CourtListener 10273432•People v. Lopez CA5
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/13/24 P. v. Lopez CA5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086974
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. DF011711B)
v.
ISRAEL LOPEZ, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
THE COURT*
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Elizabet
Rodriguez, Judge.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Kari Ricci Mueller and
Darren K. Indermill, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
*Before Peña, Acting P. J., Meehan, J. and De Santos, J.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015, a jury convicted defendant Israel Lopez of 16 felony counts arising from
two home invasions that were determined to be gang related (§ 186.22, subd. (b)).
(Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.) Defendant was also convicted
of active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) and the jury found
true firearm enhancements (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)). In a bifurcated proceeding,
the court found defendant had suffered a prior strike and serious felony conviction
(§§ 667, subds. (a), (c)–(i)) and two prison prior terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)). Three
robbery counts, the gang count, and the gang and firearm enhancements were reversed on
appeal, the matter was remanded, and defendant was resentenced on the remaining
charges.
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR)
identified defendant as an individual potentially eligible for resentencing pursuant to
Senate Bill No. 483 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 483). Additionally, in 2023, the
CDCR also recommended recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision
(a)(1) in light of the court’s new discretion to dismiss a prior serious felony conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)).
The trial court recalled and resentenced defendant pursuant to section 1172.75,
struck only the one-year section 667.5, former subdivision (b) prison prior enhancement
and declined to further reduce defendant’s sentence. The court acknowledged the legal
presumption favoring recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, but it concluded
the presumption was overcome because defendant posed an unreasonable risk of danger
to public safety, given the nature of the charges and the violence defendant used upon
multiple victims on two different dates.
On appeal, defendant argues the court abused its discretion in finding he was an
unreasonable risk to public safety and denying him further relief.
We affirm.
2.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 2014, defendant and his codefendants—Adrian Hernandez, James Delacruz,
and Frank Simental—were charged with robbery of an inhabited dwelling on or about
June 12, 2014 (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A); count 1), carjacking (§ 215, subd. (a); count 2),
residential burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 3), carrying a loaded firearm in a public place
while an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (b)(3); count 4),
active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 7), and robbery
(§ 212.5, subd. (a); count 8). Defendant was also charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm on or about July 12, 2014 (§ 29900, subd. (a); count 6).
Defendant and codefendant James Delacruz were also charged with committing
first degree residential robbery of two victims in concert on or about June 12, 2014
(§§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A), 212.5, subd. (a); counts 9, 10, 11 & 12), extortion (§ 519, subd.
1; count 13), burglary (§ 460, subd. (a); count 14), carrying a loaded firearm in a public
place while an active participant in a criminal street gang (§ 25850, subd. (c)(3); count
15), criminal threats (§ 422; count 16), dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count
17), conspiracy to commit a robbery (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 18), and active
participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 19).
It was further alleged as to defendant that counts 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14,
16, 17, and 18 were committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with
a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)); defendant was a principal in the
commission of counts 1, 2, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 18; and at least one principal personally
used a firearm during the offenses (§ 12022.53, subds. (b), (e)(1)). As to each offense, it
was also alleged defendant had suffered a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd.
(a)) that also qualified as a strike prior (§§ 667, subds. (c)–(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(e)),
and he served two prior prison terms (§ 667.5, former subd. (b)) based on an August 21,
2002, conviction for robbery (§ 211) and a February 11, 2010, conviction for burglary
(§ 460, subd. (b)). It was further alleged that, during the commission of the residential
3.
burglaries (counts 3 & 14) another person other than the accomplice was present in the
residence (§ 667.5, subd. (c)(21)), making the offenses violent felonies.
In 2015, a jury found defendant not guilty of counts 4 and 15 but otherwise
convicted defendant of all the charges and found true all of the enhancement allegations.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the court found true the prior conviction allegations.
The court sentenced defendant to 30 years to life on count 1, plus five years for the
prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus 10 years for the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (e)(1) firearm enhancement that was ordered stayed pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 4.447; a consecutive term of 30 years to life on count 9,
plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus one year
pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b), plus 10 years for the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (e)(1) firearm enhancement that was ordered stayed pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 4.447; a consecutive term of 30 years to life on count 10,
plus five years for the prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), plus one year
pursuant to section 667.5, former subdivision (b), plus 10 years for the section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (e)(1) firearm enhancement that was ordered stayed pursuant to
California Rules of Court, rule 4.447, and a consecutive term of 20 years to life on count
17.1 Punishment on the remaining counts was ordered stayed pursuant to section 654.
1At sentencing, the court denied defendant’s motion to strike his prior strike. It noted
defendant was sentenced to prison for the prior strike and then paroled and violated parole twice.
