In re C.B. CA4/2

CourtListener 10145248Calctapp17.10.2024

Gesamter Gesetzestext

Filed 10/17/24 In re C.B. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re C.B. et al, Persons Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E083755

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.Nos. J287910, J287911)

v. OPINION

C.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Steven A. Mapes,

Judge. Conditionally reversed with directions.

Jesse McGowan, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Tom Bunton, County Counsel and Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

1
INTRODUCTION

C.B (father) appeals from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights

(Welf. & Inst. Code,1 § 366.26) as to his children, C.B., Jr. and Josie B. (the children).

Father contends the matter must be conditionally reversed and remanded because the

court failed to ask two paternal relatives about the children’s possible Native American

ancestry. We conditionally reverse the order terminating parental rights and remand for

further proceedings.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

Father and Jamie N. had two children together — C.B, Jr. and Chloe N.. Father

later married another woman named Tamara B., and they had one child together — Josie

B.3

On January 26, 2021, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services

(CFS) filed petitions on behalf of C.B., Jr., who was nine years old at the time, and Josie

B., who was six years old. Both petitions alleged that the children came within the

provisions of section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b) (failure to

1 All further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code,
unless otherwise indicated.

2 The first portion of the procedural background is taken from the opinion in
father’s prior petition for extraordinary writ, in which he challenged the juvenile court’s
order bypassing his reunification services. (C.B. v. Superior Court (June 6, 2022,
E078770 [nonpub. opn.] (C.B.)) We incorporate the record in E078770 in this case.

3 Neither Jamie N. nor Tamara B. are parties to this appeal.

2
protect), (f) (parent caused death of another child through abuse or neglect), (g) (no

provision for support), (i) (cruelty), and (j) (abuse of sibling).

The social worker filed a detention report and stated that CFS received an

immediate response referral alleging physical abuse of the children by Tamara B. It was

reported that Chloe N. (C.B. Jr.’s sister) got dizzy, fell, and hit her head. She became

lethargic and Tamara B. attempted to feed her oatmeal, but she did not respond. Tamara

B. gave Chloe N. Narcan and called the police. When they arrived, Chloe N. was

unconscious. She was taken to the hospital where she was pronounced dead.

(C.B., supra, E078770.) A social worker obtained a detention warrant for the children

the following day, and the children were detained.

The court held a detention hearing on January 27, 2021. The court asked Tamara

B. if she had Native American ancestry, and she said she was registered with the “Yupik

[sic], Eskimo tribe.”4 Father denied having any Native American ancestry. The court

asked father where Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) was living, and father said he had no

idea.5 The court detained the children and set a jurisdiction/disposition hearing for

February 23, 2021.

CFS initiated a search for Jamie N. and efforts revealed eight addresses and 11

phone numbers. CFS sent Jamie N. notice of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing at the

numerous addresses and confirmed one of the phone numbers as her contact number.

4 The Jupik Tribe is apparently part of the Mekoryuk Tribe.
5 The court then asked Tamara B. about her other son, Julian H., whose father was
M.H. Julian H. is not a subject of this appeal.
3
Jurisdiction/Disposition

The social worker filed a jurisdiction/disposition report, requesting a 45-day

continuance. The social worker reported that father denied having any known Native

American ancestry again on February 2, 2021. However, on February 8, 2021, he said he

may have an insignificant amount of Indian heritage, but did not name a tribe. Father

also stated he was primarily raised by his mother, who had passed away. On February

10, 2021, the social worker asked the paternal grandfather if there was any Native

American ancestry on his side or the paternal grandmother’s side, and he said no.

