Tinsley v. Arnold CA1/4

CourtListener 10276051Calctapp18.11.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 11/18/24 Tinsley v. Arnold CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

HARRISON RANDALL TINSLEY,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A167677
v. (San Francisco City & County
LAUREN LOUISE MARTIN Super. Ct. No. FPT20377700)
ARNOLD,
Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant Harrison Randall Tinsley and respondent Lauren Louise
Martin Arnold were ordered to have joint custody of their now four-year-old
child (Minor) in 2021. After the denial of his request for sole custody, Tinsley
moved for reconsideration. Tinsley also requested a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Arnold.
The trial court granted the TRO and set the other matters for evidentiary
hearing. After the hearing, the trial court terminated the TRO and denied
both the DVRO request and the motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, Tinsley argues that the trial court (1) abused its discretion
and violated his right to a full and fair trial by imposing time limits on the
evidentiary hearing; (2) abused its discretion by failing to find Arnold’s
purported violation of the TRO or social media posts constituted “abuse”

1
warranting issuance of a DVRO; and (3) abused its discretion by denying
Tinsley’s request for sole custody without making certain findings. We
disagree and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2021, the trial court ordered that Tinsley and Arnold share joint
physical and legal custody of Minor. Several months later, Tinsley filed an ex
parte request for temporary emergency orders granting him sole custody.
Among other things, Tinsley declared there had been an incident in
September 2021 where police were called to Arnold’s residence and Minor
had fallen off a bed. Arnold also filed a declaration, stating that Minor had
not sustained any injuries. Child Protective Services (CPS) issued a report
concluding that the allegations of physical and emotional abuse were
unfounded, and that Minor was not at risk. The trial court denied Tinsley’s
request for sole custody, finding that what had happened was an “isolated
incident” and “essentially an accident.”
Tinsley moved for reconsideration of that order. He argued that there
were new facts based on unredacted police body camera footage that rebutted
Arnold’s version of the September 2021 incident and the conclusions from the
CPS report.
Tinsley then filed a DVRO request against Arnold naming both himself
and Minor as potential protected persons and seeking sole custody. Tinsley
alleged, among other things, that Arnold had committed abuse by publishing
“public social media posts referring to me as her rapist.” Tinsley also filed a

2
TRO request. Meanwhile, Arnold requested findings under Family Code
section 3044.1
The trial court issued a TRO protecting only Tinsley and set an
evidentiary hearing for (1) Tinsley’s DVRO request, (2) Tinsley’s motion for
reconsideration, and (3) Arnold’s section 3044 request. After the hearing, the
trial court denied both requests and the motion for reconsideration. It found
that Arnold had not perpetrated domestic violence against Tinsley, and that
there were no new facts sufficient to warrant reconsideration of its order
denying sole custody to Tinsley. It also found that section 3044 did not apply
in this case. The court terminated the TRO.
This appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Time Limits on Evidentiary Hearing
1. Additional Background
On August 25, 2022, the trial court set an evidentiary hearing for four
afternoons on the DVRO request, motion for reconsideration, and request for
section 3044 findings. Neither party objected to this schedule.
On September 7, 2022, the trial court reiterated to the parties that the
hearing was set for four half days. Again, neither party objected. Tinsley’s
counsel confirmed his understanding of the dates, and the court explained
those dates “will not change.” The trial court also noted that, “since we only
have four half days having a streamline present[ation], I think it will be

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code. Section
3044, subdivision (a) provides, in relevant part: “Upon a finding by the court
that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated domestic violence
within the previous five years against the other party seeking custody of the
child . . . there is a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint
physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic
violence is detrimental to the best interest of the child.”

