People v. Warda CA5

CourtListener 10274929Calctapp15.11.2024

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Filed 11/15/24 P. v. Warda CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE,
F084513
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. CR-19-001497)
v.

PETER JAMES WARDA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Robert B.
Westbrook, Judge.
Jennifer Mouzis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kimberley A. Donohue and Craig S.
Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General, Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Peter James Warda was leaving a bar with Michelle Gamble when he
saw Christopher Woodward leaning against his car, facing Thomas Hinchman. Warda
confronted them and Woodward apologized. Warda and Gamble got into the car to leave.
As Warda was backing up, he heard one of the men say, “Bitch” and then heard
something hit his car. Warda stopped the car and got out. As Warda got out, Woodward
and Hinchman approached him. Warda hit Hinchman in the face and the three got into a
fight. Warda ended up on the ground, protecting himself with his hands. The two men
stopped hitting Warda and Woodward backed away. Warda stood up, pulled out a
concealed firearm, and shot and killed Hinchman. Warda got into his car and drove away.
Warda pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1),1 count II). A jury convicted Warda of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192,
subd. (a), in count I) and found the allegation that he personally discharged the firearm in
violation of section 12022.5, subdivision (a), to be true. In a bifurcated proceeding, the
trial court found the section 12022.1 out-on-bail enhancement true as to each count.
Warda was sentenced to an aggregate term of 12 years in state prison.
On appeal, Warda raises the following claims: prosecutorial misconduct for
knowingly presenting false testimony at the preliminary hearing to secure a holding
order, prosecutorial misconduct at trial based on misstatements of law and evidence, that
the trial court erred in giving the mutual combat instruction under CALCRIM No. 3471,
that the court deprived him of his right to present a defense by instructing the jury under
CALCRIM No. 3472, and that cumulative error resulted in an unjust verdict. The People
disagree on each of Warda’s claims. We conclude there was no prosecutorial misconduct,
that the court’s instruction under CALCRIM Nos. 3471 and 3472 were proper, and that
there was no cumulative error. We affirm the judgment.

1 Hereinafter, all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Warda was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a); count I) and being a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count II). The complaint further alleged
that during the commission of the murder, Warda personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.53, subdivision (d). Additionally, Warda
was alleged to have been released on bail when he committed counts I and II, pursuant to
section 12022.1.
The preliminary hearing began August 26, 2019. The magistrate found sufficient
cause to hold Warda to answer to the charges on August 28, 2019. It did not find
premeditation as requested by the prosecution.
On September 11, 2019, the District Attorney of Stanislaus County filed an
information in which it alleged that Warda willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously and with
malice aforethought, murdered Hinchman (§ 187, subd. (a); count I), alleging that Warda
personally and intentionally discharged a firearm which proximately caused great bodily
injury or death to Hinchman (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)); and that Warda was a felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count II). It was further alleged as to both
counts that Warda was out on bail at the time of the commission of the above offenses
(§ 12022.1). Over Warda’s objection, a first amended information was filed on March
19, 2021, wherein the People alleged that the murder allegation in count I was
premeditated.
Prior to trial, Warda entered a plea of no contest as to count II, a violation of
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1). Trial commenced on June 30, 2021. On July 30, 2021,
the jury returned a verdict of guilty as to the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) in count I and found the allegation that Warda personally
discharged a firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) true. In a bifurcated proceeding, the court
found the out-on-bail enhancements (§ 12022.1) true as to each count.

3.
On June 10, 2022, the court denied Warda’s new trial motion. The court sentenced
Warda to an aggregate term of 12 years as follows: the middle term of six years for
voluntary manslaughter, plus the middle term of four years for the firearm enhancement,
plus two years for the on-bail enhancement; the court imposed but stayed a middle term
of two years for being a felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court further imposed
a separate one-year eight-month sentence in a separate case No. 1465697.
Warda filed a timely appeal on June 13, 2022.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Prosecution Evidence
Michelle Gamble
On February 17, 2019, Warda picked up Michelle Gamble to go for a ride in his
new car. The two ran errands in the new car and ended up at a bar in Modesto. They
each had a drink and left after about 15 minutes.
As they exited the bar, Gamble saw two men in their 20s, later identified as
Christopher Woodward and Thomas Hinchman, smoking cigarettes and leaning on
Warda’s car. Warda told the men to get off his car. Gamble began recording a video on
her cell phone. Woodward apologized and then Warda and Gamble got into Warda’s car.
(1RT 70, 88, 96.) The video was played for the jury.
When Warda reversed about halfway out of the parking spot, Gamble heard
Hinchman yell, “Bitch” and then heard something hit the car. Warda stopped the car and
said, “They threw something at the car.” Warda then got out of the car and confronted the
two men. Warda stated, “Why are you fucking with my car?” While Warda was by the
car door, the two men advanced swiftly towards him. Warda also moved towards
Hinchman and then pushed him in the face. Gamble described this as a defensive
gesture. Gamble acknowledged this was when the first physical contact was initiated
between Warda and the two men. Gamble recorded a video of Warda confronting the two

4.
men which was played for the jury. After watching the video, Gamble recalls Hinchman
saying, “You want to touch me?” to Warda right after Warda pushes him on the face.
Warda appeared to retreat backwards as the two men advance on him and move
towards the back of the car. Gamble looked over her shoulder and saw Warda on the
ground towards the rear of the car. The two men were hitting and kicking Warda, who
was on his side, in a fetal position, covering his head with his hands. During the next few
minutes, the two men hit and kicked Warda about 20 times each. Gamble did not observe
any firearms or weapons during the fight.2 Gamble turned her attention to a woman who
had approached by her car door, and then Gamble heard a gunshot. Gamble did not see
the gun being shot. Gamble saw the men had moved towards the front of the car. Warda
and Woodward were standing on their feet a couple of feet apart with Hinchman on the
ground further away. Warda stood for about a minute then moved very slowly to the car,
got into the driver’s seat and drove off.
Warda told Gamble that he left his cell phone and key fob at the scene of the
shooting.3 Warda drove to a house where he picked up a cell phone. Then Warda drove
to Gamble’s home where he called his girlfriend and asked her to bring another key fob
for his car. Gamble thought Warda was bleeding from a cut on his head, which Warda
asked her to record. Gamble also noticed that Warda’s knees and arms were scraped up.
Warda said his legs were hurting.
Warda called the Modesto Police Department and asked to speak with a detective
at the scene of the shooting. Warda was given a crime stopper number to call instead but
Warda did not call the crime stopper number.

2 Detective Ray Bennett collected a tan folding knife from the parking lot of the
shooting. The knife was located next to Hinchman’s jacket.
3 Detective Ray Bennett collected an iPhone, a Gucci hat and [a car] key fob from
the parking lot of the shooting. These items were located together in one spot.

5.
Christopher Woodward
Woodward had been friends with Hinchman since high school in 2010. On
February 17, 2019, Woodward met Hinchman at a bar in Modesto. Woodward and
Hinchman spent a couple of hours at the bar with Cheyanne Soria and Katelyn Conley.
Woodward and Hinchman drank several beers and shots of liquor. Woodward and
Hinchman also snorted cocaine at the bar.
At some point, Woodward and Hinchman went outside the bar to smoke cigarettes.
Woodward leaned against Warda’s car while Hinchman stood facing Woodward. Warda
exited the bar and was not happy that Woodward was leaning against his car. Warda was
angry and yelled, “Get off my fucking car.” Woodward got up and apologized, and
Warda got into his car and started to back up.
As Warda was backing up, Hinchman spit on the ground, which Woodward
believed Warda took as an insult. Woodward testified that neither he nor Hinchman said
the word, “bitch,” or threw anything at Warda’s car. Warda stopped reversing his car,
pulled back into the parking spot and got out and confronted Woodward and Hinchman.
Woodward described Warda as very angry as he approached them, and that he moved a
little bit faster than a walking speed. Woodward believed that he and Hinchman had
remained standing where they were, and that it was Warda who had moved towards them.
Warda initiated physical contact and punched Hinchman in the face with his fist.
Woodward did not initially remember if Warda hit him or Hinchman first, but after
watching the video, Woodward acknowledged that Warda hit Hinchman first. Although
the video showed that Hinchman had moved towards Warda at the first physical contact,
Woodward did not remember it that way. At that point, Woodward and Hinchman fought
back and the three of them got into a fight. Woodward advanced towards Warda “to help
[his] friend out” because he did not want him to get hit again. Woodward said he hit
Warda pretty hard because he was defending his friend, Hinchman. Woodward did not
remember if Warda fought back because everything happened so fast, but he did not think

6.
Warda was able to hit back. The fight lasted about 30 seconds to one minute. During the
fight, Woodward did not have anything in his hand and did not use any weapons. The
fight had moved from one part of the parking lot to another part. Woodward recalled that
Warda was on the ground for one part of the fight.
Woodward testified initially that the fight ended when Warda pulled out a gun and
shot Hinchman. He clarified that the fighting ended when he and Hinchman stopped
hitting Warda and stepped away from him.4 Woodward and Hinchman moved a couple of
feet away from Warda. Warda then stood up, pulled out a gun and shot Hinchman.
Woodward saw Hinchman fall to the ground and watched him “bleed out.” Then
Woodward saw the car drive away erratically and very fast.
Woodward spoke with the police at the scene of the shooting. Woodward was
angry that his friend was shot. Woodward told police that he and Hinchman had “beat[]
the dog shit” out of Warda. Woodward said he “felt like a bitch and should have had
him.” Woodward also told the police, “If you don’t find him, I’ll kill him in front of you.
I will kill him. I don’t give a fuck.” Woodward acknowledged to the police that he
retaliated against Warda.
On cross-examination, Woodward acknowledged that he testified falsely at the
preliminary hearing that he had not used cocaine on the night of the shooting, but that it
was his recollection at the time. Woodward only just learned that he used cocaine that
night after watching the video at trial. Woodward also acknowledged that after watching
the video he previously testified incorrectly or falsely that him and Hinchman remained
standing on the sidewalk when Warda approached them. And he testified incorrectly that
he was the first one to be hit and that he was disoriented by that punch. Woodward also
acknowledged that his preliminary hearing testimony that Warda was never on the ground

4 Alternatively, Woodward testified Warda had broken free from the fight and then
Woodward and Hinchman stopped fighting.

