CourtListener 10285085•People v. Tunney CA4/1
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Tunney CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D083052
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCE416526)
ERIC J. TUNNEY,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Patricia K. Cookson, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer M. French, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A.
Sevidal and Arlyn Escalante, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
After being charged with attempted murder and other crimes for a
random and unprovoked knife attack on another trolley passenger, Eric J.
Tunney pled guilty to assault with a deadly weapon. He now appeals from
the denial of his pretrial motion for mental health diversion under Penal
Code1 section 1001.36. He contends that (1) the trial court applied an
incorrect legal standard in determining that he posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, and (2) the trial court’s finding of dangerousness is
not supported by substantial evidence.
We conclude the trial court properly exercised its discretion and
substantial evidence supports its express and implied findings that Tunney
would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety and was therefore
not suitable for mental health diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In September 2022, Tunney was living with his mother T.H. (Mother).
According to Mother, Tunney had repeatedly received emergency treatment
for extreme intoxication and his erratic behavior had been escalating. Just
before midnight on September 10, 2022, police officers responded to a 911 call
from Tunney’s aunt A.T. (Aunt). Tunney was heavily intoxicated and had
lunged at Aunt and threatened to kill Mother during an argument. The
responding officer determined Tunney was a danger to others, placed him on
a 72-hour hold under Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150, and
arrested him for making criminal threats in violation of section 422,
subdivision (a).
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
On January 24, 2023, Tunney was arrested for driving under the
influence of a drug. He exhibited signs of paranoia and agitation. Three days
later, on January 27, 2023, Tunney called police, claiming he was being
followed. He was arrested for being under the influence in public with the
inability to care for his own safety or the safety of others. (§ 647, subd. (f).)
Approximately one week later, on February 4, 2023, Tunney was again
arrested for being under the influence in a public place with the inability to
care for his own safety or the safety of others. (Ibid.)
On February 22, 2023, Mother reported Tunney was missing and had
turned off his cell phone because he believed people were following him.
According to Mother, Tunney was addicted to methamphetamine, suffering
from depression and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and “getting
worse.”
Three days later, while riding the trolley on February 25, 2023, Tunney
stood up behind a fellow passenger (P.W.), wrapped his arm around him, and
held a knife against his chest. Tunney said, “don’t move” while he held the
knife seven to eight inches from P.W.’s neck. P.W. fought back and
successfully gained control of the knife but sustained several cuts and a
severe injury to his thumb tendon during the struggle.
P.W. then yelled “get back,” and Tunney got off the trolley. P.W.
remained on the trolley past his intended stop, got off at the next stop, and
returned to the previous stop. Tunney was still there and asked P.W. to
return his knife. When P.W. refused, Tunney got back on the trolley.
Officers arrested Tunney on February 28, 2023, and he was criminally
charged on March 2, 2023.
On June 14, 2023, Tunney filed a motion for mental health diversion
under sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 based on his history of alcoholism, drug
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addiction, and various mental health issues. In support of his motion,
Tunney provided a psychological evaluation report from Todd D. Pizitz,
Ph.D., letters of support from Mother and other family and friends, and a
copy of the La Mesa Police Department’s February 28, 2023 arrest report.
In his report, Dr. Pizitz diagnosed Tunney with five mental health
disorders: (1) posttraumatic stress disorder; (2) persistent depressive
disorder, mild, with anxious distress; (3) unspecified schizophrenia spectrum
and other psychotic disorder; (4) alcohol use disorder, severe; and
(5) stimulant use disorder, amphetamine type, severe. Dr. Pizitz
recommended that Tunney abstain from alcohol and all illicit substances,
continue taking his psychiatric medications as prescribed, and consult with
jail psychiatry about additional psychiatric medications that could ameliorate
his auditory hallucinations and paranoia. He also recommended that Tunney
receive individual therapy aimed at recognizing and managing his symptoms
of depression and psychosis and specialized treatment for PTSD.
The People filed written opposition in which they argued (1) there was
insufficient evidence that Tunney’s mental health disorder was a “significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2)), (2) a
qualified mental health expert had not opined that Tunney’s “symptoms . . .
causing, contributing to, or motivating the criminal behavior would respond
to mental health treatment” (id., subd. (c)(1)), (3) Tunney would “pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if
treated in the community” (id., subd. (c)(4)), and (4) Tunney failed to provide
the court with any treatment plan that “ ‘will meet [Tunney’s] specialized
mental health treatment needs’ ” (id., subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)).
