CourtListener 10274913•People v. Williams CA2/7
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/15/24 P. v. Williams CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337398
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA077466)
v.
JESSE MARLON WILLIAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Shannon Knight, Judge. Affirmed.
Jennifer A. Gambale, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________
Jesse Marlon Williams appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6). In March 2020 a jury
convicted Williams of attempted willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder and other crimes. In 2023 Williams
petitioned for resentencing. The trial court (the judge who heard
the trial) appointed counsel for Williams and, after a hearing,
denied the petition, finding Williams was ineligible for
resentencing because the jury was instructed that Williams could
only be found guilty if he had the intent to kill.
Williams appealed, and we appointed counsel. After
reviewing the record, Williams’s appointed appellate counsel filed
a brief that did not identify any arguable issues. After
independently reviewing the record and the contentions
presented by Williams in his six-page supplemental brief, we
have not identified any issue either. Therefore, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Shooting, Convictions, and Sentencing
In August 2019 Dynnell Pugh lived with his fiancée,
Malkia Hunt, their son, Dynnell, Jr., Hunt’s mother, Maranita
Porter, Hunt’s nieces, Ramaiya and Kamareya, and others.2 On
1 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide a recitation of the facts as stated in People v.
Williams (Jan. 19, 2022, B307946) [nonpub. opn.] as background
and do not rely on the facts for purposes of this appeal. (See
People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 [“the factual
summary . . . may not be used to determine a petitioner’s
2
August 20 Williams, his girlfriend, and his daughter, Nevaeh,
went to Pugh and Hunt’s house to speak with Porter about a
dispute between Nevaeh and Ramaiya. Porter agreed with
Williams that the girls’ issue “need[ed] to be squashed.” Before
Williams left, he told Porter, “I don’t want no problems. I got
people.”
The next day Williams picked up James Jones and drove
him to a house where they smoked and played dominoes.
Williams showed Jones a video of some “girls jumping” Nevaeh.
Williams and his family wanted Ramaiya to have a one-on-one
fight with Nevaeh or another girl named Jackie. Jones, Williams,
and Marvin (a Black Watts Mafia gang member) drove to Pugh
and Hunt’s house. Before Jones got out of the car, Williams gave
him a gun. According to Jones, Williams told him “any funny shit
like, going on like, squeeze on a fool.” Jones replied, “[A]lright
bro. Alright.” Jones felt Williams “low key like threatened” him
because Williams was “a god” and Williams and his brothers were
“somebody.”
At approximately 7:00 p.m. Hunt answered the door and
saw five people outside. A woman in the group told Hunt that
she wanted Ramaiya to come outside to fight. Hunt responded
that Ramaiya was not going to come outside, and Hunt asked the
group to leave. Hunt went to the kitchen and told Porter and
Pugh about the group outside their house. Pugh looked at his
security monitors and saw Jones and a group of four females. He
retrieved a gun from his safe and placed it in his right pants
eligibility at the prima facie stage”]; People v. Bratton (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 1100, 1113 [same].)
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pocket before walking outside. Jones told Pugh that Ramaiya
had gotten into a fist fight with Nevaeh and the group wanted
Ramaiya to come outside to fight. Pugh replied there would be no
fighting at his home, and he asked them to leave.
A few minutes later, Williams joined the group outside the
house. Williams told Pugh that he wanted Ramaiya to come
outside and fight either Nevaeh or the other females in the group.
Pugh responded that no fight was going to happen, and he
repeatedly asked Williams and his group to leave.
During the course of Pugh’s conversation with the group,
Porter and then Hunt joined Pugh outside the house. When
Hunt walked outside, the group asked Pugh who Hunt was, and
whether she could fight. Pugh motioned to Hunt and Porter and
suggested they all go back inside the house. As Pugh backed
away from the group, Jones walked “around to [Pugh’s] flank”
(Pugh’s left side). At this point, Jones pulled out his gun and
pointed it at Pugh, and Pugh heard Williams say, “Blow his
mother fucking head off.” Pugh then pulled out his gun from his
pants pocket and pointed it at Jones. Jones shot at Pugh, and
Pugh fired back at him. Jones and Williams ran off and left
together in Williams’s vehicle.
The jury found Williams guilty of the attempted willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder of Pugh (§§ 187, subd. (a),
664; count 1); assault with a firearm on Hunt, Porter, and Pugh
(§ 245, subd. (a)(2); counts 2, 3 & 5); and shooting at an inhabited
dwelling (§ 246; count 4). As to count 1, the jury found a
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
Williams later admitted he had suffered two prior strike
convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) that were serious
felonies within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On
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September 18, 2020 the trial court sentenced Williams to an
aggregate state prison sentence of 106 years to life. We affirmed.
