CourtListener 10285097•Cox v. Renfree CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/27/24 Cox v. Renfree CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
CHARLES COX et al., D081808
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2021-
00030158-CU-MC-CTL)
ERICA RENFREE et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Richard S. Whitney, Judge. Affirmed.
LiMandri & Jonna, Charles S. LiMandri, Paul M. Jonna, Mark D.
Myers, Jeffrey M. Trissell and Milan L. Brandon II for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
Quarles & Brady, Jeffrey P. Michalowski and Matthew N. Mushamel
for Defendants and Respondents.
Charles Cox et al. (together appellants) appeal from a judgment of
dismissal following a demurrer to their Second Amended Verified Petition for
Writ of Mandate and Complaint (SAC) against Erica Renfree, Samer Naji,
and the San Diego Unified School District (the District) (together
respondents). The appellants filed the underlying action in response to the
name change of a local high school. Appellants contend: (1) that the trial
court erroneously sustained the defendants’ demurrer to the SAC without
leave to amend because they alleged sufficient facts to support each cause of
action; and (2) that writ relief under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 1085 is
proper because sufficient facts were pled to show the defendants have a clear
and present duty and that appellants have a clear, present and beneficial
right to the performance of that duty. As we explain, we conclude the
demurrer to the mandamus petition was properly sustained, and appellants
lack standing to pursue the non-mandamus causes of action in their
complaint. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to appellants’ SAC and the exhibits attached therein,2 the
pertinent facts are as follows:
In 2020, two students of the Junípero Serra High School approached
Renfree, their principal, about changing their school’s mascot from the
“Conquistadors.” Renfree learned additional information about their school’s
namesake, Junípero Serra, and decided to pursue changing both the mascot
and the school’s name.
1 Future undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
2 When reviewing a judgment of dismissal entered after a demurrer is
sustained without leave to amend, we accept as true all properly pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint and judicially noticed facts. (§ 430.30,
subd. (a); Dudek v. Dudek (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 154, 160, fn. 4.)
2
Renfree held multiple videoconference meetings with members of the
school community, namely students, their parents, and staff, to discuss a
name-change proposal. She started a public online petition related to the
name change, posted a notice regarding the proposal on a neighborhood
website, and gave interviews to two local news television programs.
Throughout the process, Renfree provided her reasoning for seeking a name
change and provided a suggested reading list for additional information.
Renfree also solicited quantitative feedback through several polls. As school
resumed in the fall of 2020, an alumni poll revealed 31.1% of those who
responded favored keeping the school’s current name; other respondents
supported shortening the name to “Serra” (33.8%) or changing the name to
“Tierra Canyon” (18.9 %) or “Canyon Hills” (16.2 %). As to the mascot, 42.4%
wanted to keep the current mascot; and the remaining 57.6% favored
changing the mascot to one of four other options.
Renfree contacted Naji, the Facilities Communications Supervisor for
the District, to request that the District form a citizen advisory committee
regarding a proposed name change, and in response, the District formed such
a committee (the Committee). According to appellants, the Committee
“represented the community of San Diego as a whole.” The Committee
received a summary of the feedback Renfree had obtained. Appellants allege
the summary was “either outright false or clearly meant to deceive.” They
further assert that Renfree “knew that the community did not support a
name change” and that she “made sure that the letters she received from
community members were buried and never forwarded on.”
The Committee recommended to the San Diego Unified School District
Board of Education (the Board) that the high school’s name be changed to
“Canyon Hills High School” and the mascot to some variation of a
3
rattlesnake. Thereafter, the Board scheduled a public hearing for March 9,
2021, on the “ ‘Recommendation to Change the Name, Mascot, and Colors of
Junipero Serra High School to Canyon Hills High School/Mat Kwatup
KunKun, The Rattlers/ “ewii tenwai, Red and Black Primary Colors and Gray
and White Complementary Colors.” ’ ” Appellants do not dispute that the
Board gave actual notice of the hearing, but they contend, instead, that the
Board did not give notice that it intended to vote on the Committee
recommendation at the hearing. At the public hearing, the Board heard from
the students who initiated the mascot change and four representatives from
the Kanap Kuahan Coalition.3 Following the public hearing, the Board voted
to adopt the recommendation.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On February 9, 2022, appellants filed the SAC, seeking to enjoin
respondents from acting upon a name change and declaratory relief, or, in the
alternative, a writ of mandate or prohibition compelling the District to have
the renaming process “fully redone.” The SAC alleges that anti-Catholic
animus motivated the school name change, characterizing Renfree’s actions
as “vicious anti-Catholicism.”
