CourtListener 10285233•People v. Valerio CA2/8
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Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Valerio CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B327861
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA454331)
v.
RAMIRO ALBERTO VALERIO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Curtis B. Rappe, Judge. Affirmed.
Janyce Keiko Imata Blair, Under Appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan S. Pithey, Assistant Attorney
General, Michael C. Keller and Yun K. Lee, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________________________________
INTRODUCTION
A jury convicted defendant Ramiro Alberto Valerio of
12 counts of first degree murder, and it found true multiple-
murder and felony-murder special-circumstance allegations as to
each count. The court sentenced Valerio to 12 consecutive terms
of life in prison without the possibility of parole. On appeal,
Valerio contends: (1) insufficient evidence supports his murder
convictions and the felony-murder special-circumstance
allegations because the People failed to prove that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life
during the underlying arson that resulted in the victims’ deaths;
and (2) the court erred when it allowed one of the prosecution’s
expert witnesses to relay case-specific hearsay. We reject each of
Valerio’s contentions and affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
1. Prosecution evidence
1.1. The arson
In the early 1990’s, Valerio was a member of Colombia Lil
Cycos, known as CLCS, a clique of the 18th Street gang. CLCS’s
main source of income at the time was drug sales.
Valerio and Juan Manuel Romero Lopez, known as
“Termite,”1 were two of CLCS’s shot callers. Valerio was known
as the “big boss,” and Termite was known as the “enforcer.”
Valerio gave orders to other members of the clique, and Termite
was his “second in command.” CLCS’s shot callers decided how to
respond to the clique’s problems with rival gangs, law
enforcement, and local residents. Valerio answered to Francisco
Martinez, also known as “Puppet,” a member of the Mexican
Mafia.
1 To avoid confusion with other individuals in this case who
share the same last name, we hereafter refer to Juan Manuel
Romero Lopez as “Termite.”
2
CLCS controlled drug sales around an apartment building
at 330 South Burlington Avenue (Burlington Apartments), which
was in the clique’s territory. CLCS’s members and local drug
dealers often used the building to evade law enforcement.
Valerio and Termite were responsible for managing the drug
sales around the Burlington Apartments, including collecting
payments from local dealers and enforcing CLCS’s control over
the territory. Valerio and Termite regularly hung out around the
building, and Termite supplied drugs to dealers in the
neighborhood.
In early 1993, drug sales around the Burlington
Apartments were thriving because the building’s manager was
paid to provide dealers and gang members access to the building
when law enforcement entered the neighborhood. Around
February 1993, a new manager began supervising the building.
The new manager changed the building’s locks and prohibited
local drug dealers and gang members from accessing the
building, resulting in a decline in drug sales in the neighborhood.
Johanna Mirna Lopez managed a drug-dealing operation
around the Burlington Apartments. She often hung out with
Valerio and Termite, who allowed her to sell drugs in the
neighborhood.
Around February 1993, Lopez complained to Valerio and
Termite about the Burlington Apartments’ new manager,
claiming the manager was causing her drug sales to decline.
Janet Gonzalez, a member of the Hoover Locos clique of the 18th
Street Gang, was present when Valerio suggested to Termite that
they “do a little fire, or a fire to scare” the manager. On another
occasion, Gonzalez heard Valerio tell Termite and another gang
member that the manager was affecting him “money-wise,” and
3
Valerio again suggested that they start “a little fire” at the
Burlington Apartments “just to scare” the manager.
On May 2, 1993, Lopez was hanging out with Valerio and
Termite when she heard them discussing how to handle the
Burlington Apartments’ new manager. Valerio stated that he
wanted Termite to “fix the problem with the street.” When
Termite responded that he will “fix it,” Valerio said, “Don’t worry,
this son of a bitch mother, I will put fire to him.” Termite told
Valerio to bring him “lighter fluid” or “gas.”
