CourtListener 10286426•People v. St. John CA2/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 12/2/24 P. v. St. John CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B334118
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA085029)
v.
ROBERT ST. JOHN,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa Strassner, Judge. Vacated in part,
affirmed in part, and remanded with directions.
Michael Reed, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Megan Moine,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
A jury convicted defendant Robert St. John of five counts of
second degree robbery. Before the matter was submitted to the
jury, St. John admitted he suffered four prior serious or violent
felony convictions for the purposes of the “Three Strikes” law. In
accepting St. John’s admissions, the trial court did not advise
St. John as to the prior conviction allegations that he had the
right to a jury trial at which he could invoke his right against
self-incrimination and confront the witnesses against him. The
court sentenced St. John to an enhanced aggregate prison term of
25 years to life pursuant to the Three Strikes law.
On appeal, St. John argues the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to advise him that in admitting the
prior convictions, he was waiving the above trial rights. The
Attorney General argues the court’s failure to provide these
advisements was harmless. Although St. John was aware he had
certain trial rights in connection with the charged robbery
offenses, the record does not affirmatively demonstrate St. John
knew he had these rights regarding the prior conviction
allegations. Accordingly, we vacate the prior conviction findings
and remand for further proceedings.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those aspects of the procedural history
pertinent to this appeal.
1 We derive our recitation of the procedural history in part
from admissions made by the parties in their appellate briefing.
(See Williams v. Superior Court (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 666, 674
[“ ‘An express concession or assertion in a brief is frequently
treated as an admission of a legal or factual point, controlling in
the disposition of the case.’ ”]; Artal v. Allen (2003)
111 Cal.App.4th 273, 275, fn. 2 [“ ‘[A] reviewing court may make
2
On August 14, 2023, the People filed an amended
information charging St. John with five counts of second degree
robbery in violation of Penal Code2 section 211. The People
further alleged that St. John suffered four serious or violent
felony convictions for the purposes of the Three Strikes law.3
During the second day of trial and outside the presence of
the jury, the trial court accepted St. John’s admissions that he
suffered the following four prior serious or violent felony
convictions alleged in the amended information: (1) a conviction
on February 26, 1998 for violating section 288, subdivision (a);
(2) a conviction on January 28, 2011 for a violation of title 18
United States Code section 2113, subdivision (a); (3) another
conviction on January 28, 2011 for a violation of title 18 United
States Code section 2113, subdivision (a); and (4) a conviction on
May 16, 2019 for violating title 18 United States Code
section 371.4 Prior to accepting these admissions, the trial court
did not advise St. John that he had the right to a trial on the
prior conviction allegations, let alone specify any rights he would
use of statements [in briefs and argument] . . . as admissions
against the party [advancing them].’ ”].)
2 Undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
3 (See also People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 370–
371 [noting that the Three Strikes law is codified in § 667,
subds. (b)–(j) & § 1170.12].)
4 Although the trial court identified the fourth prior
conviction as a “violation of [title] 18 U.S.[C.] 3071,” the amended
information alleged he was instead convicted of violating title 18
United States Code section 371. This discrepancy does not affect
our analysis.
3
have had at such trial.5 St. John also admitted certain factors in
aggravation for the purposes of California Rules of Court,
rule 4.421.
The jury found St. John guilty on all five counts of second
degree robbery.
The prosecution later filed a sentencing memorandum
requesting, pursuant to the Three Strikes law, that the trial
court impose an aggregate prison term of 125 years to life,
comprised of consecutive sentences of 25 years to life on each of
the five counts.
On September 19, 2023, the trial court denied defense
counsel’s request to dismiss the prior conviction findings, and
sentenced St. John to 25 years to life on each count.6 The court
found under section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6) that “counts 01
through 05 were committed on the same occasion from the same
set of operative facts,” and, as a consequence, the court exercised
its discretion to “run the sentence[s] imposed as to counts 01
5 As we explain in our Applicable Law, post, although St.
John had a due process right to a trial on the fact he had suffered
the four prior convictions, his right to a jury trial arises from a
statute and it is unclear whether St. John would have been
constitutionally entitled to confront the witnesses against him
and remain silent at any such trial. In this case, the trial court
did not inform St. John that he had a right to a trial in any form
on whether he suffered the prior convictions.
6 Absent enhancements, St. John’s prison sentence on each
count of second degree robbery would have been two, three, or
five years. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).)
4
through 05 concurrent with one another” such that St. John’s
aggregate prison sentence was 25 years to life.7
St. John timely appealed the judgment.