In the action before us, appellants assert that changing the name of the
facility causes “irreparable harm to their statutorily and constitutionally
protected rights” to freedom from the government establishment of religion,
to freely exercise their own religion(s), and to equal protection under the law.
3 According to appellants, the Kanap Kuahan Coalition is “a group of
‘Kumeyaay tribal citizens’ whose mission is to create ‘safe and welcoming
public spaces for all by removing symbols of colonialism, racism, slavery, and
genocide’ through efforts to ‘remove statutes [sic], monuments, rename
schools and raise awareness.’ ”
4
Although the court had previously sustained the District’s demurrer
without leave to amend, nevertheless, appellants again amended their
pleading by including claims against the District in the SAC and seeking
reconsideration of the order denying them leave to amend as to the District.
Renfree and Naji moved to strike the SAC and respondents collectively
demurred to the pleading. The court sustained the demurrer to the SAC
without leave to amend and dismissed the action. Appellants now appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. The Standard of Review
“ ‘In reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the
operative complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to
state a cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘ “We treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not
contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. . . . Further, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in
their context.’ ” ’ ” (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; see also
Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370.) “Because only factual
allegations are considered on demurrer, we must disregard any ‘contentions,
deductions or conclusions of fact or law alleged [in the complaint.]’ ” (People
ex. rel. Gallegos v. Pacific Lumber Co. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 950, 957
(Gallegos).) Further, “[i]f the allegations in the complaint conflict with the
facts included in exhibits attached to or referenced in the complaint, ‘we rely
on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits.’ ” (Crawley v. Alameda
County Waste Management Authority (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 396, 403-404.)
2. The District’s Renaming Policy
Effective as of January 26, 2021, the District’s naming policy provided,
in relevant part:
5
“NAMING OF FACILITIES
“The Board shall name district schools and other district-
owned or leased buildings, grounds, and facilities in
recognition of:
“1. Individuals and entities that have made outstanding
contributions, including financial contributions, to the
school community.
“2. Individuals who have made contributions of statewide,
national, or worldwide significance.
“3. The geographic area in which the school or building is
located.
“The Board encourages community participation in the
process of selecting names. A citizen advisory committee
shall be appointed by the Superintendent to review name
suggestions and submit recommendations for the Board’s
consideration. Name changes shall be made by the Board
in consideration of the committee’s recommendation(s) or
upon its own initiative.
“[¶] . . . [¶]
“Before adopting any proposed name, the Board shall hold
a public hearing at which members of the public will be
given an opportunity to provide input.”
3. Appellants Have Insufficiently Pleaded Their Cause of Action for Writ
Relief4
Appellants’ first cause of action seeks a writ of mandate pursuant to
section 1085 either to enjoin the District and the individual respondents
4 In light of our conclusion that the SAC fails to state a claim for
mandamus, we assume but do not decide that appellants have sufficiently
alleged standing for the SAC’s first cause of action for a writ of mandamus.
6
“from enforcing, recognizing, or acting upon the purported name change” or,
alternatively, to require that the renaming process be fully redone, “with new
community input, a new vote by the Naming Committee, and a new vote by
the Board of Trustees.” Writ relief may be available in two circumstances:
first, “ ‘ “ ‘to enforce a mandatory and ministerial duty to act on the part of an
administrative agency or its officers’ ” ’ ”; and second, “ ‘when a public agency
has abused its discretion in carrying out a discretionary function.’ ”
Crestwood Behavioral Health, Inc. v. Baass (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 1, 15-16).
a. School renaming is discretionary, not ministerial.