The next day, May 3, 1993, Lopez saw Valerio hand
Termite a black plastic bag that contained “what [Termite]
requested the day before.” One of the Burlington Apartments
residents saw Valerio and Termite standing outside the building.
Termite then entered the building while Valerio stood near the
entrance.
About 15 minutes later, the same resident saw Termite
leave the building. The resident noticed that the building was on
fire and that people inside were screaming. 12 people who were
inside the building when the fire started—including nine children
and two pregnant women—died from smoke inhalation or
injuries related to smoke inhalation.
Around the time of the fire, Salvador Granados, another
member of the Hoover Locos clique, was inside Valerio’s
apartment while Valerio, Termite, and several other CLCS
members were hanging out near the Burlington Apartments.
Granados later saw Valerio, Termite, and another CLCS member
enter the apartment. Valerio and the other CLCS member each
carried a black trash bag. One of the bags contained a watering
can, and both bags smelled like “barbecue liquid.” Valerio’s face
was “red,” and he looked like he was in a “panic.” Termite
4
appeared upset and said, “We fucked up.” The other CLCS
member was “red” and “sweating.” As Granados left Valerio’s
apartment, police and firefighters were responding to the
neighborhood.
1.2. The investigation
An arson investigator with the Los Angeles Fire
Department concluded that the Burlington Apartments fire was
intentional. The fire originated from two mattresses and other
furniture placed in a second-floor hallway. Ronson lighter fluid
was used to ignite the furniture.
Law enforcement interviewed Lopez on several occasions
throughout the decades after the fire. In 2000, while she was
serving a federal sentence, Lopez told police that she knew
nothing about the fire. In 2010, over the course of several
interviews with law enforcement, Lopez recounted various events
leading up to the fire at the Burlington Apartments, including
conversations during which Valerio and Termite promised to take
care of the building’s manager by starting a fire.
In 2020, Lopez agreed to be interviewed by the prosecutors.
During that interview, Lopez initially denied that she told law
enforcement that Valerio and Termite ever discussed starting a
fire to deal with the manager of the Burlington Apartments.
Lopez also denied telling law enforcement that she saw Valerio
hand Termite a bag containing a “lighter” before the fire at the
apartments was started.
When the prosecutors confronted Lopez with a recording
of one of her previous interviews with law enforcement, she
acknowledged that, the day before the fire, Termite stated he was
going to “light a fire” at the Burlington Apartments to retaliate
against the building’s manager. Termite asked Valerio to bring
5
him everything he needed to set the building on fire. On the day
of the fire, Valerio handed Termite a black plastic bag. Valerio
then left, and Termite said that he was going to burn the
Burlington Apartments.
At trial, Lopez testified that after her interview with the
prosecutors, she was offered a leniency agreement, which she
accepted. Lopez told the jury that she pled guilty to two counts of
voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to 22 years in prison.
2. Defense evidence
Valerio testified at trial. He grew up on Burlington Avenue
and joined CLCS in 1989, when he was 15 years old. Valerio was
one of CLCS’s shot callers. Valerio answered directly to Martinez
and had to obtain his approval before making decisions for the
clique.
Valerio denied ordering the fire at the Burlington
Apartments. He was not present at any CLCS meetings where
a plan to start the fire was discussed. He did not believe the
building’s manager caused drug sales in the neighborhood to
decline. Valerio claimed that Lopez never complained to him
about the building’s manager.
On the day of the fire, Valerio was hanging out with his
girlfriend and other CLCS members at a restaurant when he saw
fire trucks and ambulances driving toward the Burlington
Apartments. When they returned to the neighborhood, the
Burlington Apartments were already on fire.
6
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Valerio, Lopez, and a third defendant
with, among other crimes, 12 counts of murder (Pen. Code,2
§ 187, subd. (a)). As to each count, the People alleged a felony-
murder special circumstance—i.e., that the underlying killings
were committed during the commission of arson (§ 190.2, subd.
(a)(17)(H)). The People also alleged as to each count a multiple-
murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) and a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(2)). Lopez and the third
defendant entered plea agreements before trial.
