CourtListener 10285230•Su v. Capital Mailing Services CA3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/27/24 Su v. Capital Mailing Services CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
----
JULIE SU, as Labor Commissioner, etc., C099724
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. CV20182437)
v.
CAPITAL MAILING SERVICES, INC., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Following the sudden closure of bulk mail company Capital Mailing Services, Inc.
(CMS), and the discharge of its employees, Commissioner Julia Su, in her official
capacity as the Labor Commissioner of the State of California (Labor Commissioner),
brought suit against CMS and its owner (Perice Sibley) (collectively defendants), alleging
various Labor Code violations, including a violation of the California Worker Adjustment
1
and Retraining Act (Cal/WARN Act or Act). (Lab. Code, § 1400 et seq.)1 Of relevance
here, the Cal/WARN Act requires an “employer” at a “covered establishment” to provide
back pay and lost benefits to any affected employee who was not given 60 days’ advance
notice of a “mass layoff” or “termination.” (§§ 1401, subd. (a), 1402, subd. (a).)2
Defendants appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of the Labor Commissioner. They claim reversal is required because
the evidence before the trial court established one or more triable issues of material fact.
Disagreeing, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Before we summarize the relevant facts and procedure, we first address the
deficiencies of defendants’ separate statement in opposition to the Labor Commissioner’s
motion for summary judgment.3
As our Supreme Court has explained, “The purpose of the law of summary
judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties’ pleadings in
order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve
their dispute.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843 (Aguilar).)
“The requirement of a separate statement from the moving party and a responding
statement from the party opposing summary judgment serves two functions: to give the
parties notice of the material facts at issue in the motion and to permit the trial court to
focus on whether those facts are truly undisputed.” (Parkview Villas Assn., Inc. v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1210.) “ ‘Separate statements
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Labor Code.
2 The Cal/WARN Act authorizes the Labor Commissioner to enforce the notice
requirements set forth in section 1401, subdivision (a). (§ 1406, subd. (b).)
3 We recognize that the Labor Commissioner moved for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, summary adjudication. For simplicity’s sake, we refer to the Labor
Commissioner’s motion as a motion for summary judgment.
2
are required . . . to afford due process to opposing parties and to permit trial courts to
expeditiously review complex motions for . . . summary judgment to determine quickly
and efficiently whether material facts are in dispute.’ ” (Ibid.) That purpose is defeated
when, as here, the parties opposing summary judgment fail to comply with the rules
governing the format and content requirements of a separate statement in opposition to a
motion for summary judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3) [“The
opposition papers shall include a separate statement that responds to each of the material
facts contended by the moving party to be undisputed, indicating if the opposing party
agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. . . . Each material fact contended by
the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting
evidence. Failure to comply with this requirement of a separate statement may constitute
a sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the motion”]; Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 3.1350(f)(2), (h) [setting forth the format and content requirements of a
separate statement filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, including an
unequivocal statement as to whether a fact is disputed or undisputed, and for each
disputed fact, a statement identifying the nature of the dispute and a description of the
evidence that supports the position that the fact is controverted].)
Here, at various points in their separate statement in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment, defendants assert evidentiary objections without indicating whether
the material fact claimed to be undisputed by the Labor Commissioner was in fact
disputed or undisputed, and without providing a description of the evidence that
demonstrated the fact was controverted. We construe defendants’ deficient responding
statement as admitting all of the facts in the Labor Commissioner’s separate statement to
which defendants purported to object but did not identify as disputed and did not cite
evidence for the purpose of showing the fact was controverted. (Thompson v. Ioane
(2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1180, 1186, fn. 4.)
3
Factual Background
We summarize the evidence in the light most favorable to the parties opposing
summary judgment, in this case defendants, resolving any doubts concerning the
evidence in their favor. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)
CMS was incorporated in 2008. It was a “privately held” bulk mail company,4
with its principal place of business in West Sacramento. Sibley was a cofounder of CMS
and the sole owner of the company since 2009.5 At all relevant times, Sibley was CMS’s
chief executive officer, president, secretary, chief financial officer, and agent for service
of process. During the 12-month period preceding its closure--February/March 2015 to
February/March 2016--CMS employed at least 75 employees.