The social worker further reported that Jamie N. was given notice of the

jurisdiction/hearing via phone call on February 5, 2021. The social worker received a

return phone call from Jamie N., and the social worker informed her that Chloe N. passed

away and C.B., Jr. was in CFS’s care. On February 12, 2021, the social worker

conducted a phone interview with Jamie N. and asked if she had any Native American

ancestry. Jamie N. claimed Indian heritage in the Chumash tribe through her father’s side

of the family. Notices were sent out with regard to C.B., Jr., indicating that a child

custody proceeding under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et.

seq.) (ICWA) had been initiated, and a jurisdiction/disposition hearing was scheduled for

February 23, 2021. The notices indicated that C.B., Jr. may be eligible for membership

in the Chumash tribe and listed information for Jamie N. and father. Notice was sent to

the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), Santa Ynez Band of Mission (Chumash) Indians, and

the Tejon Indian Tribe. On or around February 11, 2021, the Santa Ynez Band of

Chumash Indians responded and said C.B., Jr. was not an enrolled member and not

4
eligible for enrollment. The Tejon Indian Tribe also responded, stating C.B., Jr. and his

parents were not members of the tribe.

As to Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother), the social worker reported that, on January

28, 2021, she said she had Native American ancestry through the maternal side of her

family, and her mother and grandmother were enrolled members of a tribe called the

Native Village of Mekoryuk (the Mekoryuk Tribe). On February 8, 2021, CFS sent

ICWA notice to the BIA and the Mekoryuk Tribe. The Mekoryuk Tribe responded and

said Tamara B. was an enrolled member, and her children were not members, but were

eligible for enrollment. The Mekoryuk Tribe intervened and began to attend the

dependency hearings.

On April 8, 2021, the social worker filed an addendum to the

jurisdiction/disposition report and requested another 45-day continuance. The

jurisdiction/disposition hearing was continued multiple times.

On May 7, 2021, the court found that proper and adequate ICWA inquiry had been

conducted by CFS as to Josie B., ICWA notice was sent out, and there had been an

affirmative response of tribal eligibility of membership. The court ordered that ICWA

applied and no further notice was required.

The court held a contested jurisdiction/disposition hearing on March 23, 2022,

sustained the petitions, and declared C.B., Jr. and Josie B. dependents. It bypassed

reunification services for father and Jamie N. The court found that ICWA applied in

Josie B.’s case and the Mekoryuk Tribe was her tribe, but that ICWA did not apply to

C.B., Jr.. The court set a section 366.26 hearing for July 21, 2022.

5
Father filed a Notice of Intent to File a Writ Petition on March 30, 2022. This

court affirmed the denial of his reunification services. (C.B., supra, E078770.)

Section 366.26 and Permanent Plan Review (PPR)

On July 20, 2022, the social worker filed a section 366.26 report recommending

the “permanent plan of foster care with the permanent plan of adoption.”6 The report

indicated ICWA did not apply to C.B, Jr. and that on March 23, 2022, the court found he

did not come under the provisions of ICWA. As to Josie B., the report indicated that

ICWA did apply.

The court held a section 366.26 hearing on July 21, 2022. The court continued the

children as dependents of the court, finding that termination of parental rights would be

detrimental, as they were living with foster parents who were unwilling or unable to

adopt them, but were willing to provide them with a stable environment. The court

ordered the permanent plan of placement in foster care with a permanent plan of adoption

and continued the matter for a PPR on January 20, 2023.

The social worker filed a status review report on January 17, 2023 and noted that

the court ordered an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children with the state of

Alaska for placement of the children with Josie B.’s maternal grandparents. However,

CFS had concerns regarding the protective capacity of the maternal grandparents. The

social worker noted that the children wanted to be placed with the paternal grandfather

6 The social worker actually filed separate section 366.26 reports with regard to
C.B., Jr. and Josie B. However, for the sake of simplicity, we will just refer to the social
worker’s section 366.26 report, understanding that it incorporates both reports.
6
and his wife, with a plan of adoption. As to C.B., Jr., the social worker opined that a

section 366.26 hearing was not in C.B., Jr.’s interest since he was not a proper subject for

adoption at that time and a potential legal guardian had not been identified.

The court held a PPR hearing on January 20, 2023 and ordered no visitation

between the children and their parents. It continued the matter to April 14, 2023 for a

further PPR hearing.

The court held a PPR hearing on April 14, 2023 and allowed the paternal

grandfather and his wife overnight visits with the children three times a week. The court

continued the matter to June 9, 2023.