A jury found Valerio guilty of 12 counts of first degree
murder and, as to each count, found true the felony-murder and
multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations. The court
sentenced Valerio to 12 consecutive terms of life without the
possibility of parole.
Valerio appeals.
DISCUSSION
1. Felony murder findings
Valerio contends insufficient evidence supports his murder
convictions and the true findings on the accompanying felony-
murder special-circumstance allegations because the People
failed to prove that he was a major participant in the underlying
arson who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
We disagree.
1.1. Applicable law and standard of review
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended the definition of felony murder by incorporating
2 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
7
section 190.2, subdivision (d)’s requirements for proving a felony-
murder special-circumstance allegation. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 708.) Now, to support a first degree murder
conviction under a felony-murder theory and a true finding for a
felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the People must
prove that the killing was committed in the perpetration of, or
during an attempt to perpetrate, one of several enumerated
felonies, including arson, and that the defendant either: (1) “was
the actual killer”; (2) “was not the actual killer, but, with the
intent to kill,” aided and abetted the killer in the commission of
the murder; or (3) “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subds. (a) &
(e); § 190.2, subds. (a)(17), (d).) Here, the court instructed the
jury on only the third option—i.e., that Valerio was a major
participant in the underlying arson who acted with reckless
indifference to human life.
In People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), the California
Supreme Court clarified what it means for a defendant to be a
major participant in the underlying felony who acts with reckless
indifference to human life. (Banks, at p. 803 [discussing major
participant factors]; Clark, at pp. 618–623 [discussing reckless
indifference factors].) The Supreme Court found guidance in the
United States Supreme Court’s decisions in Enmund v. Florida
(1982) 458 U.S. 782 and Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137,
which “place[d] conduct on a spectrum, with felony-murder
participants eligible for death only when their involvement is
substantial and they demonstrate a reckless indifference to the
grave risk of death created by their actions.” (Banks, at p. 793;
8
see also Clark, at p. 616 [acknowledging Tison as “the source of
the language of section 190.2, subdivision (d)”].)
In Banks, the court identified the following factors for
determining whether a defendant was a major participant in the
underlying felony: (1) the role the defendant played in planning
the target crime that led to the victim’s death; (2) the role the
defendant played in supplying or using lethal weapons; (3) the
defendant’s awareness of the particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, the weapons used, or the past experience or
conduct of the other participants; (4) whether the defendant was
present at the scene of the killing and, if so, whether he was in a
position to facilitate or prevent the death; (5) whether the
defendant’s actions or inactions at the scene of the killing played
a particular role in the victim’s death; and (6) the defendant’s
conduct after lethal force was used. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at
p. 803.) None of these factors is necessary, nor is any one
necessarily sufficient, to establish the defendant was a major
participant. (Banks, at p. 803.)
In Clark, the court explained that reckless indifference
“encompasses a willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing)
to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not
specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.”
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Reckless indifference
includes a subjective and an objective element. (In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 677 (Scoggins).) For the subjective element,
“ ‘[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in the
violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,’ and
he or she must consciously disregard ‘the significant risk of death
his or her actions create.’ ” (Ibid.) To satisfy the objective
element, “ ‘ “[t]he risk [of death] must be of such a nature and
9
degree that, considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s
conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her], its
disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct
that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Clark identified the following factors to be considered in
determining whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference
to human life: (1) the defendant’s awareness that a gun or other
weapon would be used during the target offense; (2) the
defendant’s presence at the crime and whether he had an
opportunity to prevent the crime or aid the victim; (3) the
duration of the felony, including how long the defendant and the
victim interacted before the killing; and (4) the defendant’s
apparent efforts to reduce the risk of violence during the
commission of the target offense. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at
pp. 618–623; Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 677.)