In April 2015, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) filed a notice of federal tax lien
with the California Secretary of State, indicating that CMS owed $566,738.02 in unpaid
taxes. In June 2015, the IRS filed another tax lien notice with the California Secretary of
State, indicating that CMS owed an additional $243,484,40 in unpaid taxes. In October
2015, the California Employment Development Department (EDD) “levied against”
CMS’s bank accounts in the amount of $63,243.84. In “late 2015,” the IRS sought to
collect a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty (TFRP) from Sibley related to CMS’s federal tax
liabilities.6
4 CMS was in the business of providing full-service print, mail, and related marketing
services.
5 Since June 2012, Sibley has owned all stock in APC Holding & Management Inc.,
(APC) a California S corporation that has held all CMS stock since 2009. At all relevant
times, Sibley was the only officer of APC.
6 A TFRP is a fine charged when an employer willfully retains employee FICA (i.e., the
payroll tax that funds Social Security and Medicare) and income taxes owed to the IRS.
At some point in 2015, Sibley personally guaranteed payment of CMS’s unpaid taxes to
the IRS “in an amount not less than $500,000.”
4
In November 2015, the United States Postal Service revoked CMS’s bulk mail
permit. During that same month, Sibley was informed that CMS was late in paying its
rent.
In January 2016, the IRS levied CMS’s bank accounts in the amount of
$482,691.58.
In February 2016, CMS was served with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit.
One week later, on February 29, 2016, CMS sent all of its employees “home.”
Two days later, CMS notified its employees (via e-mail) that all of its operations were
“temporarily suspended until further notice,” and that all “future notice” from CMS
would be sent to their address of record. Although CMS posted a sign on its door
informing its employees that their final check would be mailed to them, CMS did not
issue any paychecks to its employees for the final pay period of February 14 to March 4,
2016.
In connection with the summary judgment proceedings, it was not disputed that
CMS permanently ceased operating during the week beginning February 29, 2016, and
ending March 4, 2016, and that CMS’s employees were sent a letter (dated March 3,
2016) advising them that all of CMS’s “productions” were “terminated” and “wishing
them luck in their future endeavors.” In addition, it was not disputed that CMS failed to
provide advance written notice of its closure to any employee or entity (e.g., EDD), that
CMS did not seek an exemption from the Cal/WARN notice requirements, that CMS had
employed 114 persons during the final pay period who had worked for CMS for at least
six of the 12 preceding months,7 and that, on February 29, 2016 (the same day CMS’s
7 Defendants did not dispute that 114 persons were employed by CMS during the final
pay period or that CMS failed to give these employees 60 days’ advance notice prior to
their discharge. Instead, defendants claimed that a portion of the 114 employees were
part-time or temporary employees, and therefore were not subject to the notice
requirements of the Cal/WARN Act. Defendants also objected to the evidence the Labor
5
employees were sent home), Sibley withdrew more than $200,000 from CMS’s bank
accounts and used that money to purchase cashier’s checks payable to cash, none of
which was used to pay CMS’s employees for their accrued wages.8 Finally, it was not
disputed that CMS owed back pay and lost benefits to certain employees who were
discharged in connection with CMS’s closure.
Procedural Background
Complaint
In December 2018, the Labor Commissioner filed suit against defendants,
asserting three claims under the Labor Code: (1) violation of the Cal/WARN Act (§ 1400
et seq.); (2) failure to pay minimum wages (§§ 558.1, 1193.6, 1194.2, 1197); and
(3) waiting time penalties (§§ 201, 203, 558.1). These claims were predicated on CMS’s
“mass layoff” or “termination” of more than 100 employees during the week of
February 29, 2016, to March 4, 2016, without compliance with the notice requirements of
the Cal/WARN Act (e.g., 60 days’ advance notice to employees), and CMS’s failure to
pay its employees their final check (i.e., wages accrued for the time worked from
February 14, 2016, to March 4, 2016) and any lost benefits. The complaint alleged that,
at all relevant times, Sibley was not only the chief executive officer, secretary, and chief
financial officer of CMS, but also the sole owner and manager of the day-to-day
operations of CMS. The complaint further alleged that Sibley ordered the “mass layoff”
or “termination” and did not pay CMS’s employees their accrued wages upon discharge.
