In re I.S. CA4/1

CourtListener 10285095Calctapp27.11.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/27/24 In re I.S. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.S., a Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
D083898
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES
AGENCY, (Super. Ct. No. J518904)

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

I.S.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Daniela Reali-Ferrari, Judge. Affirmed.
Neale B. Gold, under appointment of the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, County Counsel, Lisa M. Maldonado, Chief Deputy
County Counsel, and Indra N. Bennett, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
I.S. (Minor) is a dependent of the court with a permanent plan of

long-term foster care.1 Minor appeals a postpermanency review order where
the juvenile court found the services provided by San Diego Health and
Human Services Agency (Agency) were generally adequate and reasonable,
but the court set a special hearing to receive updates regarding specific
services about which the court remained concerned. Minor contends
substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court’s findings of adequate
services because the Agency did not timely provide applied behavior analysis

(ABA) services,2 trauma therapy, or gender affirming services. Minor also
contends her rights to equal protection under the law were violated because a
transgender youth with a permanent foster care plan cannot access adequate
gender affirming services.
The Agency contends the matter is not justiciable. It asserts Minor
does not have standing as an aggrieved party since Welfare and Institutions

Code3 section 366.3 does not provide a remedy for failure to provide adequate
services. Further, the issues about which Minor complains are moot since

1 Appellant asked to be referred to by different names during these
proceedings. Since issuing our last opinion, Minor expressed a preference to
use she/her/hers pronouns. Accordingly, we refer to appellant as Minor and
her preferred gender pronouns.
2 ABA therapy is an element of Minor’s care plan. ABA is a
time-intensive form of therapy used to effectively treat children with
symptoms of autism. It is often prescribed for 26 to 40 hours per week with a
treatment team supervised by a qualified expert in ABA. ABA therapy can
be performed by a licensed physician or psychologist. (Consumer Watchdog v.
Department of Managed Health Care (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 862, 867–868.)
3 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

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she received ABA services, therapy, and gender affirming care after she filed
her appeal. Alternatively, the Agency contends substantial evidence supports
the juvenile court’s finding of adequate services in the postpermanency
period.
We conclude the matter is justiciable. Because we are required to
construe questions about standing liberally, we conclude Minor has standing
to challenge the order. We decline to determine whether the issues on appeal
are moot based on postappeal evidence.
Turning to the merits, we conclude substantial evidence supported the
juvenile court’s finding that the Agency generally provided adequate
assistance to Minor during the review period, but the evidence also supported
the court’s concern about the progress of providing certain services. Based on
its concerns that certain services identified in Minor’s care plan were not yet
fully implemented, the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion by
ordering a special hearing to monitor the progress of providing ABA services,
trauma therapy, gender affirming care, and gender sensitivity training. We
further conclude Minor has not established that section 366.3, subdivision (e)
violates her right to equal protection because the record does not establish
that difficulty in obtaining services was based on her gender identity. We,
therefore, affirm the order.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prior Dependency Matters
The first time we reviewed this case was shortly after L.S. (Mother)
gave birth to Minor in 2014. The Agency filed a dependency petition because
it was concerned Mother could not provide regular care to Minor due to
Mother’s developmental disability. Mother completed her case plan and
successfully reunified with Minor.

3
Alleging Mother lacked adequate supervision skills, the Agency filed a
second dependency action in 2018, after Minor presented with unexplained
lacerations on her body. The court again returned Minor to Mother’s custody
at the disposition hearing and terminated jurisdiction.
B. Prior Appeals
The second case we reviewed started shortly after the trial court
terminated jurisdiction in the 2018 proceedings. The Agency received reports
that Mother slapped, hit, shoved, and yelled at Minor. Mother denied the
allegations but admitted she screamed loudly at Minor.
Then in January 2020, Minor, five years old at the time, told a teacher
that Mother struck her with a rope, later determined to be a vacuum cord.
Minor’s legs showed bruising consistent with physical abuse. Minor was
detained in protective custody at Polinsky Children’s Center (PCC), an
emergency shelter for children. Minor also disclosed prior abuse, saying she
did not report the abuse earlier because she “pinky promised” and “didn’t
want to go to foster care again.”
The Agency filed the petition commencing this action alleging Minor
was a child described by section 300, subdivision (a) who was at risk of
suffering serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally by Mother. Minor
was placed in a foster home in March 2020.
At the contested jurisdiction and disposition hearing in
September 2020, the juvenile court found the Agency made a prima facie
showing that Minor was a child described by section 300, subdivision (a). The
court ordered Minor detained out of the home and directed the Agency to
provide services. Mother appealed the juvenile court’s removal order. We
affirmed the order in an unpublished opinion. (In re I.S. (Jan. 26, 2021,
D077949) [nonpub. opn.].)

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One of the on-going challenges for Mother and the Agency is that Minor
has a history of disruptive behaviors related to autism and difficulty with
self-regulation. For instance, when transitioning to non-preferred tasks, she
would throw herself to the ground, kick, and cry. In April 2020, an Agency
social worker discussed obtaining ABA services and other intense behavior
correction support to help Mother enhance her parenting skills and avoid
future abuse. The Agency asked if Mother and Minor could participate in

such services through the San Diego Regional Center (Regional Center).4
Minor began participating in Foster Family Agency Stabilization

Treatment (FFAST),5 working primarily on safety and behavioral issues,
including self-regulation. The FFAST therapist looked forward to Minor
starting ABA services so they could focus during therapy on past trauma and
posttraumatic stress disorder. The caregiver reported that Minor’s
behavioral issues improved with therapy. Unfortunately, Minor’s caregiver
was unable to transport Minor to, or participate in, an ABA assessment.
At a combined six- and 12-month review hearing in April 2021, the
juvenile court determined there was a substantial risk of detriment to Minor

4 The Regional Center is a nonprofit agency, funded and regulated by the
state, which helps persons diagnosed with developmental disabilities. (See
People v. Cuevas (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 94, 104, fn. 9.) Both Mother and
Minor were clients of the Regional Center, based on Mother’s mild
developmental disability and Minor’s autism.
5 FFAST is a group of programs provided by the San Diego Center for
Children. FFAST “is the sole provider contracted with the County of San
Diego Behavioral Health Services to provide therapy and other supportive
services to youth, ages 0 to 21, who live in Foster Family Agency (FFA)
homes in San Diego County.” (<http://www.centerforchildren.org/our-
services/foster-youth/ffast/> [as of Nov. 27, 2024], archived at
<https://perma.cc/6DJW-6NGU>.)