On June 9, 2023, the court held a hearing on the issue of placement. The court

heard testimony from several witnesses, including father’s brother, Chris O. (the paternal

uncle), and father’s aunt, Sharon L. (the paternal great aunt), who were there to testify

about the paternal grandfather’s propensity for violence. The paternal great aunt was the

paternal grandmother’s sister. After hearing testimony, the court ordered an extended

visit with the paternal grandfather and his wife, and ordered the parties back on July 21,

2023.

On July 21, 2023, the court ordered the children placed with the paternal

grandfather and his wife, and set a section 366.26 hearing to determine the most

appropriate permanent plan.

The court held a hearing on January 25, 2024, and Jamie N. made her first

appearance in court. The court asked her if she had any Native American ancestry, and

she said had Chumash ancestry and was in the process of enrolling with the tribe. Jamie

7
N. completed an ICWA Inquiry form (CFS 030) and an ICWA-020 form indicating that

her father was a member of the “Chumash Santa Ynez Band.” The court ordered the

matter continued to April 4, 2024.

The social worker filed a report on April 2, 2024, recommending that the court

terminate parental rights and set adoption as the permanent plan. She reported that, on

March 4, 2024, CFS sent informal ICWA notice via email to the BIA and the “Santa

Ynez Band of Cumash [sic] Mission Indians of the Santa Ynez Reservation.”

Furthermore, the social worker contacted Jamie N.’s father, who said he was a registered

member of the “Santa Ynez C[h]umash tribe.” However, on March 27, 2024, the social

worker received notice from the Santa Ynez Chumash tribe stating, “This family is not

from the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians.”

The court held a section 366.26 hearing on April 4, 2024. County counsel

informed the court that CFS attempted to contact the BIA and Chumash tribe regarding

C.B., Jr., and there was no reason to believe or know he was a member or eligible for

membership. County counsel requested the court to find that ICWA did not apply to

C.B., Jr. The court asked if anyone objected to that finding, and no one objected. Thus,

the court found that ICWA did not apply to C.B., Jr. As to Josie B., all parties stipulated

to a qualified ICWA witness expert’s report, which stated that Josie B. was a member of

the Mekoryuk tribe, and that removal from father and Tamara B. was necessary to protect

her. The ICWA expert further reported that Josie B. “is placed in a Mekoryuk Native

Village tribal ICWA preferred and compliant out of home placement” with C.B., Jr., and

that the current caregivers indicated they were willing to support Josie B.’s connection to

8
the Mekoryuk Tribe. County counsel argued that the court should terminate parental

rights and free the children for adoption. Father testified about the bond he had with the

children and objected to the termination of parental rights, arguing that the beneficial

parental exception applied. Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother) objected to the termination of

parental rights and the plan of adoption. Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) submitted on

CFS’s recommendation of termination of parental rights and adoption. Counsel for the

children also submitted on CFS’s recommendation.

The court found the children generally and specifically adoptable. It then found

that the benefits of adoption outweighed the parent-child relationship, and it terminated

parental rights.

DISCUSSION

The Matter Should Be Remanded for Further Inquiry

Father’s sole argument on appeal is the juvenile court failed to ensure compliance

with California law enacted to implement ICWA. Specifically, he cites California Rules

of Court, rule 5.481, subdivision (a)(2)(A) (hereinafter, rule 5.481), and contends that

during the placement hearing on June 9, 2023, the paternal uncle (Christopher O.) and the

paternal great aunt (Sharon L.) testified, yet were not asked about possible Indian

ancestry. Father avers that, under rule 5.481, the court owed a duty to ask “each

participant” whether they knew or had reason to know the children were Indian children.

He concludes that since CFS and/or the court failed to inquire of the paternal uncle and

paternal great aunt, the court’s implied finding of an adequate inquiry constituted an

abuse of discretion. We conclude the matter should be remanded for further inquiry.

9
A. Applicable Law

“ICWA establishes minimum federal standards that a state court must follow

before removing Indian children from their families. [Citation.] California law

implementing ICWA also imposes requirements to protect the rights of Indian children,

their families, and their tribes.” (In re Ricky R. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 671, 678,

disapproved on other grounds, as stated in In re Dezi C. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1112, 1152, fn.

