People v. Martinez CA5

CourtListener 10285035Calctapp27.11.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/27/24 P. v. Martinez CA5
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F082991
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. VCF347222)
v.

YOVANI DEJESUS MARTINEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Melinda Reed,
Judge.
Randy S. Kravis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell and Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorneys General, Darren K.
Indermill, and Jeffrey D. Firestone, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
-ooOoo-

* Before Levy, Acting P. J., Franson, J. and Meehan, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2021, a jury convicted appellant Yovani DeJesus Martinez of 10 felonies
involving sex-related crimes committed with his daughter, who was eight years old when
she first reported the abuse. Appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual penetration
of a child under the age of 10 years (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b);1 counts 1 & 2); six
counts of committing a lewd act upon a child (§ 288, subd. (a); counts 3–8); one count of
possession of child pornography (§ 311.11, subd. (a); count 9); and one count of using a
minor to create pornography (§ 311.4, subd. (c); count 10). He received an aggregate
indeterminate prison term of 30 years to life, along with a consecutive determinate
sentence of 20 years.
Appellant appealed. In general, he alleged that certain evidentiary and sentencing
errors occurred, including a failure to prove factors in aggravation. He also asserted that
his counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
In 2023, we filed an unpublished opinion in which we rejected most of appellant’s
claims. We found the imposition of aggravated terms to be harmless error. However, we
agreed with the parties that the trial court had imposed an unauthorized sentence in count
10, which had to be reduced from two years to eight months. We further agreed that
certain fees and fines should be vacated. We directed the trial court to prepare an
amended determinate abstract of judgment to reflect those modifications. As modified,
we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Martinez (Feb. 6, 2023, F082991).)
Appellant appealed to the California Supreme Court. On October 16, 2024, the
high court transferred this matter to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and
reconsider the cause in light of People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (Lynch). In
general, Lynch provides guidance regarding how to assess prejudice when an aggravated

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.

2.
sentence is imposed without the factors in aggravation being established beyond a
reasonable doubt.2 (Id. at pp. 742–743.)
Following the transfer of this matter from the high court, the parties filed
supplemental briefs with us regarding the impact of Lynch. On October 31, 2024, we
vacated our prior opinion.
In light of Lynch, we agree with appellant that a remand is warranted. The trial
court “did not make the kind of definitive statements” that our high court has “found to
clearly indicate [the lower court] would not impose a lesser sentence under any
circumstances.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) In other words, this record fails to
demonstrate that the lower court would necessarily depart “from the legislative mandate
for no more than a middle term sentence.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, appellant shall be given
the opportunity for a trial regarding factors in aggravation, and sentencing must comply
with the amended law.
We vacate appellant’s sentence and remand for further proceedings. As we explain
later in this opinion, the trial court imposed an unauthorized sentence in count 10, which
must be corrected at resentencing. We also vacate certain fees and fines. In all other
respects, we reject appellant’s arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
At trial, appellant’s daughter, the “Victim,” testified that appellant had touched her
vagina with his penis and/or hand on multiple occasions when she stayed with him at his
residence. In contrast, appellant denied ever touching her inappropriately, and he offered
legitimate reasons why he had possibly touched her vagina, such as applying medication.

2 Under section 1170, imposition of an upper term sentence is prohibited “unless
aggravating circumstances justify that term and the facts underlying any such
circumstance, other than a prior conviction, ‘have been stipulated to by the defendant or
have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial.’ (§ 1170(b)(2), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 742.)

3.
Based on the verdicts rendered, it is apparent that the jury rejected appellant’s version of
events and found the Victim credible. We summarize the material facts that support the
judgment.
I. Appellant and his Ex-Wife Separate.
Appellant and his ex-wife, M.L., are the Victim’s parents. The Victim was born in
December 2008. In 2014, M.L. filed for divorce from appellant. She was the one who
ended the relationship. Thereafter, they had joint custody of the Victim, and they took
turns with physical custody.
M.L. began a relationship with a new man, the “Boyfriend,” and she eventually
had two children with the Boyfriend. After this new relationship started, appellant would
frequently insult M.L. or her Boyfriend. However, appellant also made it clear that he
wanted to resume a romantic relationship with M.L.
II. Appellant Accuses his Ex-Wife’s Boyfriend of Molesting the Victim.
In August 2016, M.L. obtained a three-year restraining order against appellant
after he began stalking and harassing her. Under the terms of the order, appellant could
not have contact with M.L. unless it pertained to the Victim. To comply with both the
restraining order and their child custody agreement, appellant and M.L. utilized the
residence of M.L.’s mother as the location for an exchange of physical custody.
In 2016, about a week after appellant was served with notice of the pending
restraining order, appellant accused the Boyfriend of molesting the Victim. M.L.
suspected that appellant had fabricated these allegations to disrupt her relationship with
the Boyfriend. Appellant attempted to obtain a restraining order against the Boyfriend,
but a judge denied that request.
In early 2017, appellant renewed his accusations with law enforcement, claiming
he had evidence that either the Boyfriend or the Boyfriend’s 18-year-old nephew were
molesting the Victim. Law enforcement launched an investigation, testing (in part) a pair

4.
of the Victim’s panties, and interviewing everyone allegedly involved. M.L. was
cooperative. The Boyfriend and his nephew were cooperative. The Victim underwent a
“CART” interview.3 This investigation was ultimately closed due to a lack of evidence.
No probable cause existed to arrest either the Boyfriend or his nephew.
III. The Victim Discloses Appellant’s Abuse.
On February 3, 2017, the Victim was eight years old, and she disclosed to M.L.
that it was appellant who had been touching her inappropriately. This disclosure occurred
just prior to a physical custody exchange. While waiting for appellant to arrive at the
location, the Victim began crying and she told M.L. that she did not want to go with
appellant. According to M.L., it appeared that the Victim was having a panic attack. The
Victim said it was appellant who had done everything to her that she had previously
alleged against the Boyfriend. M.L. asked the Victim if she was lying. The Victim
insisted she was telling the truth, and she asked M.L. to call the police so she would not
have to go with her father.
M.L. contacted authorities, and a law enforcement officer responded to the scene a
short time later. The Victim’s eyes were red as if she had been crying. The Victim
reported to the officer that appellant had touched her “private parts” when they were in
bed. This disclosure to the officer happened outside M.L.’s presence.
In February 2017, the Victim underwent a second CART interview. She reported
that, the previous week, she had told her mother that it was appellant who did “bad
things” to her. The Victim stated that appellant “gets on top of” her. She felt his
“tummy” on top of her “tummy.” This had occurred four or five times when the Victim
was asleep with appellant in the same bed. When asked by the interviewer how the

3 A CART interview involves a specially trained interviewer who elicits information
from a minor about alleged sexual crimes.