On August 21, 2023, the court concurrently held Tunney’s preliminary
hearing and motion for mental health diversion. Before the hearing, Tunney
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filed his own handwritten treatment plan listing in part “In/Out Patient
Residential Treatment . . . 30/60/90 day rehabilitation” and “Recovery/After
Care,” which included “sober living,” “AA/NA meetings,” and weekly “1-on-1
counseling sessions [and] therapy.” He also attached letters to his family,
former treatment programs and the court in which he expressed regret for his
prior failings and his commitment to his future recovery. At the hearing,
Officer Gaytan, Officer Bender, P.W., Mother, and Tunney’s younger sister
testified, and a video of the trolley incident, a photograph of the knife, and
two photographs of P.W.’s hand were admitted into evidence.
At the conclusion of evidence, the court held Tunney to answer on the
following five counts: (1) willful, deliberate and premeditated attempted
murder of P.W. (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189, 664) with personal infliction of great
bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)); (2) assault of P.W. with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)) with personal infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)); (3) carrying a concealed dirk or dagger (§ 21310); (4) criminally
threatening Mother (§ 422); and (5) assault of A.T. (§ 240).
The court then proceeded to hear counsel’s arguments on the diversion
motion. Preliminarily, the court determined Tunney was eligible for mental
health diversion and specifically found that Tunney suffers from qualifying
mental health disorders that were “a significant factor in the commission of
some, if not all, of the offenses.” The court then found Tunney was not “an
appropriate candidate” for mental health diversion after expressing concern
over the proposed treatment plan, the “disturbing” video showing “violence, a
random, unpredictable attack . . . close to [P.W.]’s chest/neck area,” and the
risk to society. The court ultimately denied Tunney’s motion without
prejudice to allow Tunney “to renew it.”
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Approximately one month later, Tunney pled guilty to count 2
(unlawfully assaulting P.W. with a deadly weapon in violation of § 245,
subd. (a)(1)) and admitted the great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7,
subd. (a)), and the court dismissed counts 1, 3, 4 and 5. On October 17, 2023,
the court imposed the parties’ stipulated sentence of six years in state prison
and denied probation.
On October 19, 2023, Tunney filed a timely notice of appeal challenging
the denial of his diversion motion, and on November 29, 2023, the trial court
granted his request for a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable law and standard of review
Pretrial mental health diversion under section 1001.36 authorizes “the
postponement of prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point
in the judicial process from the point at which the accused is charged until
adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo mental health
treatment . . . .” (Id., subd. (f)(1).) To qualify, the defendant must be both
eligible and suitable for diversion. A defendant is eligible for diversion if two
criteria are met: (1) the defendant “has been diagnosed” with a qualifying
mental disorder, and (2) the mental disorder “was a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.” (Id., subd. (b)(1), (2); Sarmiento v.
Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 891 (Sarmiento).) “If the
defendant meets the two enumerated eligibility requirements, ‘the court must
consider whether the defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion.’ (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).)” (People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 120 (Brown).)
A defendant is suitable for pretrial diversion if four criteria are met:
“(1) In the opinion of a qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s
symptoms of the mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the
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criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment; (2) The
defendant consents to diversion and waives the defendant’s right to a speedy
trial; (3) The defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion; and (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, as defined in [s]ection 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(Brown, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 120 [cleaned up]; § 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)-
(4).) In determining suitability, the trial court may consider “the defendant’s
treatment plan, the defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current
charged offense, and any other factors that the court deems appropriate.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
A defendant poses an “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ ” if
there is “an unreasonable risk” the defendant will commit a new violent
felony, known as super strikes, within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (§ 1170.18, subd. (c).) To find such an unreasonable
risk, “a trial court necessarily must find the defendant is likely to commit a
super-strike offense.” (People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 450
(Moine) [cleaned up].)2
Super strikes “ ‘include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to
commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a police officer, possession of
a weapon of mass destruction, . . . any serious or violent felony punishable by
death or life imprisonment[’] . . . [, and] . . . sexually violent offenses and
sexual offenses committed against minors under the age of 14.” (Moine,
supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 449-450.)
2 Although the statute itself does not use the word “likely,” we will
assume without deciding that Moine correctly interpreted the statutory
language “unreasonable risk that the [defendant] will commit” a super-strike
offense (§ 1170.18, subd. (c)) to mean that the defendant must be “ ‘likely to
commit a super-strike offense.’ ” (Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.)
