CourtListener 10278439•Johnson v. First District Appellate Project CA1/2
Johnson v. First District Appellate Project CA1/2
CourtListener 10278439Calctapp20.11.2024
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/20/24 Johnson v. First District Appellate Project CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
WAYNE JOHNSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A168243
v.
FIRST DISTRICT APPELLATE (Alameda County Super. Ct.
PROJECT et al., No. 22CV019086)
Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Wayne Johnson brought a civil malpractice claim against the
attorneys who represented him in a criminal appeal.1 After finding Johnson
did not and could not allege “factual innocence,” the trial court sustained a
second demurrer without leave to amend and subsequently entered judgment
in favor of Mark Johnson, William Capriola, J. Bradley O’Connell, and the
First District Appellate Project (together, respondents).2 We affirm.
1 Johnson also asserted claims against Franz Criego, who represented
Johnson in the related criminal trial. Criego responded to the complaint
separately and is not a party to this appeal.
2 To avoid confusion, we use Mark Johnson’s full name.
Mark Johnson
and Capriola are panel attorneys with the First District Appellate Project
(FDAP) who appeared in Johnson’s criminal appeal (No. A159389); O’Connell
is FDAP’s assistant director who “supervise[d]” Mark Johnson and Capriola.
1
BACKGROUND
In 2019, a jury convicted Johnson of stalking in violation of a
restraining order, domestic violence, and assault with a deadly weapon, after
which the court sentenced Johnson to six years in prison. Respondents
appealed on Johnson’s behalf and raised “numerous arguments,” including
that Johnson’s stalking conviction should be vacated because it was based
upon a restraining order that had been subsequently deemed “void.”3 Our
colleagues in Division One concluded that Johnson’s conviction for stalking in
violation of a restraining order must be modified, holding that “a person
cannot be convicted of violating a court order that was unlawfully issued.”4
But rather than vacate, the Court of Appeal reduced the conviction “to a
conviction of stalking in violation of Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (a)”
and remanded for resentencing, finding the stalking conviction was
supported by substantial evidence but the “imposition of increased penalties
under Penal Code section 646.9, subdivision (b) for stalking in violation of a
restraining order amount[ed] to a sentencing error.” The court separately
denied Johnson’s related petition for a writ of habeas corpus based upon a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
In September 2022, Johnson initiated the civil action underlying this
appeal, asserting a claim for legal malpractice against respondents and
3 In a separate 2020 appeal, Division Three of this court reversed the
trial court’s denial of Johnson’s motion to quash a five-year restraining order
and reinstated the temporary restraining order with instructions to conduct a
new hearing. (Cindy M. v. Johnson (Jan. 3, 2020, No. A156075) [nonpub.
opn.] (Johnson I).) We take judicial notice of the opinion on our own motion.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
4 We take judicial notice of Division One’s unpublished opinion:
People
v. Johnson (May 26, 2022, No. A159389) (Johnson II). (Evid. Code, § 459,
subd. (a).)
2
alleging respondents “contributed to [Johnson] being denied an effective
appeal” in Johnson II.
The complaint alleged that Mark Johnson “abandoned many critical
appellate issues and his interpretation of the underlying facts . . . was not
only incorrect, but also harmful to [Johnson’s] appeal.” After Johnson
requested new counsel, FDAP assistant director O’Connell “appointed”
Capriola “to raise additional issues” in Johnson’s appeal, but instead,
according to Johnson, Capriola “doubled down” on the incorrect
understanding of the underlying facts, allegedly causing Johnson to lose “all
the remainder of his valuable time that he could have devoted to filing
additional writs.” Johnson alleged that had respondents “made proper
arguments” in Johnson II, “the Court of Appeal would have been forced to
recognize them” and presumably vacate his convictions.
Respondents demurred to the complaint on the basis that Johnson
failed to allege “actual innocence,” a requisite element of an attorney
malpractice claim. The trial court agreed, explaining that Johnson “has
exhausted his post-conviction relief and cannot prove or plead actual
innocence.” Despite observing that Johnson “cannot allege a finding of actual
innocence,” the trial court granted Johnson “leave to try to do so.”
