CourtListener 10266151•People v. Quintero CA2/7
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Filed 11/6/24 P. v. Quintero CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B315403
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA118106-
v. 02)
JOSEPH ANDREW
QUINTERO,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard B. Lennon and Olivia Meme, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Allison H. Chung, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Joseph Andrew Quintero appeals from a judgment of
conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of the first degree
murder of Ibrahim Zepeda. Quintero contends on appeal that the
trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on
self-defense and the lesser-included offense of voluntary
manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence at Trial
On the afternoon of September 23, 2012 Quintero was at
the mall with his friend David Sanchez1 and the men’s
girlfriends. Quintero and Sanchez were known members of the
KHA gang, and Quintero was an influential member. Also at the
mall that day were Zepeda and his girlfriend, Yesenia Rodriguez.
Zepeda was a member of the Northside Baldwin Park gang,
which was a rival of KHA. Zepeda was known in the community
to have a reputation for violence.
Shortly after 4:00 p.m., Zepeda and Rodriguez were
walking through the mall food court when Zepeda told Rodriguez
to “stay back” and sit down at a table. Zepeda walked toward
Quintero and Sanchez, who moved in the direction of Zepeda.
Rodriguez was unable to hear what the men were saying, but she
testified they seemed to be arguing. The conversation lasted less
than five minutes, after which Zepeda returned to Rodriguez and
told her to call her mother to come pick them up at the mall.
1 Quintero and Sanchez were tried together with separate
juries.
2
A few minutes later, as Zepeda and Rodriguez were leaving
the mall, they encountered Quintero and Sanchez again. The
men began arguing with raised voices. Although Rodriguez
testified she could not remember what the men were saying, she
previously told a police detective after the incident that Quintero
and Sanchez called Zepeda a derogatory term for members of the
Northside Baldwin Park gang. After approximately one minute,
the confrontation ended, and Zepeda and Rodriguez walked
toward the mall exit on the south side of the mall. When they got
outside they went to a bench and waited for Rodriguez’s mother
to arrive.
Quintero and Sanchez left the mall with their girlfriends
around the same time and went to their vehicle—a blue truck
parked on the north side of the mall. Surveillance footage
showed the blue truck travelling west and turning left onto the
road circling the mall. The blue truck travelled southwest and
stopped approximately 15 feet from where Zepeda and Rodriguez
were sitting. The truck backed up, turned into one of the parking
aisles, and parked.
Quintero and Sanchez got out of the truck and walked
toward Zepeda and Rodriguez. At that point Rodriguez’s mother
arrived. Zepeda told Rodriguez to get in her mother’s car, and he
took a few steps forward to meet Quintero and Sanchez. The men
began arguing, and Zepeda took a step backward, making an arm
gesture that one witness understood to be a challenge. The men
then started fighting. Rodriguez testified she thought Quintero
and Sanchez started the fight, but she was not sure. After
approximately 10 seconds of fighting, Quintero took a
screwdriver out of his pocket and stabbed Zepeda repeatedly in
his back. Zepeda was between Quintero and Sanchez, with
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Sanchez punching Zepeda from the front. Zepeda told Quintero
and Sanchez to stop, and he fell to the ground. Quintero and
Sanchez continued to stab, kick, and hit Zepeda while he was on
the ground. According to Rodriguez, Zepeda did not pull out a
weapon. Once the fight stopped, Quintero and Sanchez ran
toward their truck. Zepeda got into Rodriguez’s mother’s car,
and they drove to the hospital. Zepeda died at the hospital from
multiple stab wounds.
Several years later Quintero was interviewed by police
detectives in connection with Zepeda’s murder.2 A videotaped
recording of the interview was played for the jury. At the
beginning of the interview Quintero said he did not remember
anything about the day Zepeda was killed. He explained he had
been shot in the face a year or two before the interview, and he
had difficulty remembering anything from before his injury.
After he had been questioned for a few minutes and shown
images taken from the mall surveillance footage, Quintero said
things were “coming back” to him. He told the detectives Zepeda
had threatened him, either inside or outside the mall, saying “I’ll
kill you and your whole family.” Quintero continued, “I
remember a black glove and if you’re in—you’re around the
neighborhood, you know, if you have gloves, it’s because you have
a gun. My life was in danger. . . . I just remember just him
telling me. That’s it. ‘I’ll end you. I’ll kill your family.’ And—
and the—then, he put [on] a glove before he could really, like, do
anything, I remember getting hit.” Quintero later said, “I
2 At trial one of the detectives stated his interview with
Quintero took place in May 2018; however, the transcription of
the interview that was provided to the jury states the interview
occurred in July 2017.