7.
was incorrect. Woodward explained that he was not intentionally trying to deceive
anyone. He explained that when he testified at the preliminary hearing, he testified to
what he perceived at the time. Woodward said this was the most traumatic event in his
life, and he was still upset about it and nervous testifying.
After the shooting incident, Woodward went to Warda’s place of business. Warda
was not there but Woodward communicated threats of violence to Warda through other
people at the business.
Modesto Police Officer Nicholas Largent interviewed Woodward at the scene of
the shooting and the jury was shown Largent’s body camera footage. In that video,
Woodward stated that he was leaning on Warda’s car and Warda started “talking shit.”
After Woodward apologized, Warda started to drive away. Then, Hinchman spit on the
ground and Warda got out and punched Hinchman in the face. Woodward claimed they
all got into a fist fight and that he and Hinchman “beat the dog shit out of” Warda. Then,
Warda got up and shot Hinchman. Woodward stated that he thought he was going to jail.
Charisma Weed
On February 17, 2019, at around 9:00 p.m., Charisma Weed and her boyfriend
pulled into the parking lot of a bar in Modesto. Weed was sitting in the front passenger
seat and noticed three men fighting in the parking lot. All three appeared mutually
engaged in the fight.
Weed did not see how the fight had started. Weed, who was only 15 feet from the
fight, saw the three men pushing each other around. Weed said they were standing
almost in a triangle, using their hands to shove each other’s shoulders. Weed then saw
Warda on the ground in a fetal position, covering his head with his hands, as Woodward
and Hinchman kept hitting and kicking him. Warda was not able to fight back while on
the ground. Weed never saw Woodward or Hinchman with any weapons.

8.
After a short time, no more than five minutes, Weed heard a female yell, “That’s
enough,” and the fight ended. Woodward stopped first and walked away towards the
female. Hinchman noticed that Woodward had stopped fighting and turned to look for
him. Warda stumbled as he got up and took a few steps away from Woodward and
Hinchman. Warda used both his arms and legs to get up and was almost crawling and
appeared dizzy. When Warda got up, Hinchman turned back to look at him and took two
or three steps towards Warda. Warda took a few more steps away from Hinchman and
Hinchman then stood where he was, facing Warda. While facing Hinchman, Warda
reached into the waistband of his pants and removed a handgun. Warda then pulled the
slide back on his handgun, pointed it at Hinchman and shot him. Hinchman’s “body
jolted,” his arms went up and then he fell to the ground. Weed estimated that when
Warda shot Hinchman they were 10 feet apart. Warda looked like he was shocked that he
just shot Hinchman. Weed’s boyfriend then drove them out of the parking lot.
Jesus Alejandro Diaz
Jesus Alejandro Diaz worked as a bouncer at the Modesto bar. A few minutes
before 9:00 p.m., Diaz was driving into the parking lot to start his shift at the bar when he
saw people fighting by the front entrance of the bar. Diaz observed Warda on his knees,
covering his face with his forearms to protect himself, as two other men punched and
kicked him. Diaz stopped his car and jumped out and yelled, “Hey, you guys, cut it out.”
The fighting stopped and Woodward and Hinchman took two steps back as they looked at
Diaz, who was approaching them.
Diaz then saw Warda stand up with “[n]o hesitation, you know, no stumbling,
nothing.” Diaz did not see any injuries on any of the three men fighting. Woodward and
Hinchman appeared calm and were standing up straight with their arms by their sides and
did not try to reach for anything. Warda did not appear to notice Diaz but stared at
Hinchman for a few seconds. Warda then reached into his pocket, pulled something out

9.
and then Diaz heard a gunshot. Diaz immediately ducked behind his car. Diaz, who had
been around firearms his entire life, thought the gunshot sounded like a small caliber
handgun, like a .22.
Diaz saw Warda mumble something and then walk to his car and drive off. Warda
acted “nonchalant,” walked normally over to his car, and backed up “nice and slow.”
Warda drove out of the parking lot “just like normal.”
Diaz then ran over to Hinchman, who was lying on the ground gasping for air. A
female lifted Hinchman’s shirt and Diaz saw a gunshot wound. Diaz told the female to
apply pressure to the wound and then Diaz ran into the bar and told the bartender to call
911. Diaz went back outside and directed people to perform CPR on Hinchman who had
stopped breathing. The police arrived quickly, and Diaz helped keep people away from
the crime scene.
Cheyanne Soria
Cheyanne Soria considered Hinchman her best friend and was with him, his
cousin Katelyn and Woodward at the bar on February 17, 2019. They were all at the bar
to celebrate Soria getting a second job. They drank and played some games and hung out
for a few hours. When they all left the bar, Soria waited by their car for Katelyn as
Woodward and Hinchman smoked cigarettes. Soria heard Warda say something in a loud
angry voice about a car, and she walked towards where Woodward and Hinchman were
standing. Soria saw Warda and her friends “tussling a little bit,” which consisted of
pushing and shoving. Then Warda got into his car and started to back up. Soria did not
see or hear Woodward or Hinchman throw anything at Warda’s car. Warda then stopped
his car, exited the car, and started going after Hinchman. Hinchman and Woodward had
stayed put and Warda went all the way up to them. Soria described Warda as walking fast
towards Hinchman, and believed Warda hit Hinchman, but could not be entirely sure.
Then the three of them started wrestling or tussling, which she described as not as serious

10.
as a fight. The fighting consisted of pushing and body punches and “nobody was really
aiming for the head or face.”
It was Soria’s opinion that Warda initiated the second tussle by getting out of his
car and going towards Hinchman and Woodward, and then pushing Hinchman first.
Soria saw the three men fighting and saw “everyone hitting everyone” and mostly
throwing “body punches.” Soria did not see anyone kicking anyone. The fighting
appeared mutual among all three men, including Warda who was also hitting back. The
fighting lasted about five to 10 minutes and then they stopped. Soria did not hear anyone
yell anything and said the fight “didn’t seem too serious.” Warda was on the ground
squatting at one point but was able to stand up after they stopped fighting. Warda was
not throwing punches at the end when he was on the ground. When Warda stood up,
Woodward and Hinchman backed away from him.5 Warda pulled a firearm out of his
pocket, aimed the firearm at Hinchman, pulled the trigger and shot Hinchman. Soria
stated that the fighting was done when Hinchman got shot. Neither Hinchman nor
Woodward had anything in their hands. Hinchman was approximately 15 to 20 feet away
from Warda when Warda shot him. Warda fired the gun one time, Hinchman fell to the
ground, then Warda got into his car and drove off. Warda did not appear to be too injured
and did not have any trouble walking.
Soria acknowledged that the video of the second tussle showed Hinchman outside
Warda’s car door where Warda put his hand to Hinchman’s face.
Law Enforcement Evidence
Modesto Police Officer Nicholas Largent was called to the scene of the shooting
on February 17, 2019. He found Hinchman unresponsive with a faint pulse so he began

5 At the preliminary hearing, Soria testified Hinchman stood there without moving
back.

11.
to administer CPR. The ambulance arrived and began removing Hinchman’s clothes.
Largent noticed that Hinchman’s blue shirt and leather jacket had a bullet hole.
On February 20, 2019, three days after the shooting, Modesto Police Sergeant
Shane Castro received a phone call from Warda. Warda said he was worried about people
trying to kill him and was scared for his life. He told Castro that “[t]hey went to my shop
earlier today.” Warda told Castro that he was in a physical altercation where he was
kicked and punched 20 to 30 times. Warda told Castro that he also got punches in.
Warda said that the fight with Woodward and Hinchman lasted about a minute and a half.
Warda said he was the victim and that they were trying to kill him. Warda described
Hinchman and Woodward as angry, energized and possessed. Warda said he acted out of
self-defense and asked Castro whether he would have waited that long before he did
something.
Warda then lamented that “I should have fucked him up” and called them pansies.
When asked why he did not, Warda responded, “I don’t fucking know, man. I don’t
know. I don’t got an answer for you – for that. You know, I usually beat people up.”
Warda was surprised that he “got stomped out” by two men he did not think would stomp
him out. He did not know he would not be able to handle the two men.
Warda asked Sergeant Castro to release information about the shooting to the
newspapers. He asked the police to watch the video evidence and it would exonerate
him. Warda told Castro that the witnesses were not being honest; that they were
changing their stories. Warda mentioned that he was with a woman at the time of the
shooting but refused to give Castro any information about Gamble. Warda said that the
woman had a video. Castro indicated that based on their investigation, they determined
that Warda was the initial aggressor. Castro felt Warda’s statements were calculated and
that his answers were evasive.
Modesto Police Detective Derrick Letsinger joined the telephone conversation
Warda was having with Sergeant Castro. Warda repeatedly mentioned that the police had

12.
a video or that they had watched a video. Letsinger explained to Warda that they did not
have any video and he encouraged Warda to give his account of the fight. Letsinger
encouraged Warda to get him in contact with his female companion who had the video or
to tell her to reach out to them. The video was eventually given to the police. Letsinger
also tried to encourage Warda to give them an account of what occurred, but he never got
that information. Letsinger described the phone call as more of a “fishing expedition”
where Warda was trying to determine what they knew and the course of the police
investigation. Warda avoided giving any details about the incident besides a “very vague
description of the fight, more describing it as they were killing – trying to kill him or
those kind of words. But when it came to specific information, there was none of that.”
Detective Letsinger observed photographs of Warda taken within a matter of a few
hours after the incident and observed that Warda’s injuries were consistent with “a very
minor altercation.” Warda only had a few light scuffs, one on each knee and on one of
his elbows, where the skin was not broken and no blood was present. They appeared like
small scabs that had begun to fall off. Letsinger did not observe any black eyes, a bloody
nose or split lip or bruising.
The following day, on February 21, 2019, Sergeant Castro went to Warda’s
residence to execute an arrest and search warrant. The SWAT team made public address
announcements for over an hour for Warda to surrender. The SWAT team eventually
went into Warda’s residence and he was not located inside. Police searched the
neighboring house and located Warda hiding in the backseat of a car in the garage.
On February 22, 2019, Modesto Police Detective Joshua Grant transported Warda
to the hospital to check for any injuries. A video of Warda being transported to the
hospital was played to the jury. Warda was hostile and told Detective Grant and Officer
Ra Pouv that his attorney, Frank Carson, was going to humiliate them and give them “a
fucking ass whooping.”

