CourtListener 10287101•People v. Lindsey CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/3/24 P. v. Lindsey CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B335245
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA132035)
v.
ZAVEON D. LINDSEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Juan Carlos Dominguez, Judge. Affirmed.
Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted Zaveon D. Lindsey of carrying a loaded
firearm and of spectating at an illegal motor vehicle speed
contest, and found true that the firearm was not registered to
Lindsey. Lindsey’s appellate counsel filed a brief under People v.
Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende) asking us to independently
review the record. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
One evening in September 2022, California Highway Patrol
(CHP) Officer Fernando Larez was informed that local police in
Pomona, California, had requested CHP assistance in responding
to a street takeover. A street takeover is “essentially comprised
of a large number of pedestrians and/or vehicles that block
different roadways . . . for the purpose of drag racing or
performing illegal doughnuts.” When Officer Larez arrived at the
street takeover, he witnessed a Lexus “performing doughnuts” in
a cul-de-sac while approximately 50 spectators looked on.
Several other vehicles were also parked nearby. Many attendees
fled, but officers detained 20 to 25 of the spectators, including
Lindsey.
The vehicles at the street takeover blocked a roadway in
violation of Vehicle Code section 22651, subdivision (b). Officer
Larez testified that officers typically impound vehicles in such
cases and, in preparation for impoundment, create an inventory
of any valuable items inside the vehicles. Officer Larez therefore
began conducting an inventory of the vehicles present at the
street takeover. One vehicle he inventoried was a red Dodge
Charger. In the Charger’s trunk, he found a black bag containing
a loaded firearm and a debit card bearing Lindsey’s first and last
name. The firearm was a polymer 80 replica semiautomatic
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handgun with no serial number, which Officer Larez described as
a “ghost gun” because a gun with no serial number cannot be
registered. The People later presented evidence that no firearms
were registered to Lindsey.
After seeing Lindsey’s first and last name on the debit card,
Officer Larez approached the group of detainees, who were seated
on the sidewalk or the curb, and asked, “ ‘who is Zaveon
Lindsey?’ ” Lindsey raised his hand. Lindsey told Officer Larez
that he came to the street takeover alone in the Charger, and
that nobody else had entered the Charger. Officer Larez had an
audio recording device on his uniform linked to the dash camera
in his patrol vehicle, which was about 50 feet away. Officer Larez
did not activate either recording device during his interaction
with Lindsey.
The Charger was registered to Jose Yap. Officer Larez
found the registration in the glove compartment during the
inventory search, but he did not attempt to determine if Yap was
among the detainees. Yap later testified that he was not present
at the street takeover. Around July 2022, facing financial issues,
Yap had verbally agreed to give the car to Lindsey’s mother in
exchange for her making monthly payments to Yap’s mother. He
knew the Charger was registered in his name, but he did not
consider himself to be its owner. Yap had cleaned out the
Charger when he gave it to Lindsey’s mother, including the
trunk, and he testified that the items found in the trunk during
the inventory search did not belong to him. He had only one key
for the Charger, and he gave that key to Lindsey’s mother.
About a year after the street takeover, Lindsey was stopped
while driving the Charger, which was still registered to Yap.
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At the street takeover, officers also impounded a green and
purple Pontiac G8. The impound form for the Pontiac identified
Lindsey as the driver. CHP Officer Raul Gonzalez, who filled out
the form, testified that Lindsey said “he had two cars there” and
“claimed ownership” of the Pontiac, but Officer Gonzalez was not
certain which vehicle Lindsey actually drove to the street
takeover. Officer Larez testified that two other individuals told
him that they drove the Pontiac to the street takeover. The
Pontiac was registered to Lindsey, and it was released to him
eight days after it was impounded.
Lindsey’s friend Dulce Reyes testified that the Pontiac was
Lindsey’s “daily,” meaning the car that he drove on a regular
basis. According to Reyes, Lindsey picked her up in the Pontiac
on the day of the street takeover, and they drove to Pomona.
Officers arrived and began detaining attendees. Two officers
described the Pontiac and asked whose car it was, and Lindsey
responded that it was his car. Reyes remembered officers asking
who owned a red Dodge Charger, but she did not recall if anyone
claimed that vehicle. Reyes did not tell officers that she was the
driver of the Pontiac, but officers gave her a ticket that described
her as the driver of that vehicle. Reyes testified that she and
Lindsey picked up the Pontiac from the impound the day after
the street takeover.