4
thought he was gonna grab a gun” so Quintero “just kept
fighting.”
Quintero told the detectives he “would never hurt no one”
and “would never, deliberately, start a fight.” However, he
admitted that before his son was born in 2013, he did “a lot of
stupid shit. A lot, dude. Beating people up, jumping into cars,
knocking people out, you know. . . . [I]f [someone] had a problem
with me . . . I’ll find them.”
B. Request for Self-defense Jury Instructions
After the parties rested their cases,3 Quintero’s attorney
renewed a request that the trial court instruct the jury on self-
defense and imperfect self-defense. The attorney argued Zepeda
had initiated the encounter in the food court, Zepeda had
challenged Quintero and Sanchez outside the mall, and Quintero
believed deadly force was imminent. The court disagreed,
emphasizing that Quintero and Sanchez left the mall, drove
around to where Zepeda was sitting, and confronted him. The
court stated, “That changes the evaluation because once
[Quintero and Sanchez] become—they’re the ones that become
the aggressors. Once they are the ones that engage, we now have
either that they were the aggressors or the minimu[m] . . . ,
mutual combat.” The court asked defense counsel whether the
men “at least agreed to participate in mutual combat,” to which
Quintero’s attorney replied, “At the very least.” The court later
reiterated that counsel “conceded at a minimum there was
mutual combat” and “all parties agreed this was at a minimum
mutual combat.” On this basis the court found there was not
3 Quintero and Sanchez did not present any evidence or
witnesses.
5
substantial evidence to support the self-defense and imperfect
self-defense instructions.
C. Jury Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Quintero guilty of first degree murder (Pen.
Code, § 187, subd. (a))4 and found true the special allegations
Quintero personally used a deadly weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1))
and committed the murder for the benefit of a criminal street
gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C)).
In a bifurcated bench trial, the trial court found Quintero
had two prior convictions for robbery that qualified as serious or
violent felonies within the meaning of the three strikes law
(§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and section 667, subdivision
(a)(1).5 The trial court granted Quintero’s Romero6 motion to
strike one prior conviction for purposes of sentencing but denied
his request to strike the other prior conviction.
The court sentenced Quintero to an indeterminate term of
50 years to life, consisting of 25 years to life for murder, doubled
under the three strikes law. The court dismissed the remaining
special allegations under section 1385.
D. Denial of the Motion for New Trial
Prior to sentencing, the trial court heard argument on
Quintero’s motion for a new trial based on the court’s refusal to
4 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
5 The prosecution did not proceed on a third alleged prior
conviction for assault, and the court found that allegation not
true.
6 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
504.
6
instruct the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense. The
court denied the motion, stating it did not raise any new
arguments that had not been addressed in the jury instruction
conference. The court reiterated Quintero had engaged in mutual
combat and, construing the facts most favorably to Quintero,
“even if believed that the victim put on gloves and defendant
thought this meant he had a weapon, a reasonable jury could not
find that this equated to a sudden and deadly force by the victim
justifying killing the victim.”
DISCUSSION
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
With respect to homicide, “[s]elf-defense, when based on a
reasonable belief that killing is necessary to avert an imminent
threat of death or great bodily injury, is a complete justification,
and such a killing is not a crime.” (People v. Elmore (2014)
59 Cal.4th 121, 133-134; see § 197, subds. (1) & (2) [homicide is
justifiable “[w]hen resisting any attempt to murder any person,
or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any
person” and “[w]hen committed in defense of habitation, property,
or person, against one who manifestly intends or endeavors, by
violence or surprise, to commit a felony”]; see also CALCRIM
No. 505.) “For killing to be in self-defense, the defendant must
actually and reasonably believe in the need to defend.” (People v.
Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 (Humphrey); accord,
People v. Horn (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 672, 682; People v. Rodarte
(2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1158, 1168 [“Perfect self-defense requires
that a defendant have an honest and reasonable belief in the
need to defend himself or herself.”].)