APPLICABLE LAW
“When a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, the trial
court is required to ensure that the plea is knowing and
voluntary. [Citation.] As a prophylactic measure, the court must
inform the defendant of three constitutional rights—the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury,
and the right to confront one’s accusers—and solicit a personal
waiver of each.” (People v. Cross (2015) 61 Cal.4th 164, 170
(Cross).) Courts refer to this prophylactic measure as an
advisement of “Boykin/Tahl rights . . . .” (See People v. Farwell
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 295, 301 (Farwell), citing Boykin v. Alabama
(1969) 395 U.S. 238 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122.)
“[I]t is well-established that . . . due process requires
‘adequate notice’ and ‘an opportunity to challenge the accuracy
and validity of . . . alleged prior convictions,’ ” meaning that a
defendant has the federal constitutional “right to a fair
determination of the truth of [a] prior conviction allegation.” (See
Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 172–173, 179.) Although “the
right to a jury trial on a prior conviction allegation ‘is derived
from statute’ and not from the state or federal Constitution” and
our high court has declined to delineate “the precise contours of
the advisement that is constitutionally required in th[at]
7 Two checkboxes in the abstract of judgment that indicate
whether sentence was imposed pursuant to the Three Strikes law
were not checked. This apparent clerical error has no impact on
this appeal.
5
context,” (see Cross, at p. 179, italics added), our Supreme Court
has imposed a “judicially created rule of criminal procedure
requiring full Boykin-Tahl advisements” before a trial court may
accept a defendant’s admission that he or she suffered a prior
felony conviction (see Cross, at pp. 170, 179; Farwell, supra,
5 Cal.5th at p. 301 & fn. 3; People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353,
359–360 (Mosby)).8
“The failure to properly advise a defendant of his or her
trial rights is not reversible ‘if the record affirmatively shows that
[the admission] is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of
the circumstances.’ [Citation.]” (Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 179.) “[I]n applying the totality of the circumstances test, a
reviewing court must ‘review[ ] the whole record, instead of just
the record of the plea colloquy[.]’ . . . ‘[P]revious experience in the
criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivist’s “ ‘knowledge
and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights’ ” ’ [citation].” (Id.
at pp. 179–180.) The “focus” of this inquiry is on whether “the
defendant’s admission . . . was given with an understanding of
the rights waived.” (See Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
DISCUSSION
Because the trial court did not provide St. John the
Boykin/Tahl advisements (see Procedural Background, ante),
8 Our high court has also held “a defendant must . . . be
advised of ‘the full penal effect of a finding of the truth of an
allegation of prior convictions.’ [Citation.]” (Cross, supra,
61 Cal.4th at p. 170.) In accepting St. John’s admissions to the
prior conviction allegations, the trial court did not inform
St. John of the penal effect of his admissions (i.e., the sentencing
implications of admitting the prior convictions). St. John,
however, does not claim this omission warrants reversal.
6
reversal is required unless “ ‘the record affirmatively shows that
[the admissions to the prior conviction allegations were]
voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.’
[Citation.]” (See Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 179.) The
Attorney General argues St. John’s admissions were voluntary
and intelligent because: (1) “[p]rior to admitting his four prior
strike convictions, [St. John] had observed extensive direct and
cross-examination in his trial”; (2) “[h]e was . . . advised of his
right to silence with respect to the jury trial of his charged
crimes”; (3) “[h]e . . . had prior experience in pleading guilty”;
(4) “the court instructed defense counsel to discuss [an
anticipated] bifurcated trial [on the prior convictions] with
[St. John]”; and (5) “the court confirmed directly with [St. John]
and his counsel that they had discussed admitting the prior
strikes before accepting the admissions.” The Attorney General
further maintains the instant matter is analogous to Mosby, a
case in which our high court found a trial court’s failure to advise
a defendant properly of his Boykin/Tahl rights did not warrant
reversal. (See Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 356, 359–360, 364–
365.) We disagree.
First, whether the trial court’s failure to provide St. John
with the Boykin/Tahl advisements was harmless does not hinge
on whether St. John knew, as a general matter, that he had the
rights to silence and confrontation. St. John could not have
voluntarily and intelligently admitted the prior convictions if he
were unaware of his right to a trial on those allegations.9
9 As we noted in our Applicable Law, ante, although there
is a judicially created rule of criminal procedure requiring a trial
court to advise a defendant of the three Boykin/Tahl rights (i.e.,
to a jury trial, silence, and confrontation) before accepting his or
7
Next, the record does not affirmatively show that St. John
acquired this knowledge during his prior encounters with the
criminal justice system. The probation report lists certain
convictions suffered by St. John but does not indicate St. John
had previously been informed of his right to a trial on his prior
conviction allegations. Further, although the criminal judgments
attached to the People’s sentencing memorandum show St. John
entered guilty pleas in federal court in January 2011 and
May 2019, they do not show St. John had admitted, or proceeded
to trial on, prior conviction allegations.