Under section 1085, a writ of mandate may be issued by any court to a
department or agency to compel the performance of an act which the law
specially requires. To state a cause of action for a writ of mandate under
section 1085, the appellants must demonstrate: “(1) a clear duty to act by the
defendant; (2) a beneficial interest in the defendant’s performance of that
duty; (3) the defendant’s ability to perform the duty; (4) the defendant’s
failure to perform that duty or abuse of discretion if acting; and (5) no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy exists.” (Collins v. Thurmond (2019)
41 Cal.App.5th 879, 915 (Collins).)
Traditional mandamus under section 1085 generally “may only be
employed to compel the performance of a duty which is purely ministerial in
character.” (Rodriguez v. Solis (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 495, 501 (Solis).) As
distinguished from discretionary acts, a purely ministerial duty is a duty to
perform an act “in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal
authority and without regard to [one’s] own judgment or opinion concerning
such act’s propriety or impropriety, when a given state of facts exists.” (Ibid.)
Purely ministerial acts include issuing a permit once qualifying conditions
are met (Lynch v. California Coastal Com. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 470, 480) or
7
applying a formula to calculate fees (Utility Cost Management v. Indian Wells
Valley Water Dist. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1185, 1194).
The renaming of a school is not a ministerial act. The District bears no
duty to rename a school. The Board may rename a facility on its own
initiative, may approve a proposed name change, or may maintain the status
quo. It is neither bound by the Committee’s recommendation, nor by any list
of proposed names. There are multiple opportunities for the Board to
exercise discretion and no specific outcome is pre-ordained when a name-
change request is initiated. Even if appellants were successful in their
demands that “the renaming process [be] fully redone” and “a new vote [be
taken] by the Naming Committee, and . . . the Board of Trustees,” there is no
predetermined outcome to the process, and the Board is free to exercise its
“own judgment or opinion concerning [a renaming’s] propriety or
impropriety.” (Solis, supra, 1 Cal.App.4th at p. 501.) We conclude that the
District’s school name-changing policy is, therefore, purely discretionary.
However, that conclusion does not end the analysis.
b. The District did not abuse its discretion in the renaming process.
While “mandate will not lie to control a public agency’s discretion, that
is to say, force the exercise of discretion in a particular manner, it will lie to
correct abuses of discretion.” (Helena F. v. West Contra Costa Unified School
Dist. (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1793, 1799 (Helena F.).)
Here, to establish entitlement to relief via writ of mandamus against
the District (as opposed to the individual respondents, who had no discretion
as to the name-change decision) as to a discretionary act, appellants must
demonstrate the act “was arbitrary, capricious or entirely without
evidentiary support [and/or that] it failed to conform to procedures
required . . . .” (People for Ethical Operation of Prosecutors etc. v. Spitzer
8
(2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 391, 407 (Spitzer).) An abuse of discretion occurs if an
agency did not apply or properly interpret the governing law—here, a
policy—or if there was no rational connection between the relevant factors,
the choice made, and the purpose of the policy. (California Hotel & Motel
Assn. v. Industrial Welfare Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 200, 212; American Board
of Cosmetic Surgery v. Medical Board of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th
534, 547-548.)
“In determining whether an agency has abused its discretion, the court
may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency, and if reasonable
minds may disagree as to the wisdom of the agency’s action, its
determination must be upheld. [Citation.]” (Helena F., supra,
49 Cal.App.4th at p. 1799; see also Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals
(1943) 23 Cal.2d 303, 315.) In a mandamus proceeding, the pertinent
question, whether the agency’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely
lacking in evidentiary support, is a question of law. (Mike Moore’s 24-Hour
Towing v. City of San Diego (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1303.) Here,
because the Board elected to act, we consider whether the Board abused its
discretion in the name-change undertaking. (Collins, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th
at p. 915.)