5.
Victim knew it was not a dream, the Victim stated that, when she woke up, she would not
be wearing any underwear, and her stomach would hurt.
The Victim told the interviewer that she did not want to go with appellant because
she did not want him “to do that” anymore. The Victim admitted during the second
CART interview that she had previously falsely accused the Boyfriend of molesting her.
She said she made those allegations because appellant had instructed her to do so.
According to the Victim, appellant had wanted the Boyfriend to go to jail so he could
renew a romantic relationship with the Victim’s mother, M.L. During the second CART
interview, the Victim said that the Boyfriend had never done “bad things” to her.
IV. Law Enforcement Discovers Incriminating Evidence on Appellant’s Phone.
In February 2017, appellant met with law enforcement officials. He voluntarily
turned over both his and the Victim’s cellular telephones. Law enforcement eventually
extracted relevant information from both phones.
On February 4, 2017, appellant had sent a text message to the Victim which read,
“Daddy’s princess made lies, and that’s why daddy is very sad to the princess to tell lies
when daddy told her not to say.” This text message had been sent the day after the Victim
had first disclosed to her mother and law enforcement that appellant was touching her
inappropriately. On the day that the Victim first disclosed this abuse, a police officer had
spoken with appellant on the telephone and explained why the child custody exchange
was not going to occur.
On appellant’s phone, law enforcement discovered nude photographs of the
Victim. A picture taken on or about April 23, 2016, showed her buttocks. Several
pictures taken on or about September 30, 2016, showed the Victim fully nude. In another
photo, the Victim is naked and lying on the bed with her eyes and legs closed, but her
vagina is visible. In another photo, the Victim is posed nude in a “seductive manner.”
One of her legs is laid out to the side, and both of her hands are above her head.

6.
In three photos taken on or about September 30, 2016, the Victim’s vagina is
depicted in “close-up” shots. In two of the photos, appellant is seen “opening” her
vagina. In one photo, appellant uses his finger to manipulate her vagina, and in the other
photo, he uses his thumb to do so. The third photo is of the Victim’s vagina with her legs
spread.
The pictures of the Victim’s vagina were kept in a clandestine app on appellant’s
cell phone that looked like a calculator. That app also contained photos of naked adult
women and photos of appellant’s own erect penis. One photo of his penis showed
appellant with lubricant on his fingers.
A review of his phone demonstrated that appellant had visited various
pornographic websites, and he had viewed certain pornographic videos. These included
two videos that were titled: (1) “Father Abused a Sleeping Girl” and (2) “Teen Girl
Forced By Father Sucking His Cock, Cam77.com.” These were deleted from the phone’s
history. Law enforcement did not access these videos, and they did not know whether
they involved child or adult actors. Appellant also had web searches for strippers and for
escort services.
Appellant’s phone also contained videos of the Victim. In one video, he is seen
touching and grabbing the Victim’s buttocks, while pulling down her underwear a little.
He refers to her “sexy body.” He says, “I don’t know what I am going to do with this old
lady … that has me very crazy.” In another video, appellant and the Victim are lying on a
bed. Appellant is making snoring sounds and moaning. In Spanish, he says, “Mmm,
there baby, ooh yes my love, mmm, mmm.” The Victim is topless. In a final video, the
Victim refers to appellant’s “butt cheeks” and her own “butt.” She also references “your
junior” when speaking with appellant.4

4 The jury also saw a very short clip of appellant kissing the Victim on her mouth.
The Victim testified that appellant only kissed her when saying goodbye or dropping her
off at school.

7.
The jury learned that the Victim referred to appellant’s penis as “Junior.” M.L.
testified that, when she was in a relationship with appellant, she and appellant referred to
his penis as “Junior.” Appellant acknowledged that M.L. used the term “Junior” to refer
to his penis.
V. The Victim’s Trial Testimony.
The Victim was 12 years old at the time of trial. She testified that, until she was
eight years old, she would stay with appellant on the weekends. She shared a bedroom
with appellant, and that room had two beds. She explained that, when she would go to
sleep in her own bed, appellant would talk about ghosts or some other scary subject. She
would then crawl into bed with him because she was frightened. The Victim told the jury
that on multiple occasions, and occurring at least 10 times, if not more, she would be in
his bed, and he would climb on top of her naked and place his penis or hand against her
vagina. She always fell asleep in either sweatpants and a tank top, or a nightgown. She
always wore underwear. When she woke, she would find her clothes to be inside out
and/or on backwards.
The Victim told the jury that appellant wanted to bathe with her when she stayed
with him. On more than one occasion, but less than five occasions, appellant instructed
her to jump on top of him when they were together in the bathtub, and he had her place
her vagina against his penis. He would grab her hips when she did this. He told her that
this was a game. The Victim would feel a sharp pain or burning sensation in her vagina.
The first of these incidents in the bathtub occurred when the Victim was six or seven
years old. The last incident occurred just before she stopped having contact with him.
The Victim admitted to the jury that she had previously falsely accused the
Boyfriend of molesting her, and she confirmed that the Boyfriend had never touched her

8.
inappropriately.5 She explained that she had falsely accused the Boyfriend because she
had felt scared and pressured to do so from appellant. The Victim knew that appellant did
not like the Boyfriend, and appellant had told her that he had found something on her
underwear. He had repeatedly asked her if the Boyfriend had been abusing her.
Appellant had warned her that he could have her mother, M.L., jailed if she (the Victim)
did not explain what had happened. Appellant then covered her face and he tried to take
off her pants. It was at that moment that she relented and told appellant that it was the
Boyfriend who was abusing her.
The Victim denied recalling ever having a rash on her vagina or remembering
appellant ever putting medication on her vagina. She told the jury that, because she had
been scared, she never told anyone it was appellant who was sexually abusing her. She
eventually told her mother, M.L. while they were in their vehicle outside the residence of
the Victim’s grandmother’s residence shortly before appellant was scheduled to pick her
up. She testified that she disclosed what was happening because she was scared it would
occur again. She stated that she still loved her father, but she “deserved” her own
“justice” and she believed he deserved “to go to jail.”
VI. The Defense Evidence.
A. Appellant’s testimony.
Appellant testified at trial, denying any wrongdoing. He said he had never
touched the Victim’s vagina for a sexual purpose, and when he touched her, such as her
buttocks as seen in one video, it was “just a game.” He claimed that he had touched the
Victim around her vagina only to apply a cream-based medication. He said he did this
over 10 times, including when the Victim was asleep.

5 The Victim also testified that the Boyfriend’s nephew never touched her
inappropriately.

9.
Appellant denied telling the Victim to accuse the Boyfriend, and he denied
pressuring her in this regard. He denied ever threatening to have M.L. jailed. He told the
jury that he did not know why the Victim would say that he had told her to accuse the
Boyfriend.
Appellant admitted taking pictures of the Victim’s vagina, including those with his
finger or thumb in the pictures. He claimed that he did so because Child Protective
Services had advised him that it would help him gain physical custody of her. He
claimed he took the pictures because the Victim “had a rash” and he was “applying
cream.”6 He stated that he photographed his finger near the Victim’s vagina to point out
a rash. He also claimed that he took pictures of the Victim’s vagina with her legs spread
open because he saw a discharge of “transparent liquid.” He claimed that he showed two
such photos to his mother. He believed the discharge was the result of sexual abuse by
the Boyfriend. He testified that, after showing the pictures of the Victim’s vagina, he
deleted them from his phone without showing them to police.
Regarding other naked photos of the Victim, appellant claimed he took those to
make her feel more comfortable before he applied the medication to her vagina, and/or
because she wanted him to photograph her naked. He testified that it was the Victim’s
decision to pose naked on the bed in a seductive manner. He explained that she “really
just likes to take pictures.” He claimed that he took the April 23, 2016, picture of the
Victim’s buttocks because she had complained that M.L. or the Boyfriend had hit her.
Appellant admitted that he kept photos of the Victim’s vagina in a clandestine app
on his phone, which looked like an app for a calculator. Inside this app he also kept

6 At trial, M.L. explained that, when the Victim was about five or six years old, she
did have a rash on or around her vagina, and M.L. had applied a cream a few times.
However, M.L. testified that, after that time, the Victim never again had issues with her
vagina. In contrast, Appellant claimed at trial that it was around September 2016 when
the Victim was prescribed a cream. He admitted that his testimony in this regard was in
conflict with both M.L. and the Victim.