The reckless indifference factors “ ‘significantly overlap’ ”
with the major participant factors, “ ‘for the greater the
defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely
that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.) Like the major participant factors,
none of the reckless indifference factors is necessary, nor is any
one of them necessarily sufficient, to establish the defendant
acted with reckless indifference. (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 677.) In weighing these factors, courts must consider the
totality of the circumstances. (Ibid.)
When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
any rational trier of fact could have found the evidence proved
10
the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v.
Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th 40, 87.) We draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the judgment. (Ibid.) We neither reweigh
evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. (People v.
Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.)
If the evidence supports the jury’s findings, our opinion
that the evidence might also support a contrary finding does not
warrant reversal of the conviction. (People v. Cravens (2012)
53 Cal.4th 500, 508.) Before we may set aside the judgment,
it must be clear that “upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Zamudio
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
1.2. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that Valerio was a major participant in the
underlying arson
Applying the factors outlined in Banks, substantial
evidence supports the jury’s finding that Valerio was a major
participant in the underlying arson.
The first factor—Valerio’s role in planning the arson—
weighs heavily in favor of a finding that Valerio was a major
participant in the underlying arson. Valerio was one of CLCS’s
shot callers, and he oversaw drug sales around the Burlington
Apartments. As a shot caller, Valerio was responsible for
addressing the clique’s problems with local residents and other
gangs. A few months before the fire, Lopez complained to Valerio
that the new manager at the Burlington Apartments was causing
drug sales to decline in the area. Valerio proposed to Termite
that they “do a little fire” to scare the manager. Valerio later
made the same suggestion—to start a fire at the apartments—
while complaining about the manager to Termite and another
11
gang member. Importantly, the day before the fire, Lopez heard
Valerio tell Termite not to worry about the manager because he
(Valerio) would “put fire to him.” There was, therefore, ample
evidence that Valerio played a significant role in planning the
arson, including proposing the idea to set the Burlington
Apartments on fire.
The second factor—Valerio’s role in supplying or using
lethal weapons—also strongly supports the jury’s major
participant finding. The arson investigator testified that the
Burlington Apartments fire was started with lighter fluid.
According to Lopez, Termite asked Valerio to bring him “lighter
fluid” or “gas” the day before the fire. The day of the fire, Lopez
saw Valerio hand Termite a black plastic bag that contained
“what [Termite] requested the day before”—i.e., lighter fluid or
gas. One of the residents then saw Termite enter the Burlington
Apartments while Valerio stood near the entrance. About
15 minutes later, the same resident saw Termite leave the
building, and she noticed that the building was on fire. Granados
then saw Valerio and another CLCS member enter Valerio’s
apartment carrying black plastic bags, both of which smelled like
“barbecue liquid.” Based on this evidence, a jury reasonably
could infer that Valerio supplied the lethal weapon—i.e., the
lighter fluid used to start the fire at the Burlington Apartments.
The third factor—Valerio’s awareness of the particular
dangers posed by the crime—also supports a finding that Valerio
was a major participant. Valerio and Termite planned to set fire
to an occupied apartment building. Valerio regularly hung out in
front of the Burlington Apartments and would have been aware
that residents were often present in the building. The jury
reasonably could infer that Valerio should have known that
12
setting fire to an occupied apartment building would pose a
significant risk to the lives of those who were inside the building.
Valerio’s presence at the scene of the killings, his role in
contributing to the victims’ deaths, and his failure to try to
prevent the fire or aid the victims also weigh heavily in favor of a
major participant finding. Lopez and a local resident saw Valerio
near the building around the time the fire was started. Lopez
saw Valerio hand Termite a bag before Termite entered the
building, and the resident saw Valerio standing outside the
building while Termite went inside. From this evidence, the jury
could infer that Valerio played a significant role in the victims’
deaths by supplying the lighter fluid used to ignite the fire. In
addition, the jury could find that by standing outside the building
while Termite started the fire, Valerio could, but failed to, warn
residents that the building would be set on fire or help residents
escape the building once the fire began.