Appellants correctly assert that the District was required to follow its
“lawfully issued policies,” but they do not allege that the District did not do
so. Appellants contend respondents behaved fraudulently, having “had a
predetermined intent to perpetrate a fraud on the public by holding sham
forums, receiving sham public comment, and then making a name change a
fait accompli without considering the actual interests of either the San Diego
or Tierrasanta communities.” But the SAC includes a complete dearth of
specific facts to support these rhetorical points as to the District and its
9
Board. (Gallegos, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 957 [in review of a demurrer,
a reviewing court must set aside “ ‘contentions, deductions or conclusions of
fact or law’ ” and focus on the factual allegations].)
As we have noted, according to the District’s policy: (1) the
Superintendent must appoint a citizen advisory committee; (2) the committee
must review name suggestions; (3) the committee must submit their
recommendations to the Board; (4) the Board must hold a public hearing
prior to adopting a proposed name; and (5) the public must be given an
opportunity to provide input at that public hearing. Facilities may be named
after individuals who have contributed to the school community, significant
individuals, or the geographic area in which the facility is located. We
address each of these in turn to determine whether appellants have
sufficiently pled an abuse of discretion in the name-change process.
First, appellants do not claim that the District failed to form a citizen
advisory committee. To the contrary, the SAC alleges that Naji, on behalf of
the Superintendent, formed a citizen advisory committee. Further,
appellants do not dispute that the Committee “represented the community of
San Diego as a whole.” Appellants allege the Committee did not represent
Tierrasanta, but they do not point to any requirement that would necessitate
the involvement of residents of Tierrasanta. The policy “ ‘encourages
community participation,’ ” but does not mandate it, and does not define
“community” to include neighborhoods adjacent to the facility at issue or any
other portion of the San Diego community.
Second, the Committee reviewed the name-change petition and name
suggestions. The Committee received the petition and letters that detailed
the actions taken to voluntarily gather community input. The Committee
then voted to recommend “Canyon Hills High School” as the new facility
10
name. Some Committee members opted to include explanations for their
votes while others offered their own suggestions for school names,
demonstrating their careful consideration of the petition. None of the factual
allegations in the SAC support a claim that the Committee failed to review
name suggestions.
Third, the Committee submitted their recommendations to the Board
as required by the policy.
Fourth, the Board held a virtual public hearing prior to changing the
facility’s name.5 On March 5, 2021, the District published the agenda for
their March 9 Board meeting and included the Committee recommendation
as an item for discussion. Appellants and any other interested parties were
welcome to attend the meeting virtually. Appellants assert the virtual
hearing “frustrated the ability of community members to participate” because
they “lacked access to or did not possess knowledge of how to operate the
required technology.” Nonetheless, at the time of the hearing, governing law
did not require the meetings to be held in person.6 Appellants do not allege
that they were turned away from the meeting or that the meeting was not
public. None of the factual allegations in the SAC support a claim that the
5 Due to COVID-19, the meeting was held virtually. On March 17, 2020,
the Governor authorized local and state legislative bodies to hold public
meetings by teleconferencing, waiving the Brown Act’s physical presence
requirements. (Governor Executive Order No. N-29-20.) This waiver was in
effect until February 2023. (Governor Proclamation Terminating State of
Emergency, dated February 28, 2023.)
6 Appellants further contend neither they nor the community at large
received notice “that the Board would be voting” on the name change.
Notices regarding timing of the vote are not required in the facility name-
change policy; the Board is required only to hold a public hearing prior to
adopting the proposal.
11
Board failed to hold a public hearing prior to adopting the name-change
proposal.
Finally, members of the public were given an opportunity to provide
input at the public hearing. In fact, as alleged by appellants, six members of
the public offered comments on the name change at the public hearing,
including two students and four members of the general public. Appellants
discount these comments from members of the public, contending “there was
no meaningful public comment.” While appellants fail to describe what
“meaningful public comment” would be, we understand them to mean the
speakers’ viewpoints did not align with appellants’. Appellants do not allege
that they attempted to speak but were denied the opportunity to do so at the
public hearing. Further, as alleged by appellants, their counsel had
submitted a letter to the Board in opposition to the name change prior to the
public hearing.7 Thus, despite appellants’ failure to participate in the public
hearing, the Board still received their input. None of the factual allegations
in the SAC support a claim that members of the public were not given an
opportunity to provide input to the Board at the public hearing or through
some other means.