10.
photos of naked adult women and of his penis. He claimed that, for privacy purposes, he
put the photos of the Victim’s vagina in that app so that the Victim or anyone else who
used his phone would not have access to them.7 He explained that, regarding the pictures
of his own penis, he had had surgery to reconstruct his “urinary vein” and he had taken
the photos to show his physician because urine was leaking from his penis. He claimed
his penis was not “erect” but it had a “device” there.
Appellant admitted that he watches adult pornography, and he did so at times with
a prostitute in a motel. He denied seeking out a video titled “Father Abused a Sleeping
Girl.” He said that the link to that video just happened to be on a website he was visiting.
He explained that he was indiscriminate when it came to viewing pornography, and he
watched whatever was on the screen. He denied having any sexual fantasies of abusing
his daughter while she was sleeping. He admitted watching a video in January 2017
titled “Fucking My Girlfriend’s Sister While She Sleeps.” He denied that this type of
pornography aroused him.
Appellant admitted taking showers with the Victim until she was about seven and
a half years old. He agreed that he stopped washing her vagina about two months before
she turned eight. He testified that he and M.L. had showered together with the Victim
when they were still married, and he continued showering with the Victim after their
divorce. He explained that people from Mexico would not find this behavior unusual.8
He claimed that the Victim had asked him to shower with her, and he was only with her
during baths to wash her hair.

7 Appellant also had at least one picture of his ex-wife, M.L., in that clandestine
app.
8 At trial, M.L. agreed she had previously told an officer that she did not find it odd
that appellant showered with the Victim because they had both showered with her ever
since she was an infant. M.L. also testified that the Victim does not like to sleep alone
and she used to sleep with M.L. and appellant in the same bed.

11.
B. The testimony from appellant’s various family members.
Some of appellant’s family members testified on his behalf. In general, they told
the jury that they had never witnessed appellant acting inappropriately with the Victim.
They also had not seen any concerns regarding that relationship.
Appellant’s mother denied ever seeing a rash on the Victim when she had cared for
her, but she remembered that M.L. had sent a cream that had to be applied. Appellant’s
mother, however, had trouble remembering the precise time period when the Victim may
have had a rash. She agreed that, in February 2017, she had told investigators that it had
been over a year since she had seen anything regarding the Victim’s vagina, and it had
been two years since she had put cream on the Victim’s vagina.
Appellant’s mother initially testified that she had seen the nude photographs that
appellant had taken of the Victim, and the mother understood that they were evidence that
the Victim had been touched inappropriately. The mother also heard the Victim say that
the Boyfriend had been molesting her. However, on cross-examination, appellant’s
mother agreed that appellant did not actually show her the photographs of the Victim’s
vagina. Instead, he only told her about them.
DISCUSSION
We address appellant’s claims in the order that they appear in his opening brief.
I. Appellant has Forfeited his Claim that the Trial Court Erred in Permitting
Admission of the Second CART Interview and any presumed Error is
Harmless.
Evidence Code section 1360 provides an exception to the hearsay rule in criminal
proceedings for certain statements made by child abuse victims under the age of 12.9
Among other requirements not relevant here, the trial court must find “in a hearing

9 The United States Supreme Court holds that, “[t]o be admissible under the
Confrontation Clause, hearsay evidence used to convict a defendant must possess indicia
of reliability by virtue of its inherent trustworthiness, not by reference to other evidence
at trial. [Citation.]” (Idaho v. Wright (1990) 497 U.S. 805, 822.)

12.
conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of
the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Evid. Code, § 1360, subd. (a)(2).)
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence the Victim’s
statements made during her second CART interview in which she accused him of
touching her inappropriately. He notes that the court never conducted the required
hearing to determine the reliability of her statements, and he contends that the Victim’s
hearsay statements were unreliable. He maintains that his due process rights were
violated. He asserts that he suffered prejudice, and reversal of all of his convictions is
required.
A. Background.
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed written motions in limine, which included a
request that it be permitted to admit into evidence the recording of the Victim’s CART
interview in which she disclosed the abuse she was suffering from appellant. The
prosecution’s motion was based on Evidence Code section 1360. The prosecution asked
the court to conduct a hearing to determine whether these statements were reliable.
When the matter was addressed pretrial, defense counsel pointed out to the court
that the Evidence Code required the court to conduct a hearing to determine the reliability
and trustworthiness of the Victim’s statements during her CART interview. The court
agreed it would conduct such a hearing. However, no such hearing occurred prior to
trial.10
During trial, a recording of the Victim’s second CART interview (People’s exhibit
No. 1) was played for the jury. Just before this was played, the court noted that the
defense did not object to its admissibility, and the court stated it had “specifically found
in the prosecution’s favor” regarding its admissibility.

10 The parties agree that no such hearing occurred prior to trial. Our independent
review of the record has also not discovered any such hearing.

13.
Towards the end of trial, the court later stated for the record that it had previously
indicated that it “would listen carefully to the preliminary and foundational testimony”
regarding this CART interview “as it was being presented by the witnesses while the jury
was present.” The court stated it was “satisfied” that the foundational requirements had
been met under Evidence Code section 1360 and that the CART interview “was
appropriately played.”
B. Standard of review.
The parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. Appellant contends that
this court should conduct an independent review regarding whether or not the Victim’s
statements were reliable during the CART interview. In contrast, respondent asserts that
we should assess whether the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.
Published opinions have taken conflicting approaches regarding the appropriate
standard of review in this situation. Some courts consider this an evidentiary issue,
triggering a mere abuse of discretion standard. (See People v. Roberto V. (2001)
93 Cal.App.4th 1350, 1367; People v. Brodit (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1330.) On the
other hand, other courts have employed an independent standard of review to consider
whether the child victim’s hearsay statements were reliable. (People v. Tatum (2003)
108 Cal.App.4th 288, 296; People v. Eccleston (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 436, 445–446.)
As we demonstrate below, we need not resolve the parties’ dispute or fully respond
to their various arguments regarding the appropriate standard of review. Instead, this
claim fails under either approach because this issue is forfeited and any presumed error is
harmless.
C. Analysis.
1. This claim is forfeited.
The parties dispute whether or not this claim is forfeited. Respondent argues that
appellant did not object to this evidence when it was introduced at trial. In contrast,