13.
When they arrived at the hospital, Warda claimed that he had been “jumped” and
“beat up” at the scene. Warda claimed he suffered a concussion because he was “asking
the same thing over and over.” Warda further complained that he hurt his hands, back
and spine. Dr. Linda Bobrick examined Warda and said he was “good to go” but ordered
CT scans at the request of Detective Grant.
Warda’s Medical Results
Dr. Robert Barandica, an emergency physician, testified regarding Warda’s CT
scans taken on February 22, 2019. Warda’s CT scan of his brain was normal. The CT
scans of his chest, abdomen, pelvis, cervical spine, thoracic spine, and lumbar spine
showed no recent injuries. Further, X-rays taken on Warda’s elbows and left shoulder
were “completely normal.” The physical exam revealed no evidence of trauma to Warda,
including his head, heart, lungs, back or extremities. After a thorough medical
examination, Warda was medically cleared and allowed to be transported back to jail.
Dr. Barandica acknowledged that the tests were run five days after the incident but
opined that “if there was a significant injury, there would still be evidence of the injury
four to five days later.” The doctor testified that if a patient had experienced blunt force
trauma from kicking, stomping and punching about 20 to 30 times, she would expect to
see “scratches, abrasions, bruising, tenderness to palpation, broken bones on X-rays” but
none of those were observed on Warda.
Bill Posey
Bill Posey, a forensic toxicologist with Central Valley Toxicology testified about
how poisons or toxins react within the body and how the body responds. Posey testified
that cocaine is a stimulant that affects the central nervous system. It has the effect of
making you excited; it also stimulates you or gets you to move or react more quickly.
Posey explained that alcohol is a central nervous system depressant and has the opposite
action in the body from cocaine. Alcohol slows your thinking and reaction time. It also

14.
lowers your inhibitions and affects the quality or accuracy of your perceptions. Alcohol
also affects your memory by slowing down the process of bringing in information, which
we tend to lose if not processed quickly. Additionally, alcohol creates difficulty in seeing,
hearing and judging distances. Posey tested Hinchman’s blood and found a low level of
cocaine but a blood-alcohol level of 0.14 percent.
Hinchman’s Autopsy
Dr. Michael Joseph Ferenc was the forensic pathologist with the Stanislaus
Sheriff’s Coroner’s Division that performed the autopsy on Hinchman. At the time of his
death, Hinchman was 22 years old, weighed 170 pounds and was five feet 10 inches tall.
Hinchman’s cause of death was from a gunshot wound that entered the left side of his
chest, perforated his heart and embedded itself in the middle of the spine. There was no
finding of gunpowder soot or stippling that would indicate the shooting was at close
range. Dr. Ferenc opined it was not a distance shot, but an indeterminate range.
Defense Evidence
Katelyn Conley was at the Modesto bar the night of the shooting. Conley was
Hinchman’s cousin and close friends with Woodward. Conley testified that earlier that
day, Hinchman took a Vicodin. Later at the bar, Conley snorted cocaine with Hinchman
and Woodward. Conley attended the preliminary hearing in this case. When Conley
heard Woodward testify that he had denied using cocaine on the night of the shooting,
Conley knew that was untrue and told a police detective.
Earlier in the evening of the shooting, a man started flirting with Cheyanne Soria
at the bar. When the man’s advances were not welcomed by Soria, he started harassing
her. Conley got angry with the man and confronted him. Hinchman also took offense
and asked the man to leave them alone. Conley specifically testified that she and
Hinchman were irritated, but not angry or mad about the incident. There was no
lingering tension after the confrontation and “everything was calm and fine afterwards.”

15.
Conley did not remember wearing Hinchman’s jacket that evening and did not
recall discovering anything inside of the jacket. Detective Pouv testified that Conley told
him that she had worn Hinchman’s jacket earlier that day and found a switch blade knife
in the pocket.

Verdict and Sentencing
On July 30, 2021, the jurors returned a verdict of guilty as to the lesser included
offense of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) in count I, and found the allegation
that Warda personally discharged the firearm in violation of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a), to be true. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found the
section 12022.1, out-on-bail enhancement true as to each count.
On June 10, 2022, the trial court pronounced judgement and a sentence totaling
12 years. As to count I, violation of section 192, subdivision (a), the court imposed the
midterm of six years, and the midterm of four years as to the section 12022.5
enhancement. A consecutive term of two years on the section 12022.1, out-on-bail
enhancement as to Counts I and II was imposed. As to count II, violation of
section 29800, subdivision (a)(1), the court imposed the midterm of two years, to be
served concurrently with count I.
DISCUSSION

I. NO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING.
Warda accuses the prosecution of “knowingly present[ing] the false testimony of
Woodward at the preliminary hearing” in order to secure a holding order. Warda states
that Woodward’s testimony was “central to the court’s issuing a holding order on the
murder charge” because Woodward’s testimony was used to establish Warda was the
initial aggressor, i.e., that Woodward and Hinchman were just standing there when Warda
hit Woodward in the head, and that Warda fought back and was never on the ground. The
People argue the prosecutor did not suborn perjury at the preliminary hearing and that

16.
Warda distorts the record regarding Woodward’s testimony. We conclude there is no
evidence of prosecutorial misconduct related to Woodward’s testimony at the preliminary
hearing.
A. Relevant Background
During the preliminary hearing, Woodward testified regarding the events that led
up to the shooting. Woodward testified that Warda exited his car and approached
Woodward and Hinchman while they were “just standing there” about 12 feet away. The
following colloquy occurred:

“[Prosecutor]: Okay. And where -- when [Warda] parks the SUV back in
that stall, how far away from the SUV are you?

“[Woodward]: Probably from me to you.

“[Prosecutor]: And do you approach [Warda] when he gets out of the SUV?

“[Woodward]: No. We were just standing there. [¶] … [¶]

“[Prosecutor]: When [Warda] got out of the SUV, he approached you –

“[Woodward]: Correct.

“[Prosecutor]: -- and Mr. Hinchman?

“[Woodward]: Yes, sir.

“[Prosecutor]: Did you and Mr. Hinchman move towards [Warda]?

“[Woodward]: No.

“[Prosecutor]: No?

“[Woodward]: No. I don’t -- we’re -- no.”
Woodward said he initiated the conversation by asking Warda, “What’s going on?”
or “What’s up?” Woodward testified that Warda responded physically. When asked
about the physical altercation, Woodward responded, “As far as I can recall, I was the
first one to be hit by [Warda]. After that, I – it – kind of hard for me to remember all of

17.
it. It happened pretty quick, but I do remember being hit first” in the face which caused
him to become disoriented.
When Woodward was asked about details of the fight, he responded, “I don’t
recall all the way” and “I don’t really recall.” Woodward answered with “The best I can
say is [Hinchman] had [Warda] in a headlock” and that Warda was on his feet hunched
over during the fight.

“[Prosecutor]: … At some point during the – the physical fight with
[Warda], was [Warda] on the ground?

“[Woodward]: No.

“[Prosecutor]: Was Mr. Hinchman on the ground?

“[Woodward]: Yes.

“[Prosecutor]: And where – when Mr. Hinchman was on the ground, where
was [Warda]?

“[Woodward]: [Warda] was fleeing towards his car.

“[Prosecutor]: Was – I’m sorry?

“[Woodward]: [Warda] was going to his car. He was running away.

“[Prosecutor]: Okay. So was this after you heard the gunshot?

“[Woodward]: Correct.

“[Prosecutor]: Okay. Prior to hearing the gunshot, was [Warda] ever on the
ground?

“[Woodward]: No.

“[Prosecutor]: Was Mr. Hinchman ever on the ground?

“[Woodward]: No.

“[Prosecutor]: Were you ever on the ground?

“[Woodward]: No.

“[Prosecutor]: So during the fight, everyone remained on their feet?

18.
“[Woodward]: I -- I don’t recall.”
Woodward did not recall other details such as whether his friends were outside to
observe the fight or what he did earlier that day prior to the incident. Witnesses Gamble
and Weed testified at the preliminary hearing that Warda ended up hunched over on the
ground in the fetal position covering his head and not fighting back.
At trial, Woodward initially testified that after Warda got out of the car he ran up
to them and hit Hinchman in the face. But followed up with “I don’t remember if
[Warda] hit [Hinchman] first or me first. I don’t remember.” Woodward then described
the fight in general terms: “… my memory is Mr. Warda attacking Mr. Hinchman, and
Mr. Hinchman fighting back, and me attacking Mr. Warda from behind.” When
Woodward was asked if Warda was ever on the ground, Woodward testified, “I don’t
recall.”
After being shown a video of the start of the physical confrontation, Woodward
agreed that his recollection of the physical fight had been incorrect and that Warda hit
Hinchman first. Woodward further agreed that he was incorrect when he previously
testified that Warda was never on the ground during the fight. Woodward said he was not
intentionally trying to deceive anyone at the preliminary hearing. Woodward explained
that when he testified at the preliminary hearing, he testified as to what he “perceived at
that time.”
Modesto Police Officer Nicholas Largent interviewed Woodward at the scene of
the shooting and the jury was shown Largent’s body cam footage. In that video,
Woodward told Largent that Warda hit his friend in the face and then they got into a fist
fight and “we beat the dog shit out of” Warda. Woodward said that Warda fell to the
ground, then got up and shot Hinchman.
B. Applicable Law
A prosecutor has “the responsibility and duty to correct what he knows to be false
and [to] elicit the truth.” (Napue v. Illinois (1959) 360 U.S. 264, 269–270.) “The United

19.
States Supreme Court has held that the state’s duty to correct false or misleading
testimony by prosecution witnesses applies to testimony which the prosecution knows, or
should know, is false or misleading [citation omitted], and has concluded this obligation
applies to testimony whose false or misleading character would be evident in light of
information known to other prosecutors, to the police, or to other investigative agencies
involved in the criminal prosecution.” (In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 595,
disapproved of on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6; see,
e.g., Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 154 [information known to prior
prosecutor]; United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 670–672 & fn. 4 [information
known to federal investigators];; see also Comment, The Prosecutor’s Duty [to] Disclose:
From Brady to Agurs and Beyond (1978) 69 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 197, 205–206; 2
LaFave & Israel, Criminal Procedure (1984) § 19.5, pp. 553–534 & fn. 9.)
“Every person who willfully procures another person to commit perjury is guilty
of subornation of perjury, and is punishable in the same manner as he would be if
personally guilty of the perjury so procured.” (§ 127.) The elements of subornation of
perjury are: (1) a corrupt agreement to testify falsely; (2) proof that perjury has in fact
been committed; (3) the statements of the witness who committed perjury are material;
and (4) such statements were willfully made with knowledge as to the falsity of the
statements. (People v. Jones (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 200, 217.)
C. Analysis
We conclude the record fails to support Warda’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct
by suborning perjury or knowingly presenting false testimony at the preliminary hearing.
The record does not show that Woodward offered false or misleading testimony or that
the prosecution knew or should have known the testimony was false or misleading.
At the preliminary hearing, Woodward frequently responded that he did not know
or did not recall. When asked who Warda hit first, Woodward prefaced his response by

20.
saying, “As far as I can recall” and added that “It happened pretty quick.” And while
Woodward initially responded “No” to whether Warda was ever on the ground, he
subsequently responded, “I don’t recall” when specifically asked, “So during the fight,
everyone remained on their feet?” What is clear from the record is that Woodward had a
difficult time remembering details of the incident, including whether his friends were
outside at the time of the incident.
Woodward testified at trial that he only learned that parts of his recollection were
incorrect after watching the videos for the first time during the trial. Woodward
specifically acknowledged that his previous statements that Warda hit him first and that
Warda was never on the ground were incorrect. Woodward also conceded that the video
shows Hinchman walking forward towards Warda before the physical contact occurred,
rather than Hinchman standing where he was as he previously testified. As Woodward
explained, he did not intentionally lie. Woodward’s previous version of events was his
best recollection at the time, which were difficult for him to remember. It was only after
watching the video in court that he realized his recollection of the events were
inconsistent with what was recorded by someone else. Therefore, the record does not
show Woodward intentionally provided false testimony.
Moreover, there is no evidence to support Warda’s specific claim on appeal that
“at trial Woodward candidly admitted that he testified falsely at the preliminary hearing
so as to have [Warda] held to answer on the murder charge.” This claim is not supported
in the record. Woodward never said he testified falsely “so as” to have Warda held to
answer on the murder charge. Warda appears to be joining together separate responses
from Woodward in order to make this claim: (1) when Woodward acknowledged the parts
of his previous testimony were incorrect and (2) when Woodward separately
acknowledged that he knew his testimony at the preliminary hearing would determine
whether Warda goes to trial for murder. However, Woodward never said he testified
falsely in order to secure a holding order.