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if she returned to Mother’s care. The trial court also found the reunification
services provided by the Agency were reasonable.
Mother and Minor again appealed. They contended the court erred in
determining the Agency provided reasonable services because the ABA
services were unreasonably delayed. (In re I.S. (Nov. 3, 2021, D078887
[nonpub. opn.].) In our prior opinion we described the obstacles that
prevented implementation of ABA assistance. The Agency located an ABA
provider near Mother’s home within one to two months after the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing, but Minor was placed on a waitlist due to staffing
shortages. Minor began an assessment with an ABA service provider in
January 2021. We concluded, “the delay in securing services [was] at best
unfortunate and . . . even troubling.” But we affirmed the order based on the
deferential standard of review because the juvenile court was in the best
position to understand the practical realities in the case and to determine
whether the Agency made reasonable efforts to overcome the difficulties in
providing services. (Ibid.)
C. The 18-Month Review Period and Adoption of Permanent Plan
Following its previous order, the trial court set an 18-month review
period that actually extended over the next two years. Minor continued to
have tantrums both in and out of school, and Minor often became aggressive
when upset. Her behavioral issues increased after she witnessed domestic
violence between Mother and Mother’s boyfriend.
Staffing and funding issues continued to complicate the Agency’s efforts
to secure ABA services for Minor. An ABA assessment was completed in
February 2021. However, the Agency encountered funding issues when the
provider would not accept Minor’s insurance. Minor was moved to another
foster home in March 2021.

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In June 2021, the FFAST therapist was still working with Minor on
behavioral issues. As of July 2021, Minor was on the waitlist for additional
therapy through a second ABA provider.
The second ABA provider began the intake process in September 2021
and insurance approved the services in January 2022. However, it became
impossible to schedule the ABA sessions. The ABA provider needed to start
Minor’s services prior to 4:00 p.m. each day. But, if Minor left school as
normally scheduled (3:45 p.m.), she would not even reach her caregiver until
4:00 p.m. Initially, the school said it would allow Minor to leave at 3:00 p.m.
on ABA session days. The school then determined that would violate Minor’s
individual education plan requirements, so the school decided not to allow
Minor to leave school early. Additionally, the caregiver was unable to
participate in the services due to work, and to responsibilities for children in
the home. Either alone, or taken together, these developments thwarted
Minor from receiving ABA services.
Minor’s placement changed again in April 2022, and ABA services were
paused while Minor was placed in a new home. The Agency renewed efforts
to identify yet another ABA service provider for Minor and Mother.
In June 2022, a Regional Center coordinator identified a third ABA
service provider willing to provide services, but insurance approval for ABA
services was still pending in August 2022. Meanwhile, Minor received
individual therapy focused on attachment.
In August 2022, Minor told her new caregiver she wanted both to be a
girl and to change her name. She asked Mother for a dress and a wig so she
could have long hair. Mother told Minor that dresses were for girls. Mother
said in various African cultures it’s a custom that sometimes men wear
dresses. Mother hoped it was a phase and expressed frustration that the

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social worker was making a big deal about Minor’s request. The social
worker told Mother the Agency wanted to ensure that she and Minor were
supported. The social worker discussed referring Minor, Mother, and the
caregiver to TransFamily Support Services and another gender affirming
program.
Minor returned to PCC in September 2022 due to maladaptive
behaviors and aggression she displayed at her foster home. Minor was
referred to TransFamily Support Services while she was at PCC, but they
were unable to begin services until Minor was placed in a foster home.
A fourth ABA service provider assessed Minor in October 2022. The
assessment noted Minor received intensive mental health and behavioral
support at school. The school reported low levels of maladaptive behavior,
but they gave Minor a specific and clear behavior plan that Minor knew and
followed well.
Minor was placed with another caregiver in November 2022. The new
ABA service provider received authorization to begin services in
December 2022, and that provider arranged transportation from the
caregiver’s home four days a week.
FFAST therapy ended in January 2023 because the caregiver was not
approved as a foster family agency home or a county foster home. The
Agency attempted to enroll Minor with a primary therapist. Minor was on a
waitlist for assessment with TransFamily Support Services. The Agency also
submitted a referral for another gender affirming provider.
Minor’s caregiver gave notice in January 2023, saying she could no
longer continue to care for Minor due to increased aggressive behaviors,
tantrums, and disruptions to the house. Minor returned to PCC in February
2023.

8
After some delay in obtaining clearance to provide service at PCC, the
ABA provider sent staff to PCC for Minor’s individual sessions. PCC
transported Minor for a social skills group at the provider’s clinic.
Minor also received individual therapy at PCC. Minor’s special
education services at school also included therapy and behavior intervention.
Minor’s behavioral issues worsened when there was a change of placement,
particularly her resistance to getting on the bus to return to PCC after school.
In July 2023, based on an agreement with Mother, the Agency
recommended long-term foster care as Minor’s permanent plan. Since Minor
was not appropriate for adoption and no one was willing to accept legal
guardianship, it was not in Minor’s best interest to terminate Mother’s
rights. Mother agreed to terminate reunification services and to forego
further challenges regarding provision of reasonable services.
The ABA provider paused Minor’s services around this same time due
to a severe staffing shortage. The court commented that ABA service had
been an issue for a long time and asked the Agency to work to restart the
services.
The court adopted the stipulated recommendation and terminated
court-mandated reunification services. The court ordered a permanent plan
of foster care for Minor, subject to periodic review by the court under
section 366.3.
D. Postpermanency Review Period
Minor’s placement at PCC continued. The PCC therapist continued
working with Minor on coping skills, grounding techniques, and managing
triggers for behavioral outbursts related to her posttraumatic stress disorder.