14.
appellant contends he has preserved this issue for appellate review because his trial
counsel reminded the court before trial that it was required to determine outside the jury’s
presence whether or not the Victim’s statements during her CART interview were
reliable. In the alternative, appellant raises a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Respondent has the better argument. A criminal judgment cannot be set aside by
the erroneous admission of evidence unless a timely objection was made setting forth a
“clear” and “specific ground” for the objection. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) A
reviewing court must also determine that the admitted evidence should have been
excluded on the ground stated and the error “resulted in a miscarriage of justice.” (Id. at
subd. (b).) Our Supreme Court holds that an objection must “inform the trial court, as
well as the party offering the evidence, of the specific reason or reasons the objecting
party believes the evidence should be excluded, so the party offering the evidence can
respond appropriately and the court can make a fully informed ruling.” (People v.
Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 435; accord, People v. Seijas (2005) 36 Cal.4th 291, 302.)
Here, the defense did not object when the second CART video was played for the
jury. Indeed, the court noted that the defense was making no objection, a point which the
defense never disputed or corrected. Consequently, this issue is deemed forfeited.
Appellant failed to make a timely and specific objection on the ground now asserted on
appeal. Thus, this issue was not preserved for appellate review. In any event, we also
determine that this claim fails due to a lack of prejudice.11

11 Because this claim fails for lack of prejudice, we need not fully analyze appellant’s
assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective in not preserving this issue for appeal.
Appellant cannot meet his burden of showing that he was harmed. Thus, his claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel must be rejected. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984)
466 U.S. 668, 687–688; People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436.)

15.
2. Any presumed evidentiary error is harmless.
The California Supreme Court has identified the following factors as being
relevant in determining the reliability of hearsay statements made by a child witness in a
sexual abuse case: (1) spontaneity and consistent repetition; (2) the declarant’s mental
state; (3) use of terminology unexpected of a child of a similar age; (4) lack of motive to
fabricate; and (5) the child’s ability to understand the duty to tell the truth, and to
distinguish between truth and falsity. (In re Cindy L. (1997) 17 Cal.4th 15, 29–30; see In
re Lucero L. (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1227, 1250.)
Appellant maintains that the Victim’s statements during her CART interview were
not sufficiently reliable. He acknowledges that no evidence suggests the Victim’s mental
state was impaired. However, he contends that the Victim’s allegations were not
consistently repeated. He also argues that the Victim had a motive to lie to falsely accuse
him. Finally, he asserts that her statements during the CART interview were not
sophisticated and did not suggest that her claims of sexual abuse had occurred. He relies
on People v. Eccleston, supra, 89 Cal.App.4th 436, and People v. Brodit, supra,
61 Cal.App.4th 1312, to establish error. He contends it is reasonably probable this
evidence impacted the outcome of his trial. We disagree.
We need not analyze whether or not the Victim’s statements during her CART
interview were reliable. We also need not summarize appellant’s cited authorities.
Instead, this record reveals that, even if forfeiture did not occur and the CART interview
was erroneously played at trial, any presumed evidentiary error was overwhelmingly
harmless.
The prosecution introduced evidence that conclusively established appellant’s
guilt. The Victim testified that appellant had touched her vagina with his penis and/or
hand on multiple occasions when she stayed with him at his residence. Her trial
testimony was credible and consistent with her pretrial statements. On the night the

16.
Victim disclosed this abuse to her mother, she told an officer that appellant had touched
her “private parts” when they were in bed.
The Victim’s testimony was amply corroborated by the evidence located on
appellant’s phone. He had numerous naked photos of the Victim, and one showed her in
a “seductive manner.” He kept photos of her vagina hidden in a clandestine app that
looked like a calculator, and those photos were kept with pictures of naked adult women
and images of his own erect penis. In two of the pictures involving the Victim, appellant
used his finger in one picture and his thumb in another picture to open her vagina.
Despite claiming he had taken photos of her vagina as possible evidence to gain custody
of the Victim, appellant admitted that he never showed these pictures to law enforcement.
Appellant had a video wherein he touched and grabbed the Victim’s buttocks,
while pulling down her underwear a little. He referred to her “sexy body.” He says, “I
don’t know what I am going to do with this old lady … that has me very crazy.” In
addition, the jury learned that, the day after the Victim first disclosed the abuse to her
mother and then to law enforcement, appellant sent a text message to the Victim saying
he was “very sad” because his “princess” told lies and he had “told her not to say.”
The evidence located on appellant’s phone overwhelmingly corroborated the
Victim’s trial testimony and confirmed the ongoing abuse. In contrast, the Victim
disclosed very few details about the abuse during the second CART interview, only
reporting that appellant did “bad things” to her, and he put his “tummy” on hers. She also
explained in this interview that she had previously accused the Boyfriend of molesting
her because appellant had instructed her to do so. Appellant had wanted the Boyfriend to
go to jail so he could renew a romantic relationship with M.L.
At trial, the Victim provided more details about why she had previously falsely
accused the Boyfriend. She explained that she had felt scared and pressured to do so.
The Victim knew that appellant did not like the Boyfriend, and appellant had told her that
he had found something on her underwear. He had repeatedly asked her if the Boyfriend

17.
had been abusing her. Appellant had warned her that he could have her mother jailed if
she did not explain what had happened. Appellant then covered her face and he tried to
take off her pants. It was at that moment that she relented and told appellant that it was
the Boyfriend who was abusing her.
With CALCRIM No. 226, the jurors were instructed to consider the Victim’s prior
false statement and to give it whatever weight they deemed necessary. Based on the
verdicts rendered, it is apparent that the jury found the Victim’s testimony credible.
During closing argument, the prosecutor did not rely on the CART interview to
demonstrate appellant’s guilt. Instead, it was only mentioned a few times to establish
when this abuse had ended, and to remind the jurors that the Victim had said during the
interview that she had felt appellant’s “tummy on her tummy,” and “she could feel his
feet.” The jurors were told that they could consider the CART interview and give it the
same weight and value as the Victim’s trial testimony. The prosecution, however, argued
that appellant’s guilt was shown through the Victim’s trial testimony, her demeanor, the
photos and videos found on appellant’s cell phone, and through appellant’s numerous lies.
The prosecutor asked the jury to consider the circumstances surrounding the Victim’s
initial disclosure to her mother. The prosecutor asserted that the Victim had no motive to
lie, and the photos and videos found on appellant’s phone showed that she was telling the
truth. The prosecutor reminded the jurors that, the day after the Victim disclosed this
abuse, appellant had sent her a text message saying he was sad because he had told her
“not to say.”
Appellant’s defense counsel argued to the jury that, during this CART interview,
the Victim had not talked about penetration or that appellant supposedly put his finger on
her vagina. She also did not mention showering with appellant, which was only
discussed in court. Defense counsel noted that appellant is a “pretty big man” and the
Victim “was very small at eight years old.” Counsel noted that the Victim never stated in

18.
her CART interview that she had felt suffocated or had difficulty breathing when
appellant was on her.
During the prosecution’s short rebuttal argument, the CART interview was never
again mentioned or discussed.
We reject appellant’s arguments that his right to due process was violated from the
introduction of the CART interview. Instead, appellant had a full and fair opportunity to
confront and cross-examine the Victim at trial. He was also not prevented from
presenting his defense to the jurors, claiming he had never touched her or photographed
her for a sexual purpose. It is apparent, however, that the jury found appellant’s
testimony lacking in any credibility.
Based on this record, any presumed error was harmless regarding the playing of
the CART interview at trial. We can declare beyond any reasonable doubt that this
evidence did not contribute to the jury’s verdict. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24 (Chapman).) In other words, the record reveals that this presumed error was
unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered regarding appellant’s guilt.
(Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391, 403, disapproved on other grounds in Estelle v.
McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72–73, fn. 4.) Likewise, it is not reasonably probable the
verdicts would have been more favorable to appellant absent this presumed error.
(People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) Consequently, appellant’s
arguments are without merit, and this claim fails.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Permitting the Jury to Learn
that Appellant had Viewed the two Pornographic Videos and Any Presumed
Error is Harmless.
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to
learn about the titles of two pornographic videos that he had viewed on his cell phone.
He argues that the admission of this evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, and
he seeks reversal of all of his convictions.