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beneficial, not only to the parties and counsel, but also to the Court to have a
very, very clear structure in mind for those dates.”
At the outset of the first day of trial, the court again reminded the
parties that they had four afternoons, with approximately “two hours each
afternoon” and “an eight-hour hearing total.” It continued: “[B]ecause both
of the sides have issues, you can presume that each side will then have four
hours, but that was delineated before we set the hearing; that was made
clear, so – and those are the parameters, and the Court is not going to go over
four afternoons . . . the Court has reviewed the docket, the filings, the
allegations, the RFO.” Neither party objected. On this first day, Tinsley
called two witnesses (police officers on scene during the September 2021
incident) and several exhibits were admitted into evidence.
On the second day of trial, Arnold called a physician to testify about
Minor’s treatment and medical records. Tinsley’s counsel conducted cross-
examination. Arnold’s counsel made numerous objections—including for
questions outside the scope of direct examination, lack of foundation,
vagueness, and hearsay—many of which were sustained. When ruling on one
of these objections, the trial court clarified that Tinsley’s counsel was “not
eating [Arnold’s] time” but instead “burning his time,” and that “he can use
his time however he likes.”
The court later stated: “In order to help the parties along, I think both
of the parties should be reaching out to the Clerk to see how they are doing
on time. [¶] . . . [¶] [T]he rule is the parties get just about equal amount of
time. They can use it however they like.” The court noted it had “sustained a
lot of objections on both sides,” given “the way the evidence is coming in and
the way the questions are being formed on either side.” It continued: “In the
next two days, we can try to streamline that. . . . It is a matter of being more

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efficient and getting to the essential, relevant questions. [¶]. . .[¶] Then it is
up to you to make a strategic decision on how you are going to get the most
relevant things into evidence. I will leave that up to you.”
On the third day of trial, the court again informed the parties that they
should be calculating their remaining time. Tinsley had used two hours and
40 minutes. Tinsley then testified on direct examination and exhibits were
admitted into evidence. Arnold’s counsel again made several objections,
many of which were sustained.
On the fourth day of trial, Tinsley’s direct examination continued and
additional exhibits were admitted into evidence. By the end of this day,
Tinsley had used four hours and 52 minutes (versus Arnold’s one hour and 31
minutes). While noting the parties had been “extremely inefficient,” the trial
court allowed the hearing to proceed to a fifth day.
On the fifth day of trial, the court stated that it would allow Tinsley’s
counsel to ask two more questions of Tinsley, and then five questions on
cross-examination of Arnold. The remaining two hours would be for Arnold.
The court noted that, even shifting an hour of used time from Tinsley to
Arnold based on objections, the parties would still have had roughly equal
time. After both parties had exhausted their time, the trial court permitted
the parties to submit closing statements in writing.
2. Analysis
“A trial court has the inherent authority and responsibility to fairly and
efficiently administer the judicial proceedings before it.” (California Crane
School, Inc. v. National Com. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014)
226 Cal.App.4th 12, 22 (California Crane).) This includes “the power of the
court to impose time limits before the trial commences.” (Ibid.) Indeed,
Evidence Code section 352 “expressly empowers trial judges to limit the

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presentation of evidence, even evidence that is relevant and probative.”
(California Crane, at p. 19.)
We review the imposition of time limits on a trial for abuse of
discretion. (California Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.) Tinsley offers
three arguments to support his position that the trial court abused its
discretion here. None is persuasive.
First, Tinsley argues that the trial court imposed unreasonable time
limits and did so after the evidentiary hearing had already commenced.
Specifically, Tinsley suggests that the court did not allow the parties any
“input” before setting the hearing for four afternoons. But the trial court set
this schedule months before the evidentiary hearing, at which point the
parties had the opportunity to offer such input or otherwise object. (See
California Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20 [noting courts should invite
estimates and comment from parties, and then conduct its own independent
evaluation for setting time limits].) Neither party did so.
Tinsley also suggests that the trial court injected “ambiguity” into the
time limits by initially describing them in days (four afternoons), but later by
hours (eight hours). “Time limits may be stated in terms of court days or
court hours.” (California Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 20.) The court’s
calculation of two hours for the presentation of evidence and testimony per
afternoon did not exceed the bounds of reason. Nor does it support Tinsley’s
position that any limit was imposed after trial had commenced, as the court
reminded the parties of the four-afternoon limit (and stated its calculation of
eight hours) at the outset of the first day.
Second, Tinsley argues that it was unreasonable to afford the parties
equal time to present their case, as his exhibit list contained 81 exhibits
containing “over 800 pages of evidence and eight hours of body camera