(People v. Williams (Jan. 19, 2022, B307946) [nonpub. opn.].)
B. The Superior Court’s Denial of Williams’s Petition for
Resentencing
On May 18, 2023 Williams filed a petition for resentencing
under former section 1170.95, which, as amended effective
January 1, 2022, authorized individuals convicted of felony
murder, or of murder, attempted murder, or voluntary
manslaughter under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, to petition the superior court for resentencing. In his
form petition Williams checked the box indicating he “could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes made to Penal Code [sections] 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019” and requested the appointment of counsel.
The trial court appointed counsel for Williams. The People
argued in their response that “petitioner was not convicted of any
form of murder. He was not convicted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. He was not convicted under any
situation where malice was imputed to another person. The
petitioner was convicted under a specific intent to kill, and
therefore, he is ineligible for relief.”
On March 22, 2024 the trial court denied the petition,
stating at the hearing that it had reviewed the jury instructions
and, as the trial judge who presided over the trial, was “satisfied
that the jury was not instructed on any theory of liability that is
no longer valid with regard to the attempted murder count or any
other count.” Further, “the jury was instructed on a straight
aiding and abetting theory. They were instructed that the
5
defendant could only be found guilty if he had intent to kill or
intent that the perpetrator kill the victim . . . . There was just
nothing about this case that in any way, shape, or form would fall
under any of the recently invalidated theories of liability of
natural and probable consequences or felony murder under
certain circumstances.” Williams timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Williams on appeal from
the denial of his petition for resentencing. After reviewing the
record, appointed counsel did not identify any arguable issues
and so informed this court. Appointed counsel advised Williams
that she was filing a brief stating she was unable to find any
arguable issues and that Smith had a right to file a supplemental
brief. Appointed counsel also sent Williams a copy of the brief, as
well as the transcripts of the record on appeal.
On October 22, 2024 we received a six-page, handwritten
supplemental brief from Williams. In his supplemental brief,
Williams argued that the prosecution suppressed evidence
favorable to Williams in violation of Brady v. Maryland (1963)
373 U.S. 83 and the testimony given at trial “was fabricated.” He
also urges us to review the evidence at trial and subpoena Jones
to testify in Williams’s defense.
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate
Bill 1437), effective January 1, 2019, eliminated the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant
guilty of murder and significantly limited the scope of the felony-
murder rule. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 984; People
v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708; People v. Lewis (2021)
6
11 Cal.5th 952, 957; People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-
843, 847-848.) Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits
imputing malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a
crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of
murder, except under the revised felony-murder rule in
section 189, subdivision (e). Section 189 requires the People to
prove that the defendant was the actual killer (§ 189,
subd. (e)(1)); that the defendant, though not the actual killer,
with the intent to kill aided or assisted in the commission of the
murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or that the defendant was a major
participant in a felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and
“acted with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the felony-murder special-
circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)). (People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 448; see People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th
839, 868-869; Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at pp. 842-843.)
Under section 1172.6, subdivision (a), a defendant
convicted of murder may file a resentencing petition when all of
the following conditions apply: (1) the charging document filed
against the petitioner allowed the prosecution to proceed under a
theory of felony murder or another theory of imputed malice;
(2) the petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or plea proceeding at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder; and (3) the “petitioner could not presently be convicted of
murder or attempted murder because of changes to Section 188
or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
Williams’s contentions that the prosecution withheld
evidence, his conviction was based on fabricated evidence, and
the evidence did not support his conviction do not entitle him to
7
relief because section 1172.6 does not allow a petitioner to raise
new arguments that are not based on changes made by Senate
Bill 1437. (See People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, 865
[“Section 1172.6 does not create a right to a second appeal”].)
Thus, “[t]he mere filing of a section [1172.6] petition does not
afford the petitioner a new opportunity to raise claims of trial
error or attack the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
jury’s findings.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
947.) Moreover, because the jury was instructed that to find
Williams guilty, it had to find “[t]he defendant intended to kill
[the victim], or intended that the perpetrator kill that person if
the defendant aided and abetted,” and the jury was not
instructed on the felony murder rule, the natural and probable
consequences doctrine, or any theory of imputed malice,Williams
has not made a prima facie case that he “could not presently be
convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189” made by Senate Bill 1437. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (a)(3).)
Because no cognizable legal issues have been raised by
Williams’s appellate counsel or by Williams or identified in our
independent review of the record, the order denying his petition
for resentencing is affirmed. (See People v. Delgadillo (2022)
14 Cal.5th 216, 231-232; see generally People v. Kelly (2006)
40 Cal.4th 106, 118-119; People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
441-442.)
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DISPOSITION
The order denying Williams’s petition for resentencing is
affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
STONE, J.
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