19.
A. Background.
Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a written motion in limine seeking permission
to introduce into evidence the titles of three pornographic videos which appellant had
apparently viewed on his phone. The defense opposed this request, arguing that this
evidence was more prejudicial than probative.
The prosecution eventually narrowed its request to introduce only two of the titles
discovered on appellant’s phone: (1) “Father Abused a Sleeping Girl” and (2) “Teen Girl
Forced By Father Sucking His Cock.” The prosecutor acknowledged that the website
from where these videos were downloaded likely used adult actors, and it did not have
child pornography on its platform. Nevertheless, the prosecutor asserted that these titles
were probative of appellant’s possible interest in sexual relationships between fathers and
daughters. After hearing the arguments, the court ruled that these two titles would be
admissible at trial because they were relevant regarding appellant’s alleged sexual intent.
The jury learned that appellant had visited pornographic websites on his phone,
including the videos referenced above which had been deleted from the phone’s history.
Law enforcement did not access these videos, and they did not know whether they
involved child or adult pornography. Appellant also had web searches for strippers and
for escort services.
B. Standard of review.
An abuse of discretion standard is used to review a trial court’s rulings regarding
relevancy and admissibility under Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Jones (2017)
3 Cal.5th 583, 609.) Likewise, this standard is used to review a trial court’s ruling
admitting evidence under Evidence Code section 1101. (People v. Daveggio and
Michaud (2018) 4 Cal.5th 790, 824.)
Under this standard, we will not disturb the trial court’s decision on appeal unless
“the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner
that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v.

20.
Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124–1125; see People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th
148, 162 [abuse of discretion review asks whether ruling in question falls outside bounds
of reason under applicable law and relevant facts].)
C. Analysis.
Appellant contends that he only viewed adult pornography and these two disputed
videos did not depict actual minors. He argues that the issue for the jury was whether he
had held sexual intent for his own daughter, but these videos were “adult in nature” and,
thus, their probative value was greatly outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. He
maintains that the introduction of these titles rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.
We reject appellant’s arguments. The trial court did not abuse its discretion and
any presumed evidentiary error was harmless.
1. The court did not abuse its discretion.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), prohibits the introduction of
propensity evidence to prove a defendant’s conduct on a specific occasion. (People v.
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 299.) However, character evidence can be admitted under
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), when offered for a non-propensity purpose,
such as motive or intent. (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 300.) For this inquiry,
the degree of similarity between the charged and uncharged conduct is often a key factor,
and a “continuum exists” concerning the degree of similarity required. (Ibid.) The least
degree of similarity is required to prove intent. (Ibid.) In contrast, a higher degree of
similarity is required to prove a common design or plan, and the highest degree of
similarity is required to prove identity.12 (People v. Jackson, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 300.)

12 Evidence Code section 1108 permits admission of evidence regarding a
defendant’s uncharged sexual offenses when such evidence is relevant to show his or her
propensity to commit similar sex crimes, so long as the admission of this evidence does
not violate Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Reliford (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1007,
1012–1013; People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 915.) In a footnote, appellant
asserts that Evidence Code section 1108 is inapplicable in this situation. He notes that

21.
Here, appellant disputed the charges filed against him, making his criminal intent a
relevant issue for the jury. To prove that he had committed lewd acts, the prosecution
was required to show that he had acted with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying his lust, passions or sexual desires. (§ 288, subd. (a); CALCRIM No. 1110.)
It was undisputed that appellant had viewed a wide variety of adult pornography,
including videos with titles that purported to show one father sexually abusing his
daughter, and another father forcing his daughter to perform fellatio. Although these two
disputed videos may have depicted adult performers, that does not lessen the relevancy of
their titles. Instead, those titles strongly suggested that the videos purported to depict
sexual acts occurring between family members and involving females who were
supposedly underaged. Because he watched these videos, the circumstantial evidence
strongly suggested that appellant may have derived sexual gratification from scenes of
incest, or daughters abused and/or forced to perform sex acts. As such, these titles had a
tendency in reason to prove or disprove a disputed issue of fact that was of consequence
to the action. (Evid. Code, § 210.) Thus, this evidence was relevant to the issue of
appellant’s criminal intent regarding his own underaged daughter, and whether he had
intended to commit lewd acts with her. Accordingly, these titles had probative value.
Indeed, the title regarding a father abusing his sleeping daughter was extremely similar to
some of the charged behavior in this matter.
Appellant argues that the second disputed video purported to show fellatio, but he
was not charged in this matter with oral copulation. According to appellant, there was no
similarity between that video’s title and his conduct with the Victim. Thus, appellant
contends that, at the very least, the court abused its discretion in allowing the jury to learn

the parties agreed below that these two pornographic videos involved adult rather than
child actors. We agree that Evidence Code section 1108 is inapplicable here because
nothing establishes that appellant committed a criminal offense when watching or
possessing these videos.

22.
that he had visited that second website. We disagree. Although appellant was not
charged with oral copulation in this matter, the title of the second video was nevertheless
relevant to the pending charges. Just like the first video, the second video reasonably
suggested that appellant had an unnatural sexual interest regarding fathers and daughters.
The second video also reasonably demonstrated that appellant had a repeated and
ongoing desire to view videos depicting this theme. Thus, even the second video had
probative value, and we cannot state that the trial court abused its discretion in
determining that both videos were relevant.
Finally, we reject appellant’s arguments that the introduction of these titles was
more prejudicial than probative. A trial court may exclude otherwise admissible evidence
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect; that is, if its
admission would result in the undue consumption of time, a danger of undue prejudice,
confusion about the issues or the danger of misleading the jury. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative [within the meaning of section
352] if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable ‘risk to the fairness of the proceedings or
the reliability of the outcome’ [citation].” (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724.)
The admission of this evidence did not result in an undue consumption of time.
The jury learned about these titles through the testimony of the lead detective. Her direct
testimony in this regard was very short, overlapping in two pages of the reporter’s
transcript. Nothing about this testimony demonstrates or even reasonably suggests that
the jury would have been confused or misled. Instead, the detective simply read the two
titles from the forensic report which showed that appellant had found these videos on the
internet, watched them, and subsequently deleted them from his browser’s history.
Although the disputed titles conveyed subject matters that are deplorable, the
jurors did not view the actual videos or see the acts which the titles suggested. The brief
mention of these two titles could not have possibly posed an intolerable risk to the
fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the trial outcome. Especially in light of