7
A murder charge may also be mitigated by imperfect self-
defense. “If the belief [in the need to defend oneself] subjectively
exists but is objectively unreasonable, there is ‘imperfect self-
defense,’ i.e., ‘the defendant is deemed to have acted without
malice and cannot be convicted of murder,’ but can be convicted of
manslaughter.” (Humphrey, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1082; accord,
People v. Horn, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 682; see People v.
Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 182 [“Imperfect self-defense is the
killing of another human being under the actual but
unreasonable belief that the killer was in imminent danger of
death or great bodily injury.”]; CALCRIM No. 571.) Thus,
imperfect or “[u]nreasonable self-defense is ‘not a true defense;
rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of voluntary
manslaughter.’” (People v. Elmore, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 134;
accord, People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200; see In re
Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 773 [“‘An honest but
unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from
imminent peril to life or great bodily injury negates malice
aforethought, the mental element necessary for murder, so that
the chargeable offense is reduced to manslaughter.’”].)
“[S]elf-defense . . . whether perfect or imperfect, require[s]
an actual fear of imminent harm.” (People v. Butler (2009)
46 Cal.4th 847, 868; accord, People v. Rodarte, supra,
223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1168 [“‘The defendant’s fear must be of
imminent danger to life or great bodily injury.’”].) “‘Fear of future
harm—no matter how great the fear and no matter how great the
likelihood of the harm—will not suffice. . . . “‘[T]he peril must
appear to the defendant as immediate and present and not
prospective or even in the near future. An imminent peril is one
that, from appearances, must be instantly dealt with.’”’” (People
8
v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581, italics omitted.) “All the
surrounding circumstances, including prior assaults and threats,
may be considered in determining whether the accused perceived
an imminent threat of death or great bodily injury.” (People v.
Battle (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 50, 72; see Humphrey, supra,
13 Cal.4th at p. 1083 [“Although the ultimate test of
reasonableness is objective, in determining whether a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would have believed in the need to
defend, the jury must consider all of the relevant circumstances
in which defendant found herself.”].)
As a general matter, “‘[a] trial court must give a requested
[jury] instruction only if it is supported by substantial evidence,
that is, evidence sufficient to deserve jury consideration.’”
(People v. Leon (2020) 8 Cal.5th 831, 848; accord, People v.
Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1049 [“‘[J]ust as with perfect self-
defense or any defense, “[a] trial court need give a requested
instruction concerning a defense only if there is substantial
evidence to support the defense.”’”]; People v. Larsen (2012)
205 Cal.App.4th 810, 823 [“‘[A] trial judge’ . . . ‘has the authority
to refuse requested instructions on a defense theory for which
there is no supporting evidence.’”].) “‘“[B]efore a jury can be
instructed that it may draw a particular inference, evidence must
appear in the record which, if believed by the jury, will support
the suggested inference.”’” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th
846, 920-921; accord, Larsen, at p. 823 [“Substantial evidence in
this context ‘“is ‘evidence sufficient ‘‘to deserve consideration by
the jury,’’ not ‘‘whenever any evidence is presented, no matter
how weak.’”’”].) An instruction is not required where only
“[s]peculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence” supports the
instruction. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132, 134.) In
9
deciding whether to give a defense instruction, the court must
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
When a defendant’s request for a jury instruction has been
refused, we review the record de novo to determine whether there
was substantial evidence that required giving the instruction.
(People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Refusing Quintero’s Request
for Self-defense Jury Instructions
On appeal, Quintero argues the trial court erred in refusing
to instruct the jury on self-defense and imperfect self-defense
because there was evidence from which the jury could have found
Quintero “had an actual belief that Zepeda posed imminent harm
to his life.” However, as the trial court explained and Quintero’s
attorney conceded at trial,7 at the very least Quintero was
engaged in mutual combat (or was the initial aggressor), which
prevented him from asserting his actions were justified by self-
defense.
A person who is the initial aggressor in a fight or who
engages in mutual combat may not rely on the doctrine of self-
7 Although Quintero’s counsel conceded at trial that
Quintero engaged in mutual combat, Quintero has not forfeited
his challenge based on instructional error because any error
potentially affects his substantive rights. (§ 1259 [“The appellate
court may also review any instruction given, refused or modified,
even though no objection was made thereto in the lower court, if
the substantial rights of the defendant were affected thereby”];
People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 856, fn. 8 [“when
an instruction allegedly affects the substantial rights of the
defendant, it is reviewable even in the absence of an objection”].)