In March 2023, Johnson filed a first amended complaint, retitling the
malpractice claim as breach of fiduciary duties. The first amended complaint
again alleged that had respondents “made proper arguments,” the Johnson II
court would have “been forced to recognize them,” and added allegations
about “an exception to the [actual innocence] rule when a criminal defendant
sues his attorney for breach of his fiduciary duties . . . .”5 The first amended
5 In the initial and amended complaints, as examples supporting his
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims, Johnson alleged that while
3
complaint also included a new section titled “factual innocence,” which
asserted that Johnson “never assaulted anyone, and he never followed or
harassed anyone.” (Capitalization omitted.) “[E]ven though a jury found
[Johnson] to be guilty,” the first amended complaint alleged that Johnson
“lost his case on a technicality, that being, the prosecution relying upon a
void restraining order” and that Johnson “prevailed in proving the
restraining order was void” in Johnson I “and therefore he is factually
innocent of committing any offenses while a[n in]valid restraining order was
in place.”
As with the initial complaint, respondents demurred to the first
amended complaint on the basis that Johnson failed to allege actual
innocence. The court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend,
explaining: “Although alleged as a ‘breach of fiduciary duty’ cause of action,
the primary right alleged in the [first amended complaint’s] third cause of
action is founded in legal malpractice. Therefore, ‘actual innocence is a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.’ (Wiley v. County of San
Diego (1998) 19 Cal.4th 532, 545.) Plaintiff Wayne Johnson cannot allege
factual innocence.”
On July 5, 2023, the court entered judgment, dismissing respondents
with prejudice. Johnson timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Johnson presents two issues on appeal. Johnson frames the first issue
as whether Mark Johnson “breached his fiduciary duty” to Johnson. Second,
incarcerated, Mark Johnson discussed Johnson’s “case openly over the
regular inmate telephone lines that are known to be both tapped and
delivered to the Attorney General’s Office” and “made ridiculously false
representations over the tapped line that the introduction of the void
restraining order was inconsequential.”
4
Johnson asks us to overturn Wiley v. County of San Diego, supra, 19 Cal.4th
532 (Wiley), which he argues encourages the ongoing violation of a criminal
defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. We interpret these arguments to challenge the trial court’s
order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a pleading challenge, we give the
complaint a reasonable interpretation, accepting as true all properly pled
facts “ ‘but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially noticed.’ ”
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; see also Evans v. City of Berkeley
(2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 20 [rejecting “assertions contradicted by judicially
noticeable facts” in reviewing a pleading challenge].) When a demurrer is
sustained without leave to amend, “we decide whether there is a reasonable
possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial
court has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm.” (Blank, at p. 318.)
“In civil malpractice cases, the elements of a cause of action for
professional negligence are: ‘(1) the duty of the attorney to use such skill,
prudence and diligence as members of the profession commonly possess; (2) a
breach of that duty; (3) a proximate causal connection between the breach
and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage. [Citations.]’ ” (Wiley,
supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 536.) “In criminal malpractice cases, the clear
majority of courts,” including California courts, “also require proof of actual
innocence as an additional element.” (Id. at pp. 536–537, citing authority;
Coscia v. McKenna & Cuneo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1194, 1200 (Coscia).) An
“intact conviction precludes recovery in a legal malpractice action,” and “a
plaintiff must obtain postconviction relief in the form of a final disposition of
5
the underlying criminal case . . . as a prerequisite to proving actual innocence
in a malpractice action against former criminal defense counsel.” (Coscia, at
pp. 1204, 1205.)