18 (Dezi C.).) CFS and the juvenile court have an “affirmative and continuing duty to

inquire” whether a child in a dependency proceeding “is or may be an Indian child.”

(§ 224.2, subd. (a).) “The duty to develop information concerning whether a child is an

Indian child rests with the court and the Department, not the parents or members of the

parents’ families.” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 430.) Section 224.2

“creates three distinct duties regarding ICWA in dependency proceedings. First, from the

Agency’s initial contact with a minor and his family, the statute imposes a duty of inquiry

to ask all involved persons whether the child may be an Indian child. [Citation.] Second,

if that initial inquiry creates a ‘reason to believe’ the child is an Indian child, then the

Agency ‘shall make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the child, and

shall make that inquiry as soon as practicable.’ [Citation.] Third, if that further inquiry

results in a reason to know the child is an Indian child, then the formal notice

requirements of section 224.3 apply.” (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1052

(D.S.).)

The duty of initial inquiry begins with the initial contact, when CFS must ask “the

party reporting child abuse or neglect whether the party has any information that the child

10
may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a).) Once a child is taken into temporary

custody, CFS must ask the child, the parents, legal guardian, extended family members,

and others who have an interest in the child whether the child is or may be an Indian

child. (§ 224.2, subd. (b).) Extended family members include adults who are the child’s

stepparents, grandparents, aunts, uncles, brothers, and sisters. (25 U.S.C. § 1903(2);

§ 224.1, subd. (c).)

“At the commencement of a child custody proceeding, the court is obligated

to inquire from each participant whether there is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is or

may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; 25 U.S.C. §

1912(a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2024); § 224.2, subd. (c)7.)

The juvenile court “has a responsibility to ascertain that the agency has conducted

an adequate investigation and cannot simply sign off on the notices as legally adequate

without doing so.” (In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 709.) If the court finds that

CFS has complied with its duty of inquiry and there is no reason to know that the child is

an Indian child, then the court may find that ICWA does not apply. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2);

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b)(3)(A).) “A juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does

not apply implies ‘that social workers had fulfilled their duty of inquiry.’ ” (In re

7 We note that, effective September 27, 2024, section 224.2, subdivision (c) was
amended and provides that at the first hearing on a petition, “the court shall ask each
party to the proceeding and all other interested persons present whether the child is, or
may be, an Indian child, whether they know or have reason to know that the child is an
Indian child.”

11
Dominick D. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 560, 567.) “[W]e review the juvenile court’s ICWA

findings under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine if reasonable,

credible evidence of solid value supports the court’s order.” (In re A.M. (2020) 47

Cal.App.5th 303, 314.) However, “‘the juvenile court’s fact-specific determination that

an inquiry is adequate, proper, and duly diligent is “a quintessentially discretionary

function” [Citation] subject to a deferential standard of review.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16

Cal.5th at p. 1141; see, In re K.H. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 566, 589 [“the court has

relatively broad discretion to determine whether the agency’s inquiry was proper,

adequate, and duly diligent on the specific facts of the case”].)

B. The Court’s ICWA Finding Is Not Supported by Substantial Evidence

It is undisputed that the paternal uncle and the paternal great aunt were not asked

about the children’s potential Indian ancestry at the placement hearing. However, CFS

contends it complied with its duty of inquiry, and any error was harmless, since there was

extensive ICWA noticing to the relevant tribes, and there was tribal participation in the

proceedings. Further, it was speculative to think that inquiring of the paternal uncle and

paternal great aunt would reveal any relevant information.

We first note this case is unique in that it involves father’s two children, C.B., Jr.

and Josie B., who have different mothers. Although there are three parents involved,

father’s claim only concerns his side of the family. The record demonstrates that, at the

detention hearing on January 27, 2021, the court asked father if he had any Native

American ancestry, and he said no. He again denied having any known Native American

ancestry on February 2, 2021. However, a few days later, father said he may have an

12
insignificant amount of Indian heritage, but did not name a tribe. The social worker then

asked the paternal grandfather if there was any Native American ancestry on his side or

the paternal grandmother’s side, and he said no.