21.
Second, there is no evidence in the record that (1) the prosecution knowingly
offered false evidence at the preliminary hearing, (2) the prosecutor had a prearranged
agreement with Woodward to offer false testimony, (3) that perjury had in fact been
committed, (4) that the perjury was material, or (5) that the statements were made
willfully with knowledge as to their falsity. (See People v. Jones, supra, 254 Cal.App.2d
at p. 217.) For the most part, Woodward’s testimony was consistent with Gamble’s cell
phone video evidence except for some details that he recalled differently. Moreover, the
record shows that the prosecutor double checked the parts of Woodward’s testimony that
differed. The prosecutor checked Woodward’s testimony that they remained standing
while Warda approached them by asking more specifically if he and Hinchman
approached Warda and after Woodward responded, “[N]o,” the prosecutor questioned,
“[N]o?” to double check. The prosecutor also double checked Woodward about whether
Warda was ever on the ground until Woodward admitted that he did not recall. Thus, it
shows the prosecutor appeared to notice the discrepancies in Woodward’s testimony from
other witness’s accounts of the events and tried to get Woodward to think about his
answer again. As such, there is no evidence the prosecution suborned perjury.
That the trial court chose not to make a finding that there was no prosecutorial
misconduct does not mean it believed there was prosecutorial misconduct. Rather, the
court made a record that it did not see any prosecutorial misconduct but did not think it
appropriate to make that finding in case there were facts the court did not know about.
The court stated: “I’m reluctant to make such a blanket finding as I am not aware of all
the facts that might support such a finding, and didn’t want to make an order without
having a sufficient record before me.” Part of the court’s consideration was that it did not
take defense counsel’s argument at trial to suggest the prosecutor was suborning perjury.
The court did not feel the need to reprimand the defense counsel because the court did not
take his “comments as impugning of [the prosecutor’s] integrity or that he was aware that

22.
his witness was going to lie or that he suborned perjury.” The court stated that the facts
offered by Woodward were Woodward’s truths.
Regardless, inconsistencies in Woodward’s testimony at trial were addressed by
the court and jurors were instructed they alone must judge the credibility or believability
of the witnesses, the factors to consider in evaluating the truth or accuracy of the
witnesses’ testimonies (CALCRIM Nos. 105, 200, 226), and how to evaluate conflicting
evidence (CALCRIM No. 302). We presume the jury understood and followed these
instructions, especially where there is nothing in the record indicating otherwise. (People
v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 73, 107.) Woodward’s prior inconsistent
statements went to the weight of his testimony for the jury to determine his credibility.
(See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 403, disapproved on other grounds in
Barnett v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 890, 901 [“it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the
facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts …”.]; People v. Lee (2011) 51 Cal.4th 620, 632
[reviewing courts do not revisit credibility determination on appeal].)
Nor is there evidence the court relied on Woodward’s mistaken facts alone to hold
Warda to answer at the preliminary hearing. The record is silent on the court’s specific
basis for holding Warda to answer.
“ ‘Evidence that will justify a prosecution need not be sufficient to support a
conviction.’ ” (People v. Green (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 991, 1005, quoting Rideout v.
Superior Court (1967) 67 Cal.2d 471, 474.) “ ‘ “Probable cause is shown if a man of
ordinary caution or prudence would be led to believe and conscientiously entertain a
strong suspicion of the guilt of the accused.” ’ ” (Rideout, at p. 474.) “An information
will not be set aside or a prosecution thereon prohibited if there is some rational ground
for assuming the possibility that an offense has been committed and the accused is guilty
of it.” (Ibid.)

23.
Here, Warda raises two challenges: that Woodward’s testimony was used to
establish that Warda was the initial aggressor and that Warda was never on the ground
and did not receive a brutal beating and was unjustified to use deadly force. Although
Woodward was wrong that he and Hinchman stood still while Warda approached them
for the physical fight, Warda was still the one who initiated the physical contact. Thus,
there was evidence that Warda was the initial aggressor. And although Woodward did not
recall if Warda was ever on the ground, Gamble and Weed testified that Warda ended up
hunched over on the ground in the fetal position covering his head and not fighting back.
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment as to the weight of the evidence
for that of the magistrate, and, if there is some evidence to support the information, the
court will not inquire into its sufficiency. (Rideout v. Superior Court, supra, 67 Cal.2d at
p. 474.) Every legitimate inference that may be drawn from the evidence must be drawn
in favor of the information. (Ibid.) Here, the evidence offered at the preliminary hearing
was sufficient to support that a rational ground existed for assuming the possibility that
Warda was the initial aggressor and that his use of deadly force was unreasonable. (See
ibid.) Therefore, Warda’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct regarding Woodward’s
testimony at the preliminary hearing is denied.
II. WARDA FAILS TO SHOW PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AT TRIAL.
Warda claims prosecutorial misconduct prevented him from receiving a fair trial.
Warda’s specific allegations of misconduct are that the prosecutor misstated the evidence
and applicable law during closing argument. Warda claims the errors were prejudicial
and the verdict must be reversed. The People disagree and argue the prosecutor did not
misstate the evidence or the law during closing arguments. The People note that many of
Warda’s specific claims are forfeited for failure to object below. They also argue that any
alleged error was harmless. Upon review of the record, we do not conclude there was
prosecutorial misconduct.

24.
A. Standard of Review
A claim of prosecutorial misconduct is governed by the abuse of discretion
standard of review. (People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 213.)
B. Applicable Law
“[T]o preserve a claim of prosecutorial misconduct for appeal, ‘ “ ‘a criminal
defendant must make a timely and specific objection and ask the trial court to admonish
the jury to disregard the impropriety.’ ” [Citation.] The lack of a timely objection and
request for admonition will be excused only if either would have been futile or if an
admonition would not have cured the harm.’ ” (People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
942–943.)
The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, absent an exception, the
failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct forfeits any issue that could have been raised
on appeal. (See People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 371; People v. Panah (2005)
35 Cal.4th 395, 462, 463.) “There are two exceptions to this forfeiture: (1) the objection
and/or the request for an admonition would have been futile, or (2) the admonition would
have been insufficient to cure the harm occasioned by the misconduct .… A defendant
claiming that one of these exceptions applies must find support for his or her claim in the
record. [Citation.] The ritual incantation that an exception applies is not enough.”
(Panah, at p. 462.) A defendant claiming that an exception applies must demonstrate
support, therefore, in the record. (Gamache, at p. 371; Panah, at p. 462.)
“To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct based on remarks to the jury,
the defendant must show a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or applied the
complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner. [Citations.] In
conducting this inquiry, we ‘do not lightly infer’ that the jury drew the most damaging
rather than the least damaging meaning from the prosecutor’s statements.” (People v.
Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Doolin
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) “When argument runs counter to instructions given a

25.
jury, we will ordinarily conclude that the jury followed the latter and disregarded the
former, for ‘[w]e presume that jurors treat the court’s instructions as a statement of the
law by a judge, and the prosecutor’s comments as words spoken by an advocate in an
attempt to persuade.’ ” (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 717; accord, People v.
Katzenberger (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1268.)
“It is well settled that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to base argument on facts
not in evidence.” (People v. Mendoza (2016) 62 Cal.4th 856, 906.) A prosecutor is given
wide latitude during argument. (See People v. Stanley (2006) 39 Cal.4th 913, 951–952.)
“The argument may be vigorous as long as it amounts to fair comment on the evidence,
which can include reasonable inferences, or deductions to be drawn therefrom.
[Citations.] It is also clear that counsel during a summation may state matters not in
evidence, but which are common knowledge or are illustrations drawn from common
experience, history or literature. [Citations.] The prosecutor is entitled to draw
conclusions from the evidence presented and to state them to the jury. The right is very
broad and includes the opportunity to fully state [her] views as to what the evidence
shows and as to the conclusions to be drawn therefrom. [Citations.] [¶] Moreover, even
in a case where prosecutorial misconduct is shown, reversal will not result ‘… unless the
misconduct can be said to have contributed materially to the verdict in a closely balanced
case or is of such a nature that it could not have been cured by a proper and timely
admonition.’ ” (People v. Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 396–397; see also
People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 363 [Prosecutorial misconduct requires reversal
only if it results in prejudice to the defendant].)
C. Analysis
1. Misstatements of Evidence During Closing Argument
Warda contends the prosecutor made a series of misstatements of evidence during
her closing arguments to the jury. Those statements are: (1) that Warda did not say

26.
anything as he opened the door to confront Hinchman and Woodward; (2) that there was
nothing thrown at Warda’s car, which did not show any damage; (3) that Warda engaged
in mutual combat; (4) that the fight ended and the parties separated, there was a break,
and the fight was done; (5) that a reasonable person would not have started a physical
confrontation over someone leaning against his car; (6) that no evidence supported
Warda’s claim that he was in the fetal position at the end of the fight; (7) that there was
no knife used during the fight; (8) that Gamble testified Warda started the fight; (9) that
prior to the shooting, neither Hinchman or Woodward threatened Warda; (10) that Warda
refused to answer any questions by Detective Letsinger; (11) that Woodward’s subsequent
conduct of threatening Warda had no bearing on the incident; (12) that it did not matter
that Hinchman drank alcohol and ingested cocaine that night; and (13) that Hinchman
was trying to retreat as he was shot.
The People argue that Warda forfeited many of these claims on appeal because he
failed to object and request an admonition in the trial court. Warda argues that counsel’s
decision to not object to each and every one of them is in keeping with the commonly
held belief among attorneys that “[r]epeated objections might well have served to impress
upon the jury the damaging force of the challenged assertions.” (People v. Kirkes (1952)
39 Cal.2d 719, 726; see also People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 821.)
The futility exception to the forfeiture rule applies in “unusual” or “extreme”
circumstances like those in People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 821, 826, where
defense counsel’s failure to object was excused by the prosecutor’s “continual
misconduct, coupled with the trial court’s failure to rein in her excesses, [which] created a
trial atmosphere so poisonous” that further objections “would have been futile and
counterproductive” to the defendant. (Id. at p. 821.) We address forfeiture and each of
the claims of misconduct separately.