Here, Johnson does not and cannot allege actual innocence. While
Johnson disputes the facts at trial and Johnson II’s affirmance of his
convictions, the first amended complaint alleges that “a jury found [Johnson]
to be guilty” and that he “lost” on appeal. Indeed, the Court of Appeal in
Johnson II affirmed Johnson’s convictions as modified, denied his petition for
rehearing, issued remittitur, and denied Johnson’s motion to recall
remittitur. Still, Johnson “continually sought redress by seeking review by
the California Supreme Court,” but Johnson acknowledges the “arguments
fell on deaf ears.”6 As such, Johnson’s convictions remain intact, and the first
amended complaint cannot allege actual innocence. Moreover, Johnson fails
to satisfy his burden of proving a reasonable possibility of curing the defect
by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 318.) Aside from
attacking the appellate opinion in Johnson II, Johnson makes no effort to
demonstrate a possibility of alleging actual innocence. (Genis v. Schainbaum
(2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1015 [“When it is clear the plaintiff cannot in
good faith plead factual innocence or exoneration, leave to amend the
complaint should not be granted”].) Accordingly, we find no error in
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.
Johnson attempts to avoid the actual innocence requirement by
arguing that his claim for breach of fiduciary duty is different from a
malpractice claim and is exempt from the actual innocence requirement
6 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of Johnson’s petition for
writ of mandate/prohibition in No. S276932 and his petition for review in
No. S279161, which Johnson references in his briefing; both were denied.
(Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)
6
under Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Superior Court (2003) 106
Cal.App.4th 419 (Bird). Johnson misreads Bird.
Bird held that a criminal defendant may sue counsel “to enforce the
primary rights to be billed in accordance with the retainer agreement and to
be free from unethical or fraudulent billing practices” without pleading and
proving actual innocence. (Bird, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 432.) The court
distinguished this type of “fee dispute” from the malpractice claims in Wiley,
Coscia, and Lynch v. Warwick (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 267, which involved the
primary right “to competent legal representation.” (Bird, at pp. 424–427.)
Although Bird does acknowledge “[c]ourts in other states . . . have recognized
the [actual innocence] rule does not automatically apply to every dispute
between a convicted client and former counsel” (id. at p. 429, citing Morris v.
Margulis (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) 718 N.E.2d 709), Bird did not adopt Morris7 or
otherwise create an exception for such claims beyond the exception for
billing-related disputes, nor does Johnson cite any California authority
creating a broader exception.8
7 Notably, on review, the Illinois Supreme Court found the claim for
breach of fiduciary duty time barred and reversed the appellate court.
(Morris v. Margulis (Ill. 2001) 754 N.E.2d 314, 320.)
8 Johnson does cite Labovitz v. Feinberg (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) 713
N.E.2d 379, a Massachusetts appellate decision that is not binding on us.
(People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353, 379 [“ ‘holdings from other states are
not controlling’ ”].) The court in Labovitz, at page 382, did not rely on the
plaintiff’s failure to plead actual innocence, instead deciding the case
“primarily on the basis of Labovitz’s failure to sustain his summary judgment
burden.” Since then, the California Supreme Court has cited Labovitz as an
example of “the numerous jurisdictions that have . . . required appellate or
other postconviction relief as a predicate to recovery in a criminal malpractice
action.” (Coscia, supra, 25 Cal.4th pp. 1201–1202, fn. 2.) Thus, even if
Labovitz had precedential value, it does not support Johnson’s argument.
7
Contrary to Johnson’s argument, a proper reading of Bird supports
application of the actual innocence requirement to Johnson’s claim. Unlike
Bird, the matter before us is not a fee dispute; Johnson does not challenge the
“quantity” of respondents’ work such as by asserting respondents charged
Johnson “ ‘for work [respondents] did not perform; grossly overcharg[ed
Johnson] for work they did perform,’ ” or otherwise inflated or padded their
time records. (Bird, supra, 106 Cal.App.4th at p. 429.) Rather Johnson
challenges the “quality of the work” by alleging that respondents failed to
make “proper arguments” before the Court of Appeal in Johnson II, thereby
bringing his claim outside the narrow exception in Bird. (Ibid. [ordering the
trial court to strike allegations implicating “the quality of the legal services
provided”].) Also, unlike Bird, the primary right Johnson asserts is the right
to competent representation. The first amended complaint alleges that Mark
Johnson and Capriola “were obligated to raise all arguable appellate issues”
and their failure to do so denied Johnson a fair appeal. Thus, by claiming
that respondents’ “conduct caused him to lose meritorious defenses,” Johnson
puts “his guilt or innocence in issue,” thereby implicating “the same public
policy considerations and ‘pragmatic difficulties’ which underlie the actual
innocence requirement.” (Bird, at p. 426, quoting Lynch, supra, 95
Cal.App.4th at p. 272.)