As for relief, the complaint asserted that CMS and Sibley (individually) were liable for
back pay ($814,507.84 or more), restitution of minimum wages ($128,000 or more),
Commissioner submitted to support these points. As we note post, the trial court
overruled defendants’ objections.
8 According to Sibley, she withdrew the money from CMS’s bank accounts on the
advice of counsel to (among other things) pay creditors.
6
liquidated damages ($128,000 or more), and waiting time penalties ($407,253.92 or
more).9
Motion for Summary Judgment
In April 2023, the Labor Commissioner moved for summary judgment against
both defendants, asserting that there were no defenses or triable issue of material fact as
to any of the claims alleged in the complaint.
In their written opposition, defendants made little effort to summarize the pertinent
facts (one paragraph) and no effort to show that summary judgment was improper against
CMS on the merits. Instead, defendants argued there were triable issues of material fact
as to “Sibley’s individual liability under each cause of action.” Specifically, as for the
alleged Cal/WARN Act violation, defendants asserted there was a triable issue of
material fact as to whether Sibley “possessed and employed the requisite control” of
CMS to qualify as an “employer” under the Act. In making this argument, defendants
noted that there was no evidence Sibley was “personally responsible for paying the wages
or salaries of CMS’s employees.” As for the other claims alleged in the complaint--
failure to pay minimum wages and waiting time penalties--defendants asserted there was
a triable issue of material fact as to whether Sibley personally violated or caused to be
violated any provision of the Labor Code, such that she could be held personally liable
for these claims. Additionally, as to the Cal/WARN Act claim, defendants argued in a
conclusory manner that summary judgment was improper because: (1) the Act only
applies to full-time workers (as opposed to temporary workers) and the Labor
Commissioner had not shown that the discharged employees worked full time; and
9 In connection with the summary judgment proceedings, the Labor Commissioner noted
that 79 of the 149 workers who were employed by CMS during the final pay period
(February 14, 2016, to March 4, 2016) had obtained a judgment against CMS for unpaid
wages. As such, the Labor Commissioner explained that “[t]o avoid a duplicative
award,” damages in an amount less than requested in the complaint was appropriate.
7
(2) the Labor Commissioner failed to prove that Sibley had “sufficient control of [CMS]
in 2015 and 2016 to be held legally responsible and she denie[d] it.” In making the latter
argument, defendants claimed that it was “clear that other third parties caused CMS to
fail, not . . . Sibley.” Finally, defendants suggested (without further argument or
explanation) that Sibley was not “liable” under the Cal/WARN Act because she was an
“employer” who attempted to “save” CMS in good faith.
Trial Court’s Ruling
In July 2023, the trial court issued a tentative ruling granting summary judgment
in favor of the Labor Commissioner. In so ruling, the court found that the Labor
Commissioner had proven each element of her claims, and that defendants had failed to
set forth specific facts showing the existence of one or more triable issues of material
fact. The court overruled all of defendants’ evidentiary objections, declined to rule on the
evidentiary objections lodged in defendants’ separate statement in opposition to the
motion for summary judgment, and sustained in part and overruled in part the Labor
Commissioner’s objections to Sibley’s declaration. In sustaining objections to portions
of two paragraphs of Sibley’s declaration, the court explained that the objected-to
evidence contradicted admissions made during the discovery process and Sibley’s prior
sworn statements.
In August 2023, after the tentative ruling became the final order of the court,
judgment was entered in favor of the Labor Commissioner and against defendants in the
aggregate amount of $1,063,169.99, plus attorney fees.
Appeal
Defendants timely appealed.
8
DISCUSSION
I
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate “if all the papers submitted show that there is
no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see also Regents of University of
California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
A plaintiff moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication has the
burden of showing there is no defense to a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (a).) That burden can be met if the plaintiff has proved each element of a cause of
action entitling the party to judgment on that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c,
subd. (p)(1).) This means that a plaintiff who bears the burden of proof at trial by a
preponderance of evidence must produce evidence that would require a reasonable trier
of fact to find any underlying material fact more likely than not. (Aguilar, supra, 25
Cal.4th at p. 851.)