Although appellants do not argue it, we observe that the new name of
the facility, “Canyon Hills High School” is based on “[t]he geographic area in
which the school . . . is located,” which is one of the naming options available
to the Board under its naming policy.
In total, none of appellants’ factual allegations support a claim that
defendants violated the District’s facility name-change policy. Absent such a
7 In fact, appellants had made their views clear beginning in August
2020 when they first threatened a lawsuit should the District move forward
with a name change.
12
showing, we cannot find their action to be arbitrary or capricious and we
conclude the District adhered to the requirements of the policy.
We understand that the gravamen of the SAC focuses on the alleged
inadequacy of efforts to survey the views of the Tierrasanta community,
Renfree’s alleged bias in favor of renaming, and alleged intentional and
misleading inaccuracies in the information provided to the Committee and to
the Board, as well as perceived anti-Catholic or anti-Christian motivations
for pursuing the name change. But assuming the truth of all of these
allegations, nothing in the District policy requires any particular level or
locale of public engagement, any particular presentation of information to the
Committee, or any assessment of motivations of any participant. Further, in
light of the Board’s broad discretion to make name changes “in consideration
of the committee’s recommendation(s) or upon its own initiative,” any defects
in the Committee’s review might ultimately be irrelevant to the Board’s
decision.
Perhaps the Board, as the decision-maker, may be said to have abused
its discretion if it approved the name change as a result of some
constitutionally-prohibited motivation. However, the SAC does not allege
that the Board itself had any unconstitutional motivations. At most, the SAC
alleges that the Board was “wary” of Renfree’s polling and that “somebody”
told Renfree, in advance of the Board vote, that she could purchase benches
for the school bearing the new school name (which appellants assert is
evidence that the Board had decided to change the name prior to the public
hearing and vote), and that after the vote, the Board “ratified” Renfree’s
alleged misconduct by sending an email praising the name change. Fairly
read, the SAC does not allege an unconstitutional motivation by the Board,
which retained sole discretion to change the school’s name. Further,
13
although appellants contest the extent of community support for the name
change, the SAC contains evidence that there was a level of such support,
including from students, administrators, and the San Diego Human
Relations Commission. Finally, we note that even if there had been a
complete absence of community support, the Board nonetheless retained
discretion under its policy to change the name.
Appellants rely upon Maxwell v. City of Santa Rosa (1959) 53 Cal.2d
274 (Maxwell) and Gogerty v. Coachella Valley Junior College District (1962)
57 Cal.2d 727 (Gogerty). They assert these cases are “indistinguishable” from
their own. In both cases, the plaintiffs had alleged that the agency had
complied with the applicable procedures but had done so with fraudulent
intent in order to arrive at a predetermined result. Specifically, in Maxwell,
plaintiffs alleged that the city council had decided to issue assessments
against their properties and the procedures that followed were a sham,
because the results were preordained. Similarly, in Gogerty, plaintiffs
alleged that the community college district decided to acquire a site to build a
school, and its efforts thereafter were fraudulent in light of the
predetermined intent. In both cases, the reviewing courts concluded that the
complaints sufficiently alleged that the agency had fraudulently avoided
compliance with the law.
In contrast, while the SAC asserts generally that “Defendants had a
predetermined intent to perpetrate a fraud on the public by holding sham
forums, receiving sham public comment, and then making a name change a
fait accompli without considering the actual interests of either the San Diego
or Tierrasanta communities,” the SAC does not allege that the District had
predetermined the school name change. It alleges that Renfree and Naji
14
acted fraudulently; but as to the Board’s conduct, the SAC alleges merely
that:
“potentially members of the Board of Trustees, also
colluded with Defendants Renfree and Naji. Specifically,
some officials became wary of Defendant Renfree’s polls
and wanted to send out a new poll, but that new poll was
sidelined. The District’s failure to further investigate
Defendant Renfree’s sham proceedings even after becoming
wary of their sham nature constituted ratification.”