10
defense unless he or she “actually and in good faith tried to stop
fighting” and “indicated, by word or conduct, to [his] opponent, in
a way that a reasonable person would understand, that [he]
wanted to stop fighting and that [he] had stopped fighting.”
(CALCRIM No. 3471; accord, § 197, subd. (3) [homicide is
justifiable when committed in self-defense, but if the defendant
“was the assailant or engaged in mutual combat, [he or she] must
really and in good faith have endeavored to decline any further
struggle before the homicide was committed”]; People v. Holt
(1944) 25 Cal.2d 59, 66 [“[W]hen a defendant seeks or induces the
quarrel which leads to the necessity for killing his adversary, the
right to stand his ground is not immediately available to him,
but, instead, he must first decline to carry on the affray and must
honestly endeavor to escape from it. Only when he has done so
will the law justify him in thereafter standing his ground and
killing his antagonist.”].)
“‘[A]s used in this state’s law of self-defense, “mutual
combat” means not merely a reciprocal exchange of blows but one
pursuant to mutual intention, consent, or agreement preceding the
initiation of hostilities. . . . In other words, it is not merely the
combat, but the preexisting intention to engage in it, that must be
mutual.’” (People v. Nguyen (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1015, 1044; accord,
People v. Ross 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1047 [mutual combat
requires “evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that
both combatants actually consented or intended to fight before the
claimed occasion for self-defense arose”].)
In this case, there is no reasonable interpretation of the
evidence other than that Quintero and Sanchez intended to fight
with Zepeda when they approached him outside the mall.
Quintero and Sanchez did not have a chance encounter with
11
Zepeda in the parking lot; rather, they deliberately sought him
out by stopping the truck, backing it up to drive into a parking
space, then leaving the vehicle to approach Zepeda. Quintero’s
and Sanchez’s intention to fight is further evidenced by the fact
they and Zepeda were from rival gangs, Quintero and Sanchez
had two escalating encounters with Zepeda within a short period
of time, and Quintero and Sanchez had insulted Zepeda and his
gang. Further, once Zepeda gestured his arms in a challenge,
Quintero did not protest or attempt to leave; by staying, he
impliedly agreed to fight. The only reasonable inference from
this evidence is that the three men intended to fight. Having
engaged in mutual combat, and absent any evidence Quintero
attempted to withdraw (and there was none), there was no
substantial evidence to support a self-defense instruction.
Quintero argues this finding is contradicted by his
statement to police that he would never start a fight. Even
construing the evidence in a light most favorable to Quintero, his
statement is not inconsistent with a finding of mutual combat.
Quintero clarified that prior to the birth of his son in 2013, he
engaged in many fights (“[b]eating people up” and “knocking
people out”), and he would seek out someone who had a problem
with him or with whom he had a problem. Thus, his statement to
police that he would not start a fight does not provide substantial
evidence he did not intend to fight with Zepeda in 2012.
In certain situations, a defendant who engages in mutual
combat may regain the right to assert self-defense if the victim’s
“‘“counter assault is so sudden and perilous that no opportunity
be given to decline further to fight and [the defendant] cannot
retreat with safety . . . .”’” (People v. Salazar (2016) 63 Cal.4th
214, 249; accord, People v. Quach (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 294,
12
301-302; see CALCRIM No. 3471 [“However, if the defendant
used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with
such sudden and deadly force that the defendant could not
withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had the right to
defend [himself] with deadly force and was not required to try to
stop fighting[,/ or] communicate the desire to stop to the
opponent[, or give the opponent a chance to stop fighting].”].)
Quintero contends that seeing Zepeda put on a black glove,
which suggested he had a gun, made Quintero fear for his life.
However, Quintero has not argued, nor could he, that the
appearance of the glove alone was a sudden and deadly show of
force. It is undisputed that Zepeda never drew or showed a
weapon, and there is no evidence Quintero could not safely
retreat. Nor was Quintero’s statement to the detectives that at
some point—inside or outside the mall—Zepeda said he would
kill Quintero’s family a sudden and deadly show of force during
the fight. At most it can be inferred that Quintero had a
subjective fear of sudden and deadly force, but that is insufficient
to support Quintero’s assertion of a right to self-defense once he
had engaged in mutual combat.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
FEUER, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J. STONE, J.
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