If a plaintiff successfully meets their burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to
set forth specific facts showing the existence of one or more triable issues of material fact
as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1); see
also S.B.C.C., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 383, 388.)
A triable issue of material fact exists if the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact
to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing summary judgment in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)
“An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by
‘speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work.’ [Citation.] Further, an issue of fact
is not raised by ‘cryptic, broadly phrased, and conclusory assertions’ [citation], or mere
possibilities.” (Sinai Memorial Chapel v. Dudler (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 190, 196-197.)
9
We independently review an order granting a motion for summary judgment.
(Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 1037.) In doing so, we apply the
traditional three-step analysis used by the trial court, that is, we (1) identify the issues
framed by the pleadings, (2) determine if the moving party has met their initial burden,
and if and only if so, (3) determine if the opposing party has raised a triable issue of
material fact. (See Meddock v. County of Yolo (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 170, 175;
Oakland Raiders v. National Football League (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 621, 630; Brantley
v. Pisaro (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 1591, 1602.) “We need not defer to the trial court and
are not bound by the reasons in its summary judgment ruling; we review the ruling of the
trial court, not its rationale.” (Oakland Raiders, at p. 630.)
Our review is governed by a fundamental principle of appellate procedure;
namely, that “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct,’ ” and thus,
“ ‘error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d
557, 564; see also Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Under this
principle, the appellant bears the burden of establishing error on appeal, even though the
respondent had the burden of proving its right to summary judgment before the trial
court. (Nealy v. City of Santa Monica (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 359, 372; Frank &
Freedus v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 461, 474.) For this reason, our review
is limited to contentions adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s brief. (Nealy,
at p. 372; Christoff v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 118, 125-126.)
“It is the responsibility of the appellant . . . to support claims of error with meaningful
argument and citation to authority. [Citations.] When legal argument with citation to
authority is not furnished on a particular point, we may treat the point as forfeited and
pass it without consideration. [Citations.] In addition, citing cases without any
discussion of their application to the present case results in forfeiture. [Citations.] We
are not required to examine undeveloped claims or to supply arguments for the litigants.”
(Allen v. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 41, 52 (Allen).)
10
II
Motion for Summary Judgment
At the outset, we note that defendants’ appeal is limited in nature. In their opening
brief,10 defendants do not argue that summary judgment was improperly granted against
CMS on the merits. As for Sibley, defendants offer various and largely undeveloped
arguments as to why summary judgment was improperly granted, including the existence
of one or more triable issues of material fact as to “Sibley’s individual liability under
each cause of action.” Defendants add that “given the way the [Labor Commissioner]
chose to frame and notice [the summary judgment] motion”--specifically, not requesting
summary judgment or adjudication as to each defendant “separately and individually”--
summary judgment was improperly granted against CMS. As we next explain, we see no
basis for reversal.
A. Cal/WARN Act
The Cal/WARN Act prohibits an “employer” from ordering a “mass layoff” or
“termination” at a “covered establishment” unless, 60 days before the order takes effect,
the employer gives written notice of the order to the employees of the covered
establishment affected by the order and the statutorily specified government officials and
entities (e.g., EDD). (§ 1401, subd. (a).) Here, the evidence showed that CMS, which
suddenly closed and ceased operating in late February 2016 or early March 2016, was a
“covered establishment” because it employed 75 or more people within the preceding 12
months, thereby making it an “employer” subject to the requirements of the Cal/WARN
Act.11 (§ 1400.5, subd. (a) [defining “covered establishment” to mean “any industrial or