Lindsey was charged with carrying a loaded firearm in a
vehicle (Pen. Code, § 25850, subd. (a)), a felony, and spectating at
an illegal motor vehicle speed contest (L.A. County Code,
§ 13.46.010),1 a misdemeanor. The People alleged that Lindsey
1 Lindsey was also charged with carrying a concealed and
unregistered firearm in a vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 25400, subd.
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was not the registered owner of the firearm. (Pen. Code, § 25850,
subd. (c)(6).)
Yap testified at trial. On the first day of trial, Yap saw
Lindsey while getting out of the elevator and asked him what the
case was about. Yap grew concerned when he learned that the
case involved a firearm and might incriminate him as the legal
owner of the Charger. Lindsey texted Yap later that day and said
something like, “do me a solid . . . just don’t say anything . . . .”
Lindsey also texted Yap that Lindsey’s mother said Yap should
“just plead the Fifth.” Yap “didn’t really give it no mind because
[he was at the trial] to tell the truth,” and in any case he did not
know what the Fifth Amendment is.
At trial, defense counsel asserted in his opening statement
that there was no clear photograph of the debit card that Officer
Larez found in the trunk of the Charger. Officer Larez later
testified that a photograph of the debit card introduced at trial
did not clearly depict “the name or the letters” on it. However,
during a break after his cross-examination, Officer Larez located
an additional photograph of a gun magazine and the debit card.
The gun magazine covered part of the debit card, but the visible
part of the card clearly showed Lindsey’s middle initial and last
name. That photograph was admitted into evidence.
Lindsey requested a mistrial, noting that the jury might
view defense counsel as dishonest based on the discrepancy
between his opening statement and the late-disclosed
photograph. The trial court recognized that “[t]his is probably
the worst police work I’ve ever seen by this officer; incredibly bad
(a)(1).) Before trial, that charge was dismissed in the furtherance
of justice pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c).
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police work.” However, the court determined that an instruction
on late-disclosed evidence would serve as a sufficient sanction.
The morning after the late-disclosed photograph was introduced,
the court explained to the jury that defense counsel had not been
aware of the photograph, and that counsel “was not trying to
mislead” the jury during opening statements. The court further
explained that Officer Larez identified the photograph “as late as
you possibly can produce a piece of evidence that’s in court,” and
instructed the jury that it could “certainly factor [that] in, in
evaluating the credibility of” Officer Larez. The court also
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 306, which informed the
jury that “Officer Lare[z] failed to disclose: Close-up photo of the
debit card within the legal time period,” that this failure may
have affected Lindsey’s ability to counter the People’s evidence
and receive a fair trial, and that the jury may consider Officer
Larez’s failure in weighing the evidence.
The court also recognized that the late-disclosed evidence
may have impacted Lindsey’s decision to proceed to trial. The
court therefore offered Lindsey a new, more lenient plea deal.
The People had offered Lindsey probation with 180 days in
county jail, and the court offered Lindsey straight probation with
no jail time. Lindsey discussed this offer with his counsel, but
ultimately rejected it, deciding instead to proceed to trial.
The jury convicted Lindsey as charged. The court placed
Lindsey on two years’ felony probation under the condition that
he serve 180 days in county jail for the felony firearm charge, and
one year of summary probation for the misdemeanor charge of
spectating at a motor vehicle speed contest. It awarded 13 days
of presentence credits, consisting of seven days of custody credits
and six days of conduct credits.
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Lindsey timely appealed. Court-appointed appellate
counsel filed an opening brief that raised no issues and asked this
court to independently review the record under Wende, supra, 25
Cal.3d 436. We directed appellant’s counsel to send Lindsey the
record and a copy of the opening brief, and we advised that
within 30 days of the date of the notice, Lindsey could submit a
supplemental brief or letter stating any grounds for an appeal, or
contentions, or arguments he wished this court to consider. We
have not received a response.
