People v. Cao CA4/3

CourtListener 10145721Calctapp21.10.2024

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Filed 10/21/24 P. v. Cao CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G062432

v. (Super. Ct. No. 93CF2314)

PHAT NGUYEN CAO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Andre Manssourian, Judge. Affirmed.
Heather Beugen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric A.
Swenson, and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Phat Nguyen Cao appeals from the trial court’s denial
of his petition for resentencing under former Penal Code section 1170.951
following a hearing on the merits of his petition. The trial court concluded
Cao was ineligible for resentencing because he had committed murder under
the provocative act doctrine. Cao contends there was insufficient evidence to
conclude that he committed provocative act murder, but we conclude
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding. Accordingly, we affirm the
order denying the petition.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
CHARGES AND GUILTY PLEA
In 1994, Cao, along with Tam Van Nguyen, was charged with the
murder of the victim (§ 187, subd. (a); count one) and street terrorism (§
186.22, subd. (a); count two). It was further alleged that both defendants
were vicariously armed with a firearm and knew that another principal was
personally armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and that the murder was committed
for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)).
Cao pleaded guilty. The factual basis for his plea was set forth on
the Tahl form as follows: “On 8-6-93 in Orange County I willfully and
unlawfully entered a gunfight after lying in wait for my opponent, Doi Phung,
knowing my actions would cause Doi Phung to use lethal force in response to
my actions, causing Doi Phung to shoot and kill a person while attempting to
shoot me. I did this crime for the benefit of Nip Family, a criminal street

1 Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered as
section 1172.6, without substantive change in the text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58,
§ 10.) For the sake of simplicity, we refer to the current statute, section
1172.6. Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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gang.” Pursuant to his plea agreement, Cao pleaded guilty to counts one and
two and admitted both enhancements. The court granted the prosecution’s
motion to reduce count one to second degree murder, stayed sentence on the
street terrorism counts pursuant to section 654, and struck the
enhancements. The court sentenced Cao to 15 years to life.
II
STATEMENTS TO PAROLE BOARD
Cao testified under oath before the board of parole hearings (the
Board) twice, in 2002 and 2017.2 A statement of facts originally prepared for
the probation report was read into the record without objection at the 2002
hearing. According to that statement of facts, on the day before the incident,
Phung and three other members of the Nip gang went to the residence of
Cao’s codefendant, Nguyen, regarding an intergang feud between Phung and
Nguyen, both of whom were members of the gang. Nguyen was called out of
his home, had a gun pointed to his head, and was assaulted by Phung and his
associates.
As a result of this incident, members of the Nip gang
accompanied Nguyen to a meeting with Phung set to be held at a church in
Garden Grove on the evening of August 6, 1993. Cao, armed with a
9 millimeter semiautomatic pistol, went with Nguyen. At least six other
people arrived at the church, several of whom were armed. According to the
report, the intent of the individuals associated with Nguyen was to confront

2 Cao challenged the admissibility of the transcripts at the
hearing, which the court overruled. Although he does not pursue this issue on
appeal, the transcripts were admissible. (People v. Mitchell (2022) 81
Cal.App.5th 575, 586.)

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Phung in the church, disarm him, and physically assault him in retaliation
for the incident at Nguyen’s home.
Phung had brought several people to the church as his own
support. A confrontation occurred, and shots were fired by Cao, Phung, and
possibly others. A stray round hit the victim who was sitting in his car in a
nearby parking lot. The victim was an innocent bystander.3
Cao admitted this statement of facts was essentially correct. He
told the Board that he committed the crime, fired shots that night, and was
responsible for the victim’s death.
At the church, Cao’s intent, and that of his companions, was to
beat Phung up. He had expected shots to be fired at the meeting. He said that
Phung shot at Cao and his companions first and he returned fire.
In 2017, Cao again admitted to his participation in the shooting.
Cao stated he had learned that Phung had pulled a gun on a fellow gang
member and beat him up, violating “the gang code.” Cao called other gang
members to tell them about Phung’s actions. He arranged a meeting with
Phung for the purpose of beating Phung up and jumping him out of the gang,
because it was “gang law.”
Cao admitted that the plan was to “pretend we talk to him and
then we’re going to disarm him and we’re going to beat the shit out
of him and jump him out of the gang.” Three or four cars of people went to
attack Phung. Cao was armed. Prior to the meeting at the church, Cao and
other participants met at a nearby liquor store parking lot. Cao said they met
at the parking lot so they could talk first, so there would not be confusion.

3 Although the record is not crystal clear on this point, it seems
that the bullet that struck the victim was from Phung’s gun.