23.
the overwhelming evidence introduced against appellant, it does not appear reasonably
likely that these titles would have inflamed the emotions of the average juror, motivating
them to use this information to punish appellant. (See Vorse v. Sarasy (1997) 53
Cal.App.4th 998, 1009 [setting forth these requirements to deem evidence more
prejudicial than probative].) Consequently, it cannot be stated that this evidence was
more prejudicial than probative. (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Based on this record, the trial court did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd manner. The court’s evidentiary ruling did not fall outside
the bounds of reason under the applicable law and relevant facts. Further, a manifest
miscarriage of justice did not occur. Thus, an abuse of discretion is not present and this
claim fails. In any event, we also conclude that any presumed error was harmless.
2. Any presumed error was harmless.
A trial court’s discretionary ruling involving the ordinary rules of evidence does
not normally implicate the federal Constitution. (People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585,
611; see also People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [disallowing defense
evidence is not also the denial of the right to present a defense].) Thus, the standard
under Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836, is the appropriate method to analyze any
alleged harm from evidentiary error. (People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 611.) Under
this standard, we ask whether it is reasonably probable the verdict would have been more
favorable to the defense absent the error. (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Here, during trial, appellant’s counsel had the lead detective admit that she had no
idea what the actual videos looked like. During closing argument, the prosecutor only
briefly mentioned these disputed titles. The prosecutor asserted that these porn sites,
along with appellant’s possession of photos depicting the Victim’s vagina, were
circumstantial evidence corroborating the Victim’s testimony. The prosecutor also argued
that these videos demonstrated that appellant had lied about randomly watching

24.
pornography. According to the prosecutor, this was “not a series of unfortunate events”
and, instead, appellant had twice watched the video about the father abusing a sleeping
girl. The prosecutor emphasized to the jurors that these titles were not meant to prove the
charge of child pornography, which was established by the photos of the Victim. The
prosecutor acknowledged to the jurors that adult pornography is “common” and
“normal.” The prosecutor stated that it is not a crime for consenting adults to watch adult
pornography. However, the prosecutor argued that it was not a coincidence that appellant
had watched these videos. Instead, this is what gratifies him sexually.
Although the prosecutor mentioned these titles during closing argument, they were
not a cornerstone of the prosecution’s case, and the prosecutor acknowledged to the jury
that these titles were not meant to prove the child pornography charges. Moreover, this
was not a close case. The prosecution introduced overwhelming evidence establishing
appellant’s criminal intent. The Victim’s testimony was consistent and credible. The
photos and videos recovered from appellant’s phone corroborated her accusations that he
had touched her inappropriately. Indeed, appellant twice photographed himself touching
and manipulating her vagina. He also recorded himself touching her buttocks while
pulling down her underwear slightly and describing her as having a “sexy body” and she
was driving him crazy. Appellant kept photos of the Victim’s vagina hidden on a secret
app along with naked photos of women, and photos of his own erect penis. The day after
the Victim disclosed this abuse, appellant texted her saying he was sad because he had
told her “not to say.”
Based on the overwhelming evidence introduced against appellant, it is not
reasonably probable he would have obtained more favorable verdicts had the trial court
precluded one or both of the disputed titles from being introduced into evidence. As
such, any presumed evidentiary error is harmless, and this claim fails.

25.
III. Appellant Fails to Demonstrate that his Counsel was Ineffective in Failing to
Seek a Limiting Instruction Regarding the Titles of the Pornographic Videos.
Appellant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to
request a limiting instruction regarding the two titles of the pornography videos which
were discovered on his cell phone and disclosed to the jury. Based on alleged prejudice,
he seeks reversal of all of his convictions.
In relevant part, CALCRIM No. 375 instructs jurors that, if they decide a
defendant has committed uncharged acts, they may (but are not required to) consider such
evidence for the limited purpose of deciding whether the defendant acted with the
required specific intent to prove the charged offenses. However, the instruction also
informs the jurors that they cannot consider this evidence for any other purpose, and they
cannot conclude from the evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed
to commit crime. (CALCRIM No. 375.)
It is undisputed that appellant’s trial counsel did not request this limiting
instruction, which was not read to appellant’s jury. The trial court did not have a sua
sponte duty to provide this limiting instruction. (People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th
920, 942, overruled on other grounds in People v. Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 89.)
Appellant argues that his trial counsel could have had no legitimate tactical reason for not
requesting this limiting instruction. He contends it is reasonably probable the outcome of
this matter would have been different if his counsel had requested such an instruction.
We reject appellant’s claim. To show ineffective assistance of counsel, a
defendant must establish two criteria: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonable competence and (2) that he was thereby prejudiced.
(Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688.) The defendant has the
burden of showing both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (People v. Lucas,
supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) To establish prejudice, a defendant must demonstrate a

26.
reasonable probability that, absent the errors of counsel, the result would have been
different. (Ibid.) This must be enough to undermine confidence in the outcome. (Ibid.)
In the present matter, we need not analyze whether or not defense counsel acted
reasonably in failing to request a limiting instruction regarding the two disputed titles.
Instead, appellant does not establish that he was prejudiced from his counsel’s alleged
ineffective assistance. (See People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 164 [“If the
defendant fails to show prejudice, a reviewing court may reject the claim without
determining the sufficiency of counsel’s performance.”].) We have already concluded
that overwhelming evidence was introduced to establish appellant’s guilt for all of the
charged crimes. Moreover, the prosecutor did not overly emphasize these two titles
during closing argument, and the prosecutor informed the jurors that these titles were not
intended to prove the child pornography charges. During the defense close, appellant’s
trial counsel argued to the jury that appellant had a history of looking at adult
pornography, and he had sought out strippers and prostitutes. According to the defense,
the disputed videos were not “his entire pornographic profile.” Defense counsel asserted
that his pornographic history showed that he is sexually attracted to adult women.
Based on this record, our confidence in the outcome of this trial is not undermined.
(See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687–688; People v. Lucas, supra,
12 Cal.4th at p. 436.) Appellant’s guilt was conclusively established. Thus, we reject
appellant’s assertion that this was a “relatively close case.” He does not establish that a
reasonable probability exists that the outcome of this matter would have been different
had his counsel requested this limiting instruction. Accordingly, appellant does not show
that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and this claim fails.
IV. We Vacate Any Remaining Balance Owed for the Presentence Probation
Report.
At the 2021 sentencing, the trial court ordered appellant to pay $500 to cover the
cost of the presentence probation report pursuant to former section 1203.1b. The parties

27.
agree, as do we, that it is appropriate to vacate any remaining balance of this imposed
financial obligation.
Effective July 1, 2021, Assembly Bill No. 1869 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) repealed
former section 1203.1b and abrogated the court’s authority to impose and collect the
probation report fee. This bill also enacted section 1465.9, which made any balance
remaining due uncollectible and unenforceable. (People v. Clark (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th
248, 259–260.) Accordingly, we will vacate any remaining balance owed.
V. In Light of Lynch, We Vacate Appellant’s Sentence and Remand for Further
Proceedings.
In count 3, appellant was convicted of a lewd act (touching the Victim’s vagina the
first time) in violation of section 288, subdivision (a). The court deemed this conviction
the principal determinate term, and it imposed an aggravated prison sentence of eight
years.
In count 9, appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography in
violation of section 311.11, subdivision (a). The court imposed an aggravated term of
three years, but this sentence was stayed.
At sentencing, the trial court cited the following three factors in aggravation:
(1) The Victim was particularly vulnerable because appellant committed some
of the sexual offenses “on many occasions” when she was asleep;
(2) The manner in which the crimes were committed demonstrated
sophistication or professionalism on appellant’s part because he had the Victim sleep in
the same bed with him, and he convinced her to lie to law enforcement and report it was
the Boyfriend who had committed these offenses; and
(3) As the Victim’s parent, appellant took advantage of a position of trust.
When this sentencing occurred in June 2021, the court had discretion to select a
prison term that best served the interests of justice. (§ 1170, former subd. (b).) The court
was permitted to consider the circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, “and any other