27.
a. Warda did not say anything as he opened the door to confront
Hinchman and Woodward.
Warda claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she asserted during
closing argument the following:
“He opens – he puts the car in park. He opens the side door. Goes out around the
car. Remember, he’s in a spot of safety. He can just leave. And he doesn’t say anything
at that point. He doesn’t yell out the widow, ‘Hey, don’t throw something at my car’ or
‘Hey, what was that about?’
“He goes around the door, and he moves towards him because someone who has
more height and who’s bigger than them is moving toward them.”
Warda did not object to this alleged misstatement at trial. There is no evidence
that an objection would have been futile since the statement was made towards the
beginning of the closing argument; nor is there evidence that any other exception applies.
(See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 821, 826.) Thus, this claim is forfeited. (See Panah,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)
Even if the claim is not forfeited, it is meritless. Gamble testified that it was not
until Warda got out of the car to confront the two men that he stated, “Why are you
fucking with my car?” The statement appears to be a fair comment on facts in evidence.

b. There was nothing thrown at Warda’s car, which did not show
any damage.
Warda claims the prosecutor committed misconduct when she asserted during
closing argument that neither Hinchman nor Woodward threw anything at Warda’s car
and there was no evidence of any damage to Warda’s car.
Warda did not object to these statements at trial. There is no evidence that the
failure to object was excused by the prosecutor’s “continual misconduct” since this was
also near the beginning of the closing; nor is there evidence that any other exception
applies. Thus, this claim is forfeited. (See Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)

28.
Even if it is not forfeited, it is meritless. Gamble testified that, as Warda was
backing out of the parking spot, she thought she heard Hinchman yell, “Bitch,” and she
then heard something hit the car. Gamble was inside the car and did not see Hinchman or
Woodward throw anything. Gamble, testified that Warda stopped the car and said, “They
threw something at the car.” Warda then got out of the car and confronted the two men.
Warda said, “Why are you fucking with my car?” However, Gamble never saw any
damage to the car.
Woodward testified that neither he nor Hinchman threw anything at Warda’s car.
Soria, who was watching the entire interaction from the parking lot, also did not see or
hear anyone throw anything at Warda’s car. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement is a fair
comment based on facts in evidence.
c. Warda engaged in mutual combat.
Warda claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she described the
fight as mutual combat during closing as follows:

“Earlier on when I was discussing the law, it said for mutual combat. It can
be implied or expressed as an invitation. Well, Mr. Warda extended the
invitation. It was accepted by Mr. Hinchman.

“At this point it was Mr. Warda who got aggressive. At this point it
was Mr. Warda who got out of his [car] and left his spot of safety. At this
point it was Mr. Warda who is approaching him. At this point it was Mr.
Warda who escalated this into a physical confrontation.

“And Mr. Warda, he fought back. You heard from Mr. Warda
himself that he got a few punches in, and you also heard it from other
witnesses as well. So this wasn’t a one-sided fight. This is where everyone
was involved. So at this point he doesn’t say, ‘Hey, you know what, stop, I
made a mistake’ or put his hands up. He doesn’t say anything. He starts
fighting back. Invitation has been accepted.”
Warda did not object to these statements at trial. There is no evidence that an
objection would have been futile; nor is there evidence that any other exception applies.
Thus, this claim is forfeited. (See Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)

29.
Regardless, the record contains witness testimony supporting the argument that
Warda engaged in mutual combat. Gamble testified that Warda initiated physical contact
by pushing or punching Hinchman in the face, which was supported by video evidence.
Soria testified that the fight appeared mutual. She “saw everyone hitting everyone,” and
she specifically saw Warda also hitting back. Weed testified that she saw all three men
mutually engaged in the fight, standing almost in a triangle, using their hands to shove
each other’s shoulders. Warda himself even admitted to police that he landed a few
punches during the fight, while lamenting that he did not beat up those two “pansies.”
While evidence also showed that at some point in the fight, Warda was unable to
fight back and moved into a protective or fetal position, it does not negate the evidence
that Warda initially mutually participated in the fight. Thus, the prosecutor’s statement is
a fair comment based on facts in evidence.
d. The fight ended, the parties separated, there was a break, and the
fight was done.
Warda claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she asserted the
following during closing: (1) “So the fight ends and the parties separate,” and (2) “There
was a break. Their fight was done.”
Warda objected to the first statement but not the latter. Warda’s counsel objected,
“It misstates the evidence. The testimony was that the fight ended with the shotgun [sic],
not before.” The trial court reminded the jury that they were the ones to decide the facts
of the case and that they could disagree with the prosecutor’s characterization of the
evidence.
The prosecutor’s statement does not amount to misconduct. The witness
statements support the prosecutor’s comments that the fight ended and the parties
separated, and that there was a break and the fight was done. Woodward testified that he
and Hinchman stopped fighting Warda, backed away, and then Warda pulled out a firearm
and shot Hinchman. Weed testified that Hinchman and Woodward stopped hitting Warda,

30.
Woodward walked away while Hinchman stood there. Warda took about five to
10 seconds to get up and took some steps away then faced Hinchman, reached into his
waistband, racked a gun and shot Hinchman. Diaz testified that the fight stopped when
he said, “[S]top” or “[C]ut it out.” Hinchman and Woodward stopped punching and
kicking Warda, took two steps back and looked at Diaz as he was walking towards them.
Diaz said Warda stood right up, reached in his pocket, pulled the gun out and shot
Hinchman. Soria explained that the fight stopped, the parties separated, Hinchman and
Woodward backed away and were just standing there until Warda got up, reached in his
pocket, and shot Hinchman. Therefore, the prosecutor’s comments are fair comments
based on facts in evidence.
e. A reasonable person was obligated to retreat.
Warda challenges the prosecutor’s comments that “[u]nder the guise of
‘reasonableness,’ … [Warda] was obligated to retreat.”
The prosecutor stated, “At this point, what does Mr. Warda do? He shoots Mr.
Hinchman. He had plenty of other options here. He could have just held the handgun or
said I had [sic] a gun. He could have left. There’s nothing blocking him from leaving.
He could have said, ‘I’m done. I don’t want to fight anymore.’ He had all these different
options, and this is what he reached for. He went straight for the gun and then straight to
the heart.”
Defense counsel failed to object below, and the claim is forfeited. (See Panah,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)
Regardless, we disagree that the prosecutor is arguing that Warda was obligated to
retreat. Rather, the prosecutor is explaining that the physical fighting had ended and
Warda was able to get up and could have gotten in his car and left. Warda argues that
Warda had been brutally beaten by Woodward and Hinchman and that Hinchman was
still coming for him. However, the evidence shows that Woodward and Hinchman

31.
stopped hitting Warda. The record contains evidence from witnesses supporting the fact
that Hinchman and Woodward had stopped fighting and backed away. Plus, there were
other people on the scene now who had shown up and called off the fight. Instead of
leaving, Warda adjusted his jacket, reached into his waistband or pocket, and drew out a
concealed firearm and fired. To argue that a reasonable person would have left when the
fighting stopped, is a fair comment based on facts in the evidence.
f. A reasonable person would not have started a physical
confrontation over someone leaning against his car.
Warda claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she asserted the
following during closing:
“A reasonable person in a similar situation would not have started a physical
confrontation over someone leaning against his [car]. That’s not what a reasonable person
would do.”
Warda did not object to these statements at trial. Finding no exception in the
record, the claim is forfeited. (See Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)
Even so, Warda’s claim is without merit. When looking at the above statement in
its context, we see the prosecutor is applying the concept of reasonableness to the facts of
the case. The prosecutor’s full statements on reasonableness are as follows:

“So what is reasonable here? A reasonable person would have checked
their car if they thought someone threw something at their car, not
immediately start a physical confrontation. A reasonable person would
have said something while still in the car or called the police. A reasonable
person in a similar situation would have left if they thought someone threw
something at their car.

“A reasonable person in the similar situation would have left the
scene if they had just been in a fight. Nothing was preventing him at that
point. A reasonable person in a similar situation would not have started a
physical confrontation over someone leaning against his [car]. That’s not
what a reasonable person would do.”

32.
The prosecution was questioning Warda’s defense that he acted reasonably in the
situation. The prosecutor was making the point that it was unreasonable for Warda to use
deadly force after the fist fight when he could have left. She argued a reasonable person
would have called the police and not shot someone after a fight or would have left if they
thought someone threw something at their car. She then argued that a reasonable person
would not have started a physical confrontation over someone leaning against their car.
The prosecutor appears to be making a point about how the fight started in the first place
and not intentionally misstating the sequence of facts. The prosecutor was clear in her
arguments to the jury that Warda shot Hinchman after the physical fight. Therefore, the
prosecutor made a fair comment on the evidence and no error took place.
g. No evidence supported Warda’s claim that he was in the fetal
position at the end of the fight.
Warda claims that the prosecutor committed misconduct when she asserted during
her rebuttal argument that no evidence supported Warda’s claim that he was in the “fetal
position” at the end of the fight. The following colloquy took place:

“[Prosecutor]: And then you heard Mr. Baker [defense counsel] argue that
Mr. Warda was in the fetal position. What supports that fact? Nothing.

“[Defense Counsel]: Objects as misstating the evidence.

“[Prosecutor]: Ms. Weed is the –

“[The Court]: Overruled.