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footage,” and his witness list contained seven witnesses. While a trial court
may adjust time limits for good cause (California Crane, supra,
226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 21–22), Tinsley offers no authority to support his
position that the sheer volume of these lists—identifying evidence likely to
have consumed far more than the four afternoons allotted for the entire
hearing—required the trial court to deprive Arnold of an equal amount of
time here.
Third, Tinsley argues that the trial court failed to properly “manage”
objections by Arnold’s counsel, which “depleted” his trial time. But as
correctly noted by the trial court, these objections were based on the
formation of questions by Tinsley’s counsel and many were sustained. The
trial court also correctly noted that Tinsley had used an extra hour of hearing
time, which counterbalanced any concern regarding undue consumption of
time by objections.
Beyond these arguments regarding abuse of discretion, Tinsley also
contends that he was denied a full and fair trial by the limitation of his cross-
examination of Arnold. A trial court’s authority to impose time limitations is
subject to a party’s right to be heard and “have his day in court.” (California
Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 22.) Denial of this right constitutes
reversible error. (Id. at pp. 22–23, citing In re Marriage of Carlsson (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 281, 291.) But absent such a denial, “ ‘[n]o form of civil trial
error justifies reversal . . . where in light of the entire record, there was no
actual prejudice to the appealing party.’ ” (Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004)
33 Cal.4th 780, 801.)
The trial court’s limitation of Tinsley’s cross-examination here was not
reversible error, but instead a reasonable enforcement of the time limits it
had imposed. (California Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 22 (“[I]n those

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cases in which the trial court imposes time limits, it is also important that
those limits be enforced”].) Both before and during the evidentiary hearing,
the court repeatedly reminded the parties of the schedule and time allotted to
each side. It noted the potential benefit of trying to “streamline,” but that
each party must make their own “strategic decision” on how to present
evidence.
The court also repeatedly provided Tinsley with information regarding
his use of time. During a lengthy cross-examination, the court clarified that
Tinsley was using his time (not Arnold’s) and could do so “however he likes.”
Halfway through the hearing, the court informed Tinsley he had already used
most of his time. Then, after Tinsley had used almost an hour beyond his
allotted time, the court still permitted five questions for cross-examination of
Arnold.
Litigants do not have “camping rights” entitling them to “take
whatever time” they believe necessary for their presentation of evidence and
examination of witnesses. (California Crane, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th. at
p. 19.) “This view is not only contrary to law but undermines a trial judge’s
obligation to be protective of the court’s time and resources as well as the
time and interests of trial witnesses, jurors and other litigants waiting in line
to have their cases assigned to a courtroom.” (Ibid.) Tinsley argues that
California Crane is distinguishable because the appellants in that case spent
almost seven days examining three witnesses, while he had not “wasted” trial
time here. (Id. at p. 23.) But regardless of how the record may be
characterized, it shows that Tinsley decided to use the entirety of his time on
other evidence and witnesses. The limitation on cross-examination of Arnold
was of Tinsley’s own making.

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In sum, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion or deny
Tinsley’s right to a full and fair trial in imposing time limits on the
evidentiary hearing.
B. Finding of No “Abuse” on DVRO Request
1. Additional Background
After granting the initial TRO, the trial court entered first and second
amended versions in August and September 2022, respectively. Among other
things, the second amended TRO restrained Arnold from “disturb[ing] the
peace” and included a no-contact order except for “brief and peaceful contact
to communicate regarding legal custody matters.” It also included a 100-yard
stay-away order except to “briefly and peacefully exchange” Minor for court-
ordered visits, and to visit with Minor “for court-ordered contact or visits.”
Tinsley subsequently filed a declaration stating that Arnold had
violated the TRO in October 2022 by coming into contact with him in a
hospital waiting room before Minor’s medical appointment to have some
stiches removed.
At the evidentiary hearing, Tinsley admitted into evidence photographs
purporting to show that Arnold was in the waiting room with him and Minor.
Tinsley also admitted into evidence screenshots of social media posts by
Arnold, including one post with the text: “Judge Evangelista granted my
rapist 50/50 custody of [Minor] starting immediately.” Tinsley presented
officer testimony and admitted into evidence police body camera footage that
included a statement by Arnold’s roommate that she had purportedly been
told by Arnold that Tinsley was a rapist.
After the hearing, the trial court concluded that Arnold had not
perpetrated domestic violence against Tinsley, in that they had not
“cyberstalked . . . harassed, disturbed the peace of, annoyed, battered or