The Attorney General’s intimation that St. John’s counsel
informed him of his right to a trial as to the prior convictions
fares no better. Prior to trial, the trial court decided to bifurcate
trial of the substantive offenses from trial of the prior conviction
her admission of a prior conviction, our Supreme Court has
recognized that the right to a jury trial arises from statute and
the high court has declined to ascertain the precise contours of
the advisement that is constitutionally required. Our high court
nevertheless has held the federal constitution requires, “[a]t a
minimum, [that the defendant] . . . be advised of his [or her] right
to a fair determination of the truth of the prior conviction
allegation.” (See Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 179–180; see also
id. at p. 173 [“[W]hile there is no single ‘ “best” recidivist trial
procedure,’ due process requires ‘adequate notice’ and ‘an
opportunity to challenge the accuracy and validity of the alleged
prior convictions.’ ”].) Because there is no indication St. John
knew he had this due process right, the trial court’s findings that
St. John suffered the four prior convictions are invalid without
our having to decide whether St. John also would have been
constitutionally entitled to confront the witnesses against him
and to remain silent at any such trial on the prior conviction
allegations.
8
allegations and made the following remarks to defense counsel:
“[Y]ou will speak to your client about bifurcations as well as
factors in aggravation. It doesn’t need to happen now, but those
would be two issues that would need to be addressed . . . .”
(Italics added.) Additionally, shortly before St. John admitted
the prior conviction allegations, the trial court asked defense
counsel and St. John whether they had discussed “the possibility
of admitting [St. John’s] strike priors,” and St. John and his
attorney responded in the affirmative. Because the Attorney
General does not direct us to any evidence that defense counsel
did, in fact, apprise St. John of his right to a trial as to the prior
conviction allegations, we reject the Attorney General’s
suggestion that St. John was so informed. (See In re D.N. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 741, 767 [“ ‘ “Although it is the appellant’s task to
show error, there is a corresponding obligation on the part of the
respondent to aid the appellate court in sustaining the
judgment.” ’ ”]; People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 756,
fn. 12 [rejecting an argument the People failed to support
adequately].)
Lastly, Mosby is distinguishable from the instant case.
Upon learning that the jury had reached a verdict on the
underlying substantive charge in Mosby, the trial court informed
the defendant he also had a right to a jury trial on whether he
had suffered a prior conviction. (See Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at
pp. 356–358.) The defendant subsequently expressly waived that
right, along with the right to a court trial on the prior conviction
allegation, and admitted the prior conviction, which had resulted
from a guilty plea. (See id. at pp. 358–359, 365.) On appeal, the
Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s contention that “the trial
court committed reversible error by not telling him of his rights
9
to remain silent and to confront witnesses.”10 (See Mosby, at
p. 364.) The Mosby court reasoned that the defendant “ ‘knew he
did not have to admit [the prior conviction] but could have had a
jury or court trial,’ ” defendant’s experience participating in a
jury trial in which he exercised his right to silence and observed
his attorney confront witnesses indicated he was aware he would
have those rights in a trial on the prior conviction allegation, and
“he would have received Boykin-Tahl advisements” when he
pleaded guilty in the prior criminal case. (See Mosby, supra,
33 Cal.4th at pp. 364–365.) Whereas the defendant in Mosby had
actual knowledge of his right to a jury or court trial on whether
he had suffered a prior conviction, the record does not reveal
St. John had such knowledge.
Because we are not persuaded that St. John’s admissions
were voluntarily and intelligently made, we set aside the trial
court’s findings that he suffered the four prior convictions in
question. (Cf. Cross, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 169, 179–180
[concluding that the defendant’s stipulation that he suffered a
prior conviction had to be set aside because “nothing in the record
affirmatively show[ed] that [the defendant] was aware of his
right to a fair determination of the truth of the prior conviction
allegation”].)
10 The Mosby court “assume[d] for the purpose of . . .
discussion” that “[w]hen trial is required by statute, . . . a
defendant’s due process trial rights, at least under our state
Constitution, encompass the rights to remain silent and to
confront witnesses.” (See Mosby, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 360.)
10
DISPOSITION
We vacate the trial court’s true findings as to St. John’s
four prior convictions. The remainder of the judgment is
affirmed. We remand the matter for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
KLATCHKO, J.*
* Judge of the Riverside County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
11
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