“[Prosecutor]: Ms. Weed is the only one who said that. There weren’t any
injuries consistent with this. I told you to look at all the different physical
evidence and also all the witnesses testimony together. Yeah, you’re going
to get some inconsistencies, and that’s one of them.”
In this instance, the prosecutor was interrupted by defense counsel before she
could finish her argument that only Weed testified that Warda was in a fetal position
during the fight. The record shows that Weed did testify that she saw Warda in a fetal
position. The record also shows that Woodward, Diaz and Soria did not use the words

33.
“fetal position.” They described Warda as on the ground, or his knees, or squatting or
hunched over. However, the record also shows that Gamble testified that Warda was on
the ground in a fetal position. Therefore, the prosecutor was mistaken when she said only
Weed said Warda was in the fetal position. However, this does not affect what the jury
already knew to be true: that the witnesses did not agree on whether Warda was in the
fetal position.
The prosecutor’s point was that Warda did not have injuries consistent with being
beaten so badly that he was in the fetal position. The emergency room doctor ran several
scans and found no evidence of injury consistent with being beaten. Further, witnesses
Soria and Diaz testified the fight was not serious and they did not see any injuries.
Therefore, the comment was a fair comment on the state of the evidence and not
erroneous.
Warda was not prejudiced by the fact that the prosecutor forgot that Gamble also
said Warda was in the fetal position. Right before the prosecutor’s statements here, the
court had just finished reminding the jury “you are the arbiters of the facts in this case,
and if you believe that the People are misstating the evidence that you heard, please
remember that it is your job to determine what the facts are. What the attorneys say is not
evidence.” Here, the jury heard Gamble also testify that Warda was in the fetal position.
Therefore, even though the prosecutor forgot about Gamble, the jury understood they
were the ones to determine the facts, not the attorneys.
h. There was no knife used during the fight.
Warda challenges the prosecutor’s comment that no knife was used in the fight.
The prosecutor stated: “Here, no weapons were used by either of the boys. There was no
knife. There was no gun.” Defense counsel raised an objection to misstating the
evidence, which was sustained. The prosecution stated, “There was no knife during the

34.
fight” and defense counsel objected again as misstating the evidence. The court sustained
the objection as phrased, and the prosecutor moved on.
Here, the objection was sustained as phrased because there was a knife present
during the fight, which was located in Hinchman’s jacket. The prosecutor should have
rephrased it as “no knife was used during the fight” which would have been accurate.
There was no evidence that Hinchman brandished the knife or that Warda even knew
about the knife in Hinchman’s jacket pocket. Warda concedes in his brief that “there was
no evidence that he [Hinchman] displayed it [the knife] during the fight.” Even so, the
court sustained the objection in front of the jury and the misstatement was caught and
corrected. Therefore, there was no error.
i. Gamble testified that Warda started the fight.
Warda claims the prosecutor misstated the evidence when she argued that Gamble
testified that Warda started the fight. The following colloquy occurred:

“[Prosecutor]: And then we have Warda started the fight. We have that from
his companion that night from Ms. Gamble. We have that from Mr.
Woodward, and we have that from Ms. Soria.

“[Defense Counsel]: Object again as misstating the evidence. Ms. Gamble
didn’t testify to that, that Mr. Warda started the fight.

“[The Court]: Sustained.”
Testimony from Gamble, Woodward and Soria shows that Warda initiated the
physical contact, which was also supported by video evidence. Therefore, the
prosecutor’s comments are fair comments based on facts in evidence.
j. Prior to the shooting, neither Hinchman or Woodward threatened
Warda.
Warda challenges the prosecutor’s comment that neither Hinchman nor Woodward
threatened Warda. The prosecutor stated, “And then the boys moved back and did not
keep fighting Mr. Warda. You heard that from Ms. Weed and Mr. Diaz. ... Both boys did
not say anything. They didn’t threaten him. They didn’t say they were going to kill him.”

35.
Defense counsel objected on misstating the evidence because “at least one witness said
they were unable to hear.” The objection was sustained.
The record contains no evidence that Hinchman or Woodward threatened Warda or
made any threatening movements towards Warda after they stopped hitting and kicking
him. Diaz testified that after he told them to stop, Woodward and Hinchman appeared
calm and were standing up straight with their arms by their sides and did not try to reach
for anything. The record does contain testimony from Sergeant Castro that Warda shared
that the men were saying “Kill him” while they were stomping him out. Even so, this
comment was said during the physical fight and not after they separated. Therefore, we
conclude the prosecutor’s comments are fair comments based on facts in evidence.
k. Warda refused to answer any questions by Detective Letsinger.
Warda complained that the prosecutor “falsely asserted that [Warda] ‘refused to
answer any questions regarding the incident when asked by Detective Letsinger.’ ” The
following sequence occurred:

“[Prosecutor]: Our job as the People and as the jurors is to determine these
stories. [Warda] refused to answer any questions regarding the incident
when asked by Detective Letsinger.

“[Defense Counsel]: Object again. That misstates the evidence. He
answered plenty.

“[The Court]: Sustained.

“[Prosecutor]: And [Warda] didn’t give any information during the call
about the incident. He kept asking about what the police had and tried to
get them to act on his behalf.

“[Defense counsel]: Same objection. [¶] …[¶]

“[The Court]: Sustained.”
The record contains Letsinger’s account that Warda “avoided giving any details
about the incident outside of a very vague description of the fight, more describing it as
they were killing – trying to kill him or those kind of words. But when it came to specific

36.
information, there was none of that.” While Warda did answer law enforcement, his
statements were calculated and he was evasive in his answers. Therefore, the
prosecutor’s statement was a fair comment based on the facts in evidence. Regardless, the
court sustained the objection in front of the jury and the misstatement was caught and
corrected. Therefore, there was no error.
l. Woodward’s subsequent conduct of threatening Warda had no
bearing on the incident.
Warda contends that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when she argued that
Woodward’s subsequent conduct of threatening Warda a few days after the shooting did
not matter regarding what happened at the bar. The following argument and objection
took place:

“[Prosecutor]: … Whether the physical contact was a slap or a punch, in
either case, Mr. Warda is the initial aggressor. He initiated physical contact
so hard Mr. Hinchman flew back. Woodward’s subsequent conduct has
nothing to so with what happened at the [bar] –

“[Defense Counsel]: Objection; []relevant and admissible under Evidence
Code 1103. It is relevant by law.

“[The Court]: Up on the screen it says what does not matter. You’re using
the word relevant. I think there are two different meanings there. Ms. – I’ll
sustain the objection as to it not being relevant, because you’re going to be
instructed as to that point.”
The prosecutor was arguing that Woodward’s subsequent conduct did not alter the
fact that Warda initiated the physical fight. Even so, after the objection, the court
explained to the jury that they would be getting instructions on the relevance of
Woodward’s subsequent conduct. Therefore, there was no confusion to the jury and no
error.

37.
m. It did not matter that Hinchman drank alcohol and ingested
cocaine that night.
Warda also complains that the prosecutor misstated the evidence when it argued it
did not matter than Hinchman drank alcohol and ingested cocaine that night. The
following argument and objection took place:

“[Prosecution]: … [It doesn’t matter] [h]ow much Hinchman drank or the
cocaine -

“[Defense Counsel]: Same objection … [t]hat it was admitted because it
was relevant.

“[The Court]: Sustained.

“[Prosecution]: Your Honor, my argument is it doesn’t matter about why
that fact overall, and this is a part of what I’m arguing in my closing.

“[The Court]: I think the objection was he said it wasn’t relevant.

“[Prosecution]: Right or does not matter.

“[The Court]: You may proceed.

“[Prosecution]: Thank you. It doesn’t matter, because Mr. Warda was the
one who initiated that physical contact. Even if they were sober, Mr. Warda
still initiated here. When the fight stopped in either case, the fight was
done, so the fight really doesn’t matter. What matters is what Mr. Warda
was in that moment what he knew at that moment he decided to take
Mr. Hinchman’s life.

“[Defense Counsel]: I’ll object again. It also misstates the evidence or the
People’s evidence was that the fight was over when the shot was fired.

“[The Court]: Overruled.”
The prosecutor argued specifically that Warda initiated the physical fight and the
fact that Hinchman was drunk and possibly high did not change that fact. Also, as
discussed above, evidence in the record supports the argument that the fighting was over
when the shot was fired. Therefore, the prosecutor’s statement was a fair comment based
on facts in evidence.

38.
n. Hinchman was in a position to retreat when he was shot.
Warda contends that the prosecution misstated the evidence when she argued that
Hinchman was trying to retreat as he was shot. The prosecutor stated, “The fight ended.
You heard that from two witnesses who have no dog in this fight whatsoever. They have
no interest here. He was fine. He escalated the situation and brought a gun to the fist
fight, and he used that gun to kill Hinchman when he was in a position to retreat.”
Defense counsel objected stating, “There’s no evidence that Mr. Hinchman was
[sic] retreating.”
We agree with the People that Warda has misread the argument. The prosecutor is
not claiming that Hinchman was in a position to retreat, but rather that Warda was in a
position to retreat. The use of “he” above consistently referred to Warda: “He escalated
the situation”, he “brought a gun” and “he used that gun to kill Hinchman” when “he”
“was in a position to retreat.” As discussed above, when the physical fighting ended,
Warda could have gotten into his car and left. Therefore, there was no misstatement of
facts and the prosecutor’s statement was a fair comment based on facts in evidence.
2. Inflammatory Remarks
Warda contends the prosecutor made inflammatory remarks to support her theory
of contrived self-defense. The following are Warda’s allegations of inflammatory
remarks:
The prosecutor commenced her argument as follows: “ ‘Fucking blow my head
off, I think. I’m not saying it’s the wrong thing. And I think it’s the right thing to do, not
saying it’s wrong.’ Those are the words [Warda] spoke to Detective Grant in the hospital
while waiting medical clearance.” Defense counsel did not object.
The prosecutor argued: “You heard him say in the hospital that shooting them was
the right thing to do. He’s not saying it’s wrong, that they were about to get into a fight.
That indicates that the fight – that he was thinking about shooting them, even before the

39.
fight [has] even started. He went into this physical confrontation expecting to use deadly
force.” Defense counsel did not object.
The prosecutor later argued:

“He also told Detective Grant after the shooting it was the right thing
to do, and then Mr. Warda fled. He didn’t stick around. You heard that jury
instruction about his flight. We’re going to get to that in a minute. Plus he
gave us his own words. He believed that because he was in a fist fight, that
gave him permission to use deadly force here. It’s not how the law works.
At the point where Mr. Hinchman was shot, there is no threat upon him.
He had plenty of options to back out here. He did not have to take another
person’s life.

“This is what he said to Detective Grant in the hospital, ‘Hey, if me
and my family wanted to beat your ass, you wouldn’t shoot us? We’re
about to jump you and fuck you up. You wouldn’t shoot me? Really, you
wouldn’t? You would, bro. Fucking blow my head off. Me and my friend
were jumping you, about to beat your ass, fucking blow my head off, I
think, and I think it’s the right thing to do. I’m not saying it’s wrong.’

“That indicates that Mr. Warda went into that physical confrontation
intending to kill Mr. Hinchman. He keeps saying he’s going to blow his
head off. He’s about to enter a fight. He’s speculating at this point because
he thinks, oh, because this is a fist fight, I have the right to use deadly force.
It’s not how the law works, and there’s no indication in the physical
evidence or any of the evidence presented that this was a threat upon
Mr. Warda, and that this was a fight for his life.”

Again, defense counsel did not object.
Warda did not object to these statements at trial. There is no evidence that the
failure to object was futile or excused by the prosecutor’s “continual misconduct”; nor is
there evidence that any other exception applies. Thus, this claim is forfeited. (See
Panah, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 462.)
Additionally, the prosecution’s comments relaying Warda’s statements to
Detective Grant are verbatim quotes of what Warda said in the hospital. Verbatim quotes
cannot be said to be misstatements of evidence. Thus, the prosecution’s statements were
fair comments based on facts in evidence and not grounds for prosecutorial misconduct.