Based on the foregoing, there was ample evidence from
which the jury could find that Valerio was a major participant in
the underlying arson.
1.3. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
that Valerio acted with reckless indifference to
human life
Substantial evidence also supports the jury’s finding that
Valerio acted with reckless indifference to human life under the
factors outlined in Clark. Because many of the major participant
factors that we just discussed also support a finding that Valerio
acted with reckless indifference to human life, we condense our
analysis of the reckless indifference factors. (See Clark, supra,
63 Cal.4th at p. 615 [because the two sets of factors
“ ‘significantly overlap,’ ” where the defendant’s participation in
13
the underlying felony is substantial, “ ‘the more likely that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life’ ”].)
The first factor—Valerio’s awareness that a lethal weapon
would be used in the arson—strongly supports a finding that
Valerio acted with reckless indifference. As we just discussed,
the People presented evidence that Valerio both conceived of the
plan to set fire to the Burlington Apartments and provided the
lighter fluid to start the fire. The jury, therefore, could
reasonably find that Valerio was aware a lethal weapon would be
used during the target offense.
Valerio’s presence at the scene of the crime, the duration of
the crime, and his failure to prevent the crime or aid any of the
victims also strongly support the jury’s reckless indifference
finding. As we explained earlier, witnesses saw Valerio hand
Termite a bag before Termite entered the Burlington
Apartments. Valerio stood outside the building for about
15 minutes while Termite went inside to start the fire. During
that time, Valerio did not attempt to warn any of the residents
that the building was going to be set on fire. Nor did Valerio help
any of the residents escape once the fire was started.
Finally, there was no evidence that Valerio made any effort
to reduce the risk of violence during the arson. Indeed, the
evidence shows that Valerio played a significant role in
increasing the risk of violence.
In sum, ample evidence supports the jury’s finding that
Valerio was a major participant in the underlying arson who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.
14
1.4. Valerio’s arguments challenging the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the jury’s felony-
murder findings lack merit
Relying on People v. Ware (2022) 14 Cal.5th 151 (Ware),
Valerio argues we must reverse his murder convictions and
vacate the true findings on the felony-murder special-
circumstance allegations because the People relied solely on the
fact of his gang membership to prove he was a major participant
in the underlying arson who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. In Ware, the California Supreme Court reversed the
defendant’s conviction for conspiracy to commit murder because
it was based only on evidence of his gang membership, access to
weapons, and social media posts celebrating violence against
rival gangs. (Id. at pp. 156, 168.) The Court held that such
evidence was insufficient to show the defendant possessed the
specific intent to agree to kill and to commit the killings. (Id. at
pp. 167–168.)
Valerio’s reliance on Ware is misplaced. Valerio was not
charged with conspiracy to commit murder, so the People were
not required to prove that he possessed the specific intent to
agree to kill or the specific intent to commit any killings in this
case. More importantly, unlike the prosecution in Ware, the
People did not rely primarily on Valerio’s gang membership to
prove his guilt. Instead, they relied on aspects of Valerio’s gang
membership, such as his role as a shot caller within the CLCS, to
support other evidence that showed he played a direct role in
planning and carrying out the underlying arson to prove that he
was a major participant in that crime who acted with reckless
indifference. For the reasons we discussed above, there was more
than ample evidence of Valerio’s conduct surrounding the
15
underlying arson to support the jury’s finding that he was a
major participant in that crime who acted with reckless
indifference to human life. In other words, the jury’s felony
murder findings do not punish Valerio merely because he was a
member of a gang. (See Ware, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 168–169.)
Valerio next contends that we must disregard Lopez’s
statements concerning Valerio’s role in planning and
participating in the underlying arson because she was an
accomplice to the crimes and her statements were not sufficiently
corroborated. This argument lacks merit.
A jury may not consider accomplice testimony unless it is
supported by corroborating evidence. (§ 1111.) The law,
however, “requires only slight corroboration, and the evidence
need not corroborate the [accomplice] testimony in every
particular.” (People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 628.)