9
In August 2023, Minor was cleared to attend a monthly Rainbow Play
Group at TransFamily Support Services and to access other transgender
services if the Agency could facilitate transportation.
The Agency focused its efforts on finding a new placement for Minor.
Indeed, in mid-September 2023, the Agency placed Minor in a foster home.
But Minor was only there for about a week. Her tantrums escalated, she was
physically aggressive with staff members, and she damaged property. At one
point, she left the home and ran toward traffic. Due to concerns of
self-harming behavior, Minor was hospitalized. The foster home did not feel
they could keep Minor safe; Minor was returned to PCC. The ABA service
previously paused for staffing problems was now stopped while Minor
remained placed at PCC.
In October 2023, a PCC staff member shared concerns with Minor’s
court appointed special advocate (CASA) that Minor was being “bullied” at
PCC due to her gender identity and that staff did not consistently intervene.
PCC staff also reportedly withheld a wig to use as an incentive for good
behavior. And, Minor apparently threw out her dresses when another child
told Minor to stop acting like a girl. When asked if anyone tried to stop the
bullying behavior aimed at Minor, a PCC staff member said it was not really
“bullying” because “someone was bound to say it.” The Agency discussed the
concerns with PCC staff and other providers.
Because the Agency was unable to locate a living situation in the
county that could handle Minor’s needs, the Agency undertook an extensive
process to locate and apply for a short-term residential therapeutic program
(STRTP) for Minor. They hoped placement at an STRTP would stabilize and
control Minor’s behaviors, after which the Agency could safely place Minor in
a home with a lower level of care. The Agency’s request for STRTP

10
placement was approved in November 2023, but the programs willing to
accept Minor were outside the county.
The Agency eventually located a specialized foster placement with staff
members who could provide services and ensure Minor’s safety. Among other
services, the home employed a behavioral consultant who could work with
Minor to minimize concerning behaviors and to help Minor regulate her
emotions. Before placement, staff members from the potential home visited
Minor at PCC. Agency staff also took Minor to visit the placement twice in
December 2023, and Minor was able to choose her room. The Agency stated
that Minor would get TransFamily Support Services for help and family
engagement when she was in a new placement. In January 2024, the Agency
placed Minor in the new home.
At the first scheduled six-month postpermanency review hearing on
January 9, 2024, Minor’s counsel raised concerns about the status of ABA
services, trauma therapy, and the Agency’s efforts to provide gender
affirming services, including new clothing. Counsel also requested gender
sensitivity training for staff at Minor’s new placement and that TransFamily
Support Services also get provided. County counsel responded that the
Agency only recently placed Minor in a living arrangement outside PCC.
However, while at PCC licensing procedures for outside personnel affected
the ability of non-PCC professionals to provide services to children at PCC.
The court ordered the Agency to provide Minor with clothing
conforming to her gender identity, to enroll her in the Rainbow Play Group,
and to make a referral for TransFamily Support Services. Noting that
obtaining ABA services was an ongoing issue for years, the court again asked
the Agency to prioritize getting ABA assistance for Minor and requested a
thorough report regarding those efforts.

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In a February 2024 addendum report, the Agency stated that one
potential trauma therapy provider denied service. It said that it could not
safely and meaningfully provide therapy in a private practice setting due to
Minor’s behavioral issues. An Agency psychologist agreed and recommended
that Minor receive ABA services before beginning outpatient therapy.
The addendum further documented the Agency’s efforts to secure ABA
help since October 2023. Despite the Agency’s efforts, there continued to be
“struggles in obtaining ABA [services] due to scheduling conflicts and medical
insurance issues.” When there were difficulties arranging services because of
Minor’s school schedule, they explored scheduling sessions on weekends or on
days when Minor only had a half day of school. The former ABA provider
could not accommodate Minor, but it prepared a list of other potential options
which Agency staff contacted.
At the pretrial hearing on February 14, 2024, Minor’s counsel
requested a trial on the issue of whether the Agency provided reasonable
services. Although paperwork was in process for enrollment with
TransFamily Support Services for Minor to attend the Rainbow Play Group,
counsel expressed concern that Minor had not yet gone to Rainbow Play
Group, that obtaining ABA services continued to be an issue, and that
individual therapy referrals were rejected. Counsel asked the Agency to
coordinate training for the staff at Minor’s care home about gender identity
and caring for transgender youth, including the use of pronouns.
The court reiterated its prior orders for Minor to participate in Rainbow
Play Group, to be referred to TransFamily Support Services, and to be
provided with gender affirming clothing expeditiously. The court maintained
its therapy services order.

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E. Contested Postpermanency Hearing Leading to Current Appeal
The contested postpermanency hearing occurred over three days during
a six week period: February 21, 2024, March 11, 2024, and March 29, 2024.
The court admitted various reports and heard testimony.
The assigned social worker testified about the extensive efforts to locate
a safe and appropriate placement for Minor after the court terminated
Mother’s reunification services.
The social worker explained Minor received both individual therapy
and therapeutic behavioral services at PCC. The Agency also provided
additional support to Minor with a social work intern who contacted Minor
once a week. Both the social worker and the intern tried—and continued to
try—to identify an ABA agency for Minor.
Towards the end of February, and prior to the second hearing session,
Minor began ABA services. Further, the new care home received funds for a
clothing allowance and took Minor shopping. Because Minor had not
attended the Rainbow Therapy Group, the social worker asked TransFamily
Support Services for an update. The social worker contacted several
potential individual therapy providers.
The hearing resumed March 11, 2024. A social worker supervisor
testified about efforts she and others made to help Minor with hygiene and
haircare needs. The supervisor recommended braids because they were more
age appropriate and easier to care for than a wig.
The Agency asked the court to consider the totality of the services and
find reasonable services were provided even if they were not perfect services.
County counsel suggested the court set a special hearing for updated
information if the court had specific concerns.

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Minor’s counsel asked the court to find the Agency failed to arrange
reasonable services for Minor. Counsel said there is “essentially no remedy
for a no reasonable services finding at this stage in the case” but asked the
court for “a nominal remedy” of saying the Agency did not meet its burden for
proving it provided reasonable services. Counsel argued the Agency
unreasonably delayed in arranging to start ABA services even after Minor
was placed. Counsel expressed concern that Minor should be receiving
individual therapy, apart from ABA services. Counsel was also concerned
that Minor was not yet participating in the Rainbow Play Group. Minor’s
counsel also asked the court to set a special hearing for updates on ABA
services, therapy, and TransFamily Support Services, including the Rainbow
Play Group, as well as training for staff at the placement home.
The court agreed with the Agency that the court could not look at
specific services in a vacuum and needed to look at the totality of assistance
provided by the Agency during the relevant period. Although the court stated
the help provided to Minor were “in no way the best services in the [c]ourt’s
view” and certainly were “not perfect,” the court found the Agency was
providing “adequate and reasonable services.”
The court, however, noted that both ABA and individual therapy were
required by Minor’s case plan. The court ordered a special hearing within 30
days to receive updates regarding ABA services, trauma therapy, the
Rainbow Play Group, and participation in TransFamily Support Services.
The court also ordered a child and family team meeting be held before the
next court date “where all of Minor’s providers” were to be present, “including
the ABA service provider, former therapists, the Regional Center case
manager, and any other parties responsible for the minor’s mental health and
developmental needs.” The court wanted the team “to ensure that all of the