40.
3. Misstatements of Law
Warda claims the prosecutor made the following misstatements of law: (1) that
Warda had a duty to retreat in contrast to CALCRIM No. 505; and (2) that the law
required Warda to have no other choice but to shoot.
On review of the record, the prosecutor did not state that Warda had a duty to
retreat. Rather, the prosecutor made the argument that when the fighting stopped Warda
could have left the scene, that nothing was blocking him. That is not the same as arguing
that Warda had a duty to retreat. Warda is alleging the prosecutor made arguments that it
did not make. As such, the prosecutor did not misstate the law here. Even so, the trial
court told the jury to follow the instructions it had given and clarified that there was “no
duty to retreat.”
Warda also fails to disclose what jury instruction or law was violated by the
prosecution’s argument that Warda had other choices available rather than to shoot.
Arguments raised in a conclusory manner, without adequate analysis, are treated as
forfeited. (See People v. Harper (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1419, fn. 4.)
4. Harmless Error
Even assuming one or more of the above allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
was found, Warda fails to demonstrate he was prejudiced.
Any potential error was minimized by the trial court’s instruction to the jury. The
trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALCRIM No. 222 that: “Nothing that the
attorneys say is evidence. In their opening statements and closing arguments, the
attorneys discuss the case, but their remarks are not evidence. Their questions are not
evidence. Only the witnesses’ answers are evidence .… Do not assume that something is
true just because one of the attorneys asked a question that suggested it was true.”
(CALCRIM No. 222.)
The trial court also instructed the jury: “You must decide what the facts are. It is
up to you. It is up to all of you, and you alone, to decide what happened based on the

41.
evidence that has been presented to you in this trial.” (CALCRIM No. 104.) The trial
court informed the jury several times that the jury is the decider of facts. Specifically, the
trial court told the jurors that, “If you think that the prosecution is misstating the
evidence, it is you who gets to decide what the facts are.” The trial court also told the
jury to refer to the written jury instructions when defense counsel objected that the
prosecution misstated the law.
The jury is presumed to have understood and followed these instructions. (See
People v. Brady (2010) 50 Cal.4th 547, 566, fn. 9.) We “ ‘do not lightly infer’ ” that the
jury drew the most damaging rather than the least damaging meaning from the
prosecutor’s statements. (See People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 970.) Since the jury
was properly instructed, it would have corrected any potential misstatements of law or
evidence. As such, Warda fails to show “a reasonable likelihood the jury understood or
applied the complained-of comments in an improper or erroneous manner.” (See ibid.)
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY UNDER
CALCRIM NO. 3471.
Warda contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to CALCRIM
No. 3471, which applies only where the defendant engaged in mutual combat or initiated
the fight. Warda contends the evidence adduced at trial “does not support a finding that
[he] was the initial aggressor, or that he engaged in mutual combat, thus the giving of
CALCRIM No. 3471 was prejudicial, leading to confusion and an unjust verdict .…”
Warda also contends the giving of the jury instruction violated his rights to due process
and a fair trial under the federal constitution. The People disagree and argue there was no
error. After the court ruled in favor of the defense to instruct on justifiable self-defense
under CALCRIM No. 505, the court correctly instructed the jury on applicable
limitations where the defendant is the initial aggressor or engaged in mutual combat. We
agree with the People.

42.
A. Relevant Procedural History
At the conclusion of the evidence, the parties discussed the jury instructions
outside the presence of the jury. Warda’s counsel objected to “any and all of the language
referring to mutual combat” as “inappropriate and misleading.” The prosecution
requested the instruction on mutual combat based on witnesses who saw Warda fighting
back. The court concluded that although “[t]he fight may not have gone Mr. Warda’s
way, he did get out of the car, approached the other gentlemen and struck the first blow…
I think that’s, again, a question for the jury to decide whether this was mutual combat or
who started the fight. So I have a sua sponte duty to instruct the defense if there’s
substantial evidence supporting it, I think. … There might be substantial evidence here
just based on the video.”
The jury was instructed as follows:

“A person who engages in mutual combat or who starts a fight has a
right to self-defense only if, one, he actually and in good faith tries to stop
fighting; two, indicates by word or conduct to his opponent in a way that a
reasonable person would understand that he wants to stop fighting and has
stopped fighting. And three, he gives his opponent a chance to stop
fighting.

“If the defendant meets these requirements, he then had a right to
self-defense if the opponent had continued to fight. However, if the
defendant used only nondeadly force, and the opponent started with such
sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the
fight, then the defendant had the right to defend himself with deadly force
and was not required to try to stop fighting, communicate the desire to stop
to the opponent or give the opponent a chance to stop fighting.

“A fight is mutual combat when it began or continued by mutual
consent or agreement. That agreement may be expressly stated or implied
and must occur before the claim that self-defense arose.”
B. Applicable Law
“ ‘It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial
court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the

43.
evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those
principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are
necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’ ” (People v. Diaz (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1176, 1189; accord, People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, disapproved of on
other grounds in People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 255-260.) “The trial court
must give instructions on every theory of the case supported by substantial evidence,
including defenses that are not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.”
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200 (Young).)
“ ‘ “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the
jury,’ that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.” ’ ” (People v. Cole
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1215; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 835 [“Substantial
evidence is evidence of reasonable, credible value”].)
“A party is entitled to a requested instruction if it is supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1049 (Ross).) The instruction
on mutual combat does not set out a defense or a defense theory but instead states a
longstanding legal principle limiting the claim of self-defense. (See e.g., People v. Button
(1895) 106 Cal. 628, 631 [Section 197 “is simply declarative of the common law … since
the days of Lord Hale”].) Section 197 sets out the principle that justifiable homicide
based on self-defense is not available to the defendant who engages in mutual combat or
started the fight. Section 197 states that homicide is justifiable to, inter alia, defend
against danger, but if the person who commits homicide “was the assailant or engaged in
mutual combat, [he or she] must really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any
further struggle before the homicide was committed.” (§ 197.)
Instruction on mutual combat, whether as a theory or general principle of law,
must be given where it is supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Diaz, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1189; accord, Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046–1047.) Whether
there is substantial evidence the defendant was the initial aggressor or engaged in mutual

44.
combat is “the dispositive consideration” for deciding to give the instruction. (Ross, at
p. 1052.)
C. Standard of Review
Instructional error is subject to de novo review. (People v. Berryman (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1048, 1089, overruled on another point by People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th 800,
823, fn. 1, see People v. Posey (2004) 32 Cal.4th 193, 218 [instructional error subject to
de novo review].) Whether the trial court should have given a “particular instruction in
any particular case entails the resolution of a mixed question of law and fact,” which is
“predominantly legal” and examined without deference to the trial court’s reasoning.
(People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
D. Analysis
Upon review of the record, we conclude there is substantial evidence that Warda
was the initial aggressor and that he engaged in mutual combat. Therefore, the court did
not err in instructing the jury on CALCRIM No. 3471.
1. Initial aggressor
We disagree that there was no evidence that Warda was the initial aggressor.
Video evidence shows Warda exit his car in order to approach Hinchman who was just
outside the car approaching him on foot. The video shows Warda extending one hand to
either push or punch Hinchman in the face. Woodward testified that Warda threw the
first punch using his fist. Gamble admitted that Warda “did push them back first” by
placing one hand on Hinchman’s face. Gamble admitted that this was the point where
physical contact was initiated. Thus, there is substantial evidence that Warda initiated the
physical fight. (See Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 835.)
We recognize the trial court made a comment at the sentencing hearing that the
video “showed [Warda was] not the initial aggressor.” The court made this comment
postconviction at sentencing as a mitigating factor. However, the court was clear at the

45.
hearing for jury instructions that it felt there was substantial evidence that Warda was the
initiator to warrant the sua sponte instruction on mutual combat. In fact, even at the close
of the prosecutor’s case, the court stated: “I think there’s sufficient evidence for all these
questions to be put to the jury. I think the People met their burden.” Gamble, Woodward
and Soria testified that Warda initiated the physical contact. The record contains
substantial evidence that Warda was the initial aggressor. Therefore, it was not error for
the court to instruct the jury on CALCRIM No. 3471. (See People v. Diaz, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 1189; accord, Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1046–1047, 1052.)
2. Mutual combat
The record also contains substantial evidence that Warda engaged in mutual
combat with the preexisting intent to engage. As discussed above, there was evidence
that Warda was the initiator of physical contact in the fight, which demonstrates a
preexisting intention to engage. (See Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.) The
evidence also shows Warda subsequently participated in a reciprocal exchange of blows.
Soria testified she saw all three hitting each other and saw Warda throwing physical
punches. Sergeant Castro testified that Warda admitted to him that the fight with
Hinchman and Woodward was mutual and lasted about 90 seconds. Warda admitted he
landed several punches and expressed frustration that he was unable to beat up the two
“pansies” and “should have fucked him up.” Therefore, there was substantial evidence to
support the instruction on mutual combat. (See Ross, at pp. 1033, 1046–1047.)
Warda’s reliance on Ross to argue the prosecution’s requests for mutual combat is
a tactical maneuver to counter his claim that the victim was the initial aggressor is readily
distinguishable here. (See Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 1047.) In Ross, the Court
of Appeal reversed a conviction for assault and battery due to prejudice from the
confluence of two instructional errors on mutual combat. (Ibid.) The conviction was
based on facts where a victim had slapped the defendant during an argument, and the
defendant responded by striking the victim and fracturing her cheekbone. (Id. at

46.
p. 1036.) The appellate court found it was error for the trial court to have given an
instruction on mutual combat under CALJIC No. 5.56 due to a lack of substantial
evidence of mutual combat. The court found, “no reasonable juror could conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant and [the victim] were engaged in ‘mutual
combat’ when he punched her.” (Ross, at p. 1050.) Indeed, the trial court—at the first
and second trials—concluded there was no evidence of mutual combat. (Ibid.) Despite
finding a lack of evidence of mutual combat, the trial court gave the instruction based on
“the prosecutor’s insistence that he required [the mutual combat instruction] for tactical
reasons, i.e., to meet the defense theory concerning the lesser offenses of simple assault
and battery,” and the instruction was given solely “ ‘because of the lessers.’ ” (Id. at
p. 1051.) The appellate court found that this was error: “A party’s wish to have the jury
instructed on a certain point cannot be honored based only upon the party’s desire to
make rhetorical or tactical use of the instruction.” (Ibid.) Instead, “the dispositive
consideration is whether the instruction is supported by substantial evidence. Here, the
mutual defense instruction was not.” (Id. at p. 1052.)
The second instructional error in Ross also involved mutual combat. The jury was
not given the legal definition or requirements for mutual combat but was erroneously told
that it “involved no particular legal requirement, but should be understood and applied in
an ordinary, lay sense.” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1042, fn. 9, 1047.) The two
errors resulted in “an unwarranted and dangerously incomplete instruction on a
prosecution theory in rebuttal of the defense.” (Id. at p. 1054.) The instructional errors
left the jury to think the instruction applied to any exchange of blows and the court failed
to clarify the meaning of mutual combat even after requests from the jury. These facts
suggested the jury misapplied the instruction and improperly disqualified the defendant
from asserting a right to self-defense, resulting in prejudice. (Id. at p. 1056.)
Ross is readily distinguished from this case. Unlike in Ross, here, there was
substantial evidence to support the evidentiary threshold for instructing on mutual combat

47.
under CALCRIM No. 3471. Further, here, the jury was properly instructed on the
definition of mutual combat, explaining that it exists “when it began or continued by
mutual consent or agreement” which may be expressly stated or implied and must occur
before the claim to self-defense arose. Therefore, the instruction under CALCRIM No.
3471 was proper.
3. Any error is harmless
Even assuming there was insufficient evidence to support the jury instruction on
mutual combat, any potential error in giving the instruction was harmless. An instruction
that is correct in law but has no application to the case is an error “of state law subject to
the traditional Watson[6] test .…” (People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130
(Guiton).) The Watson standard requires Warda to show a reasonable probability of a
more favorable result had the instruction not been given. (Guiton, at pp. 1129–1130; see
Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1054–1055.) It “focuses not on what a reasonable
jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under
consideration.” (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 177; accord, People v.
Valenzuela (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1234.) Only if, after an examination of the
entire record, a court concludes that an instructional error has resulted in a miscarriage of
justice can the judgment be set aside. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; People v. Dieguez
(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 278.)
The review for instructional error considers “the instructions as a whole, the jury’s
findings, and the closing arguments of counsel.” (People v. Larsen (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 810, 831; People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 35–36, overruled on other
grounds in People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 17.) CALCRIM No. 3471 is not a
directive. It is a conditional instruction, applicable only if the jury finds that the
defendant was the initial aggressor or engaged in mutual combat.