An allegation of “potential” collusion falls far short of the
predetermination claims alleged against the decision-making bodies in
Maxwell and Gogerty. More significantly, in the case before us, rather than
alleging that the Board had predetermined the naming issue, appellants have
contended that the Board acted fraudulently by ratifying the alleged
misconduct by Renfree and Naji.8 But “ratification” during or after the
Board’s compliance with its policy is inconsistent with a claim of a
preordained, intended result on the part of the Board, as was the case in
Maxwell and Gogerty. Instead, at most, it leads to a conclusion that the
Board was aware of potential defects in the characterization of the level of
community support for the proposed name change but nonetheless chose to
exercise its discretion to adopt the change without further investigation; and
then declined to revisit a change, even in the face of opposition raised after
the hearing. Thus, in addition to a failure to allege the District did not follow
8 As appellants explain in their reply brief, “the Complaint specifically
pleads how Maxwell and Gogerty should apply to the three defendants, in
subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Paragraph 134. . . . Specifically, Paragraph
134(c) pleads fraud by the decision-making body through ratification. (See
also 8-AA-1478 [¶¶102-105] [pleading on information and belief that the
proper interpretation of an odd timeline and suspicious statements in emails
is that the Board discovered the fraud and ratified it].).”
15
its policy as written, the SAC fails to allege that the Board had a
predetermined, fraudulent intent to not follow its policy in its discretionary
review of the proposed change.
In sum, as noted above, appellants must demonstrate the act “ ‘was
arbitrary, capricious or entirely without evidentiary support [and/or that] it
failed to conform to procedures required . . . .” (Spitzer, supra, 53 Cal.App.5th
at p. 407, italics added.) They have failed to do so.
As to the mandamus cause of action, appellants do not seek leave to
amend and make no argument to this court that they can amend their
pleading to properly state a claim. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial
court properly sustained the demurrer to the mandamus writ petition.
4. Appellants Lack Standing to Pursue Their Non-mandamus Claims
In their remaining causes of action, appellants assert that Renfree and
Naji, acting in both their individual and official capacities, violated
appellants’ rights under the state and federal constitutions. We requested
and received supplemental briefing from the parties on the issue of whether
appellants had standing to bring their second, third, fourth, sixth, and
seventh causes of action (referred to herein as the “non-mandamus claims”).
“ ‘ “At its core, standing concerns a specific party’s interest in the
outcome of a lawsuit. [Citations.] We . . . require a party to show that he or
she is sufficiently interested as a prerequisite to deciding, on the merits,
whether a party’s challenge to legislative or executive action independently
has merit.” [Citations.] . . . .’ ” (San Diegans for Open Government v. Fonseca
(2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 426, 434. (Fonseca).)
16
Appellants assert that they have both public interest standing and
taxpayer standing to pursue their non-mandamus claims.9
a. Appellants do not have public interest standing.
We look, first, to their claimed public interest standing. Public interest
standing has been consistently applied only in the context of mandamus
proceedings. (Reynolds v. City of Calistoga (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 865, 873-
874.) In Reynolds, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that certain
sales tax funds had not been properly spent; an order enjoining the use of
such funds; and an order directing the city to repay funds that had been
improperly spent. The Reynolds court noted that “public interest standing”
referred to a mandamus proceeding in which a public right is asserted, and
as to which the petitioner seeks enforcement of a public duty. The court
concluded that Reynolds’s action was not in mandamus, and therefore he
could not assert public interest standing:
“Reynolds fails to point to any authority applying the
public interest exception outside a mandamus
proceeding. . . . . Rather than seeking to procure
enforcement of a clear ministerial government duty
(California Assn. of Medical Products Suppliers v.