Defendant suffered four misdemeanor convictions after he was first paroled in 2005 and he was
finally discharged from parole in 2009. He suffered another felony conviction in 2008,was given
32 months at the California Department of Corrections, and was released on community
supervision during which he committed the instant crimes, which were much more serious
crimes. The court noted that all the instant crimes were serious and/or violent felonies and there
were gang enhancements attached to most of them. The court concluded, “It’s the current
conduct in conjunction with his prior history subsequent to the strike that carries significant
weight …; so I’m going to decline to exercise my discretion to dismiss the prior strike,” finding
defendant came “within the spirit of the three-strikes law.”
4.
On appeal, defendant’s convictions for counts 8, 11, and 12 were found to be
duplicative of the robbery convictions alleged in counts 1, 9, and 10; accordingly, counts
8, 11, and 12 were reversed and ordered dismissed. Defendant’s convictions for counts 7
and 19 and the findings related to the section 186.22, subdivision (b) and section
12022.53, subdivisions (b) and (e)(1) enhancements were also reversed based on People v
Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, and subsequently dismissed on the People’s motion. The
judgment as to all the other convictions and findings was affirmed. (Details regarding the
evidence presented at trial and issues raised on appeal can be found in our court’s
unpublished opinion, People v. Lopez (Oct. 19, 2018, F072812).)
After the remittitur issued, defendant was resentenced in February 2019 to an
upper term of 18 years on count 1, plus five years for the prior serious felony
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), and one year for the prison prior enhancement (§ 667.5,
former subd. (b)), a concurrent upper term of six years on count 6, a consecutive middle
term of four years on count 9, a consecutive middle term of four years on count 10, and a
consecutive middle term of six years on count 17. Punishment on counts 2, 3, 13, 14, 16,
and 18 was imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654.
In a letter dated April 26, 2023 (filed with the Kern Super. Ct. on Apr. 27, 2023),
the Office of the Secretary of the CDCR “provide[d] the court with the authority to
resentence [defendant] … pursuant to … Section 1172.1, Subdivision (a)(1).” The letter
noted defendant’s sentence included a consecutive five-year enhancement for a prior
serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) that courts were previously barred from
striking, but “effective January 1, 2019, courts are now authorized to exercise their
discretion to strike prior serious felony convictions for purposes of enhancement under
this section, or to strike the punishment for the enhancement under this section, pursuant
to PC 1385.” The Secretary further stated, “In light of the court’s newfound authority,
and after personally reviewing their commitment offense and in-prison conduct, I
recommend that [defendant]’s sentence be recalled and that they be resentenced in
5.
accordance with PC 1172.1(a)(1).” The recommendation included a “cumulative case
summary” that presented “case factors that are applicable pursuant to the
recommendation for recall of commitment based upon a change in sentencing law.” The
summary detailed the current commitment offense, defendant’s prior juvenile and adult
criminal history, his parole history, general information from prison regarding programs
and credits defendant completed while incarcerated, information regarding his
medical/mental health, his support system, and his notification and registration
requirements. The report stated defendant had “remained disciplinary free during this
term of incarceration” and had received one “Counseling Chrono” since his incarceration
(on Jan. 19, 2017, for disobeying an order).
In September 2023, defendant filed points and authorities in support of
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1). He asserted there was no
reason to believe he was a risk to public safety as defined in section 1170.18, namely,
there was no reason to believe he would engage in any of the crimes defined in section
667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). Defendant asserted, pursuant to section 1172.1,
subdivision (a)(1) and section 1385, the court could consider postconviction factors such
as his disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation since he entered the prison system.
He further asserted, “[a]ccording to the secretary,” defendant “had no disciplinary actions
since his date of incarceration, 12-4-15,” “no pending disciplinary actions,” did “not need
to have any urinalysis testing,” “has been violation free,” and only received “one
counseling chrono” for disobeying an order on January 17, 2017, which “did not require
disciplinary action.” He asserted he “works as a housing unit porter and works in
computer-related technology” and his work reports show “he is exceptional and above
average at his job.” He also argued the court “must review and give great weight to [his]
participation in rehabilitation classes,” noting he had completed substance abuse disorder
treatment programs and participated in Narcotics Anonymous and self-help programs.