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As we explained in Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th 882: “Assuming
the defendant is both eligible and suitable, the trial court must also be
satisfied ‘that the recommended inpatient or outpatient program of mental
health treatment will meet the specialized mental health treatment needs of
the defendant.’ (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1)(A)(i)[.)]” (Id., at p. 892.) “This is not
an additional eligibility or suitability requirement the defendant must meet.
Rather, subdivision (f)(1) of section 1001.36 read as a whole appears to
contemplate an ongoing assessment to assure that defendants will receive
appropriate treatment for their particular conditions as part of the diversion
program.” (Ibid.)
Even if a defendant makes a prima facie showing to satisfy the
eligibility and suitability requirements, the trial court may still exercise its
discretion to deny mental health diversion. (See People v. Gerson (2022)
80 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1080 [mental health diversion is ultimately
discretionary, not mandatory, even if all statutory requirements are met];
§ 1001.36, subds. (a) [“the court may, in its discretion, . . .” grant pretrial
diversion”], (b)(1) [“[a] defendant is eligible for pretrial diversion” if certain
criteria are met].)
On appeal, we review the court’s ultimate decision whether to grant or
deny a motion for mental health diversion for abuse of discretion. (Brown,
supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at p. 121.) “The trial court’s findings of fact are
reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de
novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary
and capricious.” (Haraguchi v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711-
712, fns. omitted.) A court abuses its discretion when it “appl[ies] the wrong
legal standard, or bases its decision on express or implied factual findings
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that are not supported by substantial evidence.” (Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 449 [cleaned up].)
We must view the record in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. (People v. Johnson (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 953, 960.) In the absence of
an affirmative record to the contrary, we assume the trial court followed the
law and considered all appropriate factors in reaching its conclusion. (See
People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 378; People v. Myers (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 305, 310.)
B. The trial court applied the correct legal standard.
Tunney first argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to
apply the correct legal standard in its dangerousness analysis. He asserts
the court did not expressly discuss section 667 or find that Tunney was
“ ‘ “likely to commit a super-strike offense.” ’ ” He claims the court instead
commented that it found the video of Tunney’s attack “disturbing” and “just
[did]n’t have a good feel[ing] for releasing him,” focused on the “violence, a
random, unpredictable attack . . . close to [P.W.]’s chest/neck area,” and
“appeared to conflate [Tunney’s] perceived ‘anger issues’ with his risk to
society.” We reject this argument for several reasons.
First, nothing in the statute requires the trial court to make an express
finding on any of the suitability factors, including that the defendant is likely
to commit a super-strike offense. Section 1001.36 makes no mention of
section 667, nor does it require the court to make any express findings orally
on the record or in writing. Rather, section 1001.36, subdivision (c) merely
specifies the suitability criteria “the court must consider,” including whether
“[a] defendant . . . pose[s] an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).)
Under the usual doctrine of implied findings, we must imply all findings in
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favor of the trial court’s order, including an implied finding that Tunney was
likely to commit a super-strike offense. (See Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at
p. 451 [analyzing whether record supported “the trial court’s implied finding
that Moine was likely to commit a super strike offense”].)
Second, in the absence of a contrary showing, we must also assume the
trial court knew and followed the law and considered all appropriate
statutory factors.3 (See People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361 [“In the
absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and
applies the correct statutory and case law’ ”].) Here, nothing in the record
suggests that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in determining
Tunney’s suitability for diversion. On the contrary, the record makes clear
that the trial court was aware of the suitability factors. At the outset of the
hearing, the court informed the parties that it had read their motion papers
not just once, but twice, and the People’s opposition set forth the statutory
requirements verbatim and specifically discussed their application to the
facts and circumstances of this case. The People’s opposition informed the
court that “[u]nder the statute, a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of
3 At oral argument, counsel for Tunney cited several cases for the
proposition that to deny mental health diversion, the trial court must make
an express finding that the defendant poses an unreasonable risk of
committing a new super-strike offense. But these cases merely held that the
trial court must make a finding on this suitability factor, not necessarily an
express finding. (Sarmiento, supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 892; People v.
Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, 1149; People v. Pacheco (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 207, 212-213; Moine, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at pp. 447-448.)