Maxwell-Jolly (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 286, 302), [his suit]
seeks redress for past alleged misfeasance.” (Id. at p. 874.)
So too here. Because the claims against Renfree and Naji for their past
alleged misconduct in the renaming process are not brought as claims for
9 We note that after appellants filed this action, respondents removed
the case to federal court; but the case was subsequently remanded to the
superior court because the appellants could not establish standing to proceed
in federal court. In federal court, appellants asserted they were proceeding
under only California taxpayer and public interest standing, implicitly
conceding they did not have a separate personal interest in the case as
required for a federal claim.
17
mandamus, appellants cannot assert public interest standing as to such
claims.10
Further, to the extent that the non-mandamus claims seek damages
against Renfree and Naji in their individual capacities, public interest
standing would not extend to such claims.11 Traditional mandamus under
section 1085 controls “a public official” in their performance of “official acts.”
(Common Cause v. Board of Supervisors (1989) 49 Cal.3d 432, 442.)
Although traditional mandamus may “correct an abuse of discretion by an
official acting in an administrative capacity,” (ibid., italics added) Renfree
and Naji are not acting in an administrative capacity in their roles as private
citizens. Their acts as individuals are, by definition, not “official acts.”
b. Appellants do not have taxpayer standing.
Appellants also argue that they have “taxpayer standing” pursuant to
section 526a, which confers standing upon a resident who has paid taxes to
bring an action against any officer of a public agency to restrain “any illegal
expenditure of, waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a
local agency . . . .” As the action is to prevent an illegal expenditure of public
money, “[n]o showing of special damage to a particular taxpayer is required.”
(Fonseca, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p. 435.) Although the statute is
“construed broadly” (ibid.), it is not limitless; the action must be an action to
10 In addition to damages against Renfree and Naji, the non-mandamus
claims also seek to enjoin them from engaging in any future misconduct; but
the suggestion that they will be involved in future school-naming endeavors
that would involve the same issues is speculative and unsupported.
11 The causes of action against Renfree and Naji in their individual
capacities allege the two acted “in their individual capacity as citizens acting
in concert with a public body.”
18
prevent waste. (See Ceres v. Modesto (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 545, 554-555
(Ceres).)
“ ‘[W]aste’ as used in section 526a means something more than an
alleged mistake by public officials in matters involving the exercise of
judgment or wide discretion. To hold otherwise would invite constant
harassment of city and county officers by disgruntled citizens and could
seriously hamper our representative form of government at the local level.
Thus, the courts should not take judicial cognizance of disputes which are
primarily political in nature, nor should they attempt to enjoin every
expenditure which does not meet with a taxpayer’s approval.” (Ceres, supra,
274 Cal.App.2d at p.555.) “Waste does not encompass the great majority of
governmental outlays of money or the time of salaried governmental
employees, nor does it apply to the vast majority of discretionary decisions
made by state and local units of government.” (Chiatello v. City and County
of San Francisco (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 472, 482-483.)
The SAC alleges that appellants have standing because they pay taxes,
and that renaming the school will involve waste, which “includes paying for
the salaries of officials who are executing an illegal policy.” First, we observe
that appellants do not seek to enjoin the expenditure of public funds or to
cancel or invalidate a contract making use of public funds. In this way, their
claim is markedly different than many of the cases upon which they rely. For
instance, they compare their supposed standing to the plaintiffs in the suit
against a school district in A.J. Fistes Corp. v. GDL Best Contractors, Inc.
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 677 (Fistes).