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items on the minor’s case plan are in place, and if they are not, that efforts
are being taken to ensure that they are all effectuated.”
Minor appealed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Justiciability
The Agency contends the case is not justiciable because Minor lacks
standing as an aggrieved person and the appeal is moot based on postappeal
events. We disagree with both contentions.
1. Standing
Any party aggrieved by a decision may appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 902.)
“An aggrieved person, for this purpose, is one whose rights or interests are
injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and
not as a nominal or remote consequence of the decision.” (In re K.C. (2011)
52 Cal.4th 231, 236.) We are required to liberally construe standing and
resolve all doubts in favor of the right to appeal. (Ibid.; In re L.Y.L. (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 942, 948.)
A child generally has standing to appeal a dependency order if she
demonstrates the alleged error affects her interests. (In re Crystal J. (2001)
92 Cal.App.4th 186, 189 (Crystal J.).) Among the rights afforded by statute to
a child in foster care is the right to “access and receive medical, dental, vision,
mental health, and substance use disorder services, and reproductive and
sexual health care, with reasonable promptness that meets the needs of the
child.” (§ 16001.9, subd. (a)(22)(A).)
Although there is no statutory penalty for failing to afford a foster child
the rights enumerated in section 16001.9, the parties and the court should
ensure children in foster care receive those rights to safeguard the safety,
protection, and physical and emotional well-being of such children. (1 Seiser

15
& Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2024) § 2.62.)
Accordingly, the juvenile court has discretion to fashion an appropriate order
to ensure adequate services are provided.
Crystal J., supra, is inapposite. There the child did not have standing
to challenge an order denying de facto parent status to potential caregivers
because her own rights as a party to the dependency proceeding were not
impinged by the order. In Crystal J., an order denying de facto parent status
only affected the rights of the individuals requesting de facto parent status.
That status permitted the potential de facto parents to be present, to be
represented, and to present evidence in a dependency proceeding. The child,
who was already a party to the action, had those rights regardless of whether
the trial court granted the adults de facto parent status. (Crystal J., supra,
92 Cal.App.4th at p. 191.)
In contrast, if the court errs in finding adequate services in the
postpermanency period or does not make an appropriate order to ensure the
provision of adequate services to meet the child’s needs, the child’s interests
are directly impinged. In the instant matter Minor contends the Agency’s
failure to timely provide ABA services, trauma therapy, and gender affirming
services caused her emotional and psychological harm. Minor contends the
juvenile court’s findings regarding adequacy of services may injuriously affect
her rights to timely and adequate services going forward. Although Minor
does not clearly identify the injurious affect of the court’s ruling, we will
liberally construe the question about standing in favor of Minor’s right to
appeal the juvenile court’s postpermanency finding regarding adequacy of
services, as well as the related discretionary order.

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2. Mootness
The Agency next contends the issues on appeal have become moot after
this appeal was filed and we cannot grant effective relief because Minor is
now receiving the services. We granted a request for judicial notice and two
motions to augment the record on appeal to add minute orders arising from
hearings conducted from April 2024 through July 2024. Consequently, we
are aware that during the pendency of this appeal, the juvenile court has
continued to monitor the status of Minor’s services. However, we decline to
consider postappeal developments to determine whether the issues on appeal
are now moot.
We ordinarily must review a trial court’s judgment based on the record
“as it existed when the trial court ruled.” (In re Kenneth D. (2024) 16 Cal.5th
1087, 1102.) The Agency’s argument that postappeal events render the
appellate issues moot, “ ‘necessarily requires that we treat the factual
assertions [in the postappeal reports and orders] as undisputed, which we
cannot do.’ ” “[A]bsent exceptional circumstances, ‘[t]his type of factfinding is
precisely what must occur in the juvenile court in the first instance [citation],
where additional and possibly competing evidence may be offered; and the
court, on a more fully developed record, will assess weight and credibility as
appropriate, and make its factual findings.’ ” (Ibid.)
We are encouraged to see the juvenile court continues to monitor
Minor’s services and that Minor appears to be making progress. But it is the
juvenile court, not this court, that will initially make a factual determination
about whether the Agency provided adequate services in the period after
Minor initiated the current appeal.

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B. Adequacy of Service in Relevant Postpermanency Period
We turn our focus, then, to Minor’s primary contention: that the trial
court lacked substantial evidence to find the Agency provided to Minor
adequate services between July 2023 and January 2024.
1. Legal Principles
When a child is removed from the custody of a parent, the juvenile
court must order the agency to provide child welfare services to the minor
and the minor’s parent(s) or guardian(s) to facilitate family reunification.
(§ 361.5, subd. (a).) Reasonable services during the reunification period are a
statutorily required benefit, but there is “no constitutional ‘entitlement’ to
these services.” (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 475.)
Although services are offered throughout juvenile dependency
proceedings, “these services are treated differently by statute at different
stages. If the juvenile court finds that reasonable services have not been
provided during the earliest stage, the first 12 months of the reunification
period, the court is prohibited from terminating services and must order that
additional services be provided.” (In re Christian K. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th
620, 627 (Christian K.).) The court may exercise its discretion to extend
reunification services up to 24 months, under certain conditions. (Ibid.)
After the court terminates reunification services for a parent, the focus
shifts away from reunification to providing permanency and stability for the
child. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If a child cannot be
returned to the home or placed for adoption, “services are intended to provide
an alternate permanent family structure.” (In re Samuel G. (2009)
174 Cal.App.4th 502, 511; § 16501, subd. (i)(1).)
When the permanent plan selected for a child is long-term foster care
and parental rights are not terminated, either the local agency or the juvenile