9
destroyed the property” of Tinsley or Minor. It found that Arnold had
testified credibly and the evidence had shown that Arnold “did not intend to
‘defame or slander,’ harass, annoy or disturb the peace” of Tinsley in the
posts. The posts were made on non-public accounts and did not refer to
Tinsley by name. Instead, they were “meant to be used as a source to vent,
refer to [Minor’s] support network, reference gender politics, thank loved ones
who have been by their side and express the ability to co-parent with people
with different values.”
The court found Tinsley did not have access to these social media
accounts, as he and his family and friends had been blocked by Arnold, but
Tinsley’s sister had gained access to the accounts without Arnold’s
“knowledge or informed consent.” It found there was no evidence presented
that anyone other than Tinsley’s sister had access to or saw the posts, and no
credible evidence that Tinsley was injured by the posts. The court also found
that Arnold believed they were raped, but that Tinsley’s “unwanted sexual
advance(s)” were not proven by Arnold to be rape or attempted rape.
2. Analysis
The Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (§ 6200 et seq.)
authorizes a trial court to issue a restraining order based on “reasonable
proof of a past act or acts of abuse.” (§ 6300, subd. (a).) “Abuse” is defined
under the DVPA to include “any behavior that has been or could be enjoined
pursuant to Section 6320.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(4).) Such behavior includes
“disturbing the peace of the other party,” which has been interpreted to mean
“conduct that destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.”
(§ 6320, subd. (a); In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483,
1497 (Nadkarni).)

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We review the denial of a DVRO request for abuse of discretion as
“ ‘ “ ‘granting, denial, dissolving or refusing to dissolve a permanent or
preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the trial court upon a
consideration of all the particular circumstances of each individual case.’ ” ’ ”
(Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.) Again, Tinsley offers three
arguments to support his position that the trial court abused its discretion
here.
First, Tinsley argues that the court failed to make “necessary” factual
findings in its order regarding whether the purported TRO violation or
statements calling him a “rapist” constituted abuse under the DVPA. We are
not persuaded.
Section 6340, subdivision (b) requires that the denial of a DVRO
request include only a “brief statement of the reasons for the decision in
writing or on the record.” In Salmon v. Salmon (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1047,
the appellate court rejected an argument much like the one Tinsley makes
here, concluding that section 6340 does not require “detailed factual findings”
on “all factors” in determining whether relief is appropriate. (Salmon v.
Salmon, at p. 1060.)
Tinsley’s DVRO request included numerous allegations of abuse beyond
those raised in this appeal: physical violence by Arnold against Minor,
Arnold’s roommate, and Tinsley, as well as unauthorized entry into Tinsley’s
home and destruction of property, threats of arson, false statements about
Minor’s medical condition, and other defamatory statements about Tinsley.
The trial court’s order addressed many of these allegations and made findings
that no credible or admissible evidence had been presented to prove such
allegations.

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Tinsley’s suggestion that the absence of explicit factual findings for
every allegation shows a failure to even “consider” the related evidence is not
supported by authority or the record. Tinsley’s citation to Bailey v. Murray
(2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 677 is inapposite, as that case involved an evidentiary
ruling. (Id. at p. 686 [affirming decision to allow testimony about sexual
assault not specifically alleged in the DVRO request as it involved same
category of abuse].) Here, the court allowed testimony and admitted evidence
related to the TRO and “rapist” statement allegations.
Tinsley’s other citation to Vinson v. Kinsey (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1166
is easily distinguishable. In that case, the victim had requested a DVRO
because she was “ ‘in fear of [her] life.’ ” (Id. at p. 1170.) She testified
regarding numerous incidents of abuse over the prior decade, and presented
texts documenting threats as well as sworn statements from witnesses of the
abuse and her resulting injuries. (Id. at pp. 1170–1172.) The trial court
denied the DVRO request, stating that “ ‘despite the fact that Ms. Vinson
repeats that she’s been repeatedly threatened by Mr. Kinsey, she repeatedly
goes back and has contact with Mr. Kinsey. So it’s clear to the Court that
she’s not particularly concerned about his comment that he will kill
her. . . . [I]t has no meaning.’ ” (Id. at pp. 1173–1174.) The appellate court
reversed the ruling, as it reflected an erroneous understanding of the term
“threatening” under the DVPA and “gave no indication it considered the
evidence Vinson submitted of additional threats and repeated verbal and
physical abuse.” (Vinson, at p. 1180.)
Unlike Vinson, there is sufficient evidence that the court considered the
evidence presented here. When the court permitted the parties to submit
closing statements in writing, it explicitly directed them to address the
“allegation of the restraining order” and the “allegation . . . in connection with