In Fistes, the plaintiff, a taxpayer, complained that the school district
improperly accepted a bid for campus improvement projects; the accepted bid
was approximately twice the plaintiff’s bid. (Fistes, supra, 38 Cal.App.5th at
19
pp. 682-683.) The Fistes action was clearly based on waste—the taxpayer
sought to prevent the district from spending an excess $1,427,100. This sets
the action in Fistes apart from the claims before us, as no challenged outlay of
funds is alleged. Additional case law cited by appellants is similarly
distinguishable.12
Second, appellants do not allege that the naming policy is
unconstitutional or in some way illegal. When a “law is unconstitutional,
then county officials may be enjoined from spending their time carrying out
its provisions.” (Blair v. Pitchess (1971) 5 Cal.3d 258, 269 [taxpayer claim
that a specific section of the California Code of Civil Procedure was violative
of federal and state constitutional provisions].) In this way, taxpayer
standing provides a general remedy to control illegal government activity
even when the taxpayer is not directly harmed. (White v. Davis (1975)
13 Cal.3d 757, 763-765.) “[T]axpayer standing may be used to challenge
ordinances that are unconstitutional on their face or in their application.”
(Thompson v. Spitzer (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 436, 454.)
Here, none of appellants’ causes of action arise from carrying out a law
or policy that is alleged to be unconstitutional. Appellants challenge the
respondents’ implementation of the naming policy, but do not contend that
the naming policy itself is unconstitutional or illegal. Accordingly, appellants
cannot establish taxpayer standing based on waste from implementation of a
flawed or unconstitutional law or policy.
12 See Sturgeon v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 630, 639
(section 526a “waste” does not extend to the outlay of funds through a
“beneficial, useful . . . [and] necessary” judicial benefits package that serve a
public purpose); Taxpayers for Accountable School Bond Spending v. San
Diego Unified School Dist. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1013, 1031 (taxpayers had
standing to bring a suit to stop a direct outlay of Prop S bond funds on
stadium lights).
20
Further, as with public interest standing, taxpayer standing would not
support the claims against Renfree and Naji in their individual capacities.
By its terms, section 526a applies to actions “against any officer” of a local
agency “or any agent, or other person, acting in its behalf.” Similarly, to the
extent the SAC seeks damages against Renfree and Naji, section 526a applies
to actions seeking to “restrain[ ] and prevent[ ] any illegal expenditure of,
waste of, or injury to, the estate, funds, or other property of a local agency.”
It does not extend to claims for damages of alleged past misconduct.
In light of the foregoing, our independent review compels us to conclude
that appellants cannot proceed under taxpayer standing.13 This is
consistent with the view that the law does not confer standing to advance
“disputes which are primarily political in nature”; and the courts should not
“attempt to enjoin every expenditure which does not meet with a taxpayer’s
approval.” (Ceres, supra, 274 Cal.App.2d at p. 555.) We therefore conclude
the trial court properly sustained the defendants’ demurrer to each of
appellants’ causes of action.
Finally, appellants have not specifically requested leave to amend their
pleading. “ ‘While such a showing can be made for the first time to the
reviewing court [citation], it must be made.’ ” (Rubenstein v. The Gap, Inc.
(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 870, 881.) As to their asserted public interest standing
appellants have, in their letter brief, argued that we should “reverse and
remand so that Plaintiffs can bring all of their claims via a petition for a writ
of mandate.” Even if we were to construe this argument as a request for
leave to amend their pleading, their pleading would still be insufficient. As
13 In light of our conclusion that appellants cannot establish waste
sufficient to support taxpayer standing for their non-mandamus causes of
action, we do not further consider whether they have standing to assert
claims against Renfree and Naji in their individual capacities.
21
we discussed above, the public interest standing that allows members of the
public to pursue traditional mandamus does not extend to claims against
individuals in their personal capacity or to claims for damages. Were we to
permit appellants to amend their pleading, they would be unable to pursue
claims against Renfree and Naji as individuals or claims for damages.
As to taxpayer standing, while appellants now argue they could
“add . . . allegations” regarding each appellant’s “specific connection to the
school,” they fail to demonstrate how such an amendment would change the
legal effect of the pleading. Pleading additional connections to the school
does not transform this into an action to prevent waste; whether the claim is
brought by a former employee or a fundraiser, the allegations as pled do not
grant them taxpayer standing. (See, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County (1975) 15 Cal.3d 508, 513, fn. 3.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on
appeal.
KELETY, J.
WE CONCUR:
IRION, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
22
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