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court must review the status of the child and the case plan every six months.
At a minimum, the juvenile court itself must review the child’s status every
12 months. (§ 366.3, subd. (d)(1)(D); Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.740(b).)
At the review hearing, section 366.3 requires the court or the agency to
“inquire about” the progress made to provide a permanent home for the child,
the safety of the child, and to make certain findings. (§ 366.3, subd. (e).)
These determinations include the “continuing necessity for, and
appropriateness of, the placement” (id., subd. (e)(1)), the “continuing
appropriateness and extent of compliance with the permanent plan for the
child” (id., subd. (e)(3)), the “extent of the agency’s compliance with the child
welfare services case plan . . . to complete whatever steps are necessary to
finalize the permanent placement of the child” (id., subd. (e)(4)), and the
“adequacy of services provided to the child” (id., subd. (e)(6)).
Section 366.3 “does not mandate a particular consequence if adequate
services are not provided” in the postpermanency phase. (Christian K.,
supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 627.) Instead, the court retains discretion to
fashion an appropriate order to protect a child’s stability and to expedite a
permanent placement, “which may or may not include further services—
regardless of whether services are found to have been wanting.” (Ibid.) Such
authority is consistent with the overarching goal of dependency proceedings
to “ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of
children” within the juvenile court’s jurisdiction. Protecting the physical and
emotional well-being of a child “may include provision of a full array of social
and health services to help the child.” (§ 300.2, subd. (a).) Unlike at earlier
stages of dependency where there is a remedy for inadequate past services,
the focus of statutory inquiry under section 366.3 requires the court to look at

19
the child’s current circumstances so the court and the Agency can address
any deficiencies and achieve stability for the child.
Here, we use two standards of review. First, we review for substantial
evidence a juvenile court’s factual findings regarding the adequacy of
services. But we look at any discretionary orders based on those findings for
abuse of discretion. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 640–641
[comparing substantial evidence and abuse of discretion standards of
review].)
2. Application
In this case, as required by section 366.3, the court inquired about and
considered the services provided to Minor between July 2023 and
January 2024, which the parties agree is the relevant review period.
The statutory scheme does not define “adequate services.” The
dictionary definition of the adjective “adequate” is “sufficient for a specified or
implied requirement” or “lawfully and reasonably sufficient.” (Webster 3d
New Internat. Dict. (2002) p. 25, col. 3.) The parties, including Minor’s
counsel, and the court described the applicable standard to measure services
as “reasonable.” But this may be interpreted to suggest a higher standard
than the statutory term “adequate.”
Christian K., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at page 628, is instructive here.
That court rejected the “false premise” that the juvenile court was first

required to find an agency provided adequate6 services to a minor before the
trial court could exercise its discretion to permit a child to travel out of the

6 We note the appellate court used the term “reasonable services,” but we
read that to mean “adequate services” given the context of the sentence. The
court wrote immediately prior that “[t]here is no dispute that the juvenile
court was required to consider and determine the adequacy of services . . . .”
(Christian K., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 627, italics added.)

20
country to visit potential new caregivers. The Christian K. court concluded
the juvenile court properly “considered” services currently provided to the
child, even if they “were imperfect, unreasonable, or inadequate,” before
making a discretionary order allowing travel that could lead to a new
placement that would protect the stability of the child. (Ibid.)
We need not define the contours of an “adequate services” finding
under section 366.3. Rather, our review of the record demonstrates
substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s findings that (1) the
Agency was generally providing Minor with adequate and reasonable
services, considering the totality of the evidence, but (2) progress on
providing ABA services, trauma therapy, and transgender services needed
further action and monitoring.
During the relevant postpermanency review period, the Agency
properly focused its efforts on exploring options for safe and appropriate
placement so Minor could move out of the PCC emergency shelter. As the
juvenile court noted, PCC is meant to provide temporary placement. But
significant challenges impeded placing Minor due to her special needs, even
with many Agency personnel involved in locating suitable options.
Further, the record indicates the Agency explored many options to
restart ABA therapy while Minor was at PCC in addition to efforts to provide
gender affirming support. The ability to provide services, and ABA therapy
in particular, was limited by availability of special providers, licensing issues
regarding who could provide service at PCC, and scheduling issues related to
Minor’s special education.
However, while awaiting placement, Minor received services at PCC.
This included individual therapy that worked on coping skills, grounding
techniques, and managing behavioral outbursts related to posttraumatic

21
stress triggers. Minor also received therapeutic behavioral services. The
record does not indicate whether Minor’s individual therapy at PCC included
aspects of ABA therapy, but it does reflect efforts to address her behavioral
issues within the scope of assistance provided to Minor. This was in addition
to a variety of services provided to Minor at school, which also focused on
behavioral issues.
After a failed placement attempt in September 2023, the Agency
ultimately located a specialized care home for Minor that could provide her
services including a behavioral consultant. To help Minor adjust well to the
placement, staff members from the potential home visited with Minor at
PCC, and the Agency took Minor to visit the potential home twice before
actually placing Minor there in January 2024. Given Minor’s history of
numerous unsuccessful residences, this incremental approach to ensure a
proper living situation appears reasonable.
Further, the Agency identified an ABA provider and, once Minor
settled into her new placement in January 2024, the Agency began the
involved process to get services started.
The Agency also searched for individual therapists who could safely
work with Minor in an outpatient setting. After a therapy provider rejected a
referral due to safety concerns, the social worker got an agency psychologist
to review the matter. The agency psychologist told the social worker given
Minor’s new living situation, she should start with ABA services before
restarting individual therapy. The court acknowledged that therapy and
ABA services are distinct aspects of Minor’s case plan but found the social
worker took appropriate steps when receiving the therapist’s denial.
The court also considered whether the Agency provided appropriate
services for Minor’s gender identity. The court emphasized that children

22
have the right to a placement that is respectful of their gender identity and
expression. The court said it requested, but did not receive, evidence about
whether Minor’s new placement lacked training about gender sensitivity.
The court considered the entirety of services provided to Minor and

determined the Agency was providing reasonable services7 under the
circumstances, even though they were “in no way the best services” and
certainly were “not perfect.” The record supports this finding.
We do not read the statutory requirement for the court to consider the
“adequacy of services provided to the child” to mean the child must receive
perfect services. (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(6).) Even during the reunification stage,
“services need not be perfect but only reasonable under the circumstances.”
(Christian K., supra, 21 Cal.App.5th at p. 628, fn. 5.)
But the court’s finding does not mean the court was satisfied with all
aspects of Minor’s services. To the contrary, the court expressed serious
concern that ABA therapy and individual therapy were not yet implemented.
The court also heard concerns from Minor’s counsel that Minor had not yet
participated in the Rainbow Play Group although the court ordered that at a
hearing in January 2024. Consequently, as requested by both Minor’s
counsel and the Agency, the court set a special hearing within 30 days to
receive an update about ABA services, trauma therapy, Minor’s participation
in the Rainbow Play Group, and TransFamily Support Services. The court
also directed the Agency to hold a child and family team meeting before that
hearing with all providers and stakeholders to ensure each of the items on
Minor’s case plan were in place.