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some of the [social media] posts,” as it would need to determine whether
Tinsley had met his burden of proof on those issues. The court’s ultimate
order denying the DVRO request explicitly referenced the TRO and Tinsley’s
allegation that Arnold had violated it, as well as Arnold’s social media posts.
The order was also explicit that the court had considered “the pleadings,
testimony, evidence and arguments,” and found that Arnold had not
perpetrated domestic violence against Tinsley. We conclude that the trial
court complied with its directive under section 6340, subdivision (b) to
provide a “brief statement of the reasons” for its denial.
Second, Tinsley argues that there was undisputed evidence proving
Arnold violated the TRO, and a TRO violation constitutes “per se abuse”
mandating issuance of a DVRO. As a preliminary matter, we do not accept
the assumption that Tinsley had proven a violation of the TRO. Tinsley
points to the photographs showing Arnold in the hospital waiting room with
him and Minor in October 2022, but the trial court could have, for example,
concluded that such contact fell within an exception of the stay-away order
for “court-ordered contact” with Minor related to his medical care.
Even accepting this assumption, we are still unpersuaded by Tinsley’s
argument that a TRO violation constitutes “per se abuse” mandating a
DVRO. The express language of section 6300, subdivision (a) is
discretionary, not mandatory: it provides that a trial court “may” issue a
restraining order upon reasonable proof of abuse. And while the case law
cited by Tinsley affirms that evidence of a restraining order violation should
be considered and may lend “ ‘very significant support’ ” for further orders,
such a determination must still be made in the totality of circumstances of
each case. (Perez v. Torres-Hernandez (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 389, 400 [trial
court erroneously required a showing of ongoing harassment, post-order

13
abuse, and physical violence to renew the order]; In re Marriage of F.M. &
M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 110 [trial court erroneously refused to
consider evidence of abuse committed after the request for order]; Nadkarni,
supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1495.)
In N.T. v. H.T. (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 595, for example, the victim filed
a DVRO request based on numerous violations of the TRO: her husband had
stalked her at her apartment complex, followed her after child visitation
exchanges, given her letters and gifts, asked for hugs or kisses, discussed
their relationship, and threatened custody disputes. (Id. at pp. 598–601.)
The trial court denied the DVRO request, describing the TRO violations as
“ ‘technical’ ” and stating it was “ ‘not aware of the authority that says a
violation of a TRO is in and of itself domestic violence.’ ” (Id. at p. 601.) The
appellate court reversed and remanded, concluding that the violations were
not “technical” and the conduct, if proven, would constitute “abuse”
warranting issuance of the DVRO even without the existence of the TRO.
(Id. at p. 603.) Here, unlike N.T. v. H.T., Tinsley relies on a singular alleged
violation of the TRO at Minor’s October 2022 medical appointment and has
not argued that such conduct would alone mandate the granting of his DVRO
request even if the TRO had not been in effect.
Third, Tinsley argues that the trial court applied the wrong legal
standard in determining whether Arnold’s non-public social media posts
constituted “abuse” under the DVPA. Specifically, he contends that the court
imposed a “heightened” standard for “disturbing the peace” by requiring
Tinsley prove injury and “wide dissemination” of the posts. But we read the
trial court’s findings—that there was no credible evidence of injury or viewing
of the posts by anyone with proper access to Arnold’s non-public accounts—as
simply determining Tinsley had not shown “conduct that destroys the mental