6 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson).

48.
A jury instruction that lacks evidence to support it can be held harmless “because
juries are said to ignore irrelevant instructions.” (Ross, supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1055–1056.) The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 200, which
provides as follows: “Some of these instructions may not apply depending on your
findings about the facts of the case. Do not assume just because I give a particular
instruction that I am suggesting anything about the facts. After you have decided what
the facts are, follow the instructions that do apply to the facts as you find them.”
Reviewing courts presume the jury followed the trial court’s instructions. (See
People v. Williams (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1244, 280; People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th
96, 152–153; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 139; [it is presumed the jury
understood and followed the court’s instruction in the absence of any showing to the
contrary]; Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1131.) There is nothing that suggests the jury
strayed from the instructions as a whole or improperly disqualified Warda from claiming
self-defense. Thus, if the jury determined the parties did not have a preexisting
agreement (express of implied) to fight as defined in CALCRIM No. 3471, the jury is
presumed to have understood and followed the instructions it was given and disregarded
CALCRIM No. 3471. (See People v. Sandoval (2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 422.)

IV. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY UNDER
CALCRIM NO. 3472.
Warda contends that the trial court erroneously “instructed the jury [under
CALCRIM No. 3472] that the right to self-defense cannot be contrived; i.e., that a person
does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes a fight or quarrel with the intent to
use force.” Warda contends “there was no substantial evidence to support this
instruction, because it was beyond dispute that the provocateurs were Hinchman and
Woodward.” Warda argues he did not create an excuse to use force. He argues his act of
pushing or punching Hinchman was not a wrongful act applicable to the contrived self-
defense theory. Warda argues it was prejudicial error to give this instruction because the

49.
prosecutor relied on the erroneous instruction in closing arguments. The People contend
Warda forfeited this claim by failing to object below. They also argue that the instruction
was properly given. We conclude substantial evidence supports the instruction.
A. Relevant Factual Background
Warda acknowledges that he did not object when the trial court informed the
parties it would be instructing the jury with CALCRIM No. 3472.
The court instructed the jury under CALCRIM No. 3472 as follows: “A person
does not have a right to self-defense is he or she provokes a fight or quarrel with the
intent to create an excuse to use force.”
B. Applicable Law
“The trial court must give instructions on every theory of the case supported by
substantial evidence, including defenses that are not inconsistent with the defendant’s
theory of the case.” (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1200.) “ ‘ “Substantial evidence is
evidence sufficient to ‘deserve consideration by the jury,’ that is, evidence that a
reasonable jury could find persuasive.” ’ ” (People v. Cole, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1215;
Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 835 [“Substantial evidence is evidence of reasonable,
credible value”].)
A party forfeits any challenge to a jury instruction that was correct in law and
responsive to the evidence if the party failed to object in the trial court. (People v.
Hudson (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1002, 1011–1012; see People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th
1015, 1051 [“If defendant believed the instruction was incomplete or misleading, he ‘had
the obligation to request clarifying language’ ”].) This rule does not apply if the
instruction was an incorrect statement of law (Hudson, at p. 1012), nor does it apply if the
instructional error affected appellant’s substantial rights (People v. Ramos (2008)
163 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1087). (See § 1259; People v. Andersen (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th

50.
1241, 1249 [“i.e., resulted in a miscarriage of justice, making it reasonably probable the
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result in the absence of error”].)
“CALCRIM No. 3472 is generally a correct statement of law, which might require
modification in the rare case in which a defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly
confrontation and the victim responds with deadly force.” (People v. Eulian (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1334; see People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th 735, 761 [a claim of
imperfect self-defense cannot be invoked by a defendant who created the circumstances
through his own wrongful conduct].) As an example, “a defendant who assaults his
victims with a gun may not set up a valid self-defense claim with evidence he believed
the victims also reached for a gun, since they would be justified in meeting deadly force
with deadly force.” (People v. Ramirez (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 940, 948 (Ramirez).)
Where there is evidence that a defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly
confrontation and the victim responded with deadly force, then the court must instruct the
jury that: “ ‘if the defendant used only nondeadly force, and the opponent responded
with such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight,
then the defendant had the right to defend [himself/herself] with deadly force and was not
required to try to stop fighting .…’ ” (Id. at p. 952.)
“It is error to give an instruction which, while correctly stating a principle of law,
has no application to the facts of the case.” (Guiton, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1129; accord,
People v. Eggers (1947) 30 Cal.2d 676, 687.) An instruction that is correct in law but has
no application to the case is an error “of state law subject to the traditional Watson
test ....” (Guiton, at p. 1130; see Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
C. Analysis
Our Supreme Court, in People v. Enraca, held that a claim of imperfect self-
defense cannot be invoked by a defendant who created the circumstances through his
own wrongful conduct. (People v. Enraca, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 761; People v. Eulian,

51.
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1333.) It held that CALCRIM No. 3472 “is generally a
correct statement of law, which might require modification in the rare case in which a
defendant intended to provoke only a nondeadly confrontation and the victim responds
with deadly force.” (Eulian, at p. 1334.) “Thus, a victim may respond to an attacker’s
initial physical assault with a physical counterassault, and an attacker who provoked the
fight may not in asserting he was injured in the fray claim self-defense against the
victim’s lawful resistance.” (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.)
The record contains evidence that Warda initiated the physical contact in the fight
by stopping his car to get out and punch Hinchman in the face, while being armed with a
handgun. Although Warda argues Hinchman and Woodward provoked him, the record
shows they were standing outside of Warda’s car as he was backing out to leave. Warda
could have left but chose to stop his car and get out of his car to confront them.
Hinchman and Woodward approached Warda when he stopped his car, but it was Warda
who initiated the physical contact by throwing the first punch. Thus, there is evidence
that Warda was the one who provoked the physical fight which would prevent him from
“asserting he was injured in the fray” and “claim self-defense against the victim’s lawful
resistance.” (Ramirez, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at p. 947.) We conclude there was
substantial evidence to support the jury instruction. (See Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1200.)
The present case is readily distinguished from People v. Olguin (1994)
31 Cal.App.4th 1355 (Olguin). Olguin involved what started as a verbal confrontation
between members of rival gangs concerning who controlled a street. The defendant
fatally shot a member of a rival gang as that person began walking toward a group of
people that included the defendant. The defendant said he took out his gun because he
thought the people moving toward him were armed. (Id. at pp. 1366–1367.) The trial
court instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 5.55, which described the contrived self-

52.
defense doctrine. (Olguin, at p. 1381, fn. 10.) Counsel were asked if they had any
objection to this instruction and said they did not. (Id. at p. 1381.)
On appeal, it was undisputed that the record contained no facts supporting the
instruction. (Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.) However, it concluded the error
was harmless where there was no objection, the instruction was part of several self-
defense instructions, and where the jury was specifically instructed to “ ‘[d]isregard any
instruction which applies to facts determined by you not to exist.’ ” (Ibid.) The facts
here are distinguished from the Olgiun court. Here, as discussed, substantial evidence
supports the instruction. Therefore, it was not error for the court to instruct on contrived
self-defense, nor was it prejudicial error for the prosecutor to factor it into her closing
arguments.
We reject Warda’s claim that CALCRIM No. 3472 erroneously required the jury to
conclude that in contriving to use force, Warda forfeited any right to self-defense. Warda
cites to Ramirez, which found that the instructions and the prosecutor’s argument
established as a matter of law that defendants were not entitled to imperfect self-defense
if they contrived to use any force, even nondeadly force. (Ramirez, supra,
233 Cal.App.4th at p. 953.) The trial court in Ramirez had modified the standard
imperfect self-defense claim under CALCRIM No. 571, stating that “ ‘a defendant who,
through his own wrongful conduct … has created circumstances under which his
adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.’ ” (Ramirez, at p. 952.) The court found
that the modified self-defense instruction with CALCRIM No. 3472 purported to bar a
defendant’s claim of self-defense if he or she contrived to use force and misled the jury
on the law of self-defense. (Ibid.) Here, the self-defense instruction was not modified in
such a way and thus the same concern does not apply here.
Therefore, we conclude CALCRIM No. 3472 is a correct statement of law and
applicable to the facts of the case. Accordingly, Warda forfeits this claim since he failed
to object in the trial court. (See People v. Hudson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 1011–1012

53.
[by failing to object, a party forfeits any challenge to a jury instruction that was correct in
law and responsive to the evidence].)
V. THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE ERROR
Warda claims that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor’s misstatements of
evidence to support an erroneous theory that Warda was the initial aggressor who
engaged in mutual combat, combined with the court’s erroneous instructions, limited his
theory of self-defense, violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due
process of law and a fair trial. “Cumulative error is present when the combined effect of
the trial court’s errors is prejudicial or harmful to the defendant. [Citations.] Although a
defendant is entitled to a fair trial, he or she is not entitled to ‘a perfect one.’ ” (People v.
Capers (2019) 7 Cal.5th 989, 1017.) For cumulative error to mandate reversal, it must be
shown to have violated the defendant’s fundamental right to a fair trial. (People v. Rivas
(2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1410, 1436.)
Based on our discussions above finding either no error or any error harmless, we
do not find the presence of combined errors that are prejudicial or harmful to Warda. Nor
are there cumulative errors that violate Warda’s right to a fair trial.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

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