28.
factor reasonably related to the sentencing decision.” (Cal. Rules of Court, former rule
4.420(b).) The court could rely on “the case record, the probation officer’s report, other
reports and statements properly received, statements in aggravation or mitigation, and
any evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.)
Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b), was amended “to prohibit
imposition of an upper term sentence unless aggravating circumstances justify that term
and the facts underlying any such circumstance, other than a prior conviction, ‘have been
stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial
by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.’ [Citation.]” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 742.) The middle term is the presumptive maximum sentence that currently exists.
(§ 1170, subds. (b)(1) & (2); Lynch, supra, at p. 777.) This amendment applies
retroactively to cases not final on appeal. (Lynch, supra, at p. 749.)
Respondent concedes that the current requirements of section 1170 were not met
when the trial court imposed the upper term sentences against appellant in 2021. The
jury was not asked to find true the factors in aggravation.
Prior to Lynch, the courts of appeal were split regarding how to analyze prejudice
if a defendant was sentenced under the former law. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
pp. 745–746.) In Lynch, the majority of a divided high court held that the amendments to
section 1170, subdivision (b), trigger a defendant’s trial right under the Sixth Amendment
of the United States Constitution with respect to every aggravating fact (other than a prior
conviction) a trial court uses to justify an upper term sentence. (Lynch, supra, at p. 768.)
Thus, under the current statute, a Sixth Amendment violation occurs if a trial court relies
on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other
aggravating facts relied on have been properly established. (Lynch, supra, at p. 768.)
Such a violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the
trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved true

29.
in compliance with the current statutory requirements. (Ibid.; see also Chapman, supra,
386 U.S. at p. 24.) If a reviewing court cannot make such a determination under the
Chapman standard of review, the defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.
(Lynch, supra, at p. 768.)
In addition to a Chapman analysis, the Lynch majority also held that the
amendment to section 1170 altered a trial court’s sentencing discretion. (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 773.) Under the prior statute, a court had broad discretion in selecting an
appropriate sentence. However, the current statute “narrows that authority by creating a
presumption against the upper term, which may be overcome only if the required facts
are properly proven and the court concludes that term is justified. These changes
circumscribe the trial court’s previously broad discretion to select whichever of the three
terms of imprisonment serves the interests of justice.” (Ibid.) Accordingly, for sentences
imposed before the statute’s 2022 amendment, it is likely a trial court did not exercise
informed sentencing discretion because it was unaware of the scope of its discretionary
powers. (Id. at p. 774; see also People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1391 [a trial
court unaware of the scope of its discretionary powers cannot exercise “ ‘informed
discretion’ ”].)
In this matter, respondent contends that the sentencing error was harmless under
the Chapman standard. Respondent also argues that this record “clearly shows” the trial
court would still impose upper term sentences under its new discretionary authority.
Respondent focuses on the trial court’s comments at sentencing, where the court called
appellant’s sexual misconduct “egregious.” Respondent asks us to deny a remand for
further proceedings.
We reject respondent’s arguments. In our prior opinion, we held that a remand
was unwarranted because we could declare beyond any reasonable doubt that the jury
would have found true beyond a reasonable doubt all three of the aggravating factors
upon which the trial court relied to impose the upper term sentences. (People v.

30.
Martinez, supra, F082991.) Lynch makes clear, however, that our prior harmful error
analysis was incomplete. In addition to a review for harmless error under Chapman, an
appellate court must also examine under the Gutierrez standard how the lower court
might exercise its new sentencing discretion. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 776.) A
reversal of the sentence and remand is warranted if that second requirement is not met.
(Id. at p. 777 [matter must be remanded in light of Gutierrez and People v. Salazar (2023)
15 Cal.5th 416 (Salazar)].)
Lynch cautions it is “ ‘almost always’ ” speculative for an appellate court to
conclude how a sentencing court would exercise new discretionary sentencing authority.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 774, quoting Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.) Lynch
instructs that a sentencing court must make “definitive statements” to “clearly indicate” it
“would not impose a lesser sentence under any circumstances.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
Lynch provides two examples regarding when a remand would be unnecessary
under the second component of harmless error. First, if a sentencing court announced it
was aware of forthcoming legislation, and then explained how it would exercise its
discretion under that legislation. (Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 431.) Second, if the
sentencing court makes it clear it would never impose a lesser sentence. For example, in
the second case that Lynch cited with approval, the judge stated that the defendant
showed no remorse, the defendant was deserving of death, the defendant was “ ‘the worst
of the worst,’ ” and the judge commented it appeared that the defendant had “ ‘no soul.’ ”
(People v. Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 432.) The Lynch court cited these two opinions as
examples of “the kind of definitive statements” needed “to clearly indicate” a remand for
resentencing is unnecessary. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
When a sentencing record falls short of these examples, Lynch instructs that a
mere reliance on the length of the original sentence—including the imposition of
consecutive sentences, the failure to strike enhancements, or the imposition of upper

31.
terms—“ ‘is not sufficient to provide a clear indication of what a sentencing court might
do on remand if it had been fully aware of the scope of its discretionary powers.’
[Citation.] In other words, it would be ‘speculative’ [citation] to conclude the trial court’s
finding that an upper term sentence was ‘appropriate’ in the exercise of its broad
discretion, clearly indicates that it would have found aggravating circumstances
sufficiently weighty to ‘justify’ an upward departure from the legislative mandate for no
more than a middle term sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.)
In Lynch, “the trial court found eight circumstances in aggravation and none in
mitigation. It emphasized, among other things, that Lynch had committed repeated acts
of violence; his use of multiple weapons in this case involved great violence, cruelty,
viciousness, and callousness; and his criminal record demonstrated a serious danger to
society. He was on parole when he committed the current crimes.” (Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) Despite these findings, the Lynch majority held it would be
“ ‘speculative’ ” to conclude the trial court would still impose an aggravated sentence
following the changes in law, and it remanded for further proceedings. (Ibid.)
At the 2021 sentencing in this matter, the trial court stated that, “[t]his is certainly
an extremely egregious offense, and [appellant] will have to live, of course, with the
consequences of his acts the rest of his life.” According to respondent, the court’s
comments show it “would have found the upper terms justified had it been aware of its
more limited discretion.” We disagree.
The trial court’s comments do not satisfy the examples which Lynch provided.
“Notably, the court did not make the kind of definitive statements” our high court has
“found to clearly indicate it would not impose a lesser sentence under any
circumstances.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) This record fails to demonstrate
that the lower court would necessarily depart “from the legislative mandate for no more
than a middle term sentence.” (Ibid.) Therefore, we need not again address whether a
jury would find true beyond a reasonable doubt all three of the aggravating factors upon

32.
which the trial court relied to impose the upper term sentences.13 Instead, even if we
could still declare that this sentencing error was harmless under Chapman, this
sentencing record requires us to speculate regarding how the trial court might exercise its
new sentencing discretion. Accordingly, Lynch dictates that this matter must be
remanded for further proceedings. (See Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777 [“The
reasoning in Gutierrez and Salazar also requires reversal of the sentence and remand
here”].)
Following remand, appellant shall be given the opportunity for a trial regarding
factors in aggravation conducted in accordance with the current statutory requirements.
(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 777.) The parties are free to introduce at trial all relevant
evidence to support or contest the factual support for the aggravating circumstances set
out in the California Rules of Court. “The court may rely on any properly proven
aggravating facts, including prior convictions or facts necessarily found by the jury to
support a verdict on underlying counts and enhancements. The court retains its discretion
to impose an upper term sentence if it concludes that one or more properly proved
circumstances justify such a sentence. (§ 1170(b)(2).) If it cannot so conclude, it may
impose no more than a middle term for each of the counts on which [appellant] stands
convicted. (Id., subd. (b)(1).)” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 777–778.)

13 The Lynch majority “cautioned that a prejudice analysis following a change in the
law respecting proof of aggravating circumstances ‘can be problematic. The reviewing
court cannot assume that the record reflects all of the evidence that would have been
presented to the jury, or that the defendant had the same incentive and opportunity at a
sentencing hearing to contest the aggravating circumstance.’ ” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at p. 775.) Lynch noted that, if potential aggravating circumstance in a particular case
rest “ ‘ “on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing
court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury
would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 775–776.)

33.
VI. An Unauthorized Sentence was Imposed in Count 10.
For count 10, the jury convicted appellant of using a minor to create child
pornography in violation of section 311.4, subdivision (c). For this conviction, the trial
court imposed a subordinate determinate term of two years.
The parties agree, as do we, that the sentence in count 10 was unauthorized. The
probation report had a scrivener’s error, and it listed this conviction under section 311.4,
subdivision (b), which has a longer sentencing triad. For the actual conviction in count
10, the sentencing triad under section 311.4, subdivision (c), is 16 months, or two or three
years in the state prison. (See § 18, subd. (a).)
We have already vacated appellant’s sentence. He is entitled to a full resentencing.
(See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) The sentence imposed in count 10
must comply with section 311.4, subdivision (c), and section 18, subdivision (a).
To assist the court and parties on remand, we also note that the current determinate
abstract of judgment has a clerical error regarding count 10. The abstract incorrectly lists
this conviction as occurring under section 311.11, subdivision (a). We direct the court to
correct that mistake when it resentences appellant. (See People v. Mitchell (2001) 26
Cal.4th 181, 185 [an appellate court may correct clerical errors appearing in abstracts of
judgment either on its own motion or upon application of the parties].)
VII. We Reject Appellant’s Claim that Sentencing Error Occurred in Counts 1
and 2.
In counts 1 and 2, the trial court imposed consecutive prison sentences of 15 years
to life for appellant’s sexual penetration of the Victim (§ 288.7, subd. (b)). These
convictions were based on the photos discovered on appellant’s cell phone in a
clandestine app in which he was seen manipulating the Victim’s vagina. He used his
finger in one picture and his thumb in another picture to open her vagina.14

14 Only a slight penetration of the labia majora is needed to establish a sexual
penetration of a female victim. (People v. Quintana (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1362, 1364.)

34.
At sentencing in 2021, the court observed that all of appellant’s crimes “were
independent of each other” because they occurred on separate dates and occasions and
involved different types of misconduct. With respect to counts 1 and 2, the court stated
that these two offenses were committed on different occasions.15
In the present claim, appellant asserts that the trial court’s reasoning for imposing
these consecutive sentences was factually flawed. He argues that the evidence shows that
his criminal conduct in counts 1 and 2 occurred during the same incident. In the
alternative, he contends that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to this
sentence. Appellant requests that we remand this matter for resentencing so the trial
court can reassess the issue of whether consecutive or concurrent sentences should be
imposed in counts 1 and 2.
Although we are already remanding this matter for further proceedings, including
resentencing, we will address appellant’s claim to assist the court and parties on remand.
Trial courts have the discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
when confronted with multiple convictions. (§ 669, subd. (a); People v. Woodworth
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1479.) To establish sentencing error in this matter,
appellant points to California Rules of Court, rule 4.425. In relevant part, this rule
permits a sentencing court to impose a consecutive sentence if the crimes were
committed “at different times or separate places, rather than being committed so closely
in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 4.425(a)(3).)
Appellant notes that the photographs showing his manipulation of the Victim’s
vagina were taken on the same day (September 30, 2016). He contends that these photos
were likely taken in the same photo shoot. Thus, he contends that these pictures were

15 When imposing this sentence, the trial court misspoke regarding the exhibit
number supporting the conviction in count 2.

35.
taken so closely in time and place as to indicate a single period of aberrant behavior.
Moreover, he argues that these two pictures show a single criminal objective.
We reject appellant’s claim that the court abused its sentencing discretion
regarding the imposition of consecutive sentences. California Rules of Court, rule 4.425,
which appellant cites, is only a guideline for a sentencing court, and it does not impose a
rigid obligation. (People v. Calderon (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 82, 86–87.) Moreover, only
a single factor is required to impose a consecutive term. (People v. Osband (1996) 13
Cal.4th 622, 728–729.) Such factors include, for example, whether “[t]he crimes and
their objectives were predominantly independent of each other;” whether they “involved
separate acts of violence or threats of violence;” and whether they “were committed at
different times or separate places.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.425(a).)
Although appellant took these pictures on the same day, it is impossible to
determine from this record how much time passed from when appellant took the first
photo until he took the second one. However, the record does demonstrate that some
time did pass between the taking of both pictures. In the first picture, appellant used his
finger to manipulate the Victim’s vagina. In the second picture, appellant used his thumb
to open her vagina. Thus, it is clear that appellant changed the position of his hand after
he inappropriately touched her the first time, and he touched her again with a different
digit. Therefore, the record amply supports the trial court’s previous determination that
these crimes occurred on different occasions. It is likewise apparent that appellant had an
opportunity to reflect on his criminal behavior before he took each photo and touched the
Victim in different ways.

36.
We take no position on how the trial court should exercise its sentencing discretion
when appellant is resentenced.16 However, appellant’s present claim is without merit that
the previous imposition of consecutive sentences was factually flawed.
VIII. We Vacate the Fine Imposed under Section 294, Subdivision (b).
At sentencing, the trial court imposed a $1,000 restitution fine pursuant to section
294, subdivision (b). The parties agree, as do we, that the imposition of this fine was in
error.
Section 294 permits a restitution fine if a defendant commits certain enumerated
crimes. However, none of those enumerated crimes are applicable in this matter. As
such, we agree with the parties that this fine must be vacated.
DISPOSITION
Appellant’s sentence is vacated, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings and resentencing consistent with Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th 730, and
section 1170, subdivision (b). In count 10, the court shall resentence appellant in
conformity with section 311.4, subdivision (c), and section 18, subdivision (a). The fine
previously imposed under section 294, subdivision (b), is vacated and it shall not be
reimposed. Any unpaid balance for the presentence probation report fee previously
imposed under former section 1203.1b is vacated and it shall not be reimposed. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

16 Because this claim fails on its merits and because appellant is being resentenced,
we do not reach appellant’s contention that his trial counsel was ineffective at his
previous sentencing.

37.

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