Defendant acknowledged the supplemental probation report recommended a one-year
6.
reduction based upon dismissal of the invalid section 667.5, former subdivision (b) prison
prior. He argued, however, the report failed to consider the required factors or the
Secretary’s recommendation. He urged the court to “give great weight to” his
circumstances “as they stand today” and asked the court to exercise its discretion under
Romero to strike his prior strike conviction. He asked the court to resentence him as
follows: “on Count 1: midterm 6 years. Count 6: 1/3 midterm (8 months). Count 9:
1/3 midterm (2 years). Count 10: 1/3 midterm (2 years). Count 17: 1/3 midterm (1
year). Count 18: 1/3 midterm (2) years). Counts 2, 3, 13, 14, 16, 18 stayed pursuant to
654.… For a total term of 13 years 8 months.”
Thereafter, the court held a hearing on September 29, 2023. As to defendant’s
request for additional relief pursuant to section 1172.1 and relief under section 1172.75,
the prosecutor asserted the People were “okay with probation’s recommendation that the
defendant receive 37 years instead of 38,” but were “not okay with any further
reduction.” The prosecutor asserted, “defendant previously was sentenced to … four life
tail [sic] sentences coming out to 127 to life,” but “[d]ue to a change in the gang law …
he was resentenced to 38 years.” The prosecutor acknowledged defendant was doing
well in prison but argued defendant was “a sophisticated criminal mastermind that was
responsible for orchestrating home invasion robberies in Delano. And during the trial of
that matter, took the stand and essentially blamed it on the sheriff’s deputy saying that it
was part of his duties as an informant. So he was not willing to take responsibility back
then ….”
Defense counsel argued the court must “give great weight to what the department
had indicated. And he is doing very, very well. He has been violation free since he’s
been in prison. He gets excellent work recommendations, especially since 2022. He’s
always performed his work satisfactorily. He’s taking classe[s] in narcotics abuse,
changing the way you think.” And, “[h]e’s dropped out of a gang.”
7.
The court denied resentencing pursuant to section 1172.1. It noted “[t]he secretary
may make a recommendation to recall the sentence and have the Court exercise its
discretion to recall and resentence if it is in the interest of justice to do so.” And, “[w]hen
the resentence [sic] request is from the secretary, it creates a presumption favoring recall
and resentence of the defendant. That presumption may be overcome if the Court finds
that the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.” The court stated it
did “not believe that recall and resentence would be in the interest of justice” and it found
“defendant does pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety given the nature of
the charges, the violence used by the defendant upon multiple victims on two different
dates.” The court further noted “defendant’s long criminal history” and his “poor
performance on parole.” In rendering its decision, the court expressly stated that it had
read and reviewed the section 1172.1 petition filed by the secretary which showed
defendant’s rehabilitative efforts from 2017 to the present.
Regarding resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, the court noted it was
“currently prohibited from imposing the upper term unless the circumstances in
aggravation are … pled and proven or admitted to by the defendant, which has not
occurred in this case.” However, it noted, it had “received a certified RAP sheet which
may be used in selecting the appropriate prison term.”
The court struck the section 667.5, former subdivision (b) enhancement allegation.
It declined to exercise its discretion to strike defendant’s prior strike allegation pursuant
to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 “based upon the facts of the
case and the defendant’s long criminal history as outlined in the certified RAP sheet, the
defendant’s criminal record span [sic] … from 19[9]8 to 2009,” “[w]ith a conviction
almost every year in that time period.” The court reasoned,
“Here the defendant committed violent crimes involving three separate
victims during the course of two days. [¶] On July 12, 2014 the defendant
and two others kicked in … the door of the victim’s home. One person was
armed with a knife. And the defendant was identified by the victim as
8.
being armed with a gun. The victim was threatened with bodily harm and
he was robbed of $40 and the keys to a truck amongst other things. [¶] The
very next day on July 13, 2014 the defendant was again involved in a home
invasion robbery where the defendant was again … named by the victim.
[¶] While the defendant was not the man who pointed the gun at the
victim’s head, the defendant was the one who did all the talking, instructing
the victims—there were two—to keep their heads down.”
The court also stated, for the same reasons, it would still be imposing the upper
term, and it would not exercise its discretion under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B)
“to strike multiple enhancements.” It found “dismissal of the enhancements would
endanger public safety. This is based on defendant’s long extensive prior criminal
history and the facts of the current case as … just previously discussed.”
It resentenced defendant to a total fixed term of 37 years composed of an upper
term of 18 years on count 1 (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), plus five years for the prior serious
felony enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)), a concurrent upper term of six years on count 6
(§ 29900, subd. (a)), a consecutive middle term of four years on count 9 (§ 213, subd.
(a)(1)(A)), a consecutive middle term of four years on count 10 (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)),
and a consecutive middle term of six years on count 17 (§ 136.1, subd. (c)). Sentences on
the remaining counts were imposed and stayed pursuant to section 654.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant contends the court abused its discretion in concluding he
posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and, relatedly, denying him recall and
resentencing under section 1172.1 and additional relief during resentencing under section
1172.75. He contends the factors the court relied upon to conclude he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were “unsupported by the record.” As the
People note, there is a specific definition of “unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety” under section 1172.1. In the interest of clarity, we address the rulings under
sections 1172.1 and 1172.75 separately and, for the reasons that follow, we reject
defendant’s contentions.
9.
I. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying Defendant Recall and
Resentencing Under Section 1172.1
First, we reject defendant’s contention the court abused its discretion in declining
to recall and resentence him pursuant to section 1172.1.
A. Applicable Law
Section 1172.1 (former § 1170.03)2 provides a procedure by which a court may
“at any time upon the recommendation of the secretary or the Board of Parole Hearings
in the case of a defendant incarcerated in state prison, … recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody,
and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial sentence.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(1).)
Section 1172.1 provides, where the secretary of the CDCR requests resentencing,
there is a presumption in favor of recall and resentencing of the defendant, “‘which may
only be overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety,’” as defined in subdivision (c) of section 1170.18.3 (People v. McMurray,
supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p. 1040; see § 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Section 1170.18,
2Assembly Bill No. 1540 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) moved the recall and resentencing
provisions of former section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) to section 1170.03, effective January 1,
2022. (Stats. 2021, ch. 719, § 3.1.) It also clarified many of the required procedures under this
section. (See People v. McMurray (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 1035, 1041 [“[T]he Legislature
repeatedly indicated that Assembly Bill [No.] 1540 was intended to ‘make clarifying changes’ to
former section 1170(d)(1), including specifying the required procedure and guidelines when the
CDCR recommends recall and resentencing”].) Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
then renumbered section 1170.03 to section 1172.1, effective June 30, 2022, but made no
substantive changes. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.) For the sake of clarity and consistency, we refer
to section 1172.1 when addressing the statute governing the petition for resentencing.
3Assembly Bill No. 600 (2022–2023 Reg. Sess.) amended subdivision (b)(2) of section
1172.1 after the resentencing hearing, effective January 1, 2024, as follows: “There shall be a
presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be overcome if a
court finds the defendant is currently poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (Original strikethrough, italics added.) For
purposes of clarity, we refer to the version of the statute currently in effect.
10.
subdivision (c) defines “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” as “an unreasonable
risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony” within the meaning of section
667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). Those offenses—known as super strikes—include, among
others, any homicide and any serious or violent felony offense punishable in California
by life imprisonment or death. (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv); People v. Braggs (2022) 85
Cal.App.5th 809, 818; see People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351.)
Additionally, “[w]here, as here, the CDCR recommends recall and resentencing,
the court is also … required to hold a hearing (unless the parties otherwise stipulate),
state on the record its reasons for its decision, provide notice to the defendant, and
appoint counsel for the defendant.” (People v. McMurray, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th at p.
1040; see § 1172.1, subds. (a)(7)–(9), (b)(1).) Furthermore, when recalling and
resentencing pursuant to its provisions, the court “shall … apply any changes in law that
reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2); see People v.
McMurray, at p. 1040; People v. Pierce (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1074, 1078.) Further,
“[i]n recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision, the court shall consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(5).) (At the time of resentencing, this provision appeared in
§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(4), and it provided the court may, as opposed to shall, consider
postconviction factors. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 795 § 1.5.))
“We apply the abuse of discretion standard of review to a trial court’s denial of
recall.” (People v. E.M. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1075, 1082; accord, People v. Frazier
(2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its
decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.”
11.
(People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 [further noting “‘all discretionary
authority is contextual’” and “we cannot determine whether a trial court has acted
irrationally or arbitrarily … without considering the legal principles and policies that
should have guided the court’s actions”].)
B. Analysis
Defendant contends the factors the court relied upon to conclude he posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety were “unsupported by the record.” He also
asserts “that other mitigating factors diminishing the risk that [he] would commit a new
violent felony were improperly balanced or evaluated by the trial court.” He argues none
of his current convictions, nor the evidence of his past convictions, established he had
been accused of, committed, or was convicted of a super strike as defined by section 667,
subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). He further asserts “the record demonstrates significant and
commendable postconviction rehabilitation strongly in support of resentencing,” and the
court’s finding he “posed an unreasonable risk of committing a new violent felony within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) was unreasonable and an abuse of
discretion.” We disagree; we cannot conclude the court abused its broad discretion in
concluding defendant posed an unreasonable risk of committing a new violent felony
within the meaning of section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv).
Here, the court acknowledged the presumption favoring recall and resentencing
provided for in section 1172.1 in light of the Secretary of the CDCR’s recommendation,
but it concluded the presumption had been overcome because defendant posed an
unreasonable risk to public safety. In support of its finding, the court cited “the nature of
the charges” and, specifically, “the violence used by the defendant upon multiple victims
on two different dates.” It also noted “defendant’s long criminal history” that spanned
over 20 years and his “poor performance on parole.” The court further stated it
12.
considered defendant’s “rehabilitative efforts” while incarcerated in considering the
petition for relief.
And we cannot conclude the court’s conclusion that defendant posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a super strike considering the nature of the current case
and defendant’s criminal history fell “outside the bounds of reason.” Here, the incidents
giving rise to defendant’s current convictions involved two home invasion robberies that
occurred within two days. There was evidence a knife and gun were used during the first
residential robbery and the victim was threatened with bodily harm during the incident.
During trial, the victim of the first robbery identified defendant as having been personally
armed with a gun. The second robbery occurred the next day and there was evidence
another individual pointed a gun at the victim’s head while defendant did all the talking.
Thus, there was evidence before the court from which it could conclude defendant had a
history of using a deadly or dangerous weapon; he was involved in crimes in which the
victims were threatened with violence; his criminal history spanned over a period of 20
years; his criminal behavior had progressively increased in severity over time; and he had
previously performed poorly on community supervision and/or parole.
On this record, we cannot conclude the court’s conclusion that defendant posed an
unreasonable risk of committing a super strike conviction was arbitrary or irrational.
Rather, the trial court reasonably concluded, based on defendant’s history and most
recent convictions, that he presented an unreasonable risk of committing a serious violent
offense listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv). (See generally People v. Hall
(2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1266 [“The trial court could reasonably infer from [the
defendant]’s recent criminal behavior and repeated failure to rehabilitate that he presents
an elevated—and escalating—risk of not only threatening violence, but also using deadly
force”].) That defendant was not currently nor previously convicted of a super strike
conviction does not change our conclusion. (See ibid. [rejecting suggestion “trial court
may only exercise its discretion to find an unreasonable risk to public safety when
13.
considering an offender who has previously committed a super strike offense”].) While
evidence defendant has been convicted of a “super strike” may support a trial court’s
finding that a defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety as defined
in subdivision (c) of section 1170.18 (see § 1172.1, subd. (c)), it is not statutorily required
to sustain such a finding. And, for the reasons stated, we conclude the court did not
abuse its discretion in finding defendant ineligible for relief based on the circumstances.
Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention.
II. The Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Declining to Reduce Defendant’s
Sentence Further During the Section 1172.75 Resentencing
We also reject defendant’s argument he should have been entitled to further relief
under section 1172.75.
A. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Proceedings
In October of 2021, the Governor signed Senate Bill 483, effective on January 1,
2022, which added section 1171.1 to the Penal Code, subsequently renumbered as section
1172.75. This section declares: “Any sentence enhancement that was imposed prior to
January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent offense … is legally
invalid.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
Section 1172.75 establishes a mechanism to provide affected defendants an
avenue for relief from now invalid prison prior enhancements. Subdivision (b) directs the
Secretary of the CDCR and the correctional administrator of each county to “identify
those persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment” that includes a
now legally invalid prison prior enhancement, and to provide the names of such persons,
their dates of birth, and the relevant case numbers or docket numbers to the sentencing
court that imposed the enhancement. (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) After the court receives
from the CDCR and county correctional administrator the information included in
subdivision (b) of section 1172.75, “the court shall review the judgment and verify that
14.
the current judgment includes a sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a),”
and if so, “recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
When resentencing a defendant under section 1172.75, the court must “apply the
sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any other changes in law that reduce
sentences or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) “The court may consider
postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age,
time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk
for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since the
original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(3).)
B. Section 1385 as Amended by Senate Bill No. 81
In 2021, the Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 81 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 81), which amended section 1385 to specify mitigating circumstances that
the trial court should consider when deciding whether to strike enhancements from a
defendant’s sentence in the interest of justice. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) As modified
by Senate Bill 81, section 1385, subdivision (c) now provides, in part:
“(1) Notwithstanding any other law, the court shall dismiss an
enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, except if
dismissal of that enhancement is prohibited by any initiative statute.
“(2) In exercising its discretion under this subdivision, the court shall
consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove that any of the mitigating circumstances … are present. Proof of the
presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of
dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public safety’
means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the enhancement would
result in physical injury or other serious danger to others.” (§ 1385, subd.
(c)(1)–(2).)
15.
The mitigating circumstances that courts are to consider and afford great weight to
in considering whether to strike an enhancement include, but are not limited to, whether
“[t]he enhancement is based on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H).)
We note Senate Bill 81 initially codified these provisions under section 1385,
former subdivision (c)(3)(B) and (C), respectively, but section 1385 was further amended
pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 200 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective June 30, 2022, to
fall under subdivision (c)(2)(B) and (C), respectively, of section 1385. (Stats. 2022, ch.
58, § 15.) Pursuant to Senate Bill 81, section 1385, subdivision (c)(7) provided: “This
subdivision shall apply to sentencings occurring after the effective date of the act that
added this subdivision.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Thereafter, Assembly Bill No. 200
modified subdivision (c)(7) of section 1385 to state: “This subdivision shall apply to all
sentencings occurring after January 1, 2022.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 15.) Because Senate
Bill 81 became effective January 1, 2022, this modification did not result in a substantive
change.
A trial court’s refusal to exercise its section 1385 discretion to dismiss is reviewed
for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374.) A trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it. (Id. at p. 376.)
C. Analysis
To the extent defendant is arguing the court erred in concluding defendant posed
an unreasonable risk to public safety during the section 1172.75 proceedings and
declining to dismiss the prior serous felony conviction enhancement on that basis, for the
reasons discussed in the previous part, we cannot conclude the court abused its
discretion.4 Though defendant asserts the trial court ignored that his prior serious felony
4It bears noting, pursuant to section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), resentencing “shall
result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of the elimination of the
16.
conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)) was over five years old—a mitigating factor weighing in
favor of resentencing and dismissal of the enhancement pursuant to section 1385—the
court was not required to afford great weight to this mitigating circumstance given its
conclusion that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety. (See § 1385,
subd. (c)(2) [“[p]roof of the presence of one or more of [the enumerated] circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that
dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety” (italics added)].) And
defendant does not explain, nor can we conclude, how the court’s reference to an
inapplicable mitigating circumstance—“multiple enhancements”—worked against him.
Defendant also argues the court “failed to balance, weigh or evaluate [his]
significant, commendable, and well-documented postconviction history of rehabilitation
since his reception by the CDCR in 2015,” and the supplemental probation report also
failed to mention or consider his “excellent behavioral record while imprisoned since
2015.” But, as discussed, the record belies defendant’s contention that the court failed to
consider his postconviction history of rehabilitation. To the contrary, the court expressly
stated it read and considered the packet submitted by the Secretary of the CDCR, which
included evidence of defendant’s rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated, in considering
relief under sections 1172.75 and 1172.1.
Thus, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion in finding defendant
posed an unreasonable risk to public safety and declining to reduce defendant’s sentence
further on that basis.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a
lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” Because the section 1172.75 resentencing
proceedings in this case resulted in a lesser sentence than that originally imposed, this provision
was not implicated.
17.
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