7 In the context of this record, we read the court’s finding to mean “[t]he
adequacy of services provided to the child.” (See § 366.3, subd. (e)(6).)

23
The record shows the court considered and decided the adequacy of
Minor’s services as required by section 366.3. (Christian K., supra,
21 Cal.App.5th at p. 628.) Substantial evidence supported the court’s
findings. The court then properly exercised its discretion to fashion an order
to protect Minor by ensuring the Agency expeditiously addresses any
deficiencies in service and implements Minor’s case plan.
C. Equal Protection
Minor contends section 366.3, subdivision (e) violates her “right to
equal protection” because the statute only requires the court to “review the
adequacy of the services provided to the child” and “the need for and progress
in providing the assistance and services described” but “[t]ransgender youth
are disproportionately going to be unable to obtain services ordered,
specifically gender-affirming services, as evident in this case.” We disagree.
A party asserting an equal protection challenge must first establish
that “the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly
situated groups in an unequal manner.” (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal. 3d 522,
530, italics omitted.) If such a classification exists, the next inquiry is to
determine whether to apply a strict scrutiny or rational basis standard.
(Warden v. State Bar (1999) 21 Cal.4th 628, 644, 652; see also In re H.K.
(2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433.) We independently review questions of
constitutionality and statutory interpretation. (Yohner v. California Dept. of
Justice (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1, 12.)
To assess the constitutionality of section 366.3, subdivision (e), “we
consider its purpose and how it operates within the context of the statutory
scheme.” (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 473.)
Facially, section 366.3, subdivision (e) does not adopt a classification
that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.

24
Instead, it describes the areas the juvenile court or the reviewing agency
must consider on a regular basis to ensure the appropriateness and extent of
compliance with any foster child’s permanent plan, the case plan, and the
adequacy of services provided to the child. The juvenile court must review
the status of services in the context of the entire applicable statutory scheme.
Children in foster care have an array of rights outlined in
section 16001.9 to ensure their health and well-being. In enacting and
amending section 16001.9, the Legislature expressly declared its intent is “to
ensure the health and well-being of all foster children . . . , including those
who are transgender or gender nonconforming.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 385, § 1,
subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2019, ch. 497, § 327, italics added.)
Several provisions of section 16001.9 specifically support and affirm
gender identity and expression. For example, foster children have a right to
placement according to their gender identity and to be referred to by their
preferred name and gender pronouns. (§ 16001.9, subd. (a)(19)). They have a
right to fair and equal access to all available services and not to be subjected
to discrimination or harassment based on gender identity or expression. (Id.,
subd. (a)(17).) They have rights to receive adequate clothing, grooming, and
hygiene products that respect their gender identity and expression (id.,
subd. (a)(3)); to access gender affirming health care and mental health care
(id., subd. (a)(22)(A)); to have caregivers and child welfare personnel who
have received instruction regarding sensitivity related to gender identity and
expression (id., subd. (a)(18)); and to participate in extracurricular and social
activities consistent with their gender identity and expression (id.,
subd. (a)(16).)
Minor contends her difficulty in accessing services in this case shows
transgender youth are treated differently from cisgender youth, making

25
transgender children “incapable of receiving adequate gender affirming
services.” We are not persuaded.
In conducting its section 366.3, subdivision (e) review, the juvenile
court was mindful of section 16001.9. It acknowledged that “minors have a
right to be in a placement, whether it be in foster care or otherwise, which is
respectful of their gender identity and expression.”
Unlike Norswoorthy v. Beard (2015) 87 F.Supp.3d 1104, 1120, relied on
by Minor, no evidence in this case supports that the Agency or aid
providersdenied services to Minor based on her status as a transgender
youth.
The record shows the Agency worked to arrange for gender affirming
services while Minor was at PCC. Beyond making a referral to TransFamily
Support Services, the Agency also made efforts to help Minor with gender
affirming hygiene and hair care. The social worker supervisor, who testified
that she identifies as a Black woman with natural hair that is the same
grade and texture as Minor, considered Minor’s behavioral issues around
bath time and wondered if Minor had a concern about her hair. The social
worker supervisor and the assigned intern worked with PCC to allow Minor
to take baths instead of a shower. They also put together a package of bubble
bath items and a bonnet for Minor’s hair to use while she slept. They
investigated funding to provide Minor with wigs or braids. They provided
braids on one occasion, which Minor declined to repeat.
The Agency obtained a clothing allowance and provided dresses for
Minor in October 2023 while she was at PCC. Unfortunately, Minor threw
the dresses away after another child at PCC made an insensitive comment
about wearing dresses.

26
When a concern was raised about how PCC staff handled the
insensitive comment and used a wig provided by Minor’s CASA as a
behavioral incentive, the Agency discussed the issue with PCC staff. The
Agency also provided Minor with emotional support and strategies for
resilience when faced with negative comments.
The Agency resubmitted the request for a clothing allowance, which
was declined as repetitive. The Agency elevated the request but regrettably
still encountered delays with it. The request was eventually approved, and in
February 2024 staff received a check so the new placement providers could
take Minor shopping.
Minor’s counsel complains that certain reports did not refer to Minor by
her preferred pronouns. However, between August 2022 until June 2023,
Minor asked to be referred to by different names and pronouns depending on
the person to whom she spoke. In June 2023, Minor asked to be referred to
by her given name with the pronouns she/her/hers. The Agency respected
Minor’s request to be referred to by female pronouns in subsequent reports.
Counsel faults a PCC therapist for discussing gender expression with
Minor when she first asked the therapist to use she/her/hers pronouns in late
May 2023. The record reflects otherwise. The therapist tried to understand
Minor’s wishes since Minor had made different requests to different
individuals about her preference for names and pronouns. The therapist
considered whether Minor gravitated toward female pronouns so she can
safely wear dresses because Minor said she thought boys who wore dresses
were “gay,” which Minor interpreted to mean “ugly.” The therapist told
Minor the term gay does not mean ugly. She did not challenge Minor’s
gender expression but challenged the belief that boys who wear dresses are
ugly. The therapist explained that both boys and girls can enjoy wearing

27
dresses if it feels right and it is not ugly to do so. The therapist praised
Minor for being herself. The therapist noted the discussion was an
interesting insight into Minor’s current thought process related to gender and
was worth noting for future clinicians.
Minor completed an intake form for TransFamily Support Services in
June 2023. It is unfortunate there were delays in connecting Minor with the
Rainbow Play Group and TransFamily Support Services. However, as
already described, the record before us shows these issues were primarily
related to Minor’s temporary placement at PCC, not related to discrimination
against Minor based on her gender identity or expression.
The juvenile court was aware of the responsibility to provide Minor
with gender affirming services and ordered the Agency to provide them.
When the services were not in place at the contested postpermanency review
hearing, the court ordered the Agency to include an update about them in a
report for a special hearing. The court also requested information about the
Agency’s progress in providing gender identity training for staff members at
Minor’s placement. This was an appropriate exercise of the court’s discretion.
As with other services discussed, the Agency’s efforts to provide Minor
with timely gender affirming care and support were not perfect. But Minor
fails to establish that the state adopted a classification that affected Minor’s
access to services as a transgender youth in an unequal manner or denied her
the same legal protections enjoyed by other foster children in similar
circumstances.