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Cao was aware Phung was armed. When they arrived at the
meeting, according to Cao, Phung shot first and Cao returned fire. Cao shot
around five rounds. He described the situation “like a battle.”
III.
PETITION AND 2022 APPELLATE OPINION
In December 2020, Cao filed a petition under section 1172.6
seeking to vacate his second degree murder conviction and to be resentenced.
The prosecution opposed, arguing Cao had pleaded guilty to a provocative act
murder. The court denied the petition at the prima facie stage. (People v. Cao
(Sept. 28, 2022, G060154) [nonpub. opn.].)
In an unpublished opinion, this court reversed. (People v. Cao,
supra, G060154.) Because we found that whether Cao committed a
provocative act murder was a question of fact, we remanded with directions
to issue an order to show cause and to hold an evidentiary hearing.

IV.
REMAND
The trial court held the evidentiary hearing on the petition in
February 2023. The court admitted the transcripts from Cao’s two parole
hearings, the Tahl form, and the information. The parties argued the petition
at some length.
After taking the matter under submission, the court found
beyond a reasonable doubt that Cao’s conduct that resulted in the victim’s
death qualified as a provocative act murder. Accordingly, the court denied
Cao’s petition. He now appeals.

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DISCUSSION
I.
BASIC PRINCIPLES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
At the evidentiary hearing on a section 1172.6 petition, the
prosecution has the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant is not entitled to relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) On appeal, we
review the court’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Keel
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 556.) Under that standard, “‘we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt’” under current law. (People v.
Morales (2020) 10 Cal.5th 76, 88.) We presume the existence of every fact the
court as factfinder could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of
the court’s order. (See People v. Beck and Cruz (2019) 8 Cal.5th 548, 626.)
II.
PROVOCATIVE ACT MURDER
A provocative act murder occurs when a defendant commits a
provocative act that causes the death of an accomplice or a third party.
(People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 867.) “The provocative act murder
doctrine has traditionally been invoked in cases in which the perpetrator of
the underlying crime instigates a gun battle . . . and the police, or a victim of
the underlying crime, responds . . . by shooting back and killing the
perpetrator’s accomplice or an innocent bystander.” (Id. at pp. 867–868.)
“A provocative act is one that goes beyond what is necessary to
accomplish an underlying crime and is dangerous to human life because it is
highly probable to provoke a deadly response.” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54

6
Cal.4th 643, 655, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in People
v. Lopez (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 566, 574.) “By necessity, the provocative act
must occur before a victim may make a lethal response. [Citation.] There may
be more than one act constituting the proximate cause of the killing.
[Citation.] If the defendant commits several acts but only one of them
actually provoked a lethal response, only that act may constitute the
provocative act on which culpability for provocative act murder can be based.”
(People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 584.)
Because provocative act murder requires a finding of malice, it is
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law. (People v. Lee
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 254, 265.)
III.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
Cao argues that the evidence demonstrated that “he was not the
instigator of [the] gun fight. [Citation.] It was Phung, not [Cao], who
instigated a gun fight when Phung shot at [Cao]’s car as it drove towards the
prearranged meeting place of the church parking lot. [Citation.] [Cao] had not
displayed a weapon towards Phung, nor had he even parked, let alone gotten
out of the car and walked towards Phung.” He claims it was Phung, not him,
who committed the provocative act by shooting at Cao’s car before anyone
had the opportunity to get out of their car.
Cao contends that the context of his acts should be considered,
and we agree. And the context of these events are far more than what
happened when Cao arrived at the church parking lot. It was Cao who took it
upon himself to notify other gang members of what had transpired between
Nguyen and Phung. He arranged the meeting with Phung, with the specific
intent of beating Phung up and jumping him out of the gang for Phung’s

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violation of “gang code.” Cao planned to “pretend we talk to” Phung, disarm
him, and beat him up. Three or four cars full of people went to execute this
plan, and a reasonable inference from the evidence is that Cao was one of the
primary organizers of the plan. Cao was armed, he knew that Phung was
armed, and he expected shots to be fired at the meeting.
Prior to going to the church, Cao and his companions met first at
the nearby liquor store parking lot in order to talk first and avoid confusion.
Cao admitted in his plea that his actions in the liquor store parking lot
constituted “lying in wait.”
Cao brought three vehicles full of fellow gang members to what
was purportedly a “meeting.” Phung had reason to believe that this was not
going to be a peaceful encounter. Phung might have fired preemptively, but
he had ample reason to believe that Cao and his companions were about to
shoot at him. Taken together, Cao’s actions that night went far beyond what
was necessary to commit an assault. His choices provoked the gun battle that
resulted in the victim’s death. Accordingly, there was substantial evidence in
support of the court’s conclusion that Cao committed provocative act murder.
Further, although we need not discuss it here, we agree with the
Attorney General that the court could also have found Cao guilty under a
theory of implied malice murder.

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DISPOSITION
The order denying Cao’s petition is affirmed.

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

GOETHALS, J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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