Corroborating evidence is sufficient so long as it tends to connect
the defendant to the crime and relates to some act or fact that is
an element of the crime. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th
635, 680–681.)
Consistent with these principles, the court instructed the
jury that if it found the crime of first or second degree murder
was committed, then Lopez was an accomplice to that crime.
The court further instructed the jury that it could not rely solely
on Lopez’s statements to convict Valerio, and that it could use her
statements to support a finding of guilt only if: (1) they were
supported by other credible evidence; (2) the supporting evidence
was independent of Lopez’s testimony; and (3) the supporting
evidence tended to connect Valerio to the commission of the
crimes.
16
These requirements were met here. As for Lopez’s
statements that Valerio proposed setting the Burlington
Apartments on fire, Gonzalez overheard Valerio’s conversation
with Termite, when he first made that proposition. Gonzalez
heard Valerio make a similar proposition to Termite and another
gang member on a separate occasion. Although Lopez was the
only person to testify that Valerio handed Termite a black plastic
bag containing lighter fluid before the fire was started, that
testimony was corroborated by other witnesses. Specifically, one
of the Burling Apartments residents watched Termite enter the
building after interacting with Valerio, shortly after which she
noticed the building was on fire. In addition, Granados testified
that he saw Valerio carrying a black plastic bag that smelled like
lighter fluid shortly after the fire began.
Valerio also argues we should disregard many of the
witnesses’ statements connecting him to the underlying crimes
because those witnesses either waited many years before
reporting Valerio’s involvement to authorities or they made out-
of-court statements that were inconsistent with their testimony
at trial. Under a substantial evidence review, we are not
permitted to second-guess the jury’s credibility determinations.
(Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.) Here, the jury heard
evidence that many of the witnesses waited several years to
report Valerio’s involvement in the underlying crimes, and they
heard some of the witnesses’ out-of-court statements that were
inconsistent with their in-court testimony. To the extent the jury
relied on those witnesses’ statements connecting Valerio to the
underlying crimes, we must defer to the jury’s decision to do so.
(Ibid.)
17
2. Expert hearsay testimony
Valerio next contends the court violated his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses when it permitted the
People’s arson investigator to relay case-specific hearsay about
the process used to review the investigative reports that he
generated for this case. As we explain, Valerio invited any error
because his counsel elicited the challenged testimony on cross-
examination. Because Valerio’s counsel made a reasonable
tactical decision when he elicited that testimony, Valerio cannot
show counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In any event, any
error in eliciting the investigator’s testimony was harmless.
2.1. Relevant background
During opening statements, Valerio’s counsel conceded that
the fire at the Burlington Apartments “was an arson.” Counsel
asserted, however, that Valerio had nothing to do with the fire.
An arson investigator later testified for the People. He
concluded that the Burlington Apartments fire was intentional.
On cross-examination, Valerio’s counsel asked the investigator
whether he consulted with other experts and whether the
investigative reports that he produced in this case were reviewed
by “superiors.” The investigator confirmed that he consulted
with other experts. The investigator also explained that an arson
investigator’s “files” generally have to undergo two types of
review: a peer review and a technical review. The investigator
confirmed that the reports he produced in this case passed both
types of review.
During his closing argument, Valerio’s counsel attacked the
credibility of one of the People’s experts on the Mexican Mafia,
calling the witness a “con artist.” Defense counsel then told the
jury, “You may have noticed I used the arson expert just to
18
illustrate in my questioning of the arson expert—I don’t know if
you caught it—but I was just trying to show you what an expert
looks like, what an expert’s qualification[s] are. [¶] An expert has
skill, an expert has training, an expert has experience. An expert
consults with other experts. An expert tests his theories. An
expert relies on reliable evidence. [¶] [The Mexican Mafia expert]
didn’t even know that the tapes that he was analyzing for you
and the letter that he was analyzing for you were all done with
[Valerio] under the supervision of the FBI. He didn’t even know
it while he is telling you what they all mean and what they show
you about [Valerio].”