Father contends the failure of the court or CFS to ask the paternal uncle and the

paternal great aunt about possible Indian ancestry at the placement hearing was

“potentially significant” since it was “unclear whether the ICWA might also apply to

both children based on the paternal grandmother’s Indian ancestry.” He notes that the

paternal grandmother was deceased and could not be questioned, and contends that her

son, the paternal uncle, and especially her sister, the paternal great aunt, “were likely to

know” whether the paternal grandmother had Indian ancestry.

“At the commencement of a child custody proceeding, the court is obligated

to inquire from each participant whether there is a ‘reason to know’ that the child is or

may be an Indian child.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; 25 U.S.C. §

1912(a); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(a) (2024); § 224.2, subd. (c).) “An implementing federal

regulation … observes that ‘participants could … include … relatives or trial witnesses,

depending on who is involved in the case.’” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1130, fn. 3.)

Here, the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt were trial witnesses at the placement

hearing on June 9, 2023 and were not asked if he/she had reason to know the children

were Indian children. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 1129-1130; § 224.2, subd. (c).)

Notably, “[t]he operative concept [of section 224.2] is those people who are reasonably

available to help the agency with its investigation into whether the child has any potential

Indian ancestry should be asked.” (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1140.) The paternal

13
uncle and paternal great aunt were readily available when they appeared in court to

testify, and they should have been asked about the children’s potential Indian ancestry.

Thus, the inquiry was inadequate.

Although father’s claim only involves his side of the family, we acknowledge that

CFS thoroughly inquired about the children’s potential Native American ancestry on their

mothers’ sides. When Jamie N. (C.B., Jr.’s mother) claimed Indian heritage in the

Chumash tribe, CFS sent ICWA notice to the BIA, Santa Ynez Band of Mission

(Chumash) Indians, and the Tejon Indian Tribe. The Santa Ynez Band responded that

C.B., Jr. was not eligible for enrollment, and the Tejon Indian Tribe similarly responded

that he was not a member of the tribe. The record also indicates that CFS subsequently

sent informal ICWA notice via email to the Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Mission

Indians, and the Santa Ynez Chumash tribe responded that “[t]his family is not from the

Santa Ynez Band of Chumash Indians.” When Tamara B. (Josie B.’s mother) stated her

mother and grandmother were enrolled members of the Mekoryuk Tribe, CFS sent ICWA

notice to the BIA and the Mekoryuk Tribe. The Mekoryuk Tribe responded that Josie B.

was eligible for enrollment, and it intervened in the proceedings.

Ultimately, because the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt were not asked

about the children’s possible Indian ancestry, the court should not have found that ICWA

did not apply to C.B., Jr. (See In re K.T. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 732, 744.) Although the

court properly found that ICWA applied to Josie B., further inquiry of these paternal

relatives is still required. The order terminating parental rights must therefore be

conditionally reversed, and the matter remanded for the court or CFS to make the proper

14
inquiry. (§ 224.2, subds. (b) and (c).) If the inquiry reveals a reason to believe C.B., Jr.

is an Indian child and Josie B. is an Indian child through a tribe other than the Mekoryuk

Tribe, the court shall proceed in conformity with ICWA and California implementing

provisions. (Dezi C., supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1152.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is conditionally reversed. The matter is

remanded to the juvenile court with directions to comply with the inquiry provisions of

ICWA and of Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224.2 (and, if applicable, the notice

provisions as well) — specifically, to inquire of the paternal uncle and paternal great aunt

regarding the children’s Native American ancestry. If, after completing the inquiry,

neither CFS nor the court has reason to believe or know the children are Indian children,

the order terminating parental rights shall be reinstated. If CFS or the court has reason to

believe that the children are Indian children, the court shall proceed in conformity with

ICWA and California implementing provisions.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

FIELDS
J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.

RAPHAEL
J.

15

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