In Moine, the court even applied the usual rule requiring reversal when a
court “bases its decision on express or implied factual findings that are not
supported by substantial evidence” (Moine, at p. 449, italics added) and found
“the record does not support the trial court’s implied finding that Moine was
likely to commit a super-strike offense if he received mental health treatment
in the community.” (Id. at p. 451, italics added.)
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danger to public safety when the court finds him or her likely to commit a
super strike offense,” and after discussing several relevant cases concluded:
“[Tunney’s] action in this case, specifically as seen on video, shows that he is
ready to commit a super-strike offense. He threatened to kill his mother on
multiple occasions. He then did attempt to kill an unsuspecting trolley
passenger by taking a large knife to the victim’s neck. [Tunney] poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to the community, as shown by his own actions.”
Section 1001.36, subdivision (c) expressly permits the trial court to
consider “the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
mental health expert, and . . . the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (Id., subd. (c)(4).) The
court’s comment that it found the video of Tunney’s attack “disturbing” and
its focus on the “violence, a random, unpredictable attack . . . close to [P.W.]’s
chest/neck area” were appropriate considerations for determining whether
Tunney was “ ‘likely to commit a super-strike offense.’ ” (Moine, supra,
62 Cal.App.5th at p. 450.)
Similarly, the trial court properly considered Tunney’s “anger issues”
and the inadequacy of his proposed treatment plan in making this
determination. Tunney’s anger issues were at least one relevant factor in
deciding his likelihood to commit a super-strike offense. (See People v.
Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, 576 [considering defendant’s lack of
conflict resolution and anger management programming].) Moreover, section
1001.36, subdivision (c)(4) expressly permits the trial court to consider “the
defendant’s treatment plan” in making this determination. In short, we see
nothing in the record to overcome the usual presumption that the trial court
applied the correct legal standard.
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C. The trial court’s dangerousness finding is supported by substantial
evidence.
Tunney next argues the trial court’s conclusion that Tunney posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety is not supported by substantial
evidence. We disagree.
A substantial evidence inquiry examines the record in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s order. (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th
1038, 1052.) We must uphold the trial court’s order “if the record contains
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of
fact could have relied in reaching the conclusion in question. Once such
evidence is found, the substantial evidence test is satisfied.” (Ibid., original
italics.) In this case, ample evidence supports the trial court’s express and
implied findings that Tunney would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety and was therefore not suitable for mental health diversion.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Subdivision (c)(4) expressly authorized the trial court to consider the
charged offenses, which in this case included willful, deliberate and
premeditated attempted murder of P.W. (the super-strike offense), assault of
P.W. with a deadly weapon, and carrying a concealed dirk or dagger during
the unprovoked trolley attack in February 2023, in addition to criminally
threatening to kill Mother and assaulting Aunt during the incident in
September 2022. The testimony of multiple witnesses at the combined
hearing and the “chilling” video depicting the circumstances of the
unprovoked knife attack on P.W. support the trial court’s finding that he was
likely to commit a super-strike offense. (See People v. Bunas (2022)
79 Cal.App.5th 840, 862 [“[T]here is nothing in section 1001.36, with respect
to . . . suitability, that precludes a trial court from relying primarily, or even
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entirely, on the circumstances of the charged offense or offenses in denying a
motion for diversion.”].)
The specific facts of the attack on P.W. not only caused the trial court to
bind Tunney over on the attempted murder charge, but they support its
implied finding that he was likely to commit another future super-strike
offense (murder or attempted murder). Without warning or provocation,
Tunney stood up behind P.W. on the trolley, wrapped his arm around him,
and held a knife against his chest. Tunney whispered, “don’t move” while he
held the knife seven to eight inches from P.W.’s neck. P.W. fought back and
successfully gained control of the knife but sustained several cuts and a
severe injury to his thumb tendon during the struggle. Officer Gaytan, the
detective who investigated the attempted murder, also testified about
Tunney’s criminal history, and Officer Bender offered testimony concerning
Tunney’s criminal threats and assault of his family members during the
September incident. Moreover, there was other evidence that Tunney was
prone to erratic behavior, calling into question whether he could be safely
treated in the community without a more robust treatment plan. Considered
in its totality, this is substantial evidence to support the trial court’s implied
finding that Tunney “pose[d] an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c)(4).)
Based on our review of the evidence and the statutory suitability
factors, we conclude the trial court applied the correct legal standard and its
conclusion that Tunney was not a suitable candidate for mental health
diversion was supported by substantial evidence. There was no abuse of
discretion.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DATO, J.
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