2.2. Valerio invited error by eliciting the challenged
testimony
An expert may relate hearsay statements concerning
general background information that informs or contributes to
his opinion. (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 676
(Sanchez).) The expert may not, however, relate testimonial
hearsay statements about case-specific facts. (Ibid.) “Case-
specific facts are those relating to the particular events and
participants alleged to have been involved in the case being
tried.” (Ibid.) If the expert relates testimonial hearsay, “there is
a confrontation clause violation unless (1) there is a showing of
unavailability and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination, or forfeited that right by wrongdoing.” (Id.
at p. 686.)
The People argue that Valerio cannot challenge the
admission of the arson investigator’s testimony because he
invited any error. The doctrine of invited error precludes a
defendant from arguing on appeal that the court erroneously
admitted evidence that the defendant elicited. (People v.
19
Williams (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 587, 620 (Williams).)
The doctrine of invited error applies to claims that an expert
witness relayed case-specific testimonial hearsay in violation
of Sanchez. (People v. Bell (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 153, 193.)
Here, defense counsel asked the questions that elicited the
investigator’s testimony that Valerio now challenges on appeal.
Valerio has, therefore, waived any challenge to that testimony.
(Williams, supra, 170 Cal.App.4th at p. 620.)
2.3. Defense counsel’s performance was not deficient
Anticipating the People’s invited error argument, Valerio
contends his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by eliciting
the arson investigator’s challenged testimony. We disagree.
The federal and state constitutions entitle a criminal
defendant to the effective assistance of counsel. (U.S. Const.,
6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 686 [the right to counsel entitles a defendant
to effective counsel].) That right entitles a defendant to “ ‘the
reasonably competent assistance of an attorney acting as [her]
diligent conscientious advocate.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Ledesma
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215.)
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(1) his lawyer’s performance was deficient because it fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness in all the circumstances;
and (2) that absent those errors, a different outcome was
reasonably probable. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th
926, 1003) We defer to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions,
and there is a presumption counsel acted within the wide range
of reasonable professional assistance. (People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) “On direct appeal, a conviction will
20
be reversed for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose
for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a
reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
As our summary of his closing argument illustrates,
Valerio’s counsel made a tactical decision to elicit the arson
investigator’s testimony that the investigative reports he
generated in this case underwent peer and technical reviews.
That is, Valerio’s counsel explained to the jury that he elicited
the challenged testimony to undermine credibility of the People’s
expert on the Mexican Mafia by contrasting the arson
investigator’s business practices and professional qualifications
against the Mexican Mafia expert’s alleged lack of qualifications
and preparation before testifying in this case. On this record, we
cannot say that counsel’s decision to elicit the arson investigator’s
challenged testimony was unreasonable. (Mai, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 1009 [we presume counsel’s tactics were reasonable].)
Even if we were to assume counsel’s strategy was
unreasonable, it did not prejudice Valerio. Testimonial hearsay
admitted in violation of the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation
clause requires reversal unless the People show the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Azcona (2020)
58 Cal.App.5th 504, 514.)
The challenged testimony addressed whether the arson
investigator’s reports concluding that the Burling Apartments
fire was intentionally set were reviewed and approved by other
arson experts. The challenged testimony was, therefore, relevant
to establishing the People’s theory that the fire was the result of
arson. But Valerio conceded that point at trial. As we discussed
21
earlier, Valerio’s counsel told the jury during opening statements
that the fire “was an arson,” while claiming that Valerio had
nothing to do with it. Thus, by the time the arson investigator
testified about the process for reviewing his investigative reports,
Valerio had already conceded the issue to which the challenged
testimony was relevant. Valerio, therefore, could not have been
prejudiced by the arson investigator’s testimony.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
VIRAMONTES, J.
WE CONCUR:
STRATTON, P. J.
GRIMES, J.
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