We presume the jury followed the
trial court’s instructions. (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th
577, 596.)
Accordingly, there was a perfectly “satisfactory
explanation” (Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 880) for defense
counsel’s failure to speak up at trial: There was no prosecutorial
misconduct to which he could object. (People v. Memro (1995)
11 Cal.4th 786, 834 [“The Sixth Amendment does not require
counsel ‘“to waste the court’s time with futile or frivolous
motions.”’ [Citation.]”].) Defendant’s right to effective assistance
of counsel was not violated.
III. Alleged instructional error
Defendant claims that the trial court should have
instructed the jury on vehicular manslaughter with gross
negligence.
He concedes that the trial court was not obligated to do so,
as our Supreme Court has held that vehicular manslaughter is
not a lesser included offense of second degree murder. (People v.
Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983, 989 [gross vehicular
manslaughter while intoxicated is not a lesser included offense of
second degree murder], overruled on another point in People v.
Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1228–1229; see also People v.
Bettasso (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1058 [vehicular
manslaughter is not a lesser included offense of second degree
murder].)
Nonetheless, defendant asks us to “recommend that the
California Supreme Court provide a mechanism that allows the
jury to consider whether a defendant charged with murder based
on vehicular homicide is actually guilty of vehicular
manslaughter instead.”
26
We must decline defendant’s invitation. We are bound by
the opinions of our Supreme Court (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 (Auto Equity Sales)),
and do not give advisory opinions about settled propositions
(Vandermost v. Bowen (2012) 53 Cal.4th 421, 452).
IV. Alleged cumulative error
Defendant contends that his conviction should be reversed
due to cumulative error. As set forth above, defendant has failed
to demonstrate any reversible error in his conviction. To the
extent we have assumed error for purposes of analysis, none of
these errors increases the impact of any other and their
cumulative impact did not deprive defendant of a fair trial or the
right to due process. (See People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th
449, 508.)
V. Alleged sentencing errors
A. Consecutive sentences for murder convictions
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences for each of his murder
convictions; “because he did not harbor a separate culpable intent
as to each victim,” defendant urges that “he should not be
sentenced to consecutive terms based on a single act . . . that
resulted in two deaths.” Our Supreme Court disagrees with him.
(People v. Calhoun (2007) 40 Cal.4th 398, 408 [“a consecutive
sentence” is proper when a defendant’s “single act of violence
caused either the death or serious injury of [multiple] people[,]”
as “[t]he gravity of and his culpability for this offense is increased
by the number of those he harmed”].) We reiterate that we must
follow Supreme Court precedent, and thus decline to entertain
defendant’s arguments against it. (Auto Equity Sales, supra,
57 Cal.2d at p. 455.)
27
B. Determinate terms
Finally, defendant alleges that the trial court erred by
imposing maximum and consecutive sentences on each of his
determinate terms.12
1. Applicable law
When imposing a determinate sentence for an offense that
carries three possible terms of imprisonment, the trial court
“shall,” in its discretion, impose a sentence “not to exceed the
middle term.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) It may only impose the
upper term if “there are circumstances in aggravation of the
crime that justify [its] imposition[,]” and “the facts underlying
those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the
jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
2. Standard of review
We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847, superseded by
statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lynch (2024)
16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch).) A court abuses its sentencing discretion
when it acts arbitrarily and capriciously, relies on improper
considerations in reaching its decision, or is unaware of the scope
of its discretion so that it does not exercise informed discretion at
all. (People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.)
12 The prosecution argues that defendant forfeited his
sentencing claims; because defendant again argues that any
forfeiture was caused by ineffective assistance of counsel, we
reach the merits of his argument. (Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th
at p. 146.)
28
3. The matter is remanded for resentencing
Under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), error “occurs when
the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an
upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied
on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 768.)
Here, the factors in aggravation listed by the trial court
were that “th[e] crime involved great violence, great bodily harm
and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness and
callousness[;]” defendant’s “prior convictions including sustained
petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are of increase in
seriousness[;]” and that “the manner in which the crime was
carried out indicates planning, sophistication or professionalism.”
The People concede that “none of the[se] aggravating
circumstances were established as required by section 1170,
subdivision (b).” However, they contend that this error should be
held harmless.
Sentencing errors under section 1170, subdivision (b)(2),
are subject to harmless error review under the standard set forth
in Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24. (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 750.) Such errors are not prejudicial if “an
appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied
upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that
those facts were otherwise proved true in compliance with the
current statutory requirements.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 768.)
29
Under the circumstances of this case, we are satisfied
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found two of
the aggravating factors listed by the trial court to be true:
Defendant’s increasingly serious criminal history is proven by his
probation report, the accuracy of which was never contested by
defendant. And, given the jury’s verdict, it would have found
that defendant exhibited a high degree of callousness. (Contra,
Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776 [holding the jury would not
necessarily have found this factor true since it acquitted the
defendant of the most serious charge against him].)
But we cannot say the same of the final factor, namely the
defendant’s planning, sophistication, or professionalism in
carrying out the crimes. The trial court found this factor present
because defendant removed some personal belongings from the
Challenger before fleeing the crime scene, without trying to help
the victims. Looking at the same information, the jury could
have reached the opposite finding. Defendant’s panicked flight,
and his failure to remove a crucial piece of identifying
information from the Challenger (namely, his state identification
card), could equally reflect his youth, inexperience, and failure to
make an adequate escape plan in the event of a disaster like the
fatal car crash.
“Because we cannot find the omission of a jury trial
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as to every aggravating fact
relied upon by the trial court to impose an upper term,
[defendant’s] sentence must be reversed. ‘“The proper remedy for
this type of failure of proof—where . . . [aggravating facts] were
‘never tried’ to the jury—is to remand and give the People an
30
opportunity to retry”’ the aggravating facts. [Citation.]”13
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.)
We therefore remand for resentencing. “On remand, the
parties remain free to introduce at trial all relevant evidence to
support or contest the factual support for the aggravating
circumstances set out in the California Rules of Court. The court
may rely on any properly proven aggravating facts, including
prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to support
a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court
retains its discretion to impose an upper term sentence if it
concludes that one or more properly proved circumstances justify
such a sentence. [Citation.] If it cannot so conclude, it may
impose no more than a middle term for” counts 3 and 5. (Lynch,
supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 777–778.)
13 Because we remand for resentencing on this ground, we
need not address defendant’s parallel argument that remand is
required under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6). (See People v.
Lua (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1004, 1021 [appellate court’s
conclusion that remand was required rendered moot other
arguments raised on appeal regarding the sentence].)
31
DISPOSITION
The sentence is reversed, and the matter is remanded to
the trial court for resentencing. In all other respects, the
judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
_____________________, J.
ASHMANN-GERST
We concur:
________________________, P. J.
LUI
________________________, J.*
HOFFSTADT
* Justice of the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District,
Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
32
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