10 Defendants did not file a reply brief.
11 In the trial court, there was no dispute that CMS was a “covered establishment” under
the Cal/WARN Act. However, on appeal, defendants suggest that reversal is required
because Sibley “personally was never a ‘covered establishment.’ ” This undeveloped
suggestion of error has no merit whatsoever, as the Cal/WARN Act contains no such
11
commercial facility or part thereof that employs, or has employed within the preceding 12
months, 75 or more persons”]; § 1400.5, subd. (b) [defining “employer” to mean “any
person, as defined by Section 18, who directly or indirectly owns and operates a covered
establishment”]; § 18 [defining “person” to include a corporation].) Sibley also qualified
as an “employer” under the Act because the evidence showed that she was the “person”
who owned and operated CMS during the relevant time period. (See § 1400.5, subd. (b);
§ 18.) And the discharge of CMS’s employees (over 100 people) in connection with the
closure of CMS was both a “termination”--because CMS stopped commercial operations
at a covered establishment (§ 1400.5, subd. (f))--and a “mass layoff”--because 50 or more
employees (i.e., persons employed at least six months of the 12 months preceding the
date on which notice was required (§ 1400.5, subd. (h)) were discharged within a 30-day
period (§ 1400.5, subd. (d)). Finally, it was not disputed that neither CMS nor Sibley
gave 60 days’ advance written notice of the mass layoff or termination to any affected
employee or any other person or entity specified in the Act (e.g., EDD). (§ 1401, subd.
(a).)
On this record, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the
Labor Commissioner on the Cal/WARN Act claim. The evidence submitted by the Labor
Commissioner showed there was no defense to the claim (i.e., the evidence proved each
element of the claim), and defendants failed to meet their burden to set forth specific facts
establishing the existence of one or more triable issues of material fact as to the claim or
a defense thereto.
requirement. As discussed, the Act prohibits an “employer” from ordering “a mass layoff
. . . or termination at a covered establishment unless, 60 days before the order takes
effect, the employer gives written notice of the order” to (among others) “[t]he employees
of the covered establishment affected by the order.” (§ 1401, subd. (a), italics added.)
The Act defines a “covered establishment” to mean “any industrial or commercial facility
or part thereof that employs, or has employed within the preceding 12 months, 75 or
more persons. (§ 1400.5, subd. (a), italics added.)
12
In urging a contrary result, defendants primarily argue that Sibley’s declaration
(executed in June 2023) established one or more triable issues of material fact.
Specifically, defendants claim the declaration created a triable issue of fact as to whether
Sibley was an “employer” within the meaning of the Cal/WARN Act. In support of their
position, defendants initially assert that the trial court erred in relying on (among other
cases) D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, to disregard Sibley’s
declaration.12 However, the record reflects that the trial court excluded only two portions
of Sibley’s declaration.13 And, in any event, we need not decide whether there was
evidentiary error because, even considering the excluded evidence, we fail to see how
Sibley’s declaration was sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
12 The party opposing summary judgment may be bound by admissions made in
deposition testimony or responses to interrogatories or requests for admissions: “[W]hen
discovery has produced an admission or concession on the part of the party opposing
summary judgment which demonstrates that there is no factual issue to be tried,”
controverting affidavits submitted by that party may be disregarded. (D’Amico v. Board
of Medical Examiners, supra, 11 Cal.3d at pp. 20-22.) This rule is often referred to as the
D’Amico rule. “Properly applied, [the rule] is limited to instances where ‘credible
[discovery] admissions . . . [are] contradicted only by self-serving declarations of a
party.’ [Citations.] In a nutshell, the rule bars a party opposing summary judgment from
filing a declaration that purports to impeach his or her own prior sworn testimony.”
(Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1521-1522.)
13 The two excluded portions of Sibley’s declaration stated as follows: (1) “CMS
continued to pay its employees into February 2016. I did not know in November or
December of 2015, or even in January of 2016, that CMS’ employees were in danger of
losing their jobs, or the business would in fact fail”; and (2) “CMS did not necessarily
pay its employees every two weeks or bi-monthly.” Prior to the execution of this
declaration, Sibley responded to discovery requests (requests for admission) propounded
by the Labor Commissioner. Among other things, Sibley admitted that, as of November
2015, she was aware that the IRS had threatened to “shut down” CMS due to its failure to
“keep current on its taxes,” which would result in 160 people losing their jobs. Sibley
also admitted that it was CMS’s official practice to pay its employees bi-monthly, on
approximately the first and 16th of each month.