28
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.

RUBIN, J.

I CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

29
BUCHANAN, J., Dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that I.S. (Minor) has standing
to appeal the juvenile court’s finding that she received adequate services for
the six-month period ending in January 2024. In my view, Minor was not
aggrieved by this finding because it has no consequences; the juvenile court
in the same order took measures to ensure she received all the relevant
services in the future; and Minor does not contend that these measures were
insufficient. I would therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of standing. I also
write separately, however, to explain my view that the record does not in fact
support the juvenile court’s finding that Minor received adequate services for
the six-month period ending in January 2024. Specifically, Minor did not
receive any of the applied behavioral analysis (ABA) services that were part
of her case plan all along and that the juvenile court itself acknowledged
were necessary to address her extreme behavioral issues related to autism.
I
“Not every party has standing to appeal every appealable order.
Although standing to appeal is construed liberally, and doubts are resolved in
its favor, only a person aggrieved by a decision may appeal.” (In re K.C.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236; see Code Civ. Proc., § 902 [“Any party aggrieved
may appeal . . . .”].) For standing purposes, an aggrieved party “is one whose
rights or interests are injuriously affected by the decision in an immediate
and substantial way, and not as a nominal or remote consequence of the
decision.” (In re K.C., at p. 236.)
Minor here only challenges the portion of the juvenile court’s order
finding that she received adequate services during the six-month period from
July 2023 through January 2024. Minor was not aggrieved by this finding
because it carried no legal consequences and did not injuriously affect her

1
rights or interests in any immediate and substantial way. As the majority
notes, the statute requires the juvenile court to make a finding as to “the
adequacy of the services provided to the child” (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(6)), but it
“does not mandate a particular consequence if adequate services are not
provided.” (In re Christian K. (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th 620, 627.) “Because no
consequence is mandated for the failure to provide reasonable services, the
statute confers discretion upon the court to issue any appropriate order to
protect a child’s stability and to expedite the child’s permanent placement—
which may or may not include further services—regardless of whether
services are found to have been wanting.” (Ibid., italics added.)
Although a finding of inadequate services carries no mandatory
consequences, I would agree that Minor was aggrieved by the juvenile court’s
finding of adequate services if it were based on a determination that she was
not entitled to the services requested and therefore would not receive them in
the future. Then I could see how Minor’s interests were injuriously affected.
But the juvenile court here agreed that Minor was entitled to all the services
she was requesting. ABA services, individual therapy, and Trans Family
Support services were all part of Minor’s case plan at the time of the juvenile
court’s order. And the juvenile court did exactly what Minor’s counsel asked
it to do to ensure she would receive these services in the future by scheduling
a special hearing for 30 days later to receive updates on the provision of ABA
services, trauma therapy, and Trans Family Support services (including the
Rainbow Play Group). Moreover, the court ordered a child and family team
meeting to be held before the next court date with all of Minor’s providers
present and stated: “The purpose of the meeting is to ensure that all of the
items [in Minor’s] case plan are in place, and if they are not, that efforts are
being taken to ensure that they are all effectuated.” (Italics added.) The

2
court also made clear that Minor had a right to have her gender identity
respected and demanded confirmation that the staff at her current placement

had received appropriate gender identity training.1
In these circumstances, I do not see how Minor was aggrieved by the
juvenile court’s finding as to past services. As I explain below, I agree that
she was aggrieved by the Agency’s failure to provide adequate services for the
six months ending in January 2024, and I do not doubt that this caused her
emotional and psychological harm, but that is not the relevant question for
standing purposes. To have standing to appeal, a party’s rights or interests
must be “injuriously affected by the judgment.” (County of Alameda v.
Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737, italics added; see also Serrano v. Stefan
Merli Plastering Co., Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1026 [aggrieved party
must be “adversely affected by the judgment or order” on appeal].) Here,
Minor was not injuriously affected by the finding she is appealing. Her
conjecture that this finding might hypothetically affect her rights to services
going forward is not sufficient to confer standing to appeal. (See, e.g., In re
Cody R. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 381, 390 [“Speculation about a hypothetical
situation is not sufficient to support standing.”].) This is not an “immediate
and substantial” injury; it is merely a “remote” possibility. (In re K.C., supra,
52 Cal.4th at p. 236.)
To illustrate the point, even if we were to conclude that Minor did not
receive adequate services from July 2023 through January 2024, we could do
nothing more than order provision of the services Minor argues she should
have received, which the juvenile court has already directed as part of the
very order Minor is appealing. In other words, a reversal of this finding

1 Minor’s counsel acknowledged at the hearing that Minor “finally has
the dresses that she needs, clothes that affirm her gender identity . . . .”