DISCUSSION
Officer Larez opened a container that he found in the trunk
during an inventory search of the Charger. As the Supreme
Court has clarified, “standardized criteria, [citation], or
established routine, [citation], must regulate the opening of
containers found during inventory searches,” because “an
inventory search must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in
order to discover incriminating evidence.” (Florida v. Wells
(1990) 495 U.S. 1, 4; People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119,
126 [quoting Wells].) The appellate record does not reflect
whether CHP had any policy on the opening of containers found
during an inventory search. However, Officer Larez testified that
CHP had a policy of impounding and inventorying vehicles that
blocked a roadway, and that his search of the Charger was
conducted pursuant to that policy. “[O]nce the prosecution has
offered a justification for a warrantless search or seizure,
defendants must present any arguments as to why that
justification is inadequate.” (Williams, at p. 130.) Lindsey never
moved to suppress any evidence found in the Charger and he did
not challenge Officer Larez’s justification for opening the
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container. Lindsey therefore forfeited this issue on appeal.
(Ibid.)
Before trial, the People moved to admit Lindsey’s out of
court statements to Officer Larez as party admissions. The
People appeared to concede that Lindsey was not provided with a
Miranda warning, but they argued that his statements were
admissible because the interrogation was not custodial.
(Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 444.) Officer Gonzalez
also testified at trial regarding Lindsey’s statements about the
Pontiac. The record includes little evidence on this issue. For
example, Officer Larez testified that officers detained the
spectators at the street takeover and that Lindsey “was seated on
the curb” when Officer Larez first contacted him. But the record
does not reflect whether Lindsey was under “formal arrest” at
this time or when he spoke to Officer Gonzalez, nor does it
indicate whether he was subject to “a restraint on freedom of
movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” (People
v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 395.) Yet, even if Lindsey may
have been in custody, Lindsey did not oppose the People’s motion,
nor did he move to suppress his out of court statements to Officer
Larez, Officer Gonzalez, or anyone else. Lindsey therefore
forfeited any Miranda claim by failing to raise it below. (People
v. Johnson (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 253, 292.)
Lindsey’s trial counsel did not object to or move to suppress
the evidence found in the Charger or Lindsey’s statements to
police officers. If those failures fell below the standard of
reasonableness “under prevailing professional norms” and that
deficient performance caused him prejudice, his trial counsel may
have been ineffective. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S.
668, 688.) However, “[w]e presume that counsel rendered
8
adequate assistance and exercised reasonable professional
judgment in making significant trial decisions.” (People v. Holt
(1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 703.) “If the record ‘sheds no light on why
counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged,’ an
appellate claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be
rejected ‘unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed
to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.’ ” (People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 746.)
There is no evidence in the record as to why Lindsey’s trial
attorney did not object to this evidence or move to suppress it.
We also cannot conclude that there could be no satisfactory
explanation therefor. For example, Lindsey’s counsel may have
determined that Lindsey was not in custody when he was
questioned and/or that the search of the Charger was consistent
with CHP policies. We presume counsel determined that any
attempt to contest these issues would have been fruitless.
During trial, after he was cross-examined, Officer Larez
located a photograph of Lindsey’s debit card that had not been
produced to the defense. The due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits suppression of “evidence
favorable to an accused” which is “material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the
prosecution.” (Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83, 87.) We
agree with the trial court that Officer Larez’s failure reflected
“incredibly bad police work.” However, the late-produced
photograph depicted a debit card bearing Lindsey’s middle initial
and last name, which was found in the same container as a
loaded firearm. This was circumstantial evidence that Lindsey
had placed both items in the bag. The photograph was therefore
9
incriminating and does not satisfy the Brady test of “evidence
favorable to” Lindsey. (Ibid.)
Moreover, after the photograph was admitted, the trial
court took appropriate remedial steps. The court explained to the
jury that defense counsel had not been aware of the photograph
when he asserted that no clear photograph existed during
opening statements, and the court emphasized that the defense
“was not trying to mislead” the jury. The jury was also instructed
with CALCRIM No. 306, which directed the jury that Officer
Larez’s failure to timely disclose the photograph may have denied
Lindsey “the chance to produce all relevant evidence, to counter
opposing evidence, or to receive a fair trial,” and that the jury
“may consider the effect, if any, of that late disclosure.” “This
language constituted ‘a proper statement of the applicable law,
from which the parties could argue inferences that might (or
might not) be drawn from the evidence presented at trial.’ ”
(People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 472 [discussing
substantially similar CALJIC No. 2.28].)
We have examined the entire record, and are satisfied that
appellate counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and
that no arguable issues exist in the appeal before us. (Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 443.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BERSHON, J.*
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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