We turn next to Johnson’s second argument on appeal: that “there is a
good faith argument for overturning the Wiley case” and that following Wiley
would violate Johnson’s rights under the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. (Capitalization omitted.) We reject both assertions.
“Under the doctrine of stare decisis,” decisions of the California
Supreme Court “are binding upon and must be followed by all the state
courts of California,” including this court. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior
8
Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) “Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction
must accept the law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction. It is not their
function to attempt to overrule decisions of a higher court.” (Ibid., citing
cases.) Wiley, which the California Supreme Court reaffirmed in 2001,
remains good law that is both binding and controlling here. (Coscia, supra,
25 Cal.4th at p. 1205.)
Further, “the Sixth Amendment applies exclusively to ‘criminal
prosecutions’ (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)” and “ ‘does not govern civil cases.’ ”
(Conservatorship of Joel E. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 429, 435; In re M.P. (2013)
217 Cal.App.4th 441, 457, quoting Turner v. Rogers (2011) 564 U.S. 431, 441.)
In the criminal context, the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to
effective assistance of counsel, and “any lapse” in the effective assistance of
counsel “can be rectified through an array of postconviction remedies,
including appeal and habeas corpus,” which Johnson unsuccessfully pursued.
(Wiley, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 542.) Accordingly, requiring Johnson to plead
the elements of a malpractice claim under Wiley does not violate his Sixth
Amendment rights.
The remainder of Johnson’s arguments take issue with the underlying
criminal trial and related appeal. We decline to substantively address them
for a variety of reasons. First, Johnson appeals from the dismissal of his civil
claim, thus Johnson’s challenges to the merits of the underlying criminal
proceedings—which have already been addressed in Johnson II—are beyond
the scope of this appeal.9 (Code Civ. Proc., § 906.)
9 Johnson argues he “is not re-trying his case,” but rather laying “a
foundation for overturning the Wiley decision. . . .” Be that as it may,
Johnson’s arguments are not supported by appropriate citations. In
Johnson’s roughly 50 pages of briefing, there appear to be only 11 citations to
the record in this action, which are all contained within the first two pages of
9
Second, Johnson’s argument deriding the justice who authored
Johnson II is not well taken. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 412
[“unwarranted personal attacks . . . are inappropriate and may constitute
misconduct”].) We find no support in the record for Johnson’s claims of bias
or misconduct, nor are such assertions relevant to his malpractice claim.
Because Johnson fails to state a cause of action for malpractice (or
breach of fiduciary duty) under Wiley, we do not reach respondents’ argument
regarding quasi-judicial immunity.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the
parties are to bear their own costs of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.278(a)(5).)
Johnson’s opening brief. An appellant’s brief “must” contain support for “any
reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page
number of the record where the matter appears,” and we may ignore
unsupported assertions. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C);
Professional Collection Consultants v. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958, 970
[statements in briefs—“whether factual or procedural and no matter where in
the brief the reference to the record occurs”—must be supported by citations
to the record]; Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 625
[“ ‘Statements of alleged fact in the briefs on appeal which are not contained
in the record . . . will be disregarded by this court on appeal’ ”].)
10
_________________________
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
_________________________
STEWART, P. J.
_________________________
MILLER, J.
Johnson v. First District Appellate Project et al. (A168243)
11
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