13
Although not entirely clear, defendants suggest that summary judgment was
improperly granted on the Cal/WARN Act claim as to Sibley because, “irrespective of
[Sibley’s] ownership of CMS,” there was “a triable issue . . . as to whether she possessed
and employed the requisite control” over CMS to be considered an “employer” under the
Cal/WARN Act. In other words, defendants argue there was a triable issue of material
fact as to whether Sibley directly or indirectly operated CMS. (See § 1400.5, subd. (b)
[defining “employer” for purposes of the Cal/WARN Act to include any person who
directly or indirectly owns and operates a covered establishment].) According to
defendants, Sibley’s declaration “demonstrated the inference” that she had “effectually
lost control of CMS’s operations when the requisite notices required by the Act should
have hypothetically been provided.” However, a review of Sibley’s declaration reveals
that the person she accused of controlling CMS and improperly representing himself as
the president and/or chief executive officer of the company in her absence (Andy Cody)
was terminated in 2015, long before CMS’s employees were sent home on February 29,
2016.14 Moreover, there was other evidence in the record--a declaration executed by
Sibley in November 2015 in connection with a related federal action--demonstrating that,
after Cody was terminated, Sibley took over management of CMS in May 2015. Further,
it was undisputed that, at all relevant times, Sibley was the chief executive officer,
president, chief financial officer, and secretary of CMS. Defendants cite no authority
supporting the proposition that, under the circumstances presented, there was a triable
issue of material fact as to whether Sibley was an “employer” within the meaning of the
Cal/WARN Act. Nor have defendants shown, by citation to pertinent authority and
reasoned legal analysis, that Sibley was not an “employer” under the Cal/WARN Act as a
matter of law. In short, given the record and defendants’ inadequate appellate briefing,
14 The evidence submitted in support of the Labor Commissioner’s motion for summary
judgment showed that Sibley terminated Cody on September 8, 2015.
14
no further discussion of this issue is required. (See Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52
[when legal argument with citation to authority is not furnished on a particular point, the
point may be deemed forfeited].)
B. Failure to Pay Wages and Waiting Time Penalties
We find no merit in defendants’ contention that reversal is required because
Sibley’s declaration created a triable issue of material fact as to “whether she could be
held legally liable” for the wage and hour claims alleged by the Labor Commissioner
(i.e., failure to pay wages and waiting time penalties). According to defendants, “[t]he
Labor Code does not appear to provide for the remedy sought by the [Labor
Commissioner] from corporate agents acting within the course and scope of their agency
for the corporate employer’s failure to pay its employees’ wages.”
As correctly pointed out by the Labor Commissioner, section 558.1 expressly
authorizes the Labor Commissioner to hold certain individuals liable for wage and hour
violations. That provision states: “Any employer or other person acting on behalf of an
employer, who violates, or causes to be violated, any provision regulating minimum
wages or hours and days of work in any order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, or
violates, or causes to be violated, Sections 203, 226, 226.7, 1193.6, 1194, or 2802, may
be held liable as the employer for such violation.” (§ 558.1, subd. (a).)15 “For purposes
of this section, the term ‘other person acting on behalf of an employer’ is limited to a
natural person who is an owner, director, officer, or managing agent of the
employer . . . .” (§ 588.1, subd. (b).) Thus, contrary to defendants’ contention, the Labor
Code authorized the “remedy” sought by the Labor Commissioner. (See Seviour-Iloff v.
LaPaille (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 427, 442 [explaining that the legislative history of
15 The Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, headed by the Labor Commissioner, is
the state agency empowered to enforce California’s labor laws. (§ 61; Tidewater Marine
Western, Inc. v. Bradshaw (1996) 14 Cal.4th 557, 561-562; California School of Culinary
Arts v. Lujan (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 16, 18.)