14
or emotional calm of the other party” for “disturbing the peace” under the
DVPA. (Cf. Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1497, 1499 [allegations
of access, reading, and publicly disclosure of private emails causing “ ‘shock’
and ‘embarrassment,’ ” fear of destroyed business relationships, and fear for
safety would be sufficient if proven]; In re Marriage of Evilsizor & Sweeney
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1416, 1421 [disclosing personal data downloaded from
cell phone causing “ ‘extreme embarrassment, fear, and intimidation’ ”
sufficient to warrant DVRO].)
Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1 is also instructive. That case
involved the issuance of a DVRO based on a private social media post stating,
“ ‘CURCIO (yes, i just outted my abuser) was SEVERELY AND
DISTURBINGLY ABUSIVE TO ME’ ” and “WHEN YOU BOOK HER ON
YOUR SHOWS, BEFRIEND HER, PLAY ON IMPROV TEAMS WITH HER
YOU, ARE ENABLING AN ABUSER. IT IS LIKE SUPPORTING A
RAPIST . . . .” (Id. at p. 5.) The appellate court determined that the private
post was insufficient to constitute abuse under the DVPA. (Curcio, at p. 13.)
It explained: “Curcio understandably was upset by the social media post and
it may have made her fear for her career, but we conclude it cannot be said to
rise to the level of destruction of Curcio’s mental and emotional calm,
sufficient to support the issuance of a domestic violence restraining order.”
(Ibid.) Here, as in Curcio, Tinsley cites only one private post by Arnold that
included the term “rapist” and even then, it did not identify Tinsley by name.
In sum, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Tinsley’s DVRO request.

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C. Findings for Denial of Sole Custody Request
1. Additional Background
Tinsley’s DVRO application included a request to change the 2021
custody order, seeking sole legal and physical custody of Minor. In his motion
for reconsideration of the 2022 order denying his sole custody request,
Tinsley alleged there were new facts from unredacted police body camera
footage regarding the September 2021 incident. Tinsley argued that the
footage showed Arnold was placed on a Welfare and Institutions Code section
5150 hold as a result of the incident. Tinsley also argued that the footage
showed Arnold had “multiple personality disorder” and made “recent threats
and attempts at suicide,” as the mother of Minor’s nanny stated that Arnold
had “ ‘an alter personality’ ” and Arnold’s roommate stated that Arnold had
purportedly told her she “ ‘had a knife to [her] throat like two months ago.’ ”
After the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Tinsley’s DVRO
request upon concluding that Arnold had not perpetrated domestic violence
against him. It also denied Tinsley’s motion for reconsideration, concluding
there were no new facts sufficient to warrant reconsideration of the order
denying sole custody to Tinsley. It found that the police had placed a Welfare
and Institutions Code section 5150 hold on Arnold at the scene, but after
being taken to the hospital to be examined by a psychiatrist, the psychiatrist
cancelled the hold. It found that Arnold had informed the psychiatrist that
they had borderline personality disorder, but that Arnold’s mental health
diagnosis did not affect Arnold’s ability to care for Minor. It also found that
Arnold was prescribed medication and had stopped taking it two weeks prior
to the incident, but neither party had presented any evidence regarding the
effects of the medication on the night in question.

16
2. Analysis
Tinsley argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it did
not make sufficient findings in its order after the evidentiary hearing
regarding (1) whether shared custody was in Minor’s best interests or (2) the
purported facts raised in his motion for reconsideration (statements
regarding suicide, mental health diagnoses, and medication non-compliance).
Tinsley cites Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249 for the principle that
an award of custody must be based on the “best interests” of the child. (Id. at
p. 252.)
Tinsley misunderstands the scope of the evidentiary hearing and the
court’s subsequent order. The trial court was tasked with determining
whether Tinsley had proven “abuse” by Arnold to support the issuance of the
DVRO. (§ 6300, subd. (a).) It found Tinsley had not done so, and thus did not
grant the relief he requested, including the request for sole custody of Minor.
The court did not make any award of custody, and thus was not required to
make any related “best interests” finding under Montenegro v. Diaz.
The trial court was also tasked with determining whether there were
“new or different facts” warranting reconsideration of the order denying
Tinsley’s request for sole custody, a ruling that we review for abuse of
discretion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (a); Monroy v. City of Los Angeles
(2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 248, 265.)
Tinsley’s motion argued there were new facts related to the September
2021 incident supporting his request. But the court concluded neither party
had presented evidence that those purported facts had any effect on the
incident or Arnold’s ability to care for Minor. The court was not required to
make any further findings regarding those purported facts.

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We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its
findings denying the DVRO and motion for reconsideration. Having rejected
each of Tinsley’s specific arguments regarding error, we also reject his
argument that the combination of errors necessitates reversal and remand.
III. DISPOSITION
The February 23, 2023 order is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs
on appeal.

STREETER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOLDMAN, J.
DOUGLAS, J.*

* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Contra Costa,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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