3
would make no actual difference to Minor’s current situation. I would
therefore dismiss the appeal for lack of standing.
II
Although I do not believe we should reach the merits, I disagree with
the majority on that issue as well. For years, everyone involved in this case
has understood that ABA services are critical to assist Minor in addressing
her extreme behavioral issues related to autism. Already in our prior opinion
three years ago, we expressed concerns about the “unfortunate and perhaps
even troubling” delays in providing these ABA services to Minor. (In re I.S.
(Nov. 3, 2021, D078887) [nonpub. opn.].) Yet even more delays followed.
Except intermittently for a few months before July 2023, Minor received no
ABA services after our prior opinion of November 2021 and before the
juvenile court’s March 2024 order at issue in this appeal. More to the point,
ABA services were still part of Minor’s case plan throughout the six-month
period from July 2023 to January 2024, but none were provided to her in this
time frame. For this reason alone, I believe the record does not support the
juvenile court’s finding that adequate services were provided to Minor for
that six-month period.
“Applied behavioral analysis (ABA) is an intensive form of therapy
which has had documented success in treating the symptoms of autism in
young children.” (Consumer Watchdog v. Department of Managed Health
Care (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 862, 867.) ABA “develops or restores, to the
maximum extent practicable, the functioning of an individual with autism.
[Citation.] Numerous studies indicate that ABA is the most effective
treatment known for autistic children. Studies also demonstrate that ABA
has lasting results. . . . ABA therapy can create new brain connections in a
child with autism; these new connections are to be contrasted with the

4
abnormal connections caused by autism.” (Id. at p. 868.) ABA providers
work intensely with autistic children to alleviate behavioral issues. The
Agency itself acknowledges that this type of therapy “can improve social,
communication, and learning skills through reinforcement strategies.”
As we noted in our prior opinion, “ABA services were a central
component of the case plan” for Minor. (In re I.S., supra, D078887.) Minor
was diagnosed with autism at a young age and had extreme behavioral
issues. As early as 2020, when Minor was only six years old, the Agency
identified the need for ABA services. These services were deemed necessary
to address Minor’s behavioral issues. As of March 2021, Minor’s psychiatrist,
her therapist, a behavioral specialist, and a clinician who provided
therapeutic supervision for visits with her mother all agreed Minor “should
be receiving ABA services for behavioral issues related to Autism, but [s]he is
not.”
In August 2021, the juvenile court noted that ABA services “had been
requested and pending for, I think, more than a year.” In October 2021, the
juvenile court acknowledged that “ABA is the standard of care for children
with [Minor]’s issues, and there have been a lot of obstacles to getting [her]
into that service . . . .” In March 2022, four months after our prior opinion
expressing concern about the delays in providing ABA services, the juvenile
court granted the agency’s request for still more time to do so. At the time of
subsequent hearings held in September and November 2022, ABA services
were still not being provided. In December 2022, Minor finally started
receiving ABA services, but they stopped after a couple of months before
being resumed in June 2023 and halted again by the first week of July 2023.
In the entire three years before July 2023, she received only three months of
ABA services. In early July 2023, the juvenile court again asked the Agency

5
to “continue to look into ABA services” and noted “that’s been a problem for a
long time now with services starting or not starting and then being put on
pause.”
Thereafter, ABA services continued to be part of Minor’s case plan
throughout the six-month period at issue here from July 2023 to January
2024. Nevertheless, Minor did not receive any further ABA services during
this period. The juvenile court itself recognized this was a significant
problem. At a hearing in January 2024, the court ordered that the provision
of ABA services “remain elevated” as an Agency priority and noted that this
had “been an ongoing issue for not just one year but for a number of years at
this point.” The next month, the court again inquired “whether there were
any efforts to perhaps resolve the issue of the ABA services being cognizant of
everyone having [Minor’s] best interests in mind and that these do appear to
be services that have been previously ordered and that [Minor] is in need of.”
(Italics added.)
On this record, the conclusion is inescapable that Minor did not receive
adequate services during the six-month period ending in January 2024.
Minor did not receive a critical behavioral health service that was a central
component of her case plan for years, that was necessary to address her
behavioral issues related to autism, and that everyone including the juvenile
court agreed she needed. For this reason, substantial evidence does not
support the juvenile court’s finding that adequate services were provided to
Minor for this time period.
The mere fact that the juvenile court considered the entirety of the
services provided to Minor does not alter this conclusion. None of the
services provided to Minor served the purpose or function of the ABA services
that were an essential part of her case plan. The juvenile court did not

6
identify any other service that addressed Minor’s severe behavioral health
issues related to autism. According to the Agency’s own staff psychologist,
individual therapy was not appropriate as a substitute for ABA services. A
child in foster care has a right to physical and mental health services “that
meet[] the needs of the child . . . .” (§ 16001.9, subd. (a)(22)(A).) No one
disputes that ABA services were a critical need for this child. The juvenile
court itself found ABA services were the “standard of care” for children with
her issues and she was “in need of” them to address her behavioral issues.
Yet she did not receive them during this six-month period—and she barely
received any in the three years before that. Because a vital service was not
provided, the overall services were inadequate.
Nor does it make any difference that the Agency may have made

reasonable efforts to arrange for ABA services.2 By its terms, the statute
requires the juvenile court to evaluate “[t]he adequacy of services provided to
the child” (§ 366.3, subd. (e)(6), italics added), not the adequacy of the
Agency’s efforts to provide services. The point is not to grade the Agency’s
efforts but to determine whether the child is receiving the services she needs.
Indeed, the Legislature knew how to employ a “reasonable efforts” standard
when it intended to. In contrast to the “services provided” provision (ibid.),
some of the other required findings in the same subdivision explicitly refer to
a “reasonable efforts” standard. (See, e.g., § 366.3, subd. (e)(4) [agency’s
“reasonable efforts” to return child to parent’s home or finalize permanent
placement]; id., subd. (e)(11) [“Whether or not reasonable efforts to make and
finalize a permanent placement for the child have been made.”].) When the

2 I say “may have made reasonable efforts” because the social worker
admitted she made no contacts to seek an ABA provider for Minor in the first
three months of the six-month period at issue here.

7
Legislature uses different language in one part of a statute than it does in
other sections concerning a related subject, it must be presumed the
Legislature intended a different meaning. (See Cornette v. Department of
Transportation (2001) 26 Cal.4th 63, 73 [“When one part of a statute contains
a term or provision, the omission of that term or provision from another part
of the statute indicates the Legislature intended to convey a different
meaning.”].)
Finally, the fact that the Agency was focused on finding a placement for
Minor also has no bearing on the adequacy of the services provided. As
noted, these are separate determinations the juvenile court must make under
the statute: whether the Agency has made reasonable efforts to find a
permanent placement (§ 366.3, subds. (e)(4) & (11)) and whether adequate
services have been provided to the child (id., subd. (e)(6)). Even the Agency’s
social work supervisor acknowledged that the Agency was obligated “not only
[to] find her an appropriate placement, but also services.” The Agency’s
exercise of reasonable efforts to find a placement therefore has no relevance
to the separate question of whether the child received adequate services.
On this record, no substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that adequate services were provided to Minor from July 2023 to
January 2024. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s opinion both on
standing to appeal and the merits of the adequate services issue.

BUCHANAN, J.

8

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