15
section 588.1 demonstrates that the Legislature, in enacting the provision, gave the Labor
Commissioner the authority to hold individual business owners accountable for their
debts to workers to “ ‘ “discourage business owners from rolling up their operations and
walking away from their debts to workers and starting a new company” ’ ”], review
granted Oct. 26, 2022, S275848.)16
And nothing in the record establishes a triable issue of material fact as to whether
Sibley was subject to individual liability for violating, or causing to be violated, the
provisions of the Labor Code underlying the Labor Commissioner’s claims for failure to
pay minimum wages (§ 1193.6, 1194.2, 1197) and waiting time penalties (§ 203). To be
held liable under section 558.1, an “owner” such as Sibley “must either have been
personally involved in the purported violation of one or more of the enumerated
provisions; or, absent such personal involvement, had sufficient participation in the
activities of the employer, including, for example, over those responsible for the alleged
wage and hour violations, such that the ‘owner’ may be deemed to have contributed to,
and thus for purposes of this statute, ‘cause[d]’ a violation.” (Usher v. White (2021) 64
Cal.App.5th 883, 896-897; see Espinoza v. Hepta Run, Inc. (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 44, 59
[determining that “in order to ‘cause’ a violation of the Labor Code, an individual must
have engaged in some affirmative action beyond his or her status as an owner, officer or
director of the corporation”; to be held personally liable, the individual “must have had
some oversight of the company’s operations or some influence on corporate policy that
resulted in the Labor Code violations”].) Here, as discussed, at all relevant times, Sibley
was the sole owner, chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, and
16 In its order granting review, the California Supreme Court specified the issues to be
briefed and argued. The specified issues do not include whether section 588.1 authorizes
the Labor Commissioner to hold individual business owners accountable for the wage
and hour violations identified therein. The Supreme Court held that, “Pending review,
the opinion of the Court of Appeal . . . may be cited . . . for its persuasive value . . . .”
(Seviour-Iloff v. LaPaille (Oct. 26, 2022, S275848) 2022 Cal. Lexis 6590.)
16
secretary of CMS. In May 2015, she took over management of CMS. In late February
2016, all of the employees working at CMS’s facility in West Sacramento were sent
home and CMS permanently closed shortly thereafter. On the same date that CMS’s
employees were sent home, Sibley withdrew over $200,000 from CMS’s bank accounts,
none of which was used to pay the wages accrued by employees during the final pay
period of February 14 to March 4, 2016. On this record, we discern no error in the trial
court’s determination that summary judgment was warranted in favor of the Labor
Commissioner on the wage and hour claims.
III
Remaining Issues
In their opening brief, defendants present several undeveloped arguments that we
reject. As they did in the trial court, defendants contend (without further elaboration or
explanation) that: (1) the Cal/WARN Act applies only to full-time workers (as opposed
to temporary workers) and the Labor Commissioner failed to establish (as a matter of
law) that the CMS employees discharged in late February or early March 2016 were full-
time workers; and (2) an employer attempting to save a business in good faith, such as
Sibley, is not liable under the Cal/WARN Act. Because these arguments were not
properly raised in the trial court or on appeal, we deem them forfeited. (See Mendoza v.
Trans Valley Transport (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 770 [undeveloped point raised for the
first time in reply papers before the trial court deemed forfeited]; Allen, supra, 234
Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [argument forfeited for failing to adequately raise on appeal].)17
Moreover, the former argument lacks merit, as there is no evidence in the record
17 To the extent defendants’ opening brief raises other undeveloped contentions
suggesting reversal is required (e.g., the declaration filed by the Labor Commissioner in
support of the motion for summary judgment was not admissible), we deem those claims
forfeited. (Allen, supra, 234 Cal.App.4th at p. 52 [argument forfeited for failing to
adequately raise on appeal].)
17
(including Sibley’s declaration) suggesting that any CMS employee was “hired with the
understanding that their employment was seasonal and temporary.” (See § 1400.5,
subd. (g)(2) [Cal/WARN Act does not apply to employees who are employed in seasonal
employment].)
Finally, we find no merit in defendant’s contention that summary judgment was
improperly granted against CMS because the Labor Commissioner did not seek summary
adjudication as to CMS “separately on the second and third causes of action” (i.e., the
wage and hour claims). This argument is belied by the record. Both the notice of motion
and the motion papers filed in connection therewith make clear that the Labor
Commissioner moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication
against CMS on all three claims alleged in the complaint.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Labor Commissioner shall recover her costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a).)
/s/
Duarte, Acting P. J.
We concur:
/s/
Renner, J.
/s/
Mesiwala, J.
18
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