CourtListener 10266161•KPMC v. Chaudhari CA2/3
Gesamter Gesetzestext
Filed 11/6/24 KPMC v. Chaudhari CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
KPMC, LLC, B326029
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV31781)
v.
VELJIBHAI CHAUDHARI et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of Thomas J. Tedesco, Thomas J. Tedesco; Law
Crafters Legal Services, Inc. and Alan M. Goldberg for
Defendants and Appellants.
Lagasse Branch Bell + Kinkead and Christopher C. Cianci
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
Defendants Veljibhai Chaudhari and Sushilkumar
Chaudhari (the Chaudharis) appeal from a judgment entered in
favor of plaintiff KPMC, LLC. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2016, the Chaudharis signed a five-year commercial
lease with KPMC. The lease required the Chaudharis to pay
monthly rent to KPMC. It allowed the prevailing party in any
action based on the lease to recover attorney fees and costs.
The Chaudharis assigned their rights under the lease to
nonparty Midtown Mart, Inc. KPMC was aware of and signed
the assignment. The assignment required that the Chaudharis
“remain primarily (and not secondarily) obligated to [KPMC] for
the full performance of all covenants, conditions, obligations and
duties required to be performed by [the Chaudharis] under the
Lease, and shall not be relieved of any such performance
thereunder as a result of this Assignment or as a result of any
extension, renewal, modification, or amendment of the Lease or
any further assignment, subletting or other tenancy under the
Lease or to any holdover term following the term granted under
the Lease or any extension or renewal thereof, regardless of
whether [the Chaudharis] consent[] thereto or receive[] notice
thereof.”
Midtown Mart stopped paying rent in early 2020. The
lease naturally expired in March 2021. In April 2021, KPMC
filed an unlawful detainer action against Midtown Mart seeking
possession of the property and restitution for unpaid rent and
holdover damages. Midtown Mart did not appear at trial. In
June, the court entered default judgment for KPMC and awarded
it possession of the property. The court also entered a
$192,420.78 monetary judgment for KPMC against Midtown
2
Mart, consisting of $165,254.38 for past rent due, $25,216.40 in
holdover damages, $1,500 in attorney fees, and $450 in costs.
In August 2021, KPMC sued the Chaudharis for breach of
contract, seeking damages not less than the amount awarded in
the unlawful detainer judgment. KPMC moved for summary
judgment in June 2022. It submitted the lease as evidence of a
contract. KPMC declared that it had performed its obligations
under the lease. It argued that the lease was materially
breached through nonpayment of rent and that the Chaudharis
were liable for that breach pursuant to the lease and the
assignment. KPMC requested judicial notice of the unlawful
detainer judgment. It declared that the judgment accurately
reflected its damages of $165,254.38 for past rent due, $25,216.40
in holdover damages, $1,500 in attorney fees, and $450 in costs.
The Chaudharis did not oppose the request for judicial notice.
In their opposition to KPMC’s summary judgment motion,
the Chaudharis argued that they were necessary parties to the
unlawful detainer action, that KPMC failed to mitigate damages,
that res judicata barred KPMC from filing a second action for
unpaid rent, and that KPMC waived its rights against the
Chaudharis. The Chaudharis declared that they were unaware
that Midtown Mart stopped paying rent and unaware of the
unlawful detainer action until they received KPMC’s complaint
against them.
KPMC’s reply argued that the Chaudharis were not
indispensable parties to the unlawful detainer action, that the
lawsuit was not barred by res judicata, and that KPMC did not
waive its rights to sue the Chaudharis. It also contended that
KPMC had not failed to mitigate damages because it promptly
filed the unlawful detainer action shortly after the lease expired.
3
After KPMC’s motion was fully briefed, the court held a
hearing, but the parties did not appear in court and did not
respond remotely when the case was called.1 The court granted
summary judgment orally and later entered an order articulating
its reasoning. The court found that the opposition “does not
contest the essential facts” and “essentially concedes that there
are no material facts in dispute.” It concluded that the
Chaudharis were not indispensable parties to the unlawful
detainer case, that KPMC’s lawsuit was not barred by res
judicata, and that KPMC did not waive its rights against the
Chaudharis. The court also rejected the Chaudharis’ argument
that KPMC had not submitted sufficient evidence of damages. It
noted that the Chaudharis failed to object to KPMC’s request for
judicial notice of the unlawful detainer judgment, and concluded
that the unlawful detainer judgment “reflect[s] a judicial
determination that KPMC has been damaged in the amount of
1 On appeal, the Chaudharis argue they were denied the
opportunity to be heard because their counsel appeared
telephonically at the hearing but “the line went dead.” However,
this assertion is based on a legal filing, not a sworn affidavit or
declaration. The record does not include any reporter’s transcript
of the hearing nor any agreed or settled statement of what
occurred. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.130(h), 8.137.) “ ‘It is the
burden of appellant to provide an accurate record on appeal to
demonstrate error. Failure to do so precludes an adequate
review . . . .’ ” (In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th
1, 9.) “ ‘We must therefore presume that what occurred at that
hearing supports the judgment.’ ” (Ibid.)
4
$192,420.78.” The trial court entered judgment in favor of KPMC
against the Chaudharis.2
The Chaudharis timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no triable
issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc.,3 § 437c, subd. (c);
Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018)
4 Cal.5th 607, 618.) A plaintiff moving for summary judgment
must “prove[] each element of the cause of action entitling the
party to judgment on the cause of action.” (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1);
Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 853
(Aguilar).) The plaintiff need not “disprove any defense asserted
by the defendant.” (Aguilar, at p. 853.)
If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, the burden
shifts to the defendant to present evidence demonstrating there
is a triable issue of material fact “as to the cause of action or a
defense thereto” based on specific facts. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1);
Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.) To support the existence of
2 KPMC’s lawsuit also named as defendants Mi Young
Chung and Yeon Min Chung, the owners of Midtown Mart. The
Chaudharis filed cross-claims against Midtown Mart and the
Chungs. KPMC also moved for summary judgment against the
Chungs, and judgment was entered jointly and severally against
the Chaudharis and the Chungs. The Chungs are not parties to
this appeal, and the Chaudharis’ cross-claims are not at issue in
this appeal.
3 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.
5
a disputed fact, the defendant “must state . . . the nature of the
dispute and describe the evidence that supports the position that
the fact is controverted.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(2).)
“ ‘ “ ‘ “We review the trial court’s decision de novo,
considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing
papers except that to which objections were made and
sustained.” ’ [Citation.] We liberally construe the evidence in
support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve
doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” ’
[Citation.]” (Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th
340, 347.)
II. The Chaudharis Have Not Established Any
Reversible Error
“To prevail on a cause of action for breach of contract, the
plaintiff must prove (1) the contract, (2) the plaintiff’s
performance of the contract or excuse for nonperformance, (3) the
defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damage to the plaintiff.”
(Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186.) The
Chaudharis primarily challenge KPMC’s evidence of damages.4
They also raise several legal arguments primarily relating to the
unlawful detainer action. We find no basis for reversal.
4 The Chaudharis ask this court to remand to the court that
resolved the unlawful detainer action for trial on damages.
However, our jurisdiction is limited to the summary judgment in
this case and any earlier rulings which necessarily affect it.
(§§ 904.1, subd. (a)(1), 906.) The Chaudharis cite no authority
allowing us to address the unlawful detainer judgment or to
remand this case to a court other than the one that granted
summary judgment.
6
a. The Chaudharis have not identified any triable
issue of fact or reversible error as to damages
The Chaudharis argue that there is a triable issue of
material fact on damages and that they were not afforded an
adequate opportunity to dispute or raise defenses to KPMC’s
damages claim. We disagree.
At summary judgment, KPMC declared that Midtown Mart
stopped paying rent in January 2020. It presented evidence that
the lease expired in March 2021 and that it regained possession
of the premises in June 2021. The lease identified the amount of
monthly rent owed during this timeframe. KPMC declared that
the unlawful detainer judgment accurately reflected its damages
of $165,254.38 for unpaid rent through the expiration of the lease
and $25,216.40 for holdover damages after the lease expired and
before KPMC regained possession. In addition, KPMC declared
that it incurred $1,500 in attorney fees and $450 in costs in the
unlawful detainer judgment. KPMC cited paragraph 31 of the
lease, which provides that the prevailing party in any action
relating to the lease is entitled to its attorney fees and costs.
Finally, KPMC pointed to the assignment as evidence that the
Chaudharis are primarily obligated to perform all requirements
under the lease, including payment of rent, holdover damages,
attorney fees, and costs. This evidence was sufficient to shift the
burden to the Chaudharis to identify “ ‘specific facts showing that
a triable issue of material fact exists’ ” on KPMC’s damages.
(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 849.)5
5 The Chaudharis argue in their appellate briefing that
KPMC’s summary judgment motion requested adjudication of a
legal issue, not factual issues, and that KPMC failed to comply
7
As the trial court correctly recognized, the Chaudharis’
opposition brief “essentially concede[d] that there are no material
issues of fact in dispute.” The Chaudharis’ separate statement of
facts opposing summary judgment purported to dispute that the
unlawful detainer judgment accurately reflects KPMC’s damages.
However, the separate statement did not identify “the nature of
the dispute,” nor did it “describe the evidence that supports the
position that the fact is controverted.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
3.1350(f)(2).) The separate statement cited to paragraphs in the
Chaudharis’ declaration, but these paragraphs did not establish
any factual dispute. The Chaudharis therefore did not meet their
burden of identifying “specific facts showing that a triable issue
of material fact exists” as to damages. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).)6
with the requirements for such a motion set out in section 437c,
subdivision (t). This claim is contradicted by the motion, which
argued there was no triable issue of material fact on any element
of breach of contract. During oral argument in this appeal, the
Chaudharis recited a litany of what they described as “triable
issues of fact,” the majority of which appeared to be related in
some form to questions of notice and damages, which are
addressed herein. To the extent they asserted additional triable
issues of fact during oral argument that were not raised below or
in their appellate briefing, those issues are forfeited. (Archdale v.
American Internat. Specialty Lines Ins. Co. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 449, 472 (Archdale) [appellate courts need not
consider arguments raised for the first time at oral argument].)
6 The Chaudharis argue KPMC had no right to a
“ ‘registration’ of the [unlawful detainer] judgment” or “a
summary determination of damages.” These contentions appear
to allude to the trial court’s conclusion that the unlawful detainer
default judgment was a “judicial determination” of KPMC’s
8
The Chaudharis nonetheless argue that a factual dispute
exists because KPMC failed to mitigate its damages. In support
of this contention, they cite Civil Code section 1951.2, which
provides that a landlord’s damages may be reduced in certain
situations, which do not apply here, for failure to mitigate.
Where a landlord terminates a lessee’s right of possession
because of a breach, the landlord may recover “[t]he worth at the
time of award of the unpaid rent which had been earned”—i.e.,
all unpaid rent owed when possession was terminated. (Civ.
Code, § 1951.2, subd. (a)(1).) The statute contemplates
mitigation only when a landlord seeks damages for future rent
owed under a lease after early termination, such as “unpaid rent
which would have been earned after termination” or “unpaid rent
for the balance of the [lease] term after the time of award.” (Civ.
Code, subd. (a)(2) & (3), italics added; Sanders Construction Co.
v. San Joaquin First Fed. Sav. & Loan Assn. (1982) 136
Cal.App.3d 387, 400 [after early termination of a lease, a landlord
has “a duty to mitigate damages by attempting to release the
premises”].) KPMC requested damages for unpaid rent earned
before Midtown Mart’s possession was terminated through the
damages. However, “ ‘the appellate court may affirm a summary
judgment on any correct legal theory, as long as the parties had
an adequate opportunity to address the theory in the trial court.
[Citation.]’ ” (California School of Culinary Arts v. Lujan (2003)
112 Cal.App.4th 16, 22.) As we have discussed, KPMC presented
sufficient evidence of its damages and, though the Chaudharis
were given the opportunity, the record reveals that they failed to
dispute that evidence. We therefore need not decide whether the
trial court accepted the unlawful detainer judgment as
determinative of KPMC’s damages or whether that decision was
erroneous.
9
unlawful detainer judgment, and therefore it was entitled to all
such rent. (Civ. Code, § 1951.2, subd. (a)(1).)7 Since possession of
the premises was not restored to KPMC until after the expiration
of the natural term of the lease, the Chaudharis fail to identify
any legal authority requiring KPMC to mitigate its damages.
Next, the Chaudharis contend that the trial court did not
allow them to fully develop and present their defenses.8 They
argue that issue preclusion did not bar them from asserting
defenses in this action. We do not need to address whether issue
preclusion should apply in this case based on issues resolved in
the unlawful detainer action, because the Chaudharis fail to cite
any evidence in the record that the trial court actually prohibited
7 Moreover, even if Civil Code section 1951.2 provided for
mitigation in this case, “the landlord may recover all contract
damages . . . unless the tenant can prove that some or all of the
rental loss could have been avoided.” (Millikan v. American
Spectrum Real Estate Services California, Inc. (2004) 117
Cal.App.4th 1094, 1102; Civ. Code, § 1951.2, subd. (a)(2).) The
Chaudharis speculate that KPMC could have acted faster by
bringing an earlier unlawful detainer action against Midtown
Mart yet they cite no legal authority which would compel KPMC
to expedite the eviction process, especially given that Midtown
Mart stopped paying rent two months before the start of the
Covid-19 pandemic.
8 The Chaudharis contend they were denied the chance to
litigate and/or raise defenses to KPMC’s damages, the trial
court’s prevailing party finding and the resulting attorney fees,
KPMC’s failure to notify the Chaudharis of the default, KPMC’s
failure to join the Chaudharis in the unlawful detainer action
and/or notify them of that action, and the Chaudharis’ “right to
perform under the Assignment and pay the rent.”
10
them from litigating the amount of damages or otherwise
asserting defenses in this case. After the Chaudharis received
the complaint, which reflected the exact damages alleged by
KPMC, they had nearly a year to develop their case before
opposing summary judgment. If the Chaudharis believed
KPMC’s damages calculations were inaccurate, unsupported by
the evidence, or inconsistent with the terms of the lease, their
opportunity to establish a triable issue of fact on any claim or
defense was at summary judgment. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(1).) If they
were uncertain of the facts, the Chaudharis could have
propounded written discovery on KPMC, subpoenaed Midtown
Mart, or taken depositions during discovery.9 And if they
believed “facts essential to justify opposition [to KPMC’s
summary judgment motion] may exist” but were not readily
available, the Chaudharis could have requested a continuance of
the summary judgment hearing. (§ 437c, subd. (h).) Despite
these opportunities, they failed to present any evidence to
establish a factual dispute on damages or any defense to KPMC’s
breach of contract claim. The Chaudharis therefore have not
identified any triable issue of fact or reversible error relating to
damages.
b. The Chaudharis’ remaining arguments do not
warrant reversal
The Chaudharis raise several additional legal arguments,
none of which provides a basis for reversal.
9 While the Chaudharis’ Case Management Statement
indicated they would be propounding interrogatories and taking
depositions, the record does not reveal whether they actually
engaged in such discovery, let alone any responses thereto.
11
It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that an
appealed judgment or order is presumed correct, and error must
be affirmatively shown. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609 (Jameson).) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the
record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be
made by the appellate court.’ ” (Ibid.) It is also the appellant’s
burden to provide reasoned arguments and citations to relevant
legal authorities to support that argument. (Lee v. Kim (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 705, 721.) Accordingly, “[w]hen an appellant fails to
raise a point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned
argument and citations to authority, we treat the point as
forfeited.” (Delta Stewardship Council Cases (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 1014, 1075 (Delta Stewardship).)
The Chaudharis argue that KPMC was required but failed
to notify them of Midtown Mart’s failure to pay rent, yet for the
first time on appeal, they rely on section 1161 to support their
contention.10 Section 1161 provides that a tenant is guilty of
unlawful detainer after the tenant receives three days’ notice of
failure to pay rent or to perform other conditions of a lease.
10 In connection with their opposition to summary judgment,
the Chaudharis declared that they did not receive notice of
Midtown Mart’s rent default, but they did not ground this point
in any legal authority. Although generally “new theories of
defense may not be raised for the first time on appeal,” their
section 1161 argument involves “a pure question of law that can
be resolved on undisputed facts,” and we exercise our discretion
to address it on appeal. (Fort Bragg Unified School Dist. v.
Colonial American Casualty & Surety Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th
891, 907 (Fort Bragg).)
12
(§ 1161, subds. (2) & (3).)11 According to the Chaudharis, section
1161 requires a landlord to provide notice to an assignor not in
possession because it defines tenant to include “any person who
hires real property” and references notice to any tenant who
possesses the property “by subtenant.” (§ 1161, subds. (2) & (6).)
KPMC’s appellate briefing does not address the Chaudharis’
section 1161 argument. Instead, KPMC argues that the
Chaudharis were not entitled to notice of the default because
“when a lease is assigned[,] the assignor becomes a surety for the
assignee,” and “a surety is liable without notice of the default of
his principal.” (Cross v. Thiele (1921) 51 Cal.App.780, 783
(Cross); Civ. Code, § 2807.) However, KPMC makes no attempt
to resolve the apparent tension between the Chaudharis’
interpretation of section 1161 and the rule described in Cross.
We need not determine whether section 1161 requires a
landlord to provide notice to an assignor who is not in possession
of the property or address any conflict between that section and
Civil Code section 2807. Section 1161 merely describes the
prerequisites for an unlawful detainer judgment. (Liebovich v.
11 In contrast, a tenant who retains possession after the
expiration of the lease is guilty of unlawful detainer regardless of
notice. (§ 1161, subd. (1).) The record does not reflect whether
KPMC’s unlawful detainer action was filed under section 1161,
subdivisions (1), (2), or (3). However, “rents accrued and unpaid
prior to the unlawful detainer may be recovered in an unlawful
detainer proceeding only when the landlord’s right to possession
is founded upon the tenant’s failure to pay rent following the
service of a three-day notice to pay rent or quit the premises
under section 1161, subdivision 2.” (Saberi v. Bakhtiari (1985)
169 Cal.App.3d 509, 513.) KPMC obtained a judgment for unpaid
rent, suggesting it proceeded under section 1161, subdivision (2).
13
Shahrokhkhany (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 511, 513.) This case is not
an unlawful detainer action. The Chaudharis fail to explain how
a statute governing a different type of claim could impact our
review of the trial court’s summary judgment ruling in this
action. “It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of
correctness.” (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p.
1075.)
Relatedly, the Chaudharis contend KPMC’s failure to
provide notice that Midtown Mart stopped paying rent means
there was a triable question of material fact as to whether KPMC
performed all its obligations under the lease. Yet, they have not
identified any provision in the lease requiring such notice.12
(Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [appellant’s burden is to
demonstrate error based on the appellate record].) The
Chaudharis also argue that, as a matter of law, they were not
obligated to perform because they were not aware of the default.
However, the parties agree that the Chaudharis were sureties
under the lease, meaning they were liable to KPMC “immediately
upon the default of the principal, and without demand or notice.”
(Civ. Code, § 2807, italics added; Cross, supra, 51 Cal.App. at p.
783 [“a surety is liable without notice of the default of his
12 At oral argument, the Chaudharis argued for the first time
that notice was required under paragraph 42 of the lease. We
“need not consider an issue which the briefs do not raise or
discuss and which is asserted for the first time in oral argument.”
(Archdale, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 472.) In any case,
paragraph 42 merely describes a party’s right to make payments
under protest. Not only does paragraph 42 not require notice of a
default, the word “notice” is mentioned nowhere therein.
14
principal”].)13 The Chaudharis cite case law for the proposition
that when “no time is specified for performance,” a person “does
not violate his agreement unless and until a demand for
performance is made . . . .” (Leonard v. Rose (1967) 65 Cal.2d
589, 592; Tisdale v. Bryant (1918) 38 Cal.App. 750, 757 [same].)
That rule is inapposite—here, the time of performance was
specified in the lease as well as the assignment, which required
rent to be paid each month.
The Chaudharis also contend they were indispensable
parties to the unlawful detainer action. However, “possession is
the fundamental issue in an unlawful detainer action and an
action does not lie against a defendant who is not in possession of
the premises at the commencement of the lawsuit.” (Glendale
Fed. Bank v. Hadden (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1153; Balassy
v. Superior Court (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1148, 1152 [“possession
is the principal subject of unlawful detainer actions and the
entitlement of the plaintiff lessor to recover damages or rents
therein is wholly dependent upon the lessor prevailing on the
issue of unlawful detainer”].) The Chaudharis assigned their
13 For the first time during oral argument, the Chaudharis
cited Civil Code section 2808 and argued that they were entitled
to notice of the default because they could not have learned of it
with reasonable diligence. Even if this argument was not
forfeited (Archdale, supra, 154 Cal.App.4th at p. 472), we would
reject it. Civil Code section 2808 applies only to a “surety upon
a conditional obligation,” and the Chaudharis’ obligations under
the assignment are not conditional. And while the Chaudharis
assert that they “could not have obtained notice [of Midtown
Mart’s default] with reasonable diligence,” they fail to cite any
evidence in the record to support this claim. (Jameson, supra, 5
Cal.5th at p. 609.)
15
right of possession to Midtown Mart several years before KPMC
filed the unlawful detainer action. They were not indispensable
parties to that lawsuit. (Glendale Fed. Bank, at p. 1154.)
Relatedly, the Chaudharis argue KPMC was required, and failed,
to notify them of the unlawful detainer action. But they again
fail to cite any provision in the lease or any legal authority
supporting such an obligation. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at
p. 609; Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)
Next, the Chaudharis argue that the lease prohibits KPMC
from filing two separate lawsuits to recover unpaid rent. They
rely on paragraph 13.2 of the lease, which states: “If termination
of this Lease is obtained through the provisional remedy of
unlawful detainer, Lessor shall have the right to recover in such
proceeding any unpaid Rent and damages as are recoverable
therein, or Lessor may reserve the right to recover all or any part
thereof in a separate suit.” The Chaudharis assert that KPMC’s
choice to claim restitution for unpaid rent in the unlawful
detainer action precluded a separate lawsuit for unpaid rent.
However, on its face, this provision only applied to any action
resulting in “termination” of the lease. By the time KPMC
initiated its unlawful detainer action against Midtown Mart, the
lease had naturally expired and terminated. (Pringle v. Wilson
(1909) 156 Cal. 313, 318 [expiration of the original term of a lease
terminates the lease].) KPMC filed its unlawful detainer action
to regain possession of the property and for restitution, not for
termination. The provision therefore is inapplicable.14
14 In the trial court, the Chaudharis similarly argued that res
judicata barred KPMC from filing a second lawsuit based on the
breach of the lease. The court rejected this contention and the
16
The Chaudharis raise several additional legal arguments
for the first time on appeal. However, because these contentions
involve “pure question[s] of law that can be resolved on
undisputed facts,” we exercise our discretion to address the
merits of their arguments despite the Chaudharis’ failure to raise
them below. (Fort Bragg, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 907.)
The Chaudharis argue KPMC lacks standing in this case
because the lease was terminated before KPMC filed suit.
However, paragraph 13.2 of the lease provides that after
termination of the lease, KPMC was entitled to “the unpaid Rent
which had been earned at the time of termination . . . .” The
Chaudharis cite case law describing the standing requirement
and asserting that a decision affirming a void judgment is itself
void, but they fail to provide any reasoned argument or legal
authority supporting that a landlord lacks standing to sue under
an expired or terminated lease. (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48
Cal.App.5th at p. 1075.)
Chaudharis did not raise it in their appellate briefing. The
argument is therefore abandoned. (Case v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co., Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 397, 402 (Case)
[“[O]ur review is limited to contentions adequately raised in
[appellant’s] briefs”].) In any case, res judicata, or claim
preclusion, “does not bar subsequent suits against co-obligors,”
such as the Chaudharis, who “were not parties to the original
litigation.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813,
825.)
The Chaudharis also contended below that KPMC waived
its right to bring any claim against them based on unpaid rent by
waiting to file suit until 15 months after Midtown Mart stopped
paying rent. The trial court rejected this argument, too, and the
Chaudharis abandoned it by failing to raise it on appeal. (Case,
supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 402.)
17
Next, the Chaudharis contend they could not have
breached the lease because they assigned it to Midtown Mart.
Yet, “[w]hen a tenant assigns a leasehold . . . [t]he assignor
remains liable to the landlord absent an express release.”
(Vallely Investments v. BancAmerica Commercial Corp. (2001) 88
Cal.App.4th 816, 822.) KPMC executed no such release here, and
the assignment made clear that the Chaudharis remained
primarily obligated on the lease.
The Chaudharis’ defense of impossibility of performance is
similarly unconvincing. As the Chaudharis recognize,
“impossibility must consist in the nature of the thing to be done,
and not in the inability of the party to do it . . . .” (Sample v.
Fresno Flume & Irrigation Co. (1900) 129 Cal. 222, 228.) Even if
the Chaudharis were not able to pay rent because they were
unaware of the default, the payment of rent itself was not
impossible.
Finally, the Chaudharis argue that KPMC’s failure to
notify them of the breach, its failure to join them in the unlawful
detainer action, and the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
without allowing the Chaudharis to fully litigate their defenses
violated their due process rights. As we have discussed, these
arguments fail on their merits. Moreover, the Chaudharis fail to
provide any reasoned argument or legal authority to support any
due process claim on appeal. We therefore reject any due process
claim as forfeited. (Delta Stewardship, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1075; Hepner v. Franchise Tax Bd. (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 1475,
18
1486 [“In civil cases, constitutional questions not raised in the
trial court are considered waived”].)15
DISPOSITION
The order granting summary judgment for KPMC is
affirmed. Respondent is awarded its appellate costs.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BERSHON, J.*
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
EGERTON, J.
15 The Chaudharis argue that they may have successfully
defended against KPMC’s post-judgment motion for attorney fees
in this action if they had been permitted to further develop their
defenses to KPMC’s damages claim. Because we affirm the
judgment, we need not address this point.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
19
Was bedeutet dieser Text für Ihre Situation?
Kostenlose und unverbindliche Beratung
Schildern Sie uns Ihre Situation. Unser Team meldet sich per E-Mail bei Ihnen für Ihre Beratung.
Setzen Sie Ihre Recherche in ChatGPT oder Claude fort
Verbinden Sie Omnilex, um den Rechtskorpus über Ihren KI-Assistenten zu durchsuchen.