People v. Ancira CA4/1

CourtListener 10281454Calctapp21.11.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/21/24 P. v. Ancira CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D082994

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. FWV21002440)

ANGEL CASTREJON ANCIRA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino,
John Nguyen, Judge. Affirmed as modified and remanded with instructions.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General,
Christopher P. Beesley and Kristen Kinnaird Chenelia, Deputy Attorneys
General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I
INTRODUCTION
Angel Castrejon Ancira appeals a judgment of conviction after a jury
found him guilty of the first degree premeditated murder of Monique Briseno

(Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)),1 and found he personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon—to wit, a knife—to commit the murder (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). He claims the evidence was insufficient to prove he killed
Briseno or acted with the premeditation and deliberation necessary to
support a conviction for first degree murder, rather than second degree
murder.
We conclude there was ample circumstantial evidence to prove Ancira
killed Briseno. However, we agree with Ancira there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. Therefore,
we modify the judgment to reduce the first degree murder conviction to a
second degree murder conviction and affirm the judgment as modified. We
remand the matter to the trial court to resentence Ancira, prepare an
amended abstract of judgment, and forward a copy of the amended abstract
of judgment to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
II
BACKGROUND
A. The Vehicle Theft
On May 4, 2021, Ancira socialized with his cousin for a few hours. At
some point during the visit, Ancira took his cousin’s car key and stole her car.
B. Ancira’s Flight from the Murder Scene
Two days later, while driving his cousin’s car, Ancira turned onto a
southbound street and clipped a traffic island, causing one of the car’s rear

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
tires to blow out. He continued driving on the car’s wheel rim, fishtailed,
turned at the next intersection onto a westbound street, and then turned onto
a southbound street that ended in a cul-de-sac. He parked on the cul-de-sac.
A man walking his dog saw Ancira’s erratic driving and called the
police. The man briefly lost sight of the car when it pulled into the cul-de-sac.
However, he regained visibility within 30 or 40 seconds by peeking over a
retaining wall and through a wrought iron gate. The man saw Ancira
standing outside the parked car using his shirt to wipe down the driver’s side
door and door handle. Ancira wore a maroon t-shirt, shorts, and a large gold
chain. After wiping the door, Ancira ran to the wrought iron gate and
jumped over it. The witness quipped, “Stolen car, huh, bud?” Ancira said
something in response that the man could not hear, then ran across the
street and climbed over a wall on the opposite side of the street.
After Ancira jumped the wall, a neighbor saw him running down his
street. Ancira asked the man for a ride and he refused. Ancira again asked
for a ride and, once more, the man refused. Ancira continued running and
hopped over another fence. At some point during his attempt to flee, Ancira
broke into an unlocked recreational vehicle (RV) and stole a Hawaiian shirt
from the RV’s closet. He also dropped the key to his cousin’s stolen car in
front of the RV.
Another neighbor saw Ancira—now donning the Hawaiian shirt—as he
ran between houses and cars parked on her street. When Ancira noticed her,
he asked to use her phone and said he had been jumped and needed to call
his mother. She said she would call his mother on his behalf and Ancira gave
her a phone number. The woman went inside and called the phone number.
A man answered the phone and the woman explained there was a young man

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in her driveway who had asked her to call his mother. The man on the phone
sighed and hung up. The woman walked back outside and Ancira was gone.
Shortly after, police officers apprehended Ancira less than a quarter
mile away from where he had abandoned his cousin’s stolen car.
C. The Victim
Meanwhile, back at the abandoned car, witnesses heard a woman
whimpering and calling for help. They noticed the car’s rear passenger door
was open and discovered the victim, 20-year-old Monique Briseno, lying on
the street near the car’s rear bumper. Briseno struggled to speak and was
covered with blood on her face and body. She died in a matter of minutes due
to severe sharp-force injuries.
Briseno had been sliced 12 times and stabbed 10 times with a knife,
sustaining a total of 22 sharp-force injuries. She sustained two stab wounds
and four incised wounds to her head and neck, including one fatal wound to

her left frontal scalp that penetrated her skull and brain.2 She suffered
three stab wounds to the torso, one of which was a fatal wound to her right
chest that punctured her right lung and a major blood vessel. She also
suffered five stab wounds and eight incised wounds on her extremities,
including one fatal stab wound to the interior left shoulder that penetrated
her left lung. The wounds to her arms and hands may have been defensive
wounds.
An autopsy showed Briseno had marijuana, methamphetamine, and
fentanyl in her system at the time of death.

2 A stab wound is a wound where the depth of the wound is greater than
the length of the wound on the skin, while an incised wound is a wound
where the length of the wound is greater than the depth of the wound.
4
D. Blood and DNA Evidence
Police officers found a knife wedged in the crevice of the driver’s seat of
the car between the seat and the seatback. There were blood stains
throughout the interior of the car on the seats, doors, door handles, windows,
center console, and floors, as well as the exterior driver’s side door handle.
The front passenger seat had a cut or stab mark on it and the rear passenger
seat window had a bloody shoe print on it.
There was substantially less blood on the driver’s seat than the front
passenger seat. According to a crime scene specialist, the minimal amount of
blood on the driver’s seat indicated that someone or something was positioned
in the driver’s seat during the attack. The crime scene specialist also opined
that Briseno likely was positioned in the front passenger seat at some point
during the attack. Based on the location of Briseno’s body, the presence of
blood throughout the car’s interior, the relatively minimal amount of blood on
the driver’s seat, the bloody shoe print on the rear passenger window, and the
fact that most of Briseno’s wounds were on the front of her body, the
prosecution theorized Ancira was seated in the driver’s seat when he stabbed
Briseno, who was seated in the front passenger seat. According to the
prosecution, Briseno climbed into the backseat and ultimately pulled herself
out of the car to try to escape her attacker.
Briseno’s blood was found on the blade and the handle of the knife that
was found in the car. Her blood was also found on Ancira’s hands and on his
maroon t-shirt.
III
DISCUSSION
Ancira challenges his first degree premeditated murder conviction on
grounds there was insufficient evidence to support the conviction. He attacks

5
the sufficiency of the evidence in two respects. First, he claims the evidence
was inadequate to establish his identity as Briseno’s killer. Second, he
contends there was insufficient evidence he acted with premeditation and
deliberation. We reject the former argument, but find the latter argument
meritorious.
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘ “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable
to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that
is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” [Citation.] We determine “whether, after viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have
found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
[Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court “presumes in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626, italics
added.)
“However, ‘a reasonable inference ... “may not be based on suspicion
alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or
guess work. [¶] ... A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence
rather than ... a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.” ’ ”
(People v. Davis (2013) 57 Cal.4th 353, 360; see People v. Jenkins (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 142, 150–151 [“While inferences may constitute substantial
evidence in support of a judgment, they must be the probable outcome of logic
applied to direct evidence; mere speculative possibilities or conjecture are
infirm.”].)

6
B. Substantial Evidence Proved Ancira Killed Briseno
For a defendant to be liable for murder as a direct perpetrator, the
prosecution must prove the defendant unlawfully killed a human being, or a
fetus, with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) If the killing is willful,
deliberate, and premeditated, it is first degree murder. (§ 189, subd. (a).) In
this appeal, Ancira contends the evidence adduced at the murder trial was
insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he killed Briseno.
On the contrary, we conclude there was compelling circumstantial
evidence to prove Ancira’s identity as Briseno’s killer. The location of
Briseno’s body, the physical evidence from inside the car (including the
extensive blood stains, the murder weapon, and the cut or stab mark on the
passenger seat), and the testimony of the crime scene specialist supported a
finding that Briseno was stabbed inside the car Ancira had stolen from his
cousin just two days earlier. A witness (the man walking his dog) identified
Ancira as the driver of the car at or about the time it is believed Briseno was
stabbed inside it. Indeed, a forensic pathologist testified that Briseno died
within a matter of “minutes” of being stabbed—precisely when Ancira was
spotted inside the car with her. Further, the witness observed no one else
inside the car while it was in motion and nobody else near the car after
Ancira parked it. And, when law enforcement apprehended Ancira, he had
Briseno’s blood on his hands and t-shirt. Ancira’s presence at the murder
scene at the time of the murder, and the existence of Briseno’s blood on his
hands and clothing, gave rise to an extremely strong inference that Ancira
killed Briseno. (See People v. Gomez (2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 279–280
[substantial evidence supported murder conviction where it showed
defendant was present at murder scene at time of murder]; People v. DePriest
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 1, 45–46 [same].)

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Ancira’s post-crime conduct also gave rise to a reasonable inference he
harbored a consciousness of guilt about killing Briseno. The witness who
identified Ancira as the driver observed him wiping down the driver’s side
door and door handle—where Briseno’s blood was later found—mere
moments after the stabbing. According to numerous witnesses, Ancira then
fled from the immediate vicinity of the crime scene to a nearby neighborhood,
asked a neighbor for a ride to escape further from the crime scene, tried
contacting an unidentified acquaintance for assistance, and stole clothing in
an apparent attempt to disguise himself. “[E]vidence of defendant’s flight
after the crime[] [was] committed support[ed] an inference of consciousness of
guilt.” (People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 679; see People v. Batey
(1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 582, 588 [“the jury could rationally draw a
consciousness of guilt inference from the defendant’s flight from the crime
scene”]; People v. Vu (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1009, 1030 [evidence defendant
tried “to hide after the crime … show[ed] consciousness of guilt”].)
Ancira contends the evidence was insufficient to prove his identity as
the killer because no witness directly observed him stabbing Briseno.
Although no witness testified to observing Ancira while he was in the
physical act of stabbing Briseno, the prosecution was not required to produce
such direct evidence to sustain the murder conviction. “ ‘Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from
that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1, 57; see also People v.
Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 142 [“Circumstantial evidence may constitute
substantial evidence of guilt.”]; People v. Hindmarsh (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d
334, 351 [“our review of the record convinces us that substantial evidence
supported the finding that appellant was the perpetrator of the [murders] of
which he was convicted”].) Here, the circumstantial evidence of Ancira’s guilt

8
was persuasive and powerful. It was sufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that Ancira was Briseno’s killer.
C. Substantial Evidence Did Not Support the Jury’s Premeditation and
Deliberation Finding
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove his
identity as Briseno’s killer, Ancira contends substantial evidence did not
support the jury’s finding of premeditation and deliberation, which elevated
the conviction from second degree murder to first degree murder.
As noted, first degree murder includes any willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing. (§ 189, subd. (a).) “ ‘ “ ‘In this context, “premeditated”
means “considered beforehand,” and “deliberate” means “formed or arrived at
or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of
considerations for and against the proposed course of action.” ’ ” [Citation.]
“ ‘An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the
result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash
impulse.’ ” [Citations.] “The true test is not the duration of time as much as
it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great
rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly ….” ’ ”
(People v. Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88 (Morales).)
In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 (Anderson), the California
Supreme Court identified three categories of evidence that are generally
“sufficient to sustain a finding of premeditation and deliberation:
(1) planning activity, or ‘facts about how and what defendant did prior to the
actual killing which show that the defendant was engaged in activity directed
toward, and explicable as intended to result in, the killing’; (2) motive, or
‘facts about the defendant’s prior relationship and/or conduct with the victim
from which the jury could reasonably infer a “motive” to kill the victim’; and
(3) manner of killing, or ‘facts about the nature of the killing from which the

9
jury could infer that the manner of killing was so particular and exacting that
the defendant must have intentionally killed according to a “preconceived
design” to take his victim’s life in a particular way for a “reason” ….’ ”
(Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 88–89.)
The Anderson factors are descriptive, not normative or exhaustive.
(People v. Rivera (2019) 7 Cal.5th 306, 324.) They “need not be present in any
particular combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and
deliberation.” (People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543.) Further, “courts
need not accord them any particular weight.” (People v. Halvorsen (2007) 42
Cal.4th 379, 420.) Nonetheless, they “ ‘ “ ‘guide an appellate court’s
assessment whether the evidence supports an inference that the killing
occurred as the result of preexisting reflection rather than unconsidered or
rash impulse.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Cage (2015) 62 Cal.4th 256, 276.) “ ‘[W]hen the
record discloses evidence in all three categories, the verdict generally will be
sustained.’ ” (Stitely, at p. 543.) By contrast, “[e]vidence in only one of these
areas most often is insufficient” to prove premeditation and deliberation.
(People v. Alcala (1984) 36 Cal.3d 604, 626 (Alcala).)
Anderson itself presents an example of a case in which the evidence
was insufficient to support a finding of premeditation and deliberation. In
Anderson, the defendant resided with the 10-year-old victim and her family.
(Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 19.) While the victim’s family members
were away, the defendant inflicted more than 60 sharp-force injuries—both
severe and superficial—over the victim’s entire body. (Id. at pp. 21–22.) The
victim’s bloodstained dress was found torn from her body, the crotch of her
underwear was ripped out, and the victim suffered vaginal lacerations and a
partial cutting off of her tongue. (Id. at pp. 21–22.) Still, the Supreme Court
found the evidence of premeditation and deliberation “totally lacking.” (Id. at

10
p. 26.) With regard to the manner-of-killing evidence, in particular, the
Anderson court concluded the “manner of killing (brutal hacking) [did] not
support a reasonable inference of deliberately placed blows, which could in
turn support an inference that the act of killing was premeditated rather
than ‘hasty and impetuous.’ ” (Id. at p. 31.) Rather, “the only inference
which the evidence reasonably support[ed] … [was] that the killing resulted
from a ‘random,’ violent, indiscriminate attack rather than from deliberately
placed wounds inflicted according to a preconceived design.” (Id. at p. 32.)
Further, although the defendant lied to the victim’s family members about
her whereabouts after the murder, and attempted to clean up bloodstains in
the home where the murder occurred, the court concluded the defendant’s
post-crime conduct did not prove premeditation and deliberation. According
to the Court, such post-crime conduct “possibly [bore] on defendant’s state of
mind after the killing, [but] it [was] irrelevant to ascertaining defendant’s
state of mind immediately prior to, or during, the killing.” (Ibid.)
In the present case, the People concede there was no planning or
motive evidence—none whatsoever. Our independent review of the record
confirms there was no evidence of Ancira’s conduct before the stabbing
(planning evidence). Nor, apart from Briseno’s presence in the car with
Ancira, was there evidence of any relationship or connection between Ancira
and Briseno, let alone evidence of why he killed her (motive evidence).
Faced with these significant evidentiary gaps, the People rely on
evidence of the manner of the killing to support their assertion that a jury
could reasonably find premeditation and deliberation. The Supreme Court
has, in one case of which we are aware, “concluded that an execution-style
killing may be committed with such calculation that the manner of killing
will support a jury finding of premeditation and deliberation, despite little or

11
no evidence of planning and motive.” (People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th
1107, 1127, citing People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 957, abrogated on
another ground by People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110–111.)
However, Briseno was not killed in an execution-like manner. “With no
evidence of planning or motive and a killing that cannot be described as
‘execution-style,’ the application of the Anderson factors weighs heavily in
favor of concluding there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to
conclude that the killing was the result of premeditation and deliberation.”
(People v. Boatman (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1269–1270.)
The People contend the manner of the killing gives rise to a reasonable
inference of premeditation and deliberation because Ancira stabbed or sliced
Briseno many times and struck fatal blows to three vital areas of her body.
They argue this evidence demonstrated that Ancira intentionally targeted
Briseno’s most vulnerable areas. Further, they cite several Supreme Court
cases for the proposition that a defendant’s infliction of numerous cut or stab
wounds—particularly to a victim’s vital regions—can establish a deliberate
intention to kill. (See Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 89–92; People v.
Elliott (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 471–472 (Elliott); People v. San Nicholas (2004)
34 Cal.4th 614, 657–659 (San Nicholas); People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195,
246–248 (Pride); Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 625–627.)
We are not convinced by this argument. Contrary to the People’s claim,
the evidence did not suggest Ancira concentrated or clustered his attacks on
vital regions of Briseno’s body. Although three cuts or stabs hit her vital
regions, 19 of them did not. Ancira inflicted sharp-force injuries across
Briseno’s upper body with no discernable focus on any given region. In fact,
Briseno’s extremities—namely her arms and hands—were struck more than
any other part. Much like the killing at issue in Anderson—where the victim

12
received more than 60 wounds across her body ranging in severity from
superficial to severe—the 22 wounds that were inflicted on Briseno appeared
to be the result of a random, violent, and indiscriminate attack, rather than a
preconceived design to kill. (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 32.)
Moreover, although the infliction of numerous cut or stab wounds can
sometimes indicate a planned killing when combined with other evidence of
premeditation and deliberation, “[t]he fact that a slaying was unusually
brutal, or involved multiple wounds, cannot alone support a determination of
premeditation.” (Alcala, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 625–627; People v. Pensinger
(1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1238 [“brutality alone cannot show premeditation; a
brutal killing is as consistent with a killing in the heat of passion as with a
premeditated killing”]; People v. Pantoja (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1, 14 [“Nor
does the sheer quantity of the wounds or the existence of defensive wounds
on [the victim’s] hands prove that the assault was not committed upon
sudden provocation”].) Tellingly, in every Supreme Court decision upon
which the People rely, the Court affirmed the challenged jury findings of
premeditation and deliberation because there was evidence satisfying all
three of the Anderson factors. (Morales, supra, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 89–92;
Elliott, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 471–472; San Nicholas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
pp. 657–659; Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 246–248; Alcala, at pp. 625–627.)
Here, by contrast, there was no evidence relevant to two of the three
Anderson factors. Thus, whatever inferences might reasonably be drawn
from the brutality of slayings in other factual contexts, the manner-of-killing
evidence at issue here was not so compelling that, standing alone, it gave rise
to a rational finding of premeditation and deliberation.
Ancira’s post-crime conduct also did not, standing alone, give rise to a
reasonable finding of premeditation and deliberation. A defendant’s post-

13
crime conduct is “not sufficient in [itself] to establish premeditation and
deliberation,” but it is one factor “a jury [can] reasonably consider in relation
to the manner of killing.” (People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1128.)
Here, there was evidence Ancira did not aid Briseno or seek assistance
from 9-1-1 or nearby witnesses after the stabbing. Rather, he quickly tried to
hide the evidence of his crime by wiping down the car door and wedging the
murder weapon into the crevice of the car seat. He also approached
strangers—erratically and seemingly at random—in a fruitless attempt to
flee the area. Clearly, this conduct demonstrated fear and a consciousness of
guilt. But it did not tend to suggest that Ancira killed Briseno pursuant to a
preconceived design to kill. (See Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 32
[“Evasive conduct shows fear: it cannot support the double inference that
defendant planned to hide his crime at the time he committed it and that
therefore defendant committed the crime with premeditation and
deliberation.”]; People v. Wear (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1031 [“we are not
aware of any authority ‘supporting the proposition that defendants tend to
flee [or dispose of evidence] only when they have committed certain crimes
but not others’ ”].) On the contrary, Ancira’s slipshod post-crime actions were
so spontaneous, perfunctory, and haphazard as to suggest that Ancira killed
Briseno rashly and impulsively with little or no forethought.
Given the absence of any motive or planning evidence, as well as the
neutral manner-of-killing and post-crime evidence, we conclude there was
insufficient evidence to support a reasonable finding that Ancira
premeditated and deliberated the murder. Because the evidence did not
support a premeditation and deliberation finding, we must reduce the first
degree premeditated murder conviction to a second degree murder conviction

14
and remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing and preparation of

an amended abstract of judgment.3 (Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 23.)
IV
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to reduce the first degree premeditated
murder conviction to a second degree murder conviction. As modified, the
judgment is affirmed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to resentence Ancira, prepare an amended abstract of judgment,
and forward a copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, J.

DATO, J.

3 In light of our modification of the judgment and remand for
resentencing purposes, we do not address Ancira’s argument that the existing
abstract of judgment